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PART VII.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

TURKISH WAR.

April 1913.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
1	Sir F. Elliot ..	62	Mar. 26, 1913	Ottoman Debt. Refers to Part IV, No. 419. Transmits *note verbale* from Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that sequestration of Debt revenues at Salonica has been raised	1
2	Sir H. Bax-Ironside..	50	28,	Bulgarian Sobranjé. Refers to Part VI, No. 293. Reports session of Sobranjé and discussion of dispute with Roumania, peace negotiations with Turkey, and relations of allies	1
3	Sir F. Cartwright ..	54	29,	Ottoman Debt. Refers to Part V, No. 501. Transmits Austrian reply to note on subject handed in by British Minister. Austrian Government regards Servian contentions as untenable	2
4	M. Cambon		29,	Financial Commission. Note transmitting No. 437, Part VI, giving commission power to draw up proposals for settlement of Ottoman Debt	3
5	Telegram communicated by Russian Chargé d'Affaires	..	29,	Conclusion of peace. Telegram from M. Nekloudof to M. Sazonof, proposing representations to Bulgarian Government to refrain from attacking Constantinople in exchange for indemnity and Enos-Midia frontier	4
6	Telegram communicated by Russian Embassy	..	30,	Organisation of Albania. Telegram from M. Sazonof to M. de Etter on subject ..	5
7	Paper communicated by Russian Embassy	..	31,	Religious minorities. Note from M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff, declaring that Russian Government cannot agree to any guarantees other than those in Treaty of Berlin	5
8	Note communicated by Russian Chargé d'Affaires	Very Confidential	Apr. 1,	Foreign warships at Constantinople. Note explaining despatch of Russian squadron to Constantinople	5
9	Board of Trade ..	Confidential	Mar. 31,	Commercial rights in conquered territories. Refers to Part VI, Nos. 290 and 291. Transmits draft formula for securing rights of Powers	5
10	Count de Salis ..	38 Tel.	31,	Evacuation of Scutari. Transports with Servian troops reported at San Giovanni di Medua	7
11	„ „ ..	39 Tel.	31,	Siege of Scutari. Attack resumed. No answer received to representations of Powers to Montenegrin Government ..	7
12	Sir G. Buchanan ..	128 Tel.	31,	Roumano-Bulgarian arbitration. Refers to Part VI, No. 406. Reports first meeting of Ambassadors' conference at St. Petersburgh. No decision reached (see No. 129)	7
13	„ „ ..	129 Tel.	31,	Evacuation of Scutari. At close of meeting reported in No. 12 identic telegram was drawn up stating Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' view in favour of naval demonstration	8
14	Sir G. Lowther ..	177 Tel.	31,	Fall of Adrianople. Reports profound impression produced on Turkish population. Indignation against Committee	

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
15	Sir G. Lowther ..	178 Tel.	Apr. 1, 1913	Conclusion of peace. Refers to Part VI, No. 614. Transmits reply of Porte, who accept the preliminary bases proposed ..	9
16	Sir F. Elliot ..	43 Tel.	1,	Evacuation of Scutari. Has communicated No. 621, Part VI, to Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, who replied that he would come to an understanding with allied Governments	9
17	Count de Salis ..	40 Tel.	1,	Evacuation of Scutari. Refers to No. 11. Montenegrin Government cannot transmit cypher message to commandant, but night transmit message *en clair* signed by the Turkish Government (see No. 173) ..	9
18	„ „ ..	41 Tel.	1,	Evacuation of Scutari. Refers to No. 11. Transmits reply to representations made in accordance with No. 448, Part VI. Montenegrin Government refuse to discontinue hostilities round Scutari ..	10
19	Sir R. Rodd ..	64 Tel.	1,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. French abstention. Informs of interview with Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who considers it of great importance to prevent isolated action by Austria	10
20	„ „ ..	65 Tel.	1,	Montenegro. Informs that Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs supports proposal for joint naval demonstration, in which Russia would not take part, and for pecuniary compensation. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees to this	10
21	Sir F. Bertie ..	39 Tel.	1,	Montenegro. Reports that, according to a communication just issued, French Government have decided not to join in naval demonstration	11
22	„ „ ..	40 Tel.	1,	Montenegro. Refers to No. 26. Reports interview with French Minister for Foreign Affairs, who will not do anything without the concurrence of the Russian Government (see Nos. 46, 52, 54, and 56)	11
23	Sir H. Bax-Ironside ..	119 Tel.	1,	Chatalja. Reports repulse of two attacks against the Bulgarians	11
24	Sir R. Paget ..	76 Tel.	1,	Evacuation of Scutari. Refers to Part VI, No. 622. Prime Minister states that Servia cannot desert her ally, but he would urge Montenegro to yield to the will of the Powers	12
25	To Sir G. Buchanan..	290 Tel.	1,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Refers to No. 13. Informs him of position of affairs. Sir E. Grey favours pecuniary compensation for Montenegro, but it is for Russia and Italy to act (see No. 65) ..	12
26	To Sir F. Bertie ..	144 Tel.	1,	Evacuation of Scutari. Failing a naval demonstration Sir E. Grey sees no alternative except a mandate to Italy and Austria. Sir F. Bertie should inform French Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sir E. Grey's views (see Nos. 22 and 84)	13
27	„ „ ..	145 Tel.	1,	War indemnity. Sir E. Grey learns that Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks an indemnity necessary. Sir E. Grey considers an increase of Turkish customs necessary after the war, but he could not agree to it if proceeds were to go to pay an indemnity instead of to re-establish order (see No. 54)	13

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
28	To Sir F. Bertie ..	146 Tel.	Apr. 1, 1913	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Austrian ships are already starting. Sir E. Grey wishes to learn immediately whether French ships are going. If British and French ships are not sent a mandate must be given to Austria and Italy	13
29	To Sir E. Goschen .. „ Sir R. Rodd ..	148 Tel. 127	1,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Austrian ships are already starting. Sir E. Goschen should enquire whether German ships are going. English ships will proceed immediately on learning that other Powers will co-operate (see Nos. 41 and 49) ..	14
30	To Sir F. Cartwright	76	1,	Evacuation of Scutari. Informs of conversation with Austrian Ambassador, who hears that Scutari is in great danger. Sir E. Grey shares his view that international action should not be abandoned ..	14
31	„ „ ..	77	1,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Austrian Ambassador has informed him that Austrian ships are proceeding to Antivari, and hoped that British ships would be at once ordered there. Sir E. Grey promised to give orders to this effect if other Powers did likewise, or even if only France and Italy did so	14
32	To Sir F. Bertie ..	231	1,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Records conversation with M. Cambon, in which Sir E. Grey urged the importance of French participation in demonstration, and pointed out that alternative to demonstration was a mandate to Austria and Italy.. ..	15
33	„ „ ..	232	1,	War indemnity. Records conversation with M. Cambon. Latter agreed that there was no guarantee that Bulgaria would cease hostilities if granted an indemnity. The question of measures to be taken in event of the capture of Constantinople by the Bulgarians discussed	15
34	To Sir G. Buchanan..	151	1,	Conclusion of peace. Transmits memorandum communicated by Russian Ambassador suggesting action at Sophia by the Triple *Entente*. Sir A. Nicolson informed him that he thought independent action undesirable, and that fresh proposals might confuse situation	16
35	To Sir F. Elliot ..	32	1,	Ambassadors' Conference and question of admitting M. Skouloudis. Informs of reply to his request. M. Skouloudis could not be admitted, but was asked to furnish written reply to M. Misu's arguments ..	16
36	To Count de Salis ..	10	1,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Informs of interview with M. Popovitch, Montenegrin delegate, who was informed that resort would be had to a demonstration and, if necessary, other measures if Montenegro refused to accept decision of Powers ..	17
37	Sir G. Lowther ..	246	Mar. 28,	Castellorizo. Transmits despatch from Vice-Consul Sir A. Biliotti reporting an expedition to island by Greeks and Cretans (see Nos. 116, 464, and 542)	17
38	„ „ ..	247	28,	Pilot boat in the Gulf of Smyrna. Transmits note from Porte complaining of attempted seizure by Greek torpedo-boats of only pilot boat giving free service (see Nos. 135 and 288)..	18

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
39	Sir G. Lowther ..	248	Mar. 28, 1913	Seizure of Ottoman fiscal stamps by the Greek and Bulgarian authorities. Transmits copy of circular *note verbale* from Sublime Porte requesting that steps be taken to secure their restitution (see No. 471)	18
40	Admiralty	Confidential	Apr. 2,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Transmits copy of instructions sent to British Admiral at Corfu	19
41	Sir E. Goschen ..	58 Tel.	2,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Refers to No. 29. Reports that German cruiser "Breslau" was instructed yesterday to proceed to Antivari	19
42	Count de Salis ..	43 Tel.	2,	Movements of military attaché. Reports his arrival at San Giovanni di Medua ..	20
43	Sir R. Paget ..	77 Tel.	2,	Albania. Hears from Bulgarian colleague that Servians and Greeks are conspiring together to refuse to evacuate Albania, and that they would certainly refuse if Scutari fell. Sir R. Paget scarcely believes this information (see Nos. 146 and 291) ..	20
44	„ „ ..	78 Tel.	2,	Conclusion of peace. Is informed by Bulgarian colleague that delay is due to Servia	20
45	Sir F. Elliot ..	44 Tel.	2,	Conclusion of peace. Refers to Part VI, No. 457. Reply delayed owing to alterations in Greek proposals being required by Servia (see No. 122) ..	20
46	Sir F. Bertie ..	41 Tel.	2,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Refers to No. 22. Correctly described Minister for Foreign Affairs' views. Has informed M. Pichon of contents of No. 32. M. Pichon was much perturbed, and will reply as soon as possible. Reports information of French Government received from German, Italian, and Russian Governments (see No. 96)	20
47	Sir F. Cartwright ..	52 Tel.	2,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs has instructed Austrian Ambassador to ascertain precise attitude of England, and in particular whether England would not act except with all other Powers, or would act, if necessary, with some of them only ..	21
48	Sir G. Lowther ..	179 Tel.	2,	Financial Commission. Refers to Part VI, No. 619. Gives information asked for ..	21
49	Sir R. Rodd ..	66 Tel.	2,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Refers to No. 29. Reports that Italian squadron has been ordered to Antivari, and commanding officer instructed to concert with British and Austrian commanders	21
50	Sir H. Bax-Ironside..	120 Tel. Confidential	2,	Conclusion of peace. Outlines probable reply of allies, which may be expected soon, and which will be evasive as foreshadowed in No. 515, Part VI. His French colleague has not received instructions in sense of No. 618, Part VI..	22
51	To Sir E. Goschen .. „ Sir F. Cartwright „ Sir R. Rodd ..	149 Tel. 129 Tel. 128 Tel.	2,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Sir E. Grey considers it useless to proceed with the Ambassadors' conferences unless steps are taken to make the agreement about the Albanian frontier respected (see No. 97)	22

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
52	To Sir F. Bertie ..	147 Tel.	Apr. 2, 1913	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Refers to No. 22. His Excellency should inform French Minister for Foreign Affairs that Sir E. Grey understood that Russia desired both France and England to participate, and that he cannot be a party to further meetings of Ambassadors unless measures are taken to make the Albanian frontier agreement respected (see Nos. 46 and 54)	22
53	„ „ ..	148 Tel.	2,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Ambassadors' meeting postponed till Friday. Explains course which His Majesty's Government will follow unless agreement about Albanian frontier is to be respected. According to Russian Ambassador, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs desires participation of France and England. Russian Ambassador at Paris must have conveyed different impression	23
54	To Sir G. Buchanan..	203 Tel.	2,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. His Excellency should inform Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nos. 22 and 52 (see No. 92)	23
55	To Sir G. Lowther ..	91	2,	Mosul. Inflammatory article published to facilitate new internal loan. Refers to Part VI, No. 475. Approves vice-consul's action to secure its withdrawal.	23
56	To Sir F. Bertie .. „ Sir G. Buchanan	234 145	2,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Informs of conversation with French and Russian Ambassadors, to whom part of telegram No. 22 was communicated. Explained course which His Majesty's Government would have to pursue if no steps taken to make Albanian frontier agreement respected. M. Sazonof's attitude had been represented differently at London and Paris	24
57	To Sir E. Goschen ..	120	2,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Refers to No. 51. Sir E. Grey informed German Ambassador of great importance he attaches to the enforcement of the Albanian frontier agreement	24
58	Consul-General Wratislaw	5	Mar. 27,	Cretan 3 per cent. surtax. Refers to "Crete," Part XXXII, No. 77. Reports that proceeds of surtax deposited in Bank of Crete amount to 339,746 fr. Suggests that part of money might be devoted to payment of M. Zaimis's indemnity as well as to compensation of family of murdered Mussulman rural guard. Reminds that there still remains the advance of 4,000,000 fr. made to Prince George of Greece (see No. 413 and Part VIII, No. 412)	24
59	Consul-General Lamb	9 Commercial	27,	Salonica and impediments to commerce with the interior caused by the Servians. Refers to Part VI, No. 361. Reports a concession to local interests in matter of railway transport between Gumendja and Uskub	25
60	Russian Minister at Cettinjé to M. Sazonof	Telegraphic Very Conf.	28,	Evacuation of Scutari. Pecuniary compensation to Montenegrins. Learns that if the King could inform his Ministers and generals of any promise of financial support from Powers crisis would become less acute.	
	Minute by Sir A. Nicolson	..	Apr. 1,	Sir A. Nicolson considers Russia and Italy might well buy the raising of siege, but that Powers as such can hardly take matter up	26

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
61	Sir F. Bertie ..	168	Apr. 2, 1913	Ottoman Debt. Refers to Part VI, No. 523. French Minister for Foreign Affairs accepts amendment proposed by Sir E. Grey to fifth paragraph of French draft note protesting against Servian action. Draft note has been forwarded to Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Rome with a view to a collective representation at Belgrade ..	26
62	Memorandum communicated by Count Mensdorff	..	3,	Protection of minorities. Suggests desirability of communicating to the Servian Government the exact text of the decision of the Ambassadors, owing to the suppression of passages dealing with national protection of minorities in version chosen by the representatives of the Triple *Entente* (see No. 359)	27
63	Count de Salis ..	42 Tel.	2,	Scutari attack. Refers to No. 11. Believes that an attempt on Tarabosch has been repulsed with severe loss. Hears that twenty-two transports with Servian troops are at San Giovanni di Medua, and that four Austrian warships are cruising between Antivari and Dulcigno	27
64	Consul-General Smith	9 Tel.	2,	Constantinople. Reports that 13th artillery brigade has orders to be ready to embark for Constantinople, and that the "Kronstadt" is ready to embark troops and horses	27
65	Sir G. Buchanan ..	130 Tel.	2,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Reports conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and French Ambassador. M. Sazonof besought His Majesty's Government to send ships, and appealed to French Ambassador to represent seriousness of situation to his Government. In reply to No. 25, Minister for Foreign Affairs considered a bribe the only thing feasible (see No. 68) ..	28
66	„ „ ..	132 Tel.	3,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Transmits official communiqué to Russian press stating that Russia wishes France and England to participate	28
67	Sir R. Paget .	79 Tel. Confidential	3,	Conclusion of peace. Gives explanation made by his Bulgarian colleague of delay in returning reply of allies to the Powers, and the substance of the draft replies proposed. Bulgaria did her best to prevent delay (see No. 179)	29
68	To Sir G. Buchanan..	296 Tel.	3,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Refers to No. 65. States that Sir E. Grey only worked for the Albanian frontier agreement on understanding that it was to be respected. Explains that, on account of impression it would produce on public opinion, British ships could not co-operate with those of the Triple Alliance alone (see No. 93)	29
69	To Sir H. Bax-Ironside	88 Tel.	3,	Conclusion of peace. Informs him of French complaint that Sir H. Bax-Ironside's latest instructions differ from formula sent in No. 618, Part VI, and points out that this formula is the one to which he should adhere, without mentioning specially indemnity or debt (see Nos. 98 and 321) ..	30

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
70	To Sir F. Bertie	227	Apr. 3, 1913	Ottoman Debt. Requests his Excellency to inform French Government that His Majesty's Government accept French proposals transmitted in Part VI, No. 437	30
71	To Sir F. Bertie „ Sir G. Buchanan	235 146	3,	Bulgarian advance to Constantinople. Informs of conversation with French and Russian Ambassadors. Sir E. Grey pointed out that only a threat of force would have any effect, and stated the limits of any action His Majesty's Government could themselves take	30
72	To Sir F. Bertie	238	3,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Informs him of M. Pichon's suggestion that England and Austria might act as the mandatories of Europe. Sir E. Grey replied that His Majesty's Government, the Government least directly interested, could not undertake such a responsibility	31
73	To Sir H. Bax-Ironside	47	3,	Conclusion of peace. Informs him of conversation on 31st March with Bulgarian Minister, who said the reply of the allies would be given that day, and intimated what its substance would be. Minister stated that Bulgaria was quite able to continue hostilities	31
74	To Sir G. Buchanan	143	3,	Ottoman Debt. Informs him that Russia favours the discussion of all financial questions by the Commission at Paris and the admission of delegates from the belligerents. Sir E. Grey also favours this arrangement	31
75	To Sir G. Lowther	95	3,	Conclusion of peace. Transmits No. 605, Part VI. Ottoman Government desired views of His Majesty's Government on Russian suggestion, which they considered most extraordinary. Tewfik Pasha insisted on urgent necessity of ending hostilities. He was later informed of the collective step at Constantinople, recommending acceptance of the Enos–Midia direct line	32
76	To Sir R. Rodd	95	3,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Informs of interview with Italian Ambassador, at which latter stated in order of preference the courses of action to which Italian Government would agree. He was informed that England could not act with Austria alone as mandatory of Europe	32
77	„ „	96	3,	(A) Albanian frontier agreement. (B) Peace conditions. Informs of conversation with Italian Ambassador. Sir E. Grey thought the reunion of Ambassadors should put on record what they had done, and should state that Servia and Montenegro disputed (A), and the allies had not accepted (B), and that it was therefore useless to discuss other questions at present. Question of action by Powers to prevent Bulgarian advance to Constantinople discussed	32
78	To Sir F. Cartwright	78	3,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Informs of conversation with Austrian Ambassador, and transmits telegram received by latter from Count Berchtold. Austrian Government hope British ships will participate, and point out difficult position of Austria	33

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
79	Minute by the Earl of Onslow		Apr. 3, 1913	Albanian frontier. Mehemed Bey Konitza and M. Philippe Noggat (Albanian delegates) transmitted memorandum calling attention to the requirements of a self-supporting independent Albania, and to the fact that Greek claims are incompatible therewith	34
80	Sir R. Crawford to Sir W. Tyrrell		Mar. 19,	Ottoman finances. Discusses situation, which, though still desperate, has slightly improved. Hopes it will continue without collapse until conclusion of peace	36
81	Sir H. Bax-Ironside	51	29,	Conclusion of peace. Refers to Part VI, No. 444. Transmits copy of joint note to Bulgarian Government laying down the four bases of negotiations	37
82	Vice-Consul Young		29,	Situation on the fall of Adrianople. Transmits three reports by Major Samson addressed to Sir G. Lowther	38
83	Sir H. Bax-Ironside	52	30,	Customs in occupied territories. Refers to Part VI, No. 570. Transmits copy of collective communication, which could not be presented before 29th March, as his colleagues had not all received instructions before then	57
84	Sir F. Bertie	172 Confidential	Apr. 2,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Refers to Nos. 26 and 27. Reports conversation with French Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which Sir F. Bertie draws attention to illogical and dilatory behaviour of Russian Government. M. Pichon stated that French Government could only join in demonstration with Russia's concurrence, and could not join in giving mandate to Austria and Italy, or Austria alone	57
85	„ „	173	3,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Refers to No. 84. Summarises article in the "Temps." Dislike of the scheme is evinced, but it is suggested that, for the sake of principle, it is necessary to make that display, and this should be done with the minimum number of ships	59
86	Admiralty	Confidential	4,	Movement of ships in the Mediterranean. Transmits telegram stating that French ship "Edgar Quinet" will proceed to Antivari with the "King Edward VII"	59
87	„ „	Confidential	4,	Movements of ships in the Mediterranean. Transmits copies of three telegrams sent and received	60
88	Note communicated by Austrian Ambassador		4,	Montenegro. Measures to be taken if the demonstration fails. Gives views of Count Berchtold, who considers that united action of the naval forces would be of the greatest importance	60
89	Memorandum communicated by M. Madjarof		4,	War indemnity. Declaration by M. de La Boulinière, President of the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt. Argues that this declaration proves that Turkey can well afford to pay the indemnity without prejudicing the interests of her creditors	61

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
90	M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff	Telegraphic	Mar. 31, 1913	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Contains identic telegram sent by Ambassadors at St. Petersburgh to their Governments. Telegram states that M. Sazonof raises no objection to demonstration, and that he suggests monetary compensation for King Nicolas	62
91	Count Berchtold to the Marquis Pallavicini	Telegraphic	Apr. 4,	Montenegro. Withdrawal of civil population from Scutari. Count Berchtold accepts Montenegrin explanation of their refusal to communicate the Grand Vizier's message to the commandant, and is trying to arrange for its transmission through agency of one or several neutral Powers, *e.g.*, of Germany	63
92	Sir G. Buchanan ..	133 Tel.	3,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Refers to No. 57. Informs that object of communiqué was to indicate attitude of Russian Government. Latter trust Sir E. Grey will not refuse his help in work of Ambassadors' Conference (see No. 101) ..	63
93	" " ..	135 Tel.	4,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. He has informed Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs of No. 68. Latter replied that the incident was closed, as the French had agreed to participate	63
94	" " ..	136 Tel.	4,	Roumano-Bulgarian arbitration. Refers to No. 12. Reports discussion by Ambassadors. Submits for approval as a proposed settlement that Russia, England, and France would agree to cession of Silistria to Roumania in return for surrender of her other claims (see Nos. 132 and 181) ..	63
95	Sir G. Barclay ..	63 Tel.	4,	Bulgarian military movements. Military attaché learns that reinforcements are going to Shumla and Varna, that 2,000 men have arrived at Rustchuk, and that fort at Silistria has recently been armed with six guns (see No. 128) .. .	64
96	Sir F. Bertie ..	42 Tel.	4,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Refers to No. 46. Gives text of communique in French press announcing French participation	65
97	Sir H. Bax-Ironside ..	121 Tel. Confidential	4,	Chatalja. Refers to Part VI, No. 613. Learns that best troops of force besieging Adrianople and all available artillery are being moved to Chatalja	65
98	" " ..	122 Tel.	4,	Conclusion of peace. Has informed French Minister of instructions in No. 618, Part VI, and No. 62, and he is now ready to act. Sir H. Bax-Ironside does not expect suggested action will prevent Bulgarian attack on Chatalja (see Nos. 252 and 321)	65
99	Consul Samson ..	Telegraphic	4,	Fall of Adrianople. Reports on situation. The Bulgarians have 1,000 officers and 50,000 men prisoners. There is difficulty in feeding population and prisoners ..	65
100	To Sir G. Lowther .	166 Tel.	4,	Bulgarian advance to Constantinople. Requests his Excellency's opinion as to (1) asking consent of Turkish Government for despatch of British ships to Constantinople to protect British subjects; (2) whether naval force could protect sacred buildings (see No. 129)	66

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
101	To Sir G. Buchanan.	229 Tel.	Apr. 4, 1913	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Refers to No. 92. Points out that Russian communiqué appears to have removed French difficulties (see No. 139) ..	66
102	To Sir F. Bertie ..	229	4,	Ottoman Debt. Position of holders of Treasury bills issued on 14th February, 1912, by the National Bank of Turkey and the Bank of Salonica. Transmits correspondence. Requests his Excellency to ascertain what action French Government propose to take to defend interests of French billholders (see No. 425) ..	66
103	To Sir F. Cartwright	79	4,	Montenegro and naval demonstration. Conclusion of peace. Informs of discussion at Ambassadors' Conference of these two questions. Gives text of resolution respecting collective communication to be made at Sophia	67
104	To Sir R. Rodd ..	98	4,	Montenegro. Informs of conversation with Italian Ambassador respecting pecuniary compensation for King of Montenegro. Sir E. Grey said he did not think it opportune to suggest concessions to Montenegro to Count Berchtold, and that British money could not be voted	68
105	To Admiralty ..	..	4,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Informs of instructions to French naval officer at Corfu to proceed to Antivari, and requests that British commanding officer be instructed to proceed as soon as possible to Antivari with his French colleague	68
106	" " ..	..	4,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Transmits copy of memorandum communicated by Count Berchtold respecting the action of the international squadron, and informs that the instructions to British vice-admiral have been communicated to Powers	68
107	Sir F. Elliot ..	63	Mar. 28,	Customs in occupied territories. Refers to Part VI, No. 494. Transmits copy of collective note to Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs conveying the decision of the Powers. Encloses the relevant articles of a new law relating to administration of occupied territories (see Nos. 515, 599) ..	69
108	" " ..	13 Commercial	28,	Shipping in the Levant. Makes observations on Austrian proposals. One object of proposals is to acquire, by the aid of international pressure, right to participate in Greek coasting trade without incurring any obligation of reciprocity ..	70
109	Sir R. Paget ..	68	30,	Scutari and joint *démarche* to invite recall of Servian troops. Reports difficulties and delays caused by M. de Hartwig and the divergent action finally taken. Transmits memorandum handed to M. Pasitch, and gives latter's reply and possible explanation of its unsatisfactory nature (see No. 110)	70
110	" " ..	69	30,	Scutari. Joint *démarche* by Powers. Refers to No. 109. Transmits press communiqué issued by Servian Government, in which the discrepancy in communications made is noted	73

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
111	Sir G. Lowther ..	249	Mar. 30, 1913	Forcible conversions to Christianity by Bulgarians at Salonica. Transmits petition by inhabitants of Pektchevo (see No. 387)	73
112	" " ..	250	30,	Greco-Bulgarian relations. Their possible effect on the tobacco trade of Cavalla district. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul	75
113	" " ..	252	30,	Dardanelles. Refers to Part VI. No. 567. Transmits despatch reporting more fully on presence of Greek transports in Besika Bay, and the consequent movements of Turkish troops (see No. 330) ..	75
114	" " ..	256	31,	Conclusion of peace. Refers to Part VI, Nos. 284 and 548. Transmits text of joint note read to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, containing proposals for the preliminary basis of peace (see No. 163)	76
115	Sir F. Elliot ..	64	31,	War news. Refers to Part VI, No. 472. Transmits continuation	77
116	" " ..	65	31,	Castellorizo. Refers to No. 37. Reports conversation on subject held some time ago with M. Venizelos (see No. 475) ..	77
117	Sir R. Rodd ..	84	Apr. 1,	Albania. Reports arrival at Rome of Ismail Kemal Bey, and conversation with him, in which he stated that Albanians would prefer a Prince who was neither Orthodox, Catholic, nor Moslem	78
118	Admiralty.. ..	Confidential	5,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. British Vice-Admiral reports that French, Austrian, Italian, and German ships are anchored off Antivari	78
119	Note communicated by M. Cambon	..	5,	Balkan Financial Commission in Paris. Gives names of delegates chosen by the German, Russian, Austrian, and French Governments. British and Italian representatives have not yet been selected	79
120	Sir R. Paget ..	Telegraphic	5,	Conclusion of peace. Transmits text of reply to Powers concerning basis of negotiations. Allies accept conditions with five reservations	79
121	Sir F. Elliot ..	45 Tel.	5,	Conclusion of peace (see Part VI, No. 611). Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs would be prepared not to fortify coast of Epirus and Ægean islands (see No. 183) ..	80
122	" " ..	46 Tel.	5,	Conclusion of peace. Refers to No. 45. Reports that reply of allies was delivered by Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, and gives text (see No. 290)	80
123	Count de Salis ..	44 Tel.	5,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Reports that Montenegrin Government have learnt of arrival of warships of Powers ..	80
124	" " ..	45 Tel.	5,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Learns from British Vice-Admiral that an international squadron is off Antivari ..	80
125	Sir G. Lowther ..	183 Tel.	5,	Smyrna. Thinks it may be desirable to send a ship on account of indications of disturbance there (see Nos. 206 and 279) ..	80

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
126	Sir G. Lowther ..	184 Tel.	Apr. 5, 1913	Bulgarian advance to Constantinople. Refers to No. 100. Point 1. Considers present naval force sufficient. Point 2. Thinks it unlikely that Bulgarians would violate sacred places. In both cases chief danger would come from Jacobin element in the Committee. Suggests that it might be desirable to have ships at Smyrna ..	80
127	Sir H. Bax-Ironside..	123 Tel.	5,	Conclusion of peace. Transmits text of reply of allies to Powers. Allies accept conditions with five reservations	81
128	" " ..	124 Tel.	5,	Roumania and Bulgaria. Prime Minister denies reports in No. 95. Bulgarian policy remains as outlined in Part V, No. 312 ..	82
129	.. " ..	125 Tel.	5,	Conclusion of peace. No. 618, Part VI, acted on. Prime Minister mentioned frontier desired by Bulgarian Government, and will give official reply after consultation with allies (see Nos. 151 and 215)	82
130	Consul Samson ..	Telegraphic	5,	Adrianople. Reports complete restoration of order, and that relief is being distributed to population and prisoners by British committees	82
131	Vice-Consul Young ..	Telegraphic	5,	Situation on fall of Adrianople. Reports great suffering among Turkish prisoners, 30,000 in number. Suggests that practical evidence of British sympathy be shown ..	82
132	To Sir G. Buchanan..	300 Tel.	5,	Roumano-Bulgarian arbitration. Refers to No. 94. Instructs him to support Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and authorises acceptance of any settlement satisfactory to latter	83
133	" " ..	304 Tel.	5,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration, and subsequent coercive measures. His Excellency should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of No. 134	83
134	To Sir F. Bertie ..	150 Tel.	5,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration, and subsequent coercive measures. Transmits communication from Austrian Ambassador respecting institution of a blockade after period of twenty-four hours, and requesting the issue of necessary instructions to British commanding officer. Sir E. Grey agrees if period be three days instead of twenty-four hours, and enquires views of French Minister for Foreign Affairs, so that British and French commanders may receive identic instructions (see Nos. 133 and 180)	83
135	To Sir G. Lowther ..	167 Tel.	5,	Apprehended seizure of pilot boat at Smyrna. Refers to No. 38. Enquires nationality of boat, whether others exist, and, if so, how many, which ply for hire? (see No. 153)	83
136	To Sir F. Bertie ..	233	5,	Balkan Financial Commission in Paris. Requests him to inform French Government unofficially of appointment of Sir P. Harvey as British representative, and to obtain certain information about Commission (see Nos. 240 and 258)	84

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
137	To Admiralty ..	..	Apr. 5, 1913	Montenegro. Naval demonstration, and subsequent coercive measures. Transmits instructions sent by Austrian and French Governments to their respective commanding officers. Informs that the identic instructions to be given to British admiral are being concerted with French Government, and will be communicated later ..	84
138	M. Sazonoff to Count Benckendorff	Telegraphic	3,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Points out delicate situation of Russian Government, and expresses hope that Sir E. Grey will not refuse his assistance	84
139	Sir G. Buchanan ..	137 Tel.	5,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Bulgarian advance to Constantinople. Refers to No. 101. Reports conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs, who asked that England and France would not leave Austria to act alone. Russian fleet would go to Constantinople in event of its occupation by Bulgarians	85
140	Count de Salis ..	46 Tel.	5,	Conclusion of peace. Refers to Part VI, No. 451. Reports that Montenegrin Government have replied in same terms as the other allies (see No. 257)	85
141	" " ..	47 Tel.	5,	Montenegro. Attack on Scutari. Learns that general is awaiting sixteen transports, arrival of which would be imposed by blockade of San Giovanni. Emperor of Russia has telegraphed direct to King Nicolas, who, however, shows no sign of yielding	85
142	" " ..	48 Tel.	5,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Has communicated to representatives of Powers telegram addressed to Montenegrin Government by vice-admiral (see No. 172) ..	86
143	Sir F. Bertie ..	44 Tel.	6,	Montenegro. Austrian proposal of coercive measures. French Government accept Austrian proposal on three conditions regarding length of notice of blockade, its nature, and its extent (see No. 184)	86
144	Sir F. Elliot ..	47 Tel.	6,	Peace conditions, and the reply of the allies. Reports conversation with Prime Minister respecting Ægean islands, Southern Albanian frontier, and war indemnity .	86
145	" " ..	48 Tel. Confidential	6,	Evacuation of Scutari. Reports attitude of Greece. M. Venizelos cannot refuse help to allies, but would secretly welcome the forcible detention by British warships of Greek ships engaged in transporting Servian troops to Albanian coast (see No. 182)	87
146	" " ..	49 Tel.	6,	Albania. Refers to No. 43. He does not believe in conspiracy of Servia and Greece respecting Albania, but thinks any understanding between them would more probably be directed against Bulgaria ..	87
147	Sir R. Paget ..	81 Tel.	6,	Scutari and Albania. Transmits Servian reply to representations. Servian troops cannot be recalled before the conclusion of peace with Turkey, when they will evacuate Albania. As regards protection of Catholics, the Servian Government cannot admit outside interference	87

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
148	Sir R. Paget ..	82 Tel.	Apr. 6, 1913	Evacuation of Scutari. Learns that Bulgarian Government are trying to persuade Servian Government to agree to immediate cessation of hostilities	88
149	" " ..	83 Tel.	6,	Servian military movements. Reports that nine transports, with Servian troops and artillery, are ready to sail from Salonica ..	88
150	Sir H. Bax-Ironside..	126 Tel.	6,	Ottoman Public Debt. Enquires whether British consul at Adrianople may accept a request to undertake protection of that department there (see No. 202).. ..	88
151	" " ..	127 Tel. Confidential	6,	Conclusion of peace. Prime Minister favours cessation of hostilities, but Greek demand for islands is a difficulty. Sir H. Bax-Ironside suggests pressing Greek Government to give prompt and favourable reply to representations made in accordance with No. 618, Part VI (see No. 129)	88
152	Sir G. Barclay ..	64 Tel.	6,	Roumano-Bulgarian arbitration. Refers to Part VI, No. 522. Reports existence of impression that, of Entente Powers, Great Britain is the most and Russia the least unfavourably disposed to Roumanian claims	88
153	Sir G. Lowther ..	185 Tel.	6,	Smyrna. Refers to No. 135. From consul's report, Turkish alarm appears to have been groundless	89
154	Consul-General Lamb	21 Tel.	6,	Greek military movements. Reports arrival at Salonica of 4th division	89
155	" "	Telegraphic	6,	Servian military movements. Reports that nine transports, with Servian troops and artillery, are ready to sail from Salonica..	89
156	Consul Samson ..	Telegraphic	6,	Relief for Moslems. Requests that fund raised by Indian newspaper "Comrade" be sent to him to Ottoman Bank at Adrianople	89
157	Sir G. Buchanan ..	106	1,	Roumano-Bulgarian arbitration. Refers to No. 12. Reports at length proceedings of first Ambassadors' meeting. Transmits statement made by himself, and also protocol of meeting drawn up by M. Delcassé (see Nos. 165 and 537)	89
158	Count de Salis ..	11	1,	Evacuation of Scutari and Albania. Transmits text of collective communication made to Montenegrin Government, and of their reply	94
159	Sir G. Lowther ..	261	2,	Greco-Bulgarian relations. Cavalla. Transmits despatch from vice-consul reporting on increase in Bulgarian garrison of Cavalla (see No. 161)	95
160	Sir E. Goschen ..	126	3,	Reichstag Budget Committee. Reports statements made there on Balkan affairs ..	96
161	Sir G. Lowther ..	263	3,	Greco-Bulgarian relations in Cavalla district. Refers to No. 159. Transmits despatch from vice-consul reporting on continuance of strained relations	97

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
162	Sir G. Lowther ..	265	Apr. 3, 1913	War indemnity and the Ottoman Debt. Refers to No. 619. Transmits letter from Sir A. Block explaining discrepancy between figures in his memorandum of 16th February, 1913, and those of M. de la Boulinière of 13th November, 1912 ..	98
163	„ „ ..	268	3,	Conclusion of peace. Refers to No. 114. Transmits reply of Porte to collective communication made by Powers. Porte accept the preliminary bases of peace ..	98
164	„ „ ..	269	3,	Fighting on the Chatalja lines. Transmits report from military attaché commenting on tactical and other errors made by Turks	99
165	Sir G. Buchanan ..	197	3,	Roumano-Bulgarian arbitration. Refers to No. 157. Reports conversation with French Ambassador and M. Sazonof respecting course to be pursued at the next meeting of Ambassadors	101
166	Sir F. Cartwright ..	56	4,	Austrian foreign policy with regard to Albania. Reports attack on Count Berchtold's policy by the burgermeister, Dr. Weiskirchner, who declared present situation to be intolerable	102
167	Sir P. Harvey to Sir L. Mallet ..		5,	Ottoman Debt. Suggests that he should propose an amendment of the Ambassadors' formula, which states that the annuity to be borne by the allies shall be convertible on 4 per cent. basis. Explains injustice of this provision to allies, who could not borrow at so low a rate as 4 per cent.	103
168	Admiralty	Confidential	5,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Transmits telegram from British commanding officer reporting text of message sent to Montenegrin Government by international squadron, and stating that he proposes to institute blockade if Montenegrin reply is unsatisfactory (see No. 171)	103
169	Memorandum communicated by Count Benckendorff	Confidential	7,	Conclusion of peace. Transmits observations of Austrian Government on reply of allies, and enquires Sir E. Grey's views	104
170	Admiralty	Confidential	7,	Montenegro. Transport of troops under Greek escort. Transmits telegram from British commanding officer reporting measures adopted by conference. Enquires whether international squadron may use force to prevent a landing	104
171	„ „	Confidential	7,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Transmits telegram from British commanding officer giving substance of Montenegrin reply to message from international squadron. Montenegrin attitude will not be changed (see No. 168)	105
172	Count de Salis ..	49 Tel.	6,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Refers to No. 142. Transmits substance of reply of Montenegrin Government to message from international squadron	105

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
173	Count de Salis ..	50 Tel.	Apr. 6, 1913	Montenegro. Civil population at Scutari. Refers to No. 17. Reports that German Minister has received an *en clair* telegram from Grand Vizier for transmission to commandant, authorising latter to allow withdrawal of civilians. Montenegrin Government have been requested to forward telegram	106
174	„ „ ..	51 Tel.	6,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Learns that Government are sending to the press statement that great excitement has been caused by demonstration. Such a statement is quite unjustifiable	106
175	Sir F. Cartwright ..	53 Tel.	7,	Montenegro. Transport of Servian troops. Reports conversation with Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who considers that transports should be forcibly interrupted, and that French attitude is unsatisfactory. Italy had behaved loyally. Sir F. Cartwright thinks Count Berchtold's position is becoming very difficult ..	106
176	„ „ ..	54 Tel.	7,	Bulgaria and Roumania. Reports conversation with Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who thought Silistria would go to Roumania, but considered Bulgaria ought to be compensated. Austria would raise the question at St. Petersburgh conference	107
177	Sir E. Goschen ..	60 Tel.	7,	Speech on foreign affairs by Chancellor. Reports eulogistic references to Sir E. Grey, and reference to Mr. Churchill's speech suggesting a naval holiday. Chancellor reciprocated friendly language of Mr. Asquith and Mr. Churchill, but awaited concrete proposals	107
178	Sir H. Bax-Ironside ..	128 Tel.	7,	Conclusion of peace. Reports that leading Government organ considers last *démarche* an important step towards peace. Allies only await exact definition of frontier line, and would be satisfied by reference of indemnity question to commission ..	107
179	Sir R. Paget ..	84 Tel.	7,	Conclusion of peace. Refers to No. 67. Learns from Bulgarian colleague that Servian draft reply was modified at last moment in favour of peace by Bulgarian influence, acting through Greece ..	108
180	Sir G. Buchanan ..	136 Tel.	7,	Montenegro. Blockade. Refers to No. 134. Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees that three days' notice of blockade must be given (see No. 203)	108
181	„ „ ..	139 Tel.	7,	Roumano-Bulgarian arbitration. Refers to No. 94. Reports that Ambassadors of Triple Alliance yielded in matter of two triangles, but held out for 10 kilom. of coast. Final decision will probably be taken 9th April (see No. 221)	108
182	To Sir F. Elliot ..	53 Tel.	7,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Refers to No. 145. Sir E. Grey does not see what more M. Venizelos wants than is contained in No. 621, Part VI. He assumes that any transports will be stopped by international squadron (see No. 194)	108

9

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
183	To Sir F. Elliot ..	54 Tel.	Apr. 7, 1913	Conclusion of peace. Refers to No. 121. Instructs him to address any suggestions to Sir E. Grey only. Informs him that whole coast of Epirus is more than even France has claimed for Greece (see No. 194)	108
184	To Sir F. Bertie ..	151 Tel.	7,	Montenegro. Blockade. Refers to No. 143. Proposes, in view of notification made to Montenegrin Government on 5th April, immediate commencement of blockade. Transports should be warned that they will be stopped	109
185	To M. Cambon ..	..	7,	Ottoman Debt. Replies to No. 159, Part VI, and defends British amendment proposed for insertion in treaty, to which French Government had raised objections (see No. 456)	109
186	Sir G. Buchanan ..	111	5,	Slav demonstration before the Servian Legation. Reports lively debate on subject in Duma, where the rough dispersal of demonstrators by police was severely criticised	110
187	„ „ ..	114	5,	Russian Balkan policy and the Duma. Reports explanations made by M. Sazonof to a meeting of delegates representing various groups of the Duma	110
188	M. Cambon ..	..	5,	Status of Jews in occupied Macedonian territories. The Italian Government have enquired views of French Government as to desirability of asking for guarantees for Jews. French Government enquire Sir E. Grey's views	111
189	M. Madjarof ..	..	7,	War indemnity. Transmits circular telegram from Bulgarian Prime Minister, arguing that the guarantees demanded for payment of indemnity would not injure interests of present creditors	111
190	Admiralty.. ..	Confidential	7,	Montenegro. Transport of troops. Transmits telegram from British commanding officer reporting presence of Greek warships with transports at Corfu, and absence of any sign of activity	112
191	„ „ „	Confidential	7,	Montenegro. Transport of troops and blockade. Transmits two telegrams to British commanding officer	113
192	„ „ „	Confidential	8,	Montenegro. Blockade. Transmits telegrams to British commanding officer containing instructions, and informing him of extent of blockade and of measures to be taken to stop transports	113
193	Paper communicated by Count Mensdorff	..	8,	Southern Albanian frontier. Gives list of villages in the Pindus region, which is the centre of the Vlach country, and makes observations respecting the frontier line ..	114
194	Sir F. Elliot ..	50 Tel.	8,	Montenegro. Transport of Servian troops in Greek ships. Albanian frontier. Refers to Nos. 182 and 183, and Part VI, No. 621. Has communicated to Prime Minister No. 182. Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and whole of the press state that Greece could only yield to force on frontier question (see Nos. 225 and 233)	115

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
195	Sir H. Bax-Ironside..	129 Tel.	Apr. 8, 1913	Distress of Moslems at Adrianople. Reports postponement of departure of consul at Adrianople on account of urgent necessity for relief work	116
196	Sir R. Paget .	85 Tel.	8,	Turco-Servian relations. Press telegram reports renewed fighting between Servian troops and Djavid Pasha, and that latter was completely defeated	116
197	„ „ .	86 Tel.	8,	Evacuation of Scutari. Reports that transports with Servian troops have been ordered not to proceed. Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs states that Government dare not, on account of public opinion, suggest to Montenegrin Commander-in-chief that troops are insufficient to deliver an assault	116
198	Sir G. Barclay ..	65 Tel.	8,	Roumano-Bulgarian arbitration. Informs of Minister for Foreign Affairs' concern at press telegram from St. Petersburgh stating that result of arbitration would not be announced until resumption of peace negotiations	117
199	Sir E. Goschen ..	61 Tel. Confidential	8,	Evacuation of Scutari. Informs of his French colleague's suggested solution of difficulty, viz., that Turkey should cede town to Powers, who would hand it over on conclusion of war to Albania ..	117
200	Sir G. Lowther ..	187	8,	Ottoman Debt. Despatch of silkworms' eggs by post. Powers are requested to obtain withdrawal of present prohibition imposed by Bulgarian Government (see Nos. 232, 272, 329, and 421, and Part VIII, No. 193)	117
201	To Sir H. Bax-Ironside „ Sir R. Paget .. „ Sir F. Elliot .. „ Count de Salis .. „ Sir G. Lowther ..	90 Tel. 74 Tel. 55 Tel. 36 Tel. 171 Tel.	8,	Conclusion of peace. Transmits suggested reply to the note of the allies, and authorises him to join in communicating it collectively with his colleagues (see Nos. 207, 252, 300, 307, and 393) ..	117
202	To Sir G. Lowther ..	169 Tel.	8,	Ottoman Debt. Refers to No. 150. Instructs him to explain to Sir A. Block that Great Britain cannot act alone, and that, in view of action already taken, further steps should be unnecessary..	118
203	To Sir G. Buchanan..	307 Tel.	8,	Montenegro. Blockade. Refers to No. 180. Considers that, as Montenegrin Government were notified on 5th April, blockade should commence at once. Has agreed to French proposal to blockade from Antivari to River Drin (see No. 220) ..	118
204	To Sir R. Rodd ..	101	8,	Montenegro. Pecuniary compensation. Informs him that Italian Government are trying to induce Austria to compensate King of Montenegro, who intimated he would then defer to Powers' decision ..	118
205	„ „ ..	102	8,	Evacuation of Scutari. Italian Ambassador states that his Government were surprised at suggestion by German Government that Russia would object to Montenegro having to evacuate Scutari, once conquered. Sir E. Grey replied that he had no reason to suppose Russia would act in this way, and he hoped Austria would take no precipitate action	118

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
206	To Sir G. Buchanan..	149	Apr. 8, 1913	Advance to Constantinople of Bulgarian troops. Transmits memorandum communicated by Count Benckendorff proposing further communication to Porte about financial formula in treaty. Records conversation between latter and Sir A. Nicolson, who pointed out necessity for Russia forcibly to prevent entry of Bulgarian troops into Constantinople, and to give notice of her intention to do so ..	119
207	To Sir F. Cartwright	80	8,	Montenegro and Albania. Records discussion at Ambassadors' meeting, at which resolution in No. 204 was finally drawn up. Southern Albanian frontier, stopping of transports bound for Scutari, and extent of blockade were subjects of discussion ..	120
	„ Sir F. Bertie ..	243			
	„ Sir E. Goschen ..	121			
	„ Sir R. Rodd ..	103			
	„ Sir G. Buchanan ..	153			
208	To Admiralty ..	..	8,	Disturbance at Smyrna. Transmits No. 125. Suggests despatch of the "Yarmouth" from Salonica	120
209	To Board of Trade ..	..	8,	Shipping and commerce of European Powers in territorial waters of Balkan States. Refers to Part V, No. 491. Sir E. Grey prefers to maintain non-committal attitude with regard to Austrian proposals, and forwards draft note to Austrian Government for concurrence of Board of Trade (see No. 211.	121
210	To Treasury ..	..	8,	Financial Commission at Paris. Informs of appointment of Sir P. Harvey as His Majesty's Government's representative, and makes suggestions as to his subsistence allowance (see No. 295)	121
211	Sir G. Lowther ..	270	3,	Conclusion of peace. Reports press criticisms of Turkish reply to collective note of Powers. Tone of press is on the whole favourable	121
212	„ „ ..	274	5,	Military movements and unrest in Albania. Transmits report from His Majesty's vice-consul at Monastir (see Part VIII, No. 111)	122
213	„ „ ..	275	5,	Serbo-Bulgarian relations. Transmits report from His Majesty's vice-consul at Monastir showing their strained state	123
214	Memorandum communicated by Turkish Embassy	..	8,	Financial Commission at Paris. Turkish Government hope that His Majesty's Government will support their intention to send delegates to represent the administration of the Ottoman Debt (see No. 189)	124
215	Admiralty ..	..Confidential	8,	Montenegro. Blockade. Reports decisions respecting conditions of blockade. Delay has been caused by lack of clear instructions to French commanding officer (see No. 230)	124
216	„ „ ..	..Confidential	9,	Montenegro. Blockade. French captain has received instructions to agree to blockade on condition of three days' notice being given	125
217	Count de Salis ..	52 Tel.	8,	War material for Montenegro from Russia. Austrian consul reports from Antivari unloading of cargo. Russian explanation is that material belongs to Montenegrin Government, and has been waiting two years for transport	125

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
218	Count de Salis ..	53 Tel.	Apr. 8, 1914	Scutari. Withdrawal of civil population. Reports refusal, on military grounds, of Montenegrin Government to forward Grand Vizier's communication to commandant	125
219	„ „ ..	54 Tel.	8,	Siege of Scutari. Reports that His Majesty's vice-consul has been wounded by shell which struck consulate, although building is not near any military establishment (see Nos. 254, 257, and 270)	126
220	Sir G. Buchanan ..	140 Tel.	9,	Montenegro. Blockade. Refers to No. 203. Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks blockade should at once be extended from Cattaro to Durazzo to prevent landing there of Servian troops (see No. 253)	126
221	„ „ ..	141 Tel.	9,	Roumano-Bulgarian arbitration. Refers to No. 181. Reports post-ponement of sitting, as German and Austrian Ambassadors have not received instructions (see No. 276)	126
222	Sir F. Bertie ..	45 Tel.	9,	Montenegro. Blockade. Refers to No. 230. Instructions are being sent to French naval commander to concert with his British colleague ..	126
223	Sir H. Rax-Ironside..	130 Tel.	9,	Visit of King of Bulgaria to Rodosto. Reports his enthusiastic reception. Considers visit of some significance, as it was probably prompted by military party ..	126
224	„ „ ..	131 Tel.	9,	Turkish prisoners of war. Reports arrival of 170; 15 have broken parole..	127
225	Sir F. Elliot ..	51 Tel.	9,	Montenegro. Transport of Servian troops in Greek ships. Refers to No. 194. Greek Government have informed Servian Government that transports will not receive Greek escort. Greek Government learn that Servian troops are being landed at Salonica	127
226	Sir R. Paget ..	87 Tel.	9,	Landing of Servian troops at Salonica. Reports re-embarkment of Servian troops	127
227	Sir F. Cartwright ..	56 Tel.	9,	Austrian military movements. Forwards information obtained by military attaché..	127
228	„ „ ..	57 Tel.	9,	Evacuation of Scutari. Reports that Minister for Foreign Affairs enquired whether Sir F. Cartwright had heard of idea that Turkey should surrender town to the Powers	127
229	„ „ ..	58 Tel.	9,	Montenegro. Blockade. Reports annoyance of Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs at French commander's demand that three days' notice of blockade should be given	128
230	To Sir F. Bertie ..	152 Tel.	9,	Montenegro. Blockade. Refers to No. 215. Instructs his Excellency to urge that French commander be instructed immediately to agree to establishment of blockade. Points out that four days have elapsed since notification of blockade was issued (see No. 222)	128
231	To Sir F. Bertie ..	155 Tel.	9,	Prohibition of despatch of silkworms' eggs. He should inform French Government of No. 231, and ask them to send similar instructions (see Part VIII, No. 274) .	128
	„ Sir R. Rodd ..	155 Tel.			
	„ Sir F. Cartwright	135 Tel.			
	„ Sir E. Goschen ..	156 Tel.			

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
232	To Sir H. Bax-Ironside	91 Tel.	Apr. 9, 1913	Prohibition of despatch of silkworms' eggs. Refers to No. 209. He should ask Bulgarian Government to withdraw prohibition (see Nos. 231 and 272)	128
233	To Sir F. Elliot ..	56 Tel.	9,	Southern Albanian frontier. Refers to No. 194. Informs him of situation ..	129
234	To Sir E. Goschen ..	126	9,	Question of fall of Scutari. Records conversation with German Ambassador as to course to be adopted. Sir E. Grey hoped that Austria would take no precipitate action. Ambassador did not seem aware of Italian apprehensions	129
235	To Sir R. Paget ..	28	9,	Servian excesses. Refers to Part VI, No. 381. Instructs him to mention reports to Servian Government, and ask that a close watch may be kept to prevent excesses (see No. 578)	129
236	To Sir G. Lowther ..	101	9,	Ottoman Debt. Refers to Part VI, No. 473. Instructs his Excellency to inform Porte that His Majesty's Government have made representations at Sophia, Athens, and Belgrade	129
237	To Sir H. Bax-Ironside	49	9,	Bulgarian excesses in Cavalla district. Transmits No. 364, Part VI, and instructs Sir H. Bax-Ironside to inform Bulgarian Government of painful impression caused by accounts of massacres of Moslems ..	130
238	" "	50	9,	Forcible conversions and excesses by Bulgarians. Informs of conversation between Sir A. Nicolson and the Bulgarian Minister	130
239	Sir F. Elliot ..	66	4,	Assassination of King of Greece. Reports on	130
240	Sir F. Bertie ..	183	9,	Financial Commission at Paris. Refers to No. 136. Transmits list of delegates of other Powers and gives official title of commission (see Nos. 280 and 361) ..	134
241	Board of Trade ..	..	9,	Shipping and commerce of European Powers in territorial waters of Balkan States. Gives observations on No. 209	134
242	Admiralty ..	..	9,	Smyrna. Informs that "Hibernia" has been ordered there to report on situation ..	135
243	" "	Confidential	9,	Montenegro. Blockade. Transmits a copy of instructions sent to British Vice-Admiral ..	135
244	" "	.. ..	10,	Montenegro. Informs that His Majesty's ship "Medea" is proceeding to Malta to facilitate wireless communication with ships off Montenegrin coast	135
245	" "	.. Confidential	10,	Montenegro. Blockade. Transmits telegram stating that blockade will begin at 8 A.M. that day	136
246	Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to Tewfik Pasha	Confidential Telegraphic	10,	Ægean islands. Italy will support Turkish Government, but they believe that His Majesty's Government are hesitating as to their attitude. Ottoman Government feel sure that Sir E. Grey will adopt their point of view (see No. 363)	136

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
247	Sir G. Buchanan ..	12 Tel. Very Conf.	Apr. 9, 1913	Evacuation of Scutari. Reports conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs. M. Sazonof was very apprehensive of present attitude of Germany, who, according to M. Delcassé, if war was inevitable, would prefer it to take place now. Italy and Russia were opposed to war (see No. 255)	136
248	Sir F. Bertie ..	10. Tel. Confidential	9,	Montenegro. Transport of Servian troops. Gathers from M. Pichon that Servian Government will not try to send troops to Scutari. German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh has been informed that Russian attitude will not change on fall of Scutari	137
249	Sir G. Lowther ..	188 Tel.	10,	Bombardment of Aivali and Dikili by Greek warships. His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna reports on	138
250	Count de Salis ..	56 Tel.	10,	Montenegro. Blockade. Refers to No. 268. He has addressed a note to Montenegrin Government in sense of vice-admiral's telegram, and has informed representatives of Powers (see No. 383)	138
251	Sir R. Paget ..	88 Tel.	10,	Montenegro. Servian troops before Scutari. Servian Government will probably conform to wishes of Powers (see Nos. 259 and 430)	138
252	Sir H. Bax-Ironside ..	132 Tel. Confidential	10,	Advance to Constantinople of Bulgarian troops. Refers to No. 98. It is anticipated that strenuous efforts will be made to force lines of Chatalja. Only Sir H. Bax-Ironside (German and Austrian colleagues have yet been instructed in sense of No. 201 ..	138
253	To Sir F. Bertie ..	157 Tel.	10,	Montenegro. Blockade. Refers to No. 220. His Excellency should enquire whether French Government agree to extension of blockade to Dulcigno (see No. 271) ..	139
254	To Sir R. Paget ..	76 Tel.	10,	Scutari. Indiscriminate bombardment. Refers to No. 219. Servian Government should be informed that Sir E. Grey is disappointed at lack of restraint exercised, and that he reserves decision as to further action	139
255	To Sir E. Goschen ..	159 Tel. Very Conf.	10,	Scutari. German apprehensions of war on fall of town. Refers to No. 247. Sir E. Grey does not think Russia would go to war to prevent Montenegro being turned out of Scutari, and has so informed Italian and German Ambassadors. Sir G. Buchanan should see Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith for Foreign Affairs (see Nos. 253 and 275)	139
257	To Count de Salis ..	38 Tel.	10,	Scutari. Indiscriminate bombardment. Refers to No. 219. He should make strong representations to Montenegrin Government	140
258	To Sir F. Bertie ..	242	10,	Financial Commission at Paris. Refers to No. 136. French Government propose that Governments should be represented by Councillors of their Embassies, assisted by technical experts. Enquires whether Sir F. Bertie favours the attendance of Mr. Carnegie	140

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
259	To Sir F. Bertie ..	249	Apr. 10, 1913	Southern Albanian frontier. Records conversation with M. Cambon. The difficulty would be to arrange a frontier acceptable to Greece, and the question of enforcing frontier would have to be faced. There could be no question of a naval demonstration against Greece	140
260	„ „ ..	250	10,	Bulgarian advance to Constantinople. Records conversation with M. Cambon, who agreed with Sir E. Grey that either Russia ought to act alone or else all the Powers ought to act collectively. Sir E. Grey promised to bring question before the meeting of Ambassadors	141
261	„ „ .	251	10,	Scutari. German apprehensions of war on fall of. Sir E. Grey has informed M. Cambon of his conversation with Italian Ambassador and of his own forecast of events if Scutari fell. M. Sazonof has now said that, unless Austria took no separate action against Servia, Russia would let matters take their course ..	141
262	„ „ ..	252	10,	Evacuation of Scutari. Proposal that it should be ceded to Powers Sir E. Grey has informed M. Cambon that he has no objection provided Powers would first consider how Scutari, if entrusted to them, could be protected, as Montenegro was really defying Powers and not Turkey ..	142
263	To Sir G. Buchanan..	152	10.	War indemnity and Bulgarian advance to Constantinople. Transmits memorandum communicated by M. Etter. Count Benckendorff has been informed that Bulgaria could only be promised a reference of financial questions to commission at Paris. If Bulgaria meant to go to Constantinople only force would stop her ..	142
264	To Count de Salis ..	11	10,	Evacuation of Scutari. M. Popovitch has hinted that an amendment of Albanian frontier might lead Government to yield on Scutari question. Essad Pasha was holding out as the Austrians had promised to make him Prince of Albania and as Montenegro could not pay him his price of 80,000*l.* for sale of town	142
265	To Sir F. Elliot ..	35	10.	Southern Albanian frontier. Greek Minister has intimated that Greece would not fortify coast from south of Corfu northwards Sir E. Grey promised to mention this to Italian Government, but said that frontier could not be settled till Scutari question had been arranged	143
266	To M. Cambon		10,	Financial Commission at Paris. Acknowledges No. 4. Informs him that His Majesty's Government will be represented by Sir H. Paul Harvey, K.C.M.G.	143
267	Count de Salis ..	12	6,	Conclusion of peace. Refers to No. 140. Transmits communication made to Montenegrin Government, and their reply ..	143
268	„ „ ..	55 Tel.	10,	Montenegro. Blockade. Transmits text of telegraphic notification of establishment of blockade made to Montenegrin Government (see Nos. 250 and 383)	145

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
269	Sir R. Paget ..	89 Tel.	Apr. 11, 1913	Evacuation of Scutari. Withdrawal of Servian troops. Refers to No. 251. Servian troops have been ordered to withdraw from all further operations ..	145
270	„ „ ..	90 Tel.	11,	Scutari. Indiscriminate bombardment. Refers to No. 219. Prime Minister does not think Servian forces can be responsible for shell which struck consulate (see Nos. 302 and 407)	145
271	Sir E. Goschen ..	68 Tel.	11,	Scutari. German apprehensions of war on fall of. Refers to No. 255. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was somewhat reassured, though still uneasy about feeling in Vienna. He will urge Austrian Government to abstain from precipitate action	145
272	Sir R. Rodd ..	71 Tel.	11,	Prohibition of despatch of silkworms' eggs. Refers to No. 232. Italian Government agree, and have instructed their representative at Sophia accordingly (see No. 421)	146
273	„ „ ..	72 Tel.	11,	Evacuation of Scutari. Italian Government learn that King will accept idea of compensation. Austria at length agrees if proposal comes from some other Power. Italy would be prepared to make it ..	146
274	Sir F. Bertie ..	47 Tel.	11,	Montenegro. Extension of blockade to Durazzo. Refers to No. 253. French Minister for Foreign Affairs will acquiesce as soon as M. Sazonof agrees (see No. 315)	146
275	Sir G. Buchanan ..	145 Tel.	11,	Scutari. Withdrawal of Servian troops. Refers to No. 256. Owing to Russian action Servian troops are to abstain from operations against Scutari, and this, M. Sazonof thinks, should prevent isolated action by Austria	147
276	„ „ ..	146 Tel.	11,	Roumano-Bulgarian arbitration. Refers to No. 221. Reports proceedings at Ambassadors' meeting. Roumanian demand for a few kilometres of coast and the compensation to be found for Bulgaria were discussed (see No. 380) ..	147
277	Sir H. Bax-Ironside..	133 Tel.	11,	Chatalja. Refers to Part VI, No. 613. Reports engagements resulting in the occupation of the littoral as far east as Yalos Castero by Bulgarians	147
278	Sir F. Cartwright .	59 Tel.	11,	German married at Vienna. Reports arrival of 500 who were sent on to Trieste ..	148
279	To Sir G. Lowther ..	177 Tel.	11,	Smyrna. Refers to No. 125. Informs him that "Hibernia" has been ordered there to report on situation	148
280	To Sir F. Bertie ..	161 Tel.	11,	Financial Commission at Paris. Refers to No. 240. Mr. Carnegie is appointed one of British delegates	148
281	To Sir G. Buchanan..	320 Tel.	11,	Russian communique. It was considered on the whole favourably by all the Ambassadors	148
282	To Sir F. Cartwright „ Sir F. Bertie .. „ Sir E. Goschen .. „ Sir R. Rodd .. „ Sir G. Buchanan..	83 255 128 106 156	11,	War indemnity, Bulgarian advance to Constantinople, compensation for Montenegro. Informs of discussion at Ambassadors' meeting of these subjects, and of proposals made in regard to them	148

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
283	To Sir H. Bax-Ironside	51	Apr. 11, 1913	Ottoman Debt. Complaints of action of Bulgarian customs authorities at Dedeagatch. Refers to Part VI, No. 593. Approves note addressed to Bulgarian Government on subject. Sir G. Lowther has been instructed to discuss vice-consul's proposal with British Commissioner of the Debt (see Part VIII, No. 64)	150
284	To Sir G. Lowther ..	105	11,	Ottoman Debt. Complaints of action of Bulgarian customs authorities at Dedeagatch. Transmits No. 593, Part VI, and instructs his Excellency to discuss vice-consul's proposal with British Commissioner of the Debt	150
285	To Sir R. Paget ..	30	11,	Official name of His Majesty's vice-consulate at Uskub. Refers to Part VI, No. 390. It will be time enough to change name when Servian annexations are recognised by Powers	150
286	To Prince Lichnowsky	..	11,	Ottoman Debt. Sequestration of funds by Greek Government. Refers to Part IV, No. 432*. Informs him that Greek Government will raise sequestration ..	150
287	To Council of Foreign Bondholders	..	11,	Ottoman Debt. Sequestration of funds by Greek Government. Refers to Part IV, No. 434*. Informs them that Greek Government have given orders to raise sequestration	151
288	Sir G. Lowther ..	276	4,	Pilot-boat service in Gulf of Smyrna. Refers to No. 38. His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna reports that there are two pilot-boats giving free service, and that danger of their capture by Greeks is small. Suggests explanation of Porte's note ..	151
289	Sir R. Paget ..	71	4,	Evacuation of Scutari. Withdrawal of Servian troops. Has communicated to M. Pasitch No. 622, Part VI. M. Pasitch replied he could not abandon Montenegro. Gist of Sir R. Paget's representations and M. Pasitch's reply has appeared in Servian press	151
290	Sir F. Elliot ..	67	5,	Conclusion of peace. Transmits reply of allies (see No. 122). Delay in returning it was due to amendments proposed by Servian Government	152
291	Sir R. Paget ..	72	6,	Albania. Possible refusal of Servian and Greek Governments to evacuate it. Refers to No. 43. Government repudiate the suggestion, but Sir R. Paget considers tone of recent Servian communications to Powers not sufficiently submissive ..	153
291A	Sir F. Elliot ..	68	7,	Financial Commission at Athens. Greek Civil List. Transmits despatch from British delegate on Commission requesting instructions as to disposal of £600,000 in Bank of England at disposal of late King George of Greece (see No. 507 VI)	153A
292	Count de Salis ..	13	7,	Montenegro. Naval demonstration. Transmits texts of telegraphic message addressed to Montenegrin Government announcing presence of international squadron, and of Montenegrin reply ..	153
293	Sir G. Lowther ..	284	8,	Ottoman Debt. Refers to Part VI, No. 336. Transmits private letter from Sir A. Block on Bulgarian memorandum respecting the share of debt to be borne by the Balkan States	154

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
294	Sir F. Cartwright ..	60	Apr. 9, 1913	Albania. Reports formation and inaugural meeting of society for promotion of Austrian interests in Albania	176
295	Treasury		11,	Financial Commission at Paris. Sir F. Harvey's expenses. Sanctions the allowances proposed in No. 210	176
296	Admiralty	[Confidential]	12,	Montenegro. Blockade. Transmits telegram to British Vice-Admiral authorising extension of blockade to Durazzo when his colleagues have been similarly instructed	177
297	Formula proposed by M. Pichon	..	12,	Ottoman Debt and war indemnity. French Government think the question as to whether pecuniary compensation for the allies is compatible with the bondholders' interests should be examined. Transmits formula proposed by M. Pichon ..	177
298	M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff	..	9.	Bulgarian advance to Constantinople and war indemnity. M. Sazonof shares Sir E. Grey's fears, and wishes to recognise principle of war indemnity in order to avoid entry of Bulgarians into Constantinople	177
299	Sir G. Buchanan ..	144 Tel.	11,	Bulgarian advance to Constantinople and war indemnity. M. Sazonof thinks it necessary to satisfy allies on question of indemnity in order to prevent entry of Bulgarians into Constantinople, and proposes a basis for indemnity (see No. 303)	177
300	Sir H. Bax-Ironside ..	134 Tel.	11,	Conclusion of peace. Refers to No. 291. All his colleagues have received instructions except Russian Minister. Prime Minister's hands will be strengthened in favour of peace by proposed *démarche* (see No. 303)	178
301	Sir R. Rodd ..	73 Tel.	12,	Southern Albanian frontier. Control of Corfu Channel. Italian naval and military staff insist on danger of control of channel by Greece	178
302	To Count de Salis ..	40 Tel.	12,	Scutari. Indiscriminate bombardment. Refers to No. 270. Enquires date of occurrence	178
303	To Sir G. Buchanan ..	322 Tel.	12,	Conclusion of peace. Refers to No. 299. He should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of No. 300. It is important that *démarche* should be made at once (see No. 312)	178
304	To Sir F. Elliot ..	58 Tel.	12,	Northern Albanian frontier. Transmits text of definition of frontier communicated by Russian Ambassador (see Nos. 305, 318, and 345)	178
	„ Sir R. Paget ..	77 Tel.			
	„ Count de Salis ..	41 Tel.			
	„ Sir H. Bax-Ironside	93 Tel.			
305	To Sir F. Elliot ..	59 Tel.	12,	Northern Albanian frontier. Refers to No. 304. Instructs him to point out to his Austrian colleague that Russian text is not identical with Austrian text, and to enquire which text should be communicated to allies (see No. 318)	179
	„ Sir R. Paget ..	78 Tel.			
	„ Count de Salis ..	42 Tel.			
	„ Sir H. Bax-Ironside	94 Tel.			
306	To Sir F. Bertie ..	162 Tel.	12,	International situation. Transmits French proposal as to despatch of fleet. His Majesty's Government are prepared to co-operate (see Nos. 308, 311, 316, 341, 356)	179
	„ Sir R. Rodd ..	137 Tel.			
	„ Sir G. Buchanan ..	323 Tel.			
	„ Sir F. Cartwright	136 Tel.			
	„ Sir E. Goschen	161 Tel.			

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
307	Sir H. Bax-Ironside. .	135 Tel.	Apr. 13, 1913	Conclusion of peace. Has acted on No. 201. Prime Minister must consult his allies before replying. Bulgarian Government are satisfied with new proposals (see Nos. 352, 353, and 439) ..	180
308	Sir R. Rodd ..	74 Tel.	13,	International action at Constantinople. Refers to No. 306. Italian Government are prepared to co-operate (see No. 553).	180
309	„ „ ..	75 Tel.	13,	Southern Albanian frontier. Control of Corfu Channel. Austrian General Staff urges as strongly as Italian the danger of control of channel being in Greek hands. Austria insists on a frontier considerably south of limits claimed by Greece ..	180
310	„ „ ..	76 Tel.	13,	Scutari. Danger of Austrian action. Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks only hope lays in financial assistance, and that Austria will only accept proposal of guaranteed loan if all Powers joined. Suggests procedure	180
311	Sir E. Goschen ..	64 Tel.	13,	International action at Constantinople. Refers to No. 306. Secretary of State will communicate decision of German Government as soon as possible (see No. 348) ..	181
312	„ „ ..	65 Tel.	13,	Evacuation of Scutari. Withdrawal of Servian troops. Learns that Servian troops have been ordered not to attack. Servian Government would be glad if commandant could be instructed, through agency of German Government, to remain passive	181
313	Sir R. Paget ..	91 Tel.	13,	Servian boycott of Austrian goods. Belgrade Chamber of Commerce has declared boycott probably on account of rumoured Austrian threat to enter sanjak. As rumour is incorrect, boycott is not likely to be carried out	181
314	„ „ ..	92 Tel.	13,	Conclusion of peace. Reports that Servian Government are trying to arrange an exchange of prisoners, which indicates that they expect an early conclusion of peace.	181
315	Sir F. Bertie ..	49 Tel.	13,	Montenegro. Extension of blockade to Durazzo. Refers to No. 274. No communication on subject has been received from Russian Government, but French commander is being instructed to co-operate with his British colleague ..	182
316	„ „ ..	50 Tel.	13,	International action at Constantinople. Refers to No. 306. French Government concur in Sir E. Grey's views.	182
317	Consul-General Lamb	26 Tel.	13,	Forcible conversions to Christianity. Refers to Part V, No. 248. Mussulmans declare that in spite of official denials violence is being used to obtain conversions. (see Nos. allocated 601)	182
318	For Sir F. Lamb ..	60 Tel.	13,	Northern Albanian frontier. Refers to	
	„ Sir R. Paget ..	79 Tel.		Nos. 304 and 305. He should take no	
	„ Count de Salis ..	43 Tel.		action until further notice (see Nos. 344,	
	„ Sir H. Bax-Ironside	55 Tel.		345, 352, et [illegible]	182
319	Sir H. Bax-Ironside. .	52 A	Mar. 31,	Military and political events. Reports on, and reviews situation. Refers to Part VI, Nos. 301 and 601	183
320	„ „ ..	53	Apr. 5,	Fall of Adrianople. Transmits memorandum by His Majesty's consul on situation immediately before and after surrender of town	185

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
321	Sir H. Bax-Ironside. .	54	Apr. 4, 1913	Conclusion of peace. Refers to Part VI, No. 618, and Part VII, Nos. 69 and 98. French misunderstandings respecting nature of his instructions have been removed	186
322	„ „ ..	55	5,	Ottoman Debt. Complaints of Bulgarian action in Macedonia. Refers to Part V, No. 102. Transmits, with comments, Bulgarian reply to his note (see No. 473) ..	186
323	Sir F. Elliot ..	69	7,	Proposed distribution of Greek forces. Transmits report by military attaché (see Part VIII, No. 103)	188
324	„ „ ..	70 Confidential	7,	Albania. Has acted separately on No. 621, Part VI. Explains that no collective representation as to cessation of hostilities has been made	189
325	Sir R. Paget ..	73	7,	Financial situation in Servia. Troops to be demobilized. Servia will have to look to funds from abroad ..	189
326	Sir H. Bax-Ironside. .	57 Confidential	8,	Forcible conversions by Bulgarians and other excesses. Refers to Part V, No. 521, and Part VI, No. 352. Informs of conversation with Prime Minister, who expressed great regret for incidents. Transmits memorandum communicated to M. Gueschof. Suggests that representations by other Powers would have good effect (see No. 378)	190
327	Sir R. Paget ..	75	8,	Religious guarantees for Albanian population outside Albania. Reference made in the "Samoprava," in which allusion is made to negotiations with the Holy See for the execution of a Concordat to assure religious freedom to Catholics ..	196
328	„ „ ..	77	8,	Political and military situation in Uskub district. Transmits reports by His Majesty's vice-consul	196
329	Sir G. Lowther ..	288	8,	Silkworms' eggs. Prohibition of their despatch. Refers to No. 200. Transmits letter from Sir A. Block requesting withdrawal of prohibition imposed by Bulgarian Government	198
330	„ „ ..	290	9,	Unrest in districts of Dardanelles and Smyrna. Refers to No. 113. Transmits consular reports. Mentions rumours of disturbances at Smyrna. Austrian unofficial agencies are said to be stirring up trouble in Western Asia Minor ..	199
331	Sir R. Paget ..	78	9,	Servo-Bulgarian relations. Reports consolidation of fraction since fall of Adrianople. Refers to Part VI, Nos. 299 and 313. Mentions his own relations with his Bulgarian colleague, which have been similar to those of M. d'Oigron (see No. 431) ..	201
332	Sir H. Bax-Ironside. .	57	9,	War indemnity. Reports conversations with Bulgarian Minister of Finance, who stated that Germany and Great Britain were only Powers unfavourably disposed on question	201
333	„ „ ..	58	10,	Bulgarian Sobranjé. Refers to No. 2. Reports proceedings which are of little interest (see No. 604)	202

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
334	Sir H. Bax-Ironside..	59	Apr. 10, 1913	Conclusion of peace. Reviews situation. Reports on suspension of hostilities between Turks and Bulgarians. Alludes to collective *démarche* made in pursuance of No. 618, Part VI, and of Prime Minister's answer. Gives reply of the allies to previous collective *démarche* made 22nd March (see No. 605)	202
335	Sir C. Lowther ..	295	10,	Servian consulate-general at Salonica. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's consul-general reporting its reopening (see No. 492)	203
336	„ „ ..	296	10,	Relations of the allies. Transmits report from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica. Greek garrison has been reinforced. Bulgarians talk of their intention to reinforce their troops	204
337	Sir G. Buchanan ..	117	10,	Roumano-Bulgarian arbitration. Refers to No. 157. Transmits, with observations, protocols of second meeting, held 4th April, and of third meeting, held 7th April (see No. 448)	204
338	„ „ ..	119	11,	Russian policy in the Balkans. Transmits official communiqué issued to Russian press on 11th April	207
339	Sir R. Paget ..	79	11,	Servian Skupshtina. Reports opening. M. Pasitch's speech referred only to debt of gratitude owed by country to the army ..	210
340	Admiralty ..	.. Confidential	12,	Montenegro. Blockade. Transmits telegram from British vice-admiral reporting on situation. French concurrence is awaited before extending blockade to Durazzo ..	210
341	Sir G. Buchanan ..	147 Tel.	13,	International action at Constantinople. Refers to No. 398. Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees with Sir E. Grey's views in principle, but does not wish to act, except in case of imminent danger ..	211
342	„ „ ..	148 Tel.	13,	Conclusion of peace. Refers to No. 303. Delay was due to Russian desire to modify formula respecting war indemnity ..	211
343	Sir F. Bertie ..	51 Tel.	13,	Conclusion of peace. Minister for Foreign Affairs states that negotiations for cessation of hostilities are proceeding between Bulgarians and Turks	211
344	Sir F. Elliot ..	52 Tel.	14,	Southern Albanian frontier. Refers to No. 318. Presumes there is no objection to communication of No. 201 to Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs (see No. 346)	211
345	„ „ ..	53 Tel.	14,	Albania. Refers to No. 318. He had already ascertained that Austrian text was identical with that in No. 304, except for one word. Russian Minister has not yet received definition of frontier ..	212
346	„ „ ..	54 Tel.	14,	Albania. Refers to No. 344. Communication has been made	212
347	Sir R. Paget ..	93 Tel.	14,	Conclusion of peace. Refers to No. 304. Reply of Powers on the four points has been collectively communicated	212
348	Sir E. Goschen ..	66 Tel.	14,	International action at Constantinople. Refers to No. 311. German Government will participate, but hopes demonstration will be unnecessary	212

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
349	Sir G. Buchanan ..	150 Tel.	Apr. 14, 1913	Anglo-Russian relations. Balkan situation. Reports conversation with Emperor, who expressed great appreciation of British support Russia had received. He had no intention of going to war on account of Scutari. He thought Powers should accept principle of indemnity .. .	212
350	Sir F. Cartwright ..	60 Tel.	14,	International action at Constantinople. Refers to No. 306. Minister for Foreign Affairs showed himself unfavourable to French proposals, and did not credit Bulgaria with the intention of advancing to Constantinople	213
351	„ „ ..	61 Tel.	14,	Montenegro. Pecuniary compensation. Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs thought it unfortunate that proposal to offer 20,000,000 fr. to Montenegro should have been published before she had yielded on Scutari question. It would be more difficult for King to yield now. Minister for Foreign Affairs thought money would have to be found for Montenegro at end of war	213
352	Sir H. Bax-Ironside..	136 Tel.	14,	Northern Albanian frontier. Refers to Nos. 307 and 318. Definition of frontier has not been communicated	214
353	„ „ ..	137 Tel. Confidential	14,	Conclusion of peace. Military authorities have not received the *démarche* made to Bulgarian Government (see No. 307) in good part. Submits that action suggested in No. 306 is urgently desirable (see No. 354)	214
354	„ „ ..	138 Tel.	14,	Conclusion of peace. Refers to No. 353. M. Danef has been sent to prevail on generals to cease hostilities ..	214
355	To Sir H. Bax-Ironside	99 Tel.	14,	Excesses upon Moslems. He should inform Bulgarian Government unofficially of contents of No. 317	214
356	To Sir C. Lowther ..	180 Tel.	14,	Servian troops at Scutari. Servian Government have ordered their troops to suspend operations, and request that Governor of Scutari may consequently be ordered to refrain from attack. Authorises his Excellency to join in collective action accordingly (see No. 374)	214
357	To Sir F. Elliot ..	61 Tel.	14,	Albania. Refers to No. 344. No objection	215
358	To Sir F. Elliot ..	62 Tel.	14,	Northern Albanian frontier. Refers to No. 348. Informs of revised identic text defining frontier communicated by Russian and Austrian Ambassadors. He should communicate it to Government to which he is credited when his colleagues are similarly instructed (see Nos. 393, 409, 421, and 423)	215
	„ Sir H. Bax-Ironside	96 Tel.			
	„ Sir R. Paget ..	80 Tel.			
	„ Count de Salis ..	44 Tel.			
359	To Sir F. Cartwright	81	14,	Protection of minorities in territories annexed by Servia. Transmits No. 62. Russian Ambassador has been asked what reply his Government propose to make ..	215
360	To Sir F. Bertie ..	217	14,	Albanian Frontier Agreement. Informs of declaration communicated to Ambassadors at *réunion* defining attitude of His Majesty's Government	216
	„ Sir E. Goschen ..	125			
	„ Sir F. Cartwright	82			
	„ Sir G. Buchanan..	151			
	„ Sir R. Rodd ..	105			

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
361	To Sir F. Bertie ..	233	Apr. 14, 1913	Financial Commission at Paris. Refers to No. 240. His Majesty's Government agree to date proposed for its first meeting. Instructs his Excellency to give every assistance to Sir P. Harvey. Mr. Carnegie is to be considered as on an equal footing with him (see No. 433) ..	216
362	To Count Mensdorff ..	..	14,	Shipping of European Powers in territorial waters of Balkan States. Replies to Part V, No. 121. British interests would not be assisted by putting forward the suggested proposals, but His Majesty's Government will consider question further if all the other Powers are agreed as to desirability of making them. Offers observations on articles suggested ..	216
363	To Tewfik Pasha ..	..	14,	Ægean islands. Refers to No. 246. Replies that discussion of question is useless until the allies have accepted the proposals of the Powers	217
364	To Treasury ..	..	14,	Financial Commission at Paris. Enquires whether the Treasury have any objections to the amendment which Sir P. Harvey wishes to propose to the formula accepted by the Ambassadors' Conference (see No. 305)	218
365	„ „ ..	..	14,	War indemnity. Transmits, for observations, two Bulgarian communications (see No. 360)	218
366	Sir H. Rax-Ironside to Sir L. Mallet	..	10,	Conditions in Adrianople after its fall. Transmits letter from Vice-Consul Young describing situation and the unfortunate condition of Turkish prisoners of war .	218
367	Admiral Jackson ..	..	14,	Southern Albanian frontier. Corfu Channel. Furnishes observations on its strategic importance, and suggests where dividing-line between Greece and Albania should reach the sea	219
368	Count Benckendorff ..	..	15,	Montenegro. Pecuniary compensation. Enquires Sir E. Grey's views on certain proposals made on behalf of King Nicholas to the Russian Minister at Cettinje ..	220
369	Admiralty ..	.. Confidential	15,	Montenegro. Extension of blockade. Transmits telegram from vice-admiral stating that French commander is still without instructions	220
370	„ „ ..	.. Confidential	15,	Scutari. Smyrna. Transmits copy of instructions sent to vice-admiral to confer with his colleagues as to means of sending message from Turkish Government to Governor of Scutari instructing him not to attack Servian troops. Reports of disturbances at Smyrna are without foundation	220
371	Sir R. Paget ..	94 Tel.	14,	Evacuation of Scutari. Withdrawal of Servian troops. King of Montenegro will continue Siege. Servian Government suggest mode of transmission for message from Turkish Government to Governor of Scutari warning him not to make a sortie (see No. 382)	221
372	Count de Salis ..	57 Tel.	14,	Evacuation of Scutari. Servian troops are beginning to withdraw. Reports on situation	221

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
373	Sir F. Elliot ..	56 Tel. Confidential	Apr. 15, 1913	Conclusion of peace. Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs appreciates reply of Powers, but fears that Bulgarian army may be an obstacle to conclusion of peace. He appeals to the *Entente* for support in the question of the Ægean isles ..	222
374	Sir G. Lowther ..	192 Tel.	15,	Evacuation of Scutari. Refers to No. 356. Instructions have been sent to Governor not to attack Servian troops	222
375	„ „ ..	193 Tel.	15.	Conclusion of peace. War indemnity. Reports severe criticism in the "Tanin" of Powers' action in agreeing to alteration of frontier line, and in reopening indemnity question. The allies must break Turkey's last line of defence before they can obtain an indemnity	222
376	„ „ ..	194 Tel.	15,	Conclusion of peace. Refers to No. 381. A verbal understanding has been reached for cessation of hostilities for ten days. Russian Ambassador has telegraphed to Sofia for permission to make this public	222
377	Sir H. Rax-Ironside ..	159 Tel. Secret	15,	Serbo-Greek relations. Learns that a more formal agreement than the *entente* of 1912 is contemplated, owing to fear of Bulgarian territorial pretensions. Negotiations for the settlement of Serbo-Greek frontier and for a secret defensive treaty are proceeding	223
378	„ „ ..	140 Tel.	15,	Excesses upon Moslems. Refers to No. 326. Prime Minister desires certain alterations in memorandum, which he will have to lay before the King. The offenders will be most sternly dealt with after the war (see No. 395)	223
379	„ „ ..	141 Tel.	15,	Financial Commission at Paris. Bulgaria will be represented by the Minister of Finance with his staff, and by Bulgarian representative at Paris (see No. 404) ..	223
380	Sir G. Buchanan ..	152 Tel.	15,	Roumano-Bulgarian arbitration. Refers to No. 276. After arguing in favour of rectification of frontier near the two triangles, Ambassadors of the Triple Alliance have referred to their Governments for final instructions	223
381	To Sir G. Lowther ..	182 Tel.	15,	Armistice between Turkey and Bulgaria. Enquires whether he has any information (see Nos. 376 and 389)	224
	„ Sir H. Rax-Ironside	100 Tel.			
382	Consul-General Lamb	10 Commercial	9,	Railway construction in Macedonia. Refers to Part VI, No. 379. Construction of the proposed Ghida-Papapoulia Railway will be competed for by the group controlling the Salonica-Monastir Railway as well as by the Batignolles Company. Transmits press extract	224
383	Count de Salis ..	15	10,	Montenegro. Blockade. Refers to Nos. 250 and 268. Transmits copy of note notifying the Montenegrin Government of the blockade	225
384	Sir G. Lowther ..	300	12.	Turkish provincial administration. Refers to Part VI, No. 489. Reports publication of a new law which is worthy of attention, and submits survey of its contents (see Part VIII, No. 327)	225

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
385	Sir G. Lowther ..	301	Apr. 12, 1913	Turkish military dispositions in Western Anatolia. Forwards despatch from military attaché	228
386	" " ..	303	12,	Future of Salonica. Transmits article in the "Jeune Turc" advocating its internationalization	229
387	" " ..	304	12,	Bulgarian excesses. Refers to No. 111. Transmits petition from the inhabitants of Ruptchos and Novrokop. Mr. Lamb has little doubt that the statements made are substantially true.	229
388	Admiralty	Confidential	16,	Evacuation of Scutari. Withdrawal of Servian troops. Transmits telegram relative to suggested arrangements for communicating message to Governor ..	230
389	Sir H. Bax-Ironside. .	142 Tel.	15,	Armistice between Turkey and Bulgaria. Refers to No. 381. No armistice has been concluded, but simply a suspension of hostilities for purpose of burying dead. Bulgarian Government will try to prevent recommencement of hostilities (see No. 402)	231
390	Admiralty		15,	Montenegro. Extension of blockade. Withdrawal of Servian troops at Scutari. Transmits telegram from vice-admiral reporting on situation, and proposing course of action. Governor at Scutari has received message through the German Ambassador instructing him not to impede withdrawal of Servian troops	231
391	" "		16,	Evacuation of Scutari. Withdrawal of Servian troops. Transmits telegram from vice-admiral reporting that Servian troops have nearly all been withdrawn, and that consequently Servian general thinks it unnecessary to communicate with the Governor of Scutari	231
392	Count de Salis ..	58 Tel.	16,	Evacuation of Scutari. Pecuniary compensation. King of Montenegro will not accept compensation	232
393	" . ..	59 Tel.	16,	Conclusion of peace. Refers to Nos. 201 and 358. Collective representation has been made (see No. 486)	232
394	Sir R. Paget ..	95 Tel.	16,	Evacuation of Scutari. Withdrawal of Servian troops. Reports that Servian Government intend to withdraw their troops from Alessio and Durazzo as well as Scutari	232
395	To Sir H. Bax-Ironside	101 Tel.	16,	Excesses upon Moslems. Refers to No. 378. Agrees to certain alterations being made in memorandum. Suggests that Sir H. Bax-Ironside might inform his French and German colleagues of his representations with a view to obtaining their co-operation	232
396	To M. Cambon ..	..	16,	Status of Ottoman Jews in annexed territories. Informs of Sir E. Grey's answer to Italian enquiry on this question. His Majesty's Government would willingly co-operate in its settlement after the mediation question has been dealt with ..	232

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
397	To Board of Trade		Apr. 16, 1913	Safeguards for foreign trade in ceded territories. Refers to No. 9. Points out that stipulation proposed in article 1 (3) would hamper fiscal arrangements of Balkan States, which does not appear equitable in view of contemplated treatment of Turkey and of treatment of Italy in regard to Tripoli. Application of article 1 (4). Paragraph 4 of article 1 might cause practical difficulties (see No. 458)	233
398	Count de Salis ..	16	10,	Scutari. Withdrawal of civil population. Refers to Part VI, No. 487. Reports efforts made to obtain transmission of a message to Governor of Scutari, and transmits correspondence that passed ..	233
399	Sir F. Elliot ..	71	9,	Greek Debt in occupied territory. Refers to Part VI, No. 218. Transmits despatch from Mr. Beaumont on the probable effects on Debt of territorial changes and on suggested abolition of system of pluralities (see Part VIII, No. 135).	236
400	" " ..	72	11,	Southern Albanian frontier. Corfu Channel. Surveys situation from Greek point of view. As regards the fate of the islands and of Epirus, Greek Government urge the adoption of a plebiscite	238
401	Imperial Ottoman Bank ..		16,	Financial Commission at Paris. Points out that there are British holders of bonds and bills other than those with which Council of Foreign Bondholders is connected (see No. 474)	240
402	Sir H. Bax-Ironside. .	143 Tel.	16,	Conclusion of peace. Armistice. Refers to No. 389. Cessation of hostilities has been arranged for ten days. Prime Minister is hopeful of the conclusion of an armistice	240
403	" " ..	144 Tel.	16,	Greco-Bulgarian relations. Prime Minister states that tension between troops at Salonica is dangerous. He believes that Serbo-Bulgarian differences will be arranged through Russian intervention	240
404	Sir G. Buchanan ..	153 Tel.	17,	Roumano-Bulgarian arbitration. Refers to No. 379. Reports unanimous decision of Ambassadors and transmits text of it for modification if desired.	241
405	Sir G. Lowther ..	198 Tel.	17,	Conclusion of peace. Refers to No. 201. His Russian and Austrian colleagues are without instructions to communicate four points of basis for mediation, so no official communication has been made ..	241
406	" " ..	199 Tel.	17,	Cessation of hostilities. Reports its verbal arrangement and the conditions made ..	241
407	Count de Salis ..	60 Tel.	17,	Scutari. Indiscriminate bombardment. Refers to No. 270. Gives date of occurrence. Has made a representation to Minister for Foreign Affairs as instructed in No. 257	242
408	Sir F. Elliot ..	57 Tel.	17,	Albania. Turkish occupation of Vallona. Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests that Greeks and Servians might combine to capture Turks and then retire to present positions	242

No.	Name.	No.	Date	Subject.	Page
409	Sir F. Elliot ..	58 Tel.	Apr. 17, 1913	Northern Albanian frontier. Has acted on No. 358	242
410	Sir R. Paget ..	96 Tel.	17,	Evacuation of Scutari. Withdrawal of Servian troops. Servian Government repeat request that transports bringing away Servian troops be allowed to pass blockade. Sir R. Paget suggests that impatience of Government is due to increasing tension in relations with Bulgaria	242
411	„ „ ..	97 Tel.	17,	Serbo-Bulgarian relations. Reports appearance of article in semi-official organ declaring that Servia is entitled to a revision of the territorial agreement concluded before the war. The tension is becoming marked (see No. 422) ..	242
412	To Sir F. Elliot ..	63 Tel.	17,	Evacuation of Scutari. Withdrawal of Servian troops. He should inform Government to which he is accredited that British admiral is being instructed to allow Greek transports to go to San Giovanni and Durazzo to pick up Servian troops, provided other Powers have given similar instructions	243
	„ Sir R. Paget ..	84 Tel.			
413	To Sir F. Bertie ..	260	17,	Crete. Indemnities for M. Zaimis and for family of rural guard. Refers to Part III, No. 101. Transmits No. 58, and instructs him to submit to French Government Mr. Wratislaw's proposals that these claims might be met out of sum produced by the 3 per cent. surtax (see Nos. 416 and 417, and Part VIII, No. 117)	243
414	„ „ ..	261	17,	Southern Albanian frontier. Records conversation between M. Cambon and Sir A. Nicolson. They agreed as to the impossibility of forcing Greece to accept a frontier distasteful to her, and M. Cambon suggested that a line acceptable to Greece should be proposed by Austria and Italy. .	243
415	To Sir F. Bertie ..	263	17,	Montenegro. Pecuniary compensation. Records discussion of question at Ambassadors' meeting. The Prime Minister said that His Majesty's Government, subject to the assent of Parliament, would agree to the principle of a loan if Powers were unanimously in favour of it. Contains text of resolution proposing a loan of 1,200,000*l.*	244
	„ Sir E. Goschen ..	132			
	„ Sir G. Buchanan..	162			
	„ Sir F. Cartwright	84			
	„ Sir R. Rodd ..	110			
416	To Sir G. Buchanan..	159	17,	Crete. Indemnities for M. Zaimis and for family of murdered Mussulman rural guard. Refers to Part III, No. 101. Transmits No. 58, and instructs him to submit Mr. Wratislaw's proposals to Government to which he is accredited (see No. 413) ..	245
	„ Sir R. Rodd ..	108			
417	To Treasury		17,	Crete. Advance of 4,000,000 fr. to Prince George of Greece. Transmits No. 58, and informs them of enquiry addressed to French Government as to whether question can properly be settled by the Financial Commission at Paris (see No. 413). Asks for observations (see Part VIII, No. 72)	245
418	Council of Foreign Bondholders ..		17,	Financial Commission at Paris. Requests that the Administration of the Ottoman Debt be invited to send delegates (see Part VIII, No. 142)	24

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
419	Admiralty.. ..	Confidential	Apr. 18, 1913	Montenegro. Withdrawal of Servian troops. Transmits three telegrams to and from vice-admiral and from Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean. Austrian admiral has proposed to his Government the occupation of certain towns, a course from which vice-admiral dissents	246
420	Count de Salis ..	61 Tel.	17,	Scutari. Pecuniary compensation. Thinks King may modify his defiant attitude in view of departure of Servian troops ..	247
421	Sir R. Paget ..	98 Tel.	18,	Northern Albanian frontier. Has acted on No. 358	247
422	„ „ .	99 Tel.	18,	Serbo-Bulgarian relations. Refers to No. 411. Minister of Finance stated recently that 30,000,000 fr. would be required for upkeep of army until the definitive peace treaty was signed, and even settled. Bulgarian Government have hope she can expect it (see No. 457) ..	247
423	Sir H. Bax-Ironside..	[illegible] Tel.	18,	Albania. Has acted on No. 358	247
424	Consul-General Wratislaw	9 Tel.	18,	Crete. Preferential treatment of Greek goods. Reports publication of circular of Governor-General stating that Greek products are to be admitted free of duty by order of Greek Minister of Finance (see No. 427)	248
425	To Sir F. Elliot ..	64 Tel.	18,	Evacuation of Scutari. Withdrawal of Servian troops. He should inform Government to which he is credited that empty transports will be allowed to proceed to San Giovanni di Medua.. ..	248
	„ Sir R. Paget ..	84 Tel.			
426	To Sir F. Elliot ..	66 Tel.	18,	Crete. Preferential treatment of Greek goods. Instructs him to act according to No. 427 when his colleagues are similarly instructed (see No. 396)	248
427	To Sir F. Bertie ..	176 Tel.	18,	Crete. Preferential treatment of Greek goods. His Excellency should inform Government to which he is accredited of No. 424, and ask them to join in protesting at Athens (see Nos. 446, 467, 487, and 515)	248
	„ Sir E. Goschen ..	173 Tel.			
	„ Sir F. Cartwright	146 Tel.			
	„ Sir G. Buchanan..	313 Tel.			
	„ Sir R. Rodd ..	147 Tel.			
428	To Count de Salis ..	47 Tel. Very Conf..	18,	Evacuation of Scutari. Pecuniary compensation to Montenegro. Informs him that Ambassadors are recommending to their Governments a proposal to lend Montenegro 1,200,000*l.* He should make a communication accordingly to Montenegrin Government when his colleagues are similarly instructed (see No. 460) ..	248
429	To Sir R. Rodd ..	109	18,	Evacuation of Scutari. Pecuniary compensation to Montenegro. Informs of telegram from Marquis di San Giuliano communicated by Italian Ambassador respecting the danger of overthrow of Montenegrin dynasty and of Montenegro being united to Servia. It was important to offer a subsidy to King without delay ..	249
430	Sir R. Paget ..	89	12,	Evacuation of Scutari. Withdrawal of Servian troops. Refers to No. 251. Comments on M. Pashitch's *volte-face*, and relates his method of throwing odium for step on Austria	249

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
431	Sir R. Paget ..	81	Apr. 12, 1913	Serbo-Bulgarian relations. Refers to No. 351. Reports conversation with his Bulgarian colleague on situation. M. Toshef referred to the alliance as quite ephemeral	250
432	Sir R. Rodd ..	94	15,	Southern Albanian frontier and the Ægean islands. Reports evidence of strong Italian opposition to Greek ambitions ..	252
433	Sir F. Bertie ..	197	18,	Financial Commission at Paris. Refers to No. 361. Transmits despatch from British delegates reporting on indefinite postponement of meeting (see No. 494) .	252
434	Admiralty	Confidential	18,	Montenegro. Blockade of coast. Transmits telegrams to and from vice-admiral respecting extension of blockade ..	253
435	„ „	..	19,	Evacuation of Scutari. Withdrawal of Servian troops. Transmits telegram from Commander-in-chief reporting on situation	253
436	Sir R. Paget ..	100 Tel.	19,	Serbo-Bulgarian relations. Reports military activity. Bulgarian Government are protesting to Servian Government against ill-treatment of Bulgarian population (see Part VIII, No. 225)	254
437	„ „ ..	101 Tel.	19,	Serbo-Bulgarian relations. Refers to No. 422. Prime Minister explained to Bulgarian Minister that statement of Minister of Finance was made without his knowledge	254
438	Sir F. Cartwright ..	62 Tel.	19,	Serbo-Bulgarian relations. Bulgarian representative has applied to his Government for permission to publish the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty in Vienna to put an end to Servian misrepresentations ..	254
439	Sir H. Bax-Ironside..	146 Tel.	19,	Conclusion of peace. Refers to No. 397. Answer of allies may be expected shortly. Gathers that reservations will be made by Greek and Bulgarian Governments (see No. 442)	255
440	Sir G. Buchanan ..	155 Tel.	19,	Crete. Preferential treatment of Greek goods. Refers to No. 427. Russian Minister at Athens will be instructed to join in a protest	255
441	To Sir G. Buchanan.. „ Sir F. Bertie ..	161 262	19,	Safeguards for commerce in annexed territories. Transmits No. 335, Part V, and instructs his Excellency to enquire what answer Government to which he is accredited propose to return (see No. 535)	255
442	Sir H. Bax-Ironside..	147 Tel. Confidential	20,	Conclusion of peace. Refers to No. 439. Reply of allies has been made. Greek and Servian Governments have made reservations. Prime Minister would be glad if conditions of peace could be drawn up by Powers and presented to the allies (see No. 462)	255
443	To Sir G. Lowther ..	190 Tel.	20,	Evacuation of Scutari. Withdrawal of Servian troops. His Excellency should ascertain whether Porte will undertake not to allow attack on transports by Turkish vessels (see No. 485) .. .	256

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
444	Count de Salis ..	17	Apr. 11, 1913	Case of Father Palitch. Refers to Part VI, No. 561. Reports on Austrian representations and the Montenegrin reply. A mixed enquiry into this and other matters was arranged. Transmits copies of correspondence mentioned	256
445	Sir G. Buchanan ..	121	14,	International situation. Reports conversation with the Emperor of Russia ..	257
446	Sir F. Elliot ..	74	14,	Conclusion of peace. Transmits copy of note communicated to M. Gennadius containing rejoinder of Powers to note of allies (see No. 598)	259
447	„ „ ..	75	14,	Greek interference in the administration of Ottoman Debt. Refers to Part V, No. 179. Transmits explanations furnished by the Minister of Finance	260
448	Sir G. Buchanan .	122	16,	Roumano-Bulgarian arbitration. Refers to No. 397. Transmits protocol of 4th meeting and gives account of discussion. A communiqué has been published by Foreign Ministry declaring that all reports of the proceedings of conference are without foundation	261
449	„ „ ..	127	16,	Roumano-Bulgarian arbitration. Refers to No. 448. Transmits protocol of 5th meeting, held 15th April, and gives account of proceedings (see No. 451) ..	263
450	Sir G. Lowther ..	314	17,	Graeco-Bulgarian relations. Transmits despatches from Consul-General Lamb and Vice-Consul Morgan reporting on situation (see Part VIII, No. 110) ..	264
451	Sir G. Buchanan ..	128	17,	Roumano-Bulgarian arbitration. Refers to No. 449. Transmits text of final decision, which was reached at 6th meeting of Ambassadors (see Nos. 488, 534, and 618, and Part VIII, No. 148)	266
452	Sir R. Rodd ..	95	18,	Financial Commission at Paris. Reports names of Italian representatives	267
453	Sir R. Paget	82	18,	Serbo-Bulgarian relations. Translates article in the "Satamprava" setting forth grounds for Servia's claim for a revision of the treaty, and outlines Bulgaria's reply	268
454	Admiralty ..	Confidential	19,	Evacuation of Scutari. Withdrawal of Servian troops. Transmits telegram from vice-admiral reporting decision of conference of commanders, against wishes of Austrian Admiral, not to extend blockade. Admiral suggests cause of Austrian attitude	268
455	Count Benckendorff to Sir A. Nicolson ..		20,	Mission of the "Saint-Pétersbourg" to remove Servian wounded from Albanian coast to Salonika. Has been sent at request despatch of instructions to British admiral to permit passage of ship ..	269
456	Memorandum communicated by M. de Flotow ..		21,	Distribution of Ottoman Debt. Replies to No. 185, and gives figures on which French proposal was based. In view of the different results obtained by the various Powers by different methods of calculation M. Pichon would see no objection to formulation of British amendment proposed in No. 381, Part V ..	269

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
457	Admiralty ..	Confidential	April 24, 1913	Evacuation of Scutari. Withdrawal of Servian troops. Transmits copy of telegram informing vice-admiral of position in regard to obtaining assurances from the Porte not to permit attack on transports, and giving him instructions	278
458	M. Cambon ..	.	21,	Financial Commission at Paris. Communicates its programme	279
459	Admiralty ..	..	20,	Evacuation of Scutari. Withdrawal of Servian troops. Transmits telegram from vice-admiral reporting on embarkation of Servians. Servian general fears massacres in Albania when siege of Scutari is raised	279
460	Count de Salis ..	62 Tel.	20,	Evacuation of Scutari. Pecuniary compensation to Montenegro. Refers to No. 428. Montenegrins are still defiant, but King will probably accept the money. Suggests that no condition regarding Scutari be coupled with the offer of a loan ..	279
461	Sir F. Elliot ..	59 Tel.	21,	Conclusion of peace. Gives reply of allies to the Powers' note, the conditions in which they accept with reservations (see Nos. 453, 456, and 458)	280
462	Sir H. Rax-Ironside. .	143 Tel Confidential	21,	Conclusion of peace. Refers to No. 442. Prime Minister has not yet been able to bring Greek and Servian Governments into line, and would be grateful for some authoritative action on part of Powers	280
463	„ „ .	149 Tel.	21,	Conclusion of peace. Gives text of reply of allies to Powers' note (see Nos. 461 and 462)	280
464	Sir G. Lowther ..	201 Tel.	21,	Castellorizo. Refers to No. 37. His Majesty's vice-consul at Rhodes reports occupation of Castellorizo by Greeks (see Part VIII, No. 112)	281
465	„ „ ..	202 Tel.	21,	Evacuation of Scutari. Safe conduct for Servian troops. Refers to No. 443. Has informed Commander-in-chief at Malta that assurance has been given ..	281
466	Sir R. Paget ..	103 Tel.	21,	Conclusion of peace. Has received reply of allies, and recounts its concluding paragraph (see Nos. 461 and 463)	281
467	Sir E. Goschen ..	67 Tel.	21,	Crete. Preferential treatment of Greek goods. Refers to No. 427. German Government will join in representations at Athens	282
468	Consul-General Lamb	27 Tel.	21,	Greek military movements. Reports on ..	282
469	To Count de Salis ..	48 Tel.	21,	Evacuation of Scutari. Pecuniary compensation to Montenegro. Gives text of resolution at Ambassadors' Conference to effect that an offer should at once be made to Montenegrin Government, and that to facilitate its acceptance Scutari might be surrendered to the Powers with Turkish consent. Instructs Count de Salis to act in sense of resolution when his colleagues are similarly instructed (see No. 470) ..	282
470	To Sir E. Goschen ..	176 Tel.	21,	Evacuation of Scutari. Pecuniary compensation to Montenegro. No. 469 is for his Excellency's information only	282
	„ Sir F. Bertie ..	178 Tel.			
	„ Sir R. Rodd ..	150 Tel.			
	„ Sir G. Buchanan..	351 Tel.			
	„ Sir F. Cartwright	149 Tel.			

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
471	To Sir F. Bertie ..	264	Apr. 21, 1913	Seizure of Ottoman fiscal stamps. Transmits No. 39. Sir E. Grey thinks a belligerent is entitled to seize such property, but would be glad to learn views of Government to which his Excellency is accredited (see Part VIII, Nos. 35, 139, 171, 187, and 367)	283
	„ Sir E. Goschen	133			
	„ Sir F. Cartwright	85			
	„ Sir G. Buchanan..	163			
	„ Sir R. Rodd ..	111			
472	To Sir F. Bertie ..	267	21,	Evacuation of Scutari. Pecuniary compensation to Montenegro. Informs of discussion at Ambassadors' Conference of 21st April (see No. 469). Suggestions for further measures than a blockade were made, but withdrawn	283
	„ Sir E. Goschen ..	138			
	„ Sir F. Cartwright	87			
	„ Sir G. Buchanan	164			
	„ Sir R. Rodd ..	116			
473	To Sir G. Lowther ..	115	21,	Interference with Administration of Ottoman Debt. Refers to Part IV, No. 470. Transmits No. 322. Sir E. Grey considers the Bulgarian explanations unsatisfactory, and requests Sir V. Corbett to advise on this question, and also on suggested enquiry into the seizure of records at Phokopeppas mills	284
474	To Imperial Ottoman Bank	..	21,	Financial Commission. Refers to No. 401. Informs them that interests of British holders of bonds and bills, other than those with whom Council of Foreign Bondholders is connected, will be duly considered	284
475	Sir F. Elliot ..	76	15,	Castellorizo. Refers to No. 116. Reports conversation with M. Coromilas recounting recent events. Latter had no official knowledge of Turkish descent on island. An expedition had recently sailed from the Pirmus, and had hoisted Greek flag in island	284
476	„ „ ..	77 Confidential	15,	Neutralisation of Corfu Channel. Ægean islands. War indemnity. Relates conversation with M. Coromilas on these subjects, and on situation generally from Greek point of view	285
477	Admiralty	Confidential	21,	Evacuation of Scutari. Withdrawal of Servian troops. Transmits telegram from vice-admiral reporting on situation ..	286
478	Council of Foreign Bondholders	..	21,	Financial Commission. Transmits copy of communication being made to the various syndicates representing the holders of Turkish bonds proposing a course of action	286
479	Admiralty	..	22,	Evacuation of Scutari. Embarkation of Servian troops. Transmits telegram from vice-admiral reporting on situation ..	287
480	„ „	..	21,	Evacuation of Scutari. Transmits telegram from Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, reporting arrival at Salonica of Greek transports with Greek troops	287
481	Sir F. Cartwright ..	63 Tel.	22,	Evacuation of Scutari. Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks an international force should now be disembarked, as blockade is producing no effect. He considers that financial offers to Montenegro would be useless	287
482	Sir R. Paget ..	104 Tel.	22,	Evacuation of Scutari. Withdrawal of Servian troops. Refers to No. 371. A Servian emissary has succeeded in communicating to Governor that Servian troops are withdrawing	288

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
483	Sir R. Paget ..	105 Tel.	Apr. 22, 1913	Northern Albanian frontier. Withdrawal of Servian troops. Ministry learns of Mahommedan attacks on Christians. Servians have been petitioned to remain to keep order	288
484	„ „ ..	106 Tel.	22,	Serbo-Bulgarian relations. Reports Servian military movements (see No. 579) ..	288
485	Sir H. Bax-Ironside..	150 Tel.	22,	Serbo-Bulgarian relations. Reports that tension is becoming acute	288
486	Count de Salis ..	63 Tel.	22,	Conclusion of peace. Refers to No. 393. Informs of last part of reply of Montenegrin Government to Powers' note (see No. 573)	289
487	Sir R. Rodd ..	78 Tel.	22,	Crete. Preferential treatment of Greek goods. Refers to No. 427. Italian Government will join in collective representation, but wish to avoid independent action	289
488	To Sir G. Buchanan..	352 Tel.	22,	Roumano-Bulgarian arbitration. Refers to No. 551. Sir E. Grey has no modification to suggest in text of decision of conference	289
489	To Sir F. Bertie ..	265	22,	Financial Commission. Transmits No. 214. Sir E. Grey is not disposed to accede to Turkish request that the Ottoman Debt Administration be represented at the Commission, and will reply in this sense. His Excellency should so inform Government to which he is accredited, and ask what their attitude will be (see Part VIII, Nos. 118, 172, 182, 188, and 255) ..	289
	„ Sir E. Goschen ..	136			
	„ Sir F. Cartwright	86			
	„ Sir R. Rodd ..	114			
490	Consul-General Lamb	11 Commercial	16,	Customs in territories occupied by Greek troops. Reports on fiscal arrangements adopted	290
491	Count de Salis ..	19	17,	Scutari. Indiscriminate bombardment. Considers shell that wounded British vice-consul must have been fired by Montenegrins, and transmits text of note communicated to Montenegrin Government (see No. 560)	290
492	Sir G. Lowther ..	325	19,	Withdrawal of Servian troops from Gheyghueli and Demir Kapu. Refers to No. 335. Transmits report from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica ..	291
493	„ „ ..	326	19,	Forcible conversions of Moslems in district of Salonica. Transmits report from His Majesty's consul-general, who considers these barbarities to be result of a deliberate policy	291
494	Sir F. Bertie ..	202	22,	Financial questions arising out of the war. Refers to No. 433. Transmits despatch from British delegates to Commission reporting a discussion with French delegates. More information is needed on various points. Preliminary informal meetings would expedite the work of the Commission	293

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
495	Sir F. Bertie ..	203	Apr. 22, 1913	Ottoman Debt. Position of holders of bills issued 14th February, 1912, by the National Bank of Turkey and the Bank of Salonica. Refers to No. 102. Transmits note from M. Pichon, who has instructed French representatives at Sophia and Athens to discuss the matter there. He thinks it desirable that British representatives should be similarly instructed (see No. 651, and Part VIII, No. 482) ..	294
496	M. Cambon		22,	Financial Commission. French Government propose 15th May as date of meeting of Commission, and suggest that only the diplomatic delegate and the chief technical delegate should be admitted to the plenary sittings (see No. 627)	295
497	Admiralty	Confidential	22,	Mission of the "Saint-Pétersbourg." Transmits copy of telegram to vice-admiral instructing him to give all assistance ..	295
498	Board of Trade ..	Confidential	22,	Safeguards for foreign trade in the annexed territories. Replies to No. 397. Board of Trade agree to drop suggestion in article I (3), but think that article I (4) might be included in proposals to Powers	296
499	Count Mensdorff ..	..	23,	The Capitulations in the annexed territories. Gives observations on Russian proposal made at meeting of 15th March, which was based on contention that former treaty rights remain in force in ceded territories	296
500	Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff	..	23,	Fall of Scutari. Declares that measures must at once be taken to enforce will of Europe and rehabilitate dignity of Powers. Proposes occupation or bombardment of Montenegrin ports, and states that, if Powers cannot agree to this, Austria will act alone to compel evacuation of Scutari	297
501	Admiralty	Confidential	23,	Evacuation of Scutari. Withdrawal of Servian troops. Transmits three telegrams from vice-admiral reporting on situation. The Albanians are uneasy at withdrawal of Servian forces. Blockade has been extended to Durazzo to stop a ship stated to be bringing Indian corn for Montenegrin army	297
502	Count de Salis ..	64 Tel.	23,	Fall of Scutari. Announces fall	298
503	Sir G. Buchanan ..	156 Tel.	23,	1. Fall of Scutari. 2. Serbo-Bulgarian relations. Minister for Foreign Affairs fears Austrian action, and is apprehensive of effect even of collective coercive measures on Russian opinion. He asks whether Sir E. Grey could suggest offering King Nicolas a strip of territory in addition to loan to secure evacuation of Scutari. His Excellency is anxious about Serbo-Bulgarian relations (see No. 526)	298
504	Sir F. Cartwright ..	63 A Tel.	23,	Austrian military preparations. Transmits report from Director of Military Operations	299
505	Sir R. Paget ..	107 Tel.	23,	Ottoman Debt. Refers to Part VI, No. 527. Enquires whether he is to present memorandum with his French and Austrian colleagues (see No. 524)	299

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
506	Sir F. Elliot ..	60 Tel.	Apr. 23, 1913	Crete. Preferential treatment of Greek goods. Refers to No. 426. Anticipates that Greek Government would justify preference by precedent of Italian action in Ægean islands. Enquires, therefore, whether it is desirable to make protest (see No. 525)	299
507	To Sir G. Lowther ..	195 Tel.	23,	Conclusion of peace. Informs of resolution of Conference that Porte should be informed of acceptance of basis of negotiations by allies and asked to choose representatives for negotiating peace. His Excellency should act accordingly when his colleagues are similarly instructed (see Part VIII, Nos. 15 and 115) ..	299
508	To Count de Salis ..	50 Tel.	23,	Evacuation of Scutari. Instructs him to join in communication to Montenegrin Government demanding evacuation (see No. 567)	300
509	To Sir F. Elliot .. „ Sir H. Bax-Ironside „ Sir R. Paget .. „ Count de Salis ..	67 Tel. 102 Tel. 83 Tel. 49 Tel.	23,	Conclusion of peace. Instructs him to join in a communication inviting the allies to choose plenipotentiaries for negotiating peace. The definition of Albania and the Ægean islands are matters exclusively concerning the Powers (see No. 617, and Part VIII, Nos. 18, 43, 55, and 256) ..	300
510	To Sir F. Cartwright	89	23,	Evacuation of Scutari. Informs of conversation between Austrian Ambassador and Sir A. Nicolson. Austrian Government, who anticipate speedy fall of Scutari, propose occupation of points on coast. Sir A. Nicolson expressed his doubts as to whether Prime Minister or Sir E. Grey would consent to join in such action ..	300
511	Consul-General Wratislaw	7	12,	Crete. Reports on general situation since arrival of M. Dragoumis as Governor-General. The last half-year has been unprecedentedly calm, and the public appear quite content under the benevolent despotism of M. Dragoumis	301
512	Count de Salis ..	20	17,	Montenegro and Russia. Reports on press comments concerning the Russian official communiqué describing that country's policy towards Montenegro	302
513	Sir F. Elliot ..	79	17,	Turkish troops at Vallona. Reports conversation with M. Coromilas, who is clearly embarrassed by their presence and suggests a combined operation by Greeks and Servians to capture them	303
514	„ „ ..	80	17,	Northern Albanian frontier. Transmits text of collective note informing Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Powers' definition of frontier	303
515	„ „ ..	81	17,	Greek customs in occupied territories. Refers to No. 107. Transmits translation of Act establishing fiscal conditions similar to those in Greece	304
516	Admiralty		23,	State of affairs at Corfu. Transmits report by Commander Woodward	304
517	„ „ ..	Confidential	24,	Evacuation of Scutari. Transmits telegram reporting that international detachment of 1,000 men will be landed to maintain order on surrender of town by Montenegrins ..	305
518	Sir G. Lowther ..	205 Tel.	23,	Turkey and Bulgaria. Reports prolongation of suspension of hostilities until 4th May ..	306

No.	Name	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
519	Sir F. Elliot ..	61 Tel.	Apr. 24, 1913	Southern Albanian frontier. Reports protest by inhabitants of several places against separation from Greece	306
520	Count de Salis ..	65 Tel.	24,	Montenegro. Blockade. Transmits text of telegram from vice-admiral announcing its extension to Durazzo (see Nos. 524 and 575)	306
521	„ „ ..	66 Tel.	24,	Montenegro. Extension of blockade. Refers to No. 520. Has informed Montenegrin Government accordingly (see No. 575) ..	306
522	Sir F. Cartwright ..	64 Tel. Confidential	24,	Fall of Scutari. Learns that Austrian Government are anxiously awaiting reply of Powers to their circular telegram. If their answer is unfavourable, Austrian Ambassador will cease attending Ambassadors' Conference	306
523	Sir H. Bax-Ironside..	152 Tel.	24,	Turkey and Bulgaria. Reports prolongation of suspension of hostilities	307
524	To Sir R. Paget ..	86 Tel.	24,	Ottoman Debt. Refers to No. 505. Authorises him to act with his French and Austrian colleagues	307
525	To Sir R. Rodd ..	155 Tel.	24,	Crete. Preferential treatment of Greek goods. Refers to No. 506. Enquires whether Italian goods enter Ægean islands duty free (see Nos. 560 and 569) ..	307
526	To Sir G. Buchanan..	356 Tel.	24,	Evacuation of Scutari. Refers to No. 503. Points out danger of Austrian action, and instructs his Excellency to ask M. Sazonof to agree to delivery of decisive communication to Montenegrin Government (see No. 510)	307
527	To Sir G. Buchanan .. „ Sir F. Bertie ..	168 269	24,	Conclusion of peace. Informs of conversation between M. Cambon, Count Benckendorff, and Sir A. Nicolson in regard to reply of allies. Two Ambassadors thought an Ambassadors' conference should at once be held to agree on action to be taken to obtain cessation of hostilities	308
528	To Count de Salis ..	12	24,	Evacuation of Scutari. Informs of verbal communication from M. Popovitch that Montenegrin Government had irrevocably decided to continue her operations against Scutari, and would not accept any compensations, territorial or financial ..	308
529	To Sir F. Cartwright	90	24,	Evacuation of Scutari. Informs of conversation between Count Mensdorff and Sir A. Nicolson. Count Berchtold urged that troops should be landed. Sir A. Nicolson reminded Count Mensdorff of His Majesty's Government's decision not to join in landing detachments	309
530	To Treasury ..	..	24,	Financial Commission. Transmits for observations programme prepared by French Government (see Part VIII, No. 73) ..	309
531	Consul-General Wratislaw	8	16,	Crete. Reports arrival of Greek officers to act, it is understood, as instructors to the 1912 contingent of Cretan recruits ..	309
532	Sir H. Bax-Ironside..	60 Secret	18,	Serbo-Bulgarian relations. Refers to Part VI, No. 297. Bulgarian Government have replied to Servian note, categorically refusing their demands. The matter will probably be put in the hands of the Russian Government as arbitrators (see No. 562) ..	310

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
533	Sir H. Bax-Ironside..	61	Apr. 19, 1913	Forcible conversions. Suggests that incident reported by Mr. Lamb of conversion of Mussulmans at Tchervnik would, if brought to notice of Government, test the genuineness of their professed intentions (see No. 521)	310
534	Sir G. Buchanan ..	132	22,	Roumano-Bulgarian arbitration. Refers to No. 451. Transmits protocol of 6th sitting, held 17th April, announcing decision of Conference	310
535	Sir F. Bertie ..	210	24,	Safeguards for commerce in annexed territories. Refers to No. 441. French Government have not received any similar communication from German Government	312
536	Admiralty	Confidential	25,	Evacuation of Scutari. Vice-admiral submits that he could proceed to Scutari to interview Montenegrin authorities if desired. Informs of movements of German vessel "Goeben"	312
537	Sir G. Lowther ..	207 Tel.	24,	Financial Commission. Reports that Sir R. Crawford is leaving for Paris 28th April, and that remainder of commission will follow later	313
538	Count de Salis ..	67 Tel.	24,	Fall of Scutari. Reports that Montenegrins have not yet been able to enter town, but are expected to do so next day (see No. 562)	313
539	Sir F. Cartwright ..	65 Tel.	25,	Evacuation of Scutari. Reports conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs about situation. Latter anxiously awaiting reply of Powers to his circular note ..	313
540	Sir G. Buchanan ..	138 Tel.	25,	Evacuation of Scutari. Refers to No. 526. Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees to proposed communication, but is anxious that territorial compensation should be offered to King privately for surrender of Scutari	313
541	Sir R. Paget ..	108 Tel.	25,	Servian military movements. Reports departure of 11th regiment from Monastir to Kumanovo (see No. 561)	314
542	Sir F. Bertie ..	54 Tel. Confidential	25,	Evacuation of Scutari. French Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks Russian proposal that Montenegro should receive territorial compensation should come, if made, from Russian Government	314
543	„ „ ..	55 Tel.	25,	Crete. Preferential treatment of Greek goods. Refers to No. 427. French Minister at Athens has been instructed to join in protest	314
544	Sir H. Bax-Ironside..	153 Tel.	25,	Evacuation of Scutari. Bulgarian Prime Minister learns that King of Montenegro will surrender Scutari in return for financial and territorial compensations ..	314
545	To Sir F. Bertie ..	182 Tel.	25,	Evacuation of Scutari. Informs of decisions of Ambassadors' Conference held 24th April. It was agreed to make collective communication at Cettinjé at once. Blockade would then be made stricter and financial aid cut off. Further measures would have to be considered if these failed (see No. 547)	314
	„ Sir G. Buchanan..	360 Tel.			
	„ Sir R. Rodd	156 Tel.			
	„ Sir F. Cartwright	153 Tel.			
	„ Sir E. Goschen .	182 Tel.			

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
546	To Count de Salis ..	52 Tel.	Apr. 25, 1913	Evacuation of Scutari. Instructs him to report to Foreign Office and to vice-admiral as soon as collective communication to Montenegrin Government has been made	315
547	*Procès-verbal* of meeting of Ambassadors	..	25,	Evacuation of Scutari (see No. 545). Contains text of proposed [illegible]	315
548	Sir G. Lowther ..	330	19,	Ottoman Debt. Revenues from the 3 per cent. customs surtax. Reports discussion by Council of the Debt as to their disposal	316
549	„ „ ..	351	19,	Castellorizo. Refers to No. 37. Reports further overtures of Greek agents there ..	316
550	Sir F. Elliot .	82	21,	International Financial Commission at Athens. Transmits despatch from British delegate respecting a request by the National Bank of Greece to be released from the obligation of holding in reserve bonds of the 2½ per cent. guaranteed loan given in payment of advances to the Government prior to 1898 (see Part VIII, Nos. 16, 125, and 170)	317
551	Sir G. Lowther	333 Confidential	21,	Position of Princess Khadejeh, fourth wife of the ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid, and of her son Prince Ahmed Nemeddin. Transmits petition from them to the King, and explains their case. Comments on persecution of members of Imperial Family by the Committee	319
552	„ „ ..	335	22,	Situation in Adrianople. Transmits report from His Majesty's consul describing events from 31st March to 7th April ..	321
553	Sir R. Rodd ..	96	23,	Southern Albanian frontier. Refers to No. 308. Reports on Italian attitude towards Greek claims to west. As Greece desires a more northerly frontier, a compromise might be arranged	323
554	Sir G. Buchanan ..	134	23,	Crete. Preferential treatment of Greek goods. Transmits *aide-mémoire* from Russian Government explaining their views. Russian Minister at Athens has been instructed to join in making protest..	323
555	Sir P. Harvey to Sir L. Mallet	..	24,	Financial Commission. War indemnity. Transmits memorandum on present situation. Sir P. Harvey thinks that, in referring question to a commission, the principle of an indemnity was admitted, and the commission will really only be concerned with its amount	324
556	Treasury ..	.. ..	25,	Ottoman Debt. The Financial Commissioners have stated their preference for French scheme of calculating revenues arising from the ceded territories (see Part VIII, No. 134)	325
557	„ „ ..	.. ..	25,	Financial Commission. Refers to No. 264. Gives observations of Lords Commissioners of the Treasury to which they [illegible] Sir P. Harvey's proposal to suggest an amendment to formula accepted by Ambassadors' Conference	325
558	Admiralty ..	.. Confidential	26,	Evacuation of Scutari. Transmits telegram to vice-admiral informing him that any mission to Montenegrin authorities would be most undesirable. He should consider measures to make blockade stricter ..	326

No.	Name	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
559	Sir E. Goschen ..	69 Tel.	Apr. 26, 1913	Evacuation of Scutari. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs thinks the only solution is to give Austria and Italy a mandate	326
560	Sir R. Rodd ..	79 Tel.	26,	Crete. Preferential treatment of Greek goods. Refers to No. 525. Information respecting Italian customs in the Ægean Islands has been telegraphed for to Rhodes	326
561	Sir R. Paget ..	109 Tel.	26,	Serbo-Bulgarian relations. Refers to No. 511. Gives reasons, reported to military attaché, for delay of the outbreak of hostilities until 5 days before 1st May	326
562	Count de Salis ..	68 Tel.	26,	Fall of Scutari. Refers to No. 538. Cannot ascertain definitely conditions of surrender. It is reported to be Essad Pasha's intention to proclaim himself ruler of Albania (see No. 564). ..	327
563	To Sir G. Lowther ..	123 Confidential	26,	Messrs. Armstrong's negotiations with Turkish Government. Communicates information received to effect that such negotiations are to be conducted by Captain Bonner. Their nature is unknown ..	327
564	Count de Salis ..	70 Tel.	26,	Fall of Scutari. Refers to No. 562. Montenegrins have occupied town without resistance, and good order is being maintained. Conditions of surrender were probably favourable to Essad ..	327
565	.. .. ..	71 Tel.	26,	Scutari. Indiscriminate bombardment. Refers to No. 491. Vice-consul has recovered from wound	328
566	.. .. ..	72 Tel.	27,	Conclusion of peace. Refers to Part VI, No. 546. Representation has not yet been made, as Russian Minister is awaiting instructions	328
567	.. .. ..	73 Tel.	27,	Evacuation of Scutari. Refers to No. 508. Collective representation in sense of Ambassadors' resolution has been made (see No. 581)	328
568	Sir F. Cartwright ..	66 Tel.	27,	Evacuation of Scutari. Count Berchtold is disappointed at outcome of Ambassadors' mission, and said patience of Government was almost exhausted. They could not entertain Russian suggestion that Montenegro should receive territorial compensation at expense of Albania	328
569	Sir R. Rodd ..	81 Tel.	27,	Crete. Preferential treatment of Greek goods. Italian precedent. Refers to No. 525. Italian goods, with exception of military supplies, pay duty on importation into occupied islands (see No. 590) ..	329
570	Sir R. Paget ..	110 Tel.	27,	Albania. Reports rumour that Essad has proclaimed himself ruler of Albania ..	329
571	Mr. Vaughan ..	44	21,	Resignation of M. Filipesco. Reports. He was most warlike member of Cabinet, and M. Maiorescu's pacific policy will now receive more support	329
572	" " ..	45	21,	Roumanian politics. Reports on recent events	330

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
573	Count de Salis ..	21	Apr. 21, 1913	Conclusion of peace. Refers to No. 486. Transmits texts of collective note to Montenegrin Government and of their reply	331
574	Sir R. Paget ..	82 A	22,	Servian financial measures to meet military expenditure. The Skupshtina have authorised a credit of 3,600,000*l*. ..	332
575	Count de Salis ..	22	23,	Montenegro. Extension of blockade. Refers to Nos. 520 and 521. Transmits copies of telegram from vice-admiral and of note addressed to Government notifying them of the extension	332
576	Sir G. Lowther ..	342	24,	Ottoman Debt. Difficulties caused by action of Bulgarian officials in Macedonia. Transmits letter from Sir A. Block expressing thanks of Debt Council for His Majesty's Government's support. When peace is assured Council will decide as to appointment of agents in Balkan capitals on lines of Vice-Consul Heard's memorandum (see Part VIII, No. 64) ..	333
577	" " ..	344	24,	Financial Commission. Reports names of Turkish members	334
578	Sir R. Paget ..	83	24,	Servian outrages upon Moslems. Has acted on No. 235. He was informed that Servian Government had a clear conscience, and could not admit any accusations not substantially proved	334
579	" " ..	85	24,	Serbo-Bulgarian relations. Refers to No. 481. Reports discussion with M. Stefanovitch. States Servian case and attitude. Believes issue to be dependent on Russian views	334
580	" " ..	86	25,	Fall of Scutari. Reports enthusiastic reception of news in Belgrade. Thinks, however, its surrender not very opportune for the Servian Government, whose assistance is shown to be unnecessary for Montenegro (see Part VIII, No. 30)	336
581	Admiralty ..	.. Confidential	26,	Montenegro. Blockade. Transmits telegram reporting on blockade, which is now quite strict	336
582	" " ..	..	28,	Albania. Conditions in, after withdrawal of Servian troops. Transmits letter addressed to vice-admiral by Servian general, who fears outbreak of disorders, and begs that steps may be taken to maintain order ..	337
583	" " ..	.. Confidential	28,	Albania. Essad Pasha's movements. Bulgarian forces at Salonica. The "Hamidyeh." Transmits telegrams from vice-admiral and from Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, reporting on	338
584	M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff	Telegraphic	21,	Evacuation of Scutari. M. Sazonof has no objection in principle to suggested collective representation at Cettinje. He has proposed to Austrian Government that King Nicholas should be offered compensation for surrender of town ..	338
585	Count de Salis ..	74 Tel.	27,	Evacuation of Scutari. Refers to No. 567. Minister for Foreign Affairs cannot reply to collective note until after festival of Easter (see No. 632 and Part VIII, No. 70)	339

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
586	Sir G. Buchanan ..	160 Tel.	Apr. 28, 1913	Evacuation of Scutari. Danger of isolated action by Austria. Reports conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir G. Buchanan fears that, if bloodshed results from Austrian action, Russian public opinion will get beyond control ..	339
587	Sir R. Rodd ..	82 Tel.	28,	Evacuation of Scutari. Austrian intervention. Italy would not act with Austria alone, though she would co-operate efficaciously with Great Britain or France	340
588	Mr. Vaughan ..	66 Tel.	28,	Departure of Turkish steamer with war material from Kustendje. Reports ..	340
589	To Sir G. Buchanan..	365 Tel.	28,	Evacuation of Scutari. Informs him of course Sir E. Grey proposes to take. Suggests that Powers should agree to discussion of compensation for King Nicholas if he consents to evacuation of Scutari (see No. 619)..	340
590	To Sir F. Elliot ..	69 Tel.	28.	Crete. Preferential treatment of Greek goods. Refers to No. 569. Authorises him to act when his colleagues are similarly instructed	341
591	To Sir F. Bertie .. „ Sir G. Buchanan..	292 176	28,	Evacuation of Scutari. Informs his Excellency that he adopted course recorded in proceedings of Ambassadors' Conference held that day after consultation with French and Russian Ambassadors ..	341
592	To Sir H. Bax-Ironside	59	28,	Conclusion of peace. Informs of conversation with Bulgarian Minister. Bulgarian Government desired the Ambassadors' Conference to draw up terms of peace. Sir E. Grey suggested that Powers' last representation might perhaps be turned into a treaty..	341
593	To Sir R. Rodd ..	119	28,	Evacuation of Scutari. Coercive measures. Informs him of conversation with Italian Ambassador. Italy would oppose a mandate to Austria, and would not herself act with Austria alone. She would participate if other Powers co-operated. Sir E. Grey did not think England could join in military action, but said he would consult the Cabinet	341
594	To Sir E. Goschen ..	145	28.	Evacuation of Scutari. Coercive measures. Informs of conversation with German Ambassador, who urged British co-operation with Austria and Italy. Sir E. Grey thought His Majesty's Government could only participate in general international action, but would consult Cabinet. He understood that a policy of compensation had been decided on	342
595	To Sir F. Cartwright	92	28,	Evacuation of Scutari. Coercive measures. Transmits note from Austrian Ambassador setting forth views of his Government. Count Mensdorff was instructed to propose coercive measures if Montenegro failed to reply satisfactorily to Powers' note. If Conference came to no decision, Austria would reserve the right to take necessary action on account of not. Informs of conversation with Count Mensdorff about latter's instructions ..	342

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
596	To Sir F. Cartwright „ Sir F. Bertie .. „ Sir E. Goschen .. „ Sir R. Rodd .. „ Sir G. Buchanan.	93 293 146 120 117	Apr. 28, 1913	Evacuation of Scutari. Coercive measures. Peace conditions Transmits record of Ambassadors' Conference held 28th April. Ambassadors of the Triple Alliance favoured coercion by an international force. It was doubtful whether France and England could participate in such action. Sir E. Grey suggested offering to discuss compensation with King Nicholas if he yielded. His suggestion was referred to the respective Governments. Sir E. Grey communicated to Conference the statement of Bulgarian Minister as to formulating peace conditions ..	344
597	To Sir G. Lowther ..	124	28,	Ottoman Debt. Refers to Part IV, No. 470. Transmits for Sir A. Block's observations, reply of Greek Government	345
597A	To Treasury ..	..	28,	Financial Commission at Athens. Greek Civil List. Transmits No. 291 A. Enquires views of Treasury	345A
598	Sir F. Elliot ..	85	21.	Conclusion of peace. Refers to No. 446. Transmits, with observations, further reply of allies to peace proposals (see No. 461)	345
599	„ „ ..	86	22.	Customs in occupied territories. Refers to No. 107. Transmits reply of Greek Government to collective protest. They defend preferential treatment of Greek goods on ground of right and of precedent, citing Italian action in the Ægean islands	346
600	Sir H. Bax-Ironside..	63	22.	Conclusion of peace. Relations of allies. Reports conversation with Bulgarian Prime Minister, who recounted recent events and surveyed situation	346
601	„ „ ..	64	24,	Forcible conversions by Bulgarians. Refers to No. 317. Transmits note to Bulgarian Government and their reply denying that violence had been used, but admitting employment of methods of intimidation	347
602	„ „ ..	65 Confidential	24,	Relations of the allies. Refers to No. 532. Reports conversation with M. Nekludof, his Russian colleague, who suggests separate discussions between M. Gueshof and M. Venizelos and then between M. Gueshof and M. Pashitch. M. Nekludof's view of situation seems opposed to that of M. de Hartwig	348
603	„ „ ..	66	24,	Bulgarian army. Transmits report from military attaché on the condition and distribution of Bulgarian forces, and the feeling of the army against Russia	349
604	„ „ ..	67	24.	Bulgarian Embassy. Refers to No. 373. Reports on proceedings	349
605	„ „ ..	69	25.	Situation in Bulgaria. Refers to No. 534. Surveys recent events ..	350
606	„ „ ..	70	25.	Bulgarian, Servian, and Greek military dispositions. Transmits report from military attaché	351
607	Sir G. Buchanan ..	156	26.	Fall of Scutari. Reports reception of the news by the Russian press and people	352
608	Mr. Ramsay (Treasury) to Mr. Maxwell	..	26.	Ottoman Debt. War indemnity. Transmits unofficial memorandum on scheme proposed by Bulgarian Government in their note arguing in favour of a war indemnity (see No. 599)	353

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
609	Treasury		Apr. 26, 1913	Ottoman Debt. War indemnity. Refers to No. 365. Treasury cannot usefully criticise Bulgarian arguments in favour of a war indemnity (see No. 608)	355
610	Sir F. Bertie ..	215	28,	Evacuation of Scutari. Summarises article in "Temps" declaring that Austria is "bluffing." Transmits article in "Figaro" protesting against criticisms of the Ambassadors' Conference (see Part VIII, No. 364)	355
611	Admiralty	Confidential	28.	Evacuation of Scutari. Embarkation of Servian troops. Essad Pasha's army. Embarkation of Turkish troops. Transmits telegram from vice-admiral relative to above	356
612	„ „ ..	Confidential	29.	Albania. Movements of Essad Pasha. Transmits telegram from vice-admiral containing text of telegram sent by Essad to War Minister, Constantinople ..	356
613	Sir F. Cartwright ..	67 Tel.	29,	Evacuation of Scutari. Reports conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs on Austrian attitude. Minister for Foreign Affairs is perturbed by Essad Pasha's actions	356
614	Sir E. Goschen ..	70 Tel.	29.	Evacuation of Scutari. From language of Foreign Minister and of Austrian Ambassador danger of action by Austria appears imminent	357
615	Sir G. Lowther ..	209 Tel.	29.	Albania. Essad Pasha. Informs of message from Essad to War Minister, and gives text of reply latter proposed to send (see No. 620)	357
616	„ „ ..	212 Tel.	29.	Albania. Essad Pasha. Refers to No. 615. Reply to Essad Pasha has been sent through Ottoman Ambassador at Rome ..	358
617	Sir H. Rax-Ironside ..	154 Tel.	29.	Conclusion of peace. Refers to No. 599. Cannot act as his Russian colleague has no instructions	358
618	Sir G. Buchanan ..	163 Tel.	29.	Roumano-Bulgarian arbitration. Refers to No. 451. Bulgarian Government have requested modification in text of Ambassadors' decision, signature of which has in consequence been delayed until 2nd May	358
619	„ „ ..	161 Tel.	29,	Evacuation of Scutari. Has communicated No. 589 to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who approves proposed language to King of Montenegro. M. Sazonof hopes England will not publicly declare that she has no objection to military action by other Powers (see Nos. 603 and 616) ..	359
620	To Sir G. Lowther ..	201 Tel.	29,	Albania. Essad Pasha's troops. Refers to No. 615. He should consult with his colleagues as to approaching Turkish Government on question of conveying Essad's troops to Asia Minor (see Nos. 622 and 630)	359
621	To Sir H. Rax-Ironside	103 Tel.	29,	Forcible conversions of Moslems. Refers to No. 535. Authorises him to use his discretion in acting as he suggests (see Part VIII, No. 432)	359

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
622	To Sir R. Rodd ..	160 Tel.	Apr. 29, 1913	Albania. Essad Pasha's troops. Refers to No. 620. His Excellency should ascertain whether Minister for Foreign Affairs would consent to proposed step (see Nos. 637, 638, and 640, and Part VIII, No. 45)	360
	„ Sir F. Cartwright	156 Tel.			
	„ Sir E. Goschen ..	185 Tel.			
	„ Sir F. Bertie ..	186 Tel.			
	„ Sir G. Buchanan .	368 Tel.			
623	To Sir F. Cartwright	94	29,	Evacuation of Scutari. Records conversation with Austrian Ambassador relative to a statement in Viennese press pointing to immediate action by Austria. Sir E. Grey pointed out that such action would be illogical on Austria's part, and emphasised need for patience	360
624	To Sir H. Rax-Ironside	57	29,	Relations of allies. Records conversation between Bulgarian Minister and Sir A. Nicolson on 26th April. Tension was increasing, and Minister hoped the Triple *Entente* would assert moderating influence at Athens and Belgrade (see Part VIII, No. 227)	360
625	To Sir E. Goschen ..	142	29.	Evacuation of Scutari. Records conversation between German Ambassador and Sir A. Nicolson on 26th April. Prince Lichnowsky took a serious view of situation. He suggested that Sir E. Grey might hint to Montenegrin Government at possibility of compensation	361
626	To Sir G. Buchanan ..	173	29.	Evacuation of Scutari. Transmits telegram communicated by Russian Ambassador from M. Sazonof suggesting compensation for Montenegro. Records conversation in which Sir A. Nicolson urged on Count Benckendorff great importance of agreeing to proposed communication to Montenegrin Government without delay	361
627	To M. Cambon ..	..	29.	Financial Commission. Refers to No. 496. Agrees to 15th May for date of assembly. Informs that His Majesty's Government will be represented by two delegates only	362
628	Admiralty	Confidential	30,	Repatriation of Turkish troops in Albania. Withdrawal of Servian troops. Transmits telegram from vice-admiral, who has transmitted a message to Turkish Minister of War from Turkish colonel, who asks that his troops may be conveyed to Constantinople. Transmits two telegrams from Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, relative to transport of Servian troops ..	363
629	Count Benckendorff	..	30,	Evacuation of Scutari. Communicates copies of telegrams sent by M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassadors at Vienna and Berlin, and of telegram from M. Sazonof. M. Sazonof instructs Ambassadors to represent difficult position of Russia, and to suggest that question of compensation should be raised	363
630	M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff	Confidential Telegraphic	25,	Conclusion of peace. Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs prefers that Powers should communicate definite conditions to the allies rather than let them arrange the terms between each other	364
631	Count de Salis ..	75 Tel.	29.	Fall of Scutari. The surrender took place peacefully, according to an agreement between Essad Pasha and King Nicholas. Gives supposed terms of agreement ..	364

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
632	Count de Salis ..	76 Tel.	Apr. 30, 1913	Conclusion of peace. Refers to No. 585. Transmits reply of Montenegrin Government justifying their attitude and reserving question of Scutari. They adhere to communication to Powers of 21st April (see Part VIII, No. 106)	365
633	Sir F. Cartwright ..	68 Tel.	30,	Repatriation of Turkish troops in Albania. Refers to No. 620. Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees to proposal ..	366
634	„ „ ..	69 Tel.	30,	Austrian military movements. Transmits report from military attaché	366
635	Sir G. Buchanan ..	165 Tel.	30,	Evacuation of Scutari. Refers to No. 619. Transmits substance of note from Minister for Foreign Affairs. M. Sazonof thinks it desirable that proposed declaration by England disinteresting herself in fate of Montenegro should be made confidentially at Cettinje, and not publicly (see No. 636)	366
636	„ „ ..	166 Tel.	30,	Evacuation of Scutari. Refers to No. 635. Minister for Foreign Affairs hoped France and England would make at least a semblance of participation in Austrian action, which he expected would be taken in two days. Sir G. Buchanan replied that he feared such action by England would be condemned by public opinion (see Part VIII, No. 21)	367
637	„ „ ..	167 Tel.	30,	Repatriation of Turkish troops in Albania. Refers to No. 622. Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs cannot agree to their removal as he thinks their presence useful for maintaining order, and that they would, if removed, only be replaced by Austrian troops (see Part VIII, No. 60) ..	367
638	Sir E. Goschen ..	71 Tel.	30,	Repatriation of Turkish troops in Albania. Refers to No. 622. Foreign Minister approves suggestion	367
639	„ „ ..	72 Tel.	30,	Albania. Removal of Turkish battery from San Giovanni di Medua to Durazzo. Refers to No. 647. Foreign Minister approves removal of battery from both towns, but not from one to the other	368
640	Sir F. Bertie ..	57 Tel.	30,	Repatriation of Turkish troops in Albania. Refers to No. 622. French Minister for Foreign Affairs concurs in suggestion ..	368
641	„ „ ..	58 Tel.	30,	Albania. Removal of Turkish battery from San Giovanni di Medua to Durazzo. Refers to No. 617. French Minister for Foreign Affairs sees no objection	368
642	„ „ ..	59 Tel. Confidential	30,	Evacuation of Scutari. French Minister for Foreign Affairs learns that Austria has notified Italy of her intention to act alone shortly if Powers' action fails. Italian Government will in that case occupy a port as a pledge	368
643	Consul-General Lamb	28 Tel.	30,	Albania. Withdrawal of Servian troops. Greco-Serb relations. Reports arrival at Salonica of two transports of Servian troops. Relations between Greeks and Serbs are [illegible]	368
644	Sir R. Rodd ..	83 Tel.	30,	Evacuation of Scutari. Describes position as viewed by Italian Government, who fear that Austria would not confine her operations to Scutari	369

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
645	To Sir G. Buchanan..	374 Tel.	Apr. 30, 1913	Evacuation of Scutari. Declaration of British disinterestedness in fate of Montenegro. Refers to No. 619. Declaration was made by Sir E. Grey at Ambassadors' meeting ..	369
646	„ „ ..	375 Tel.	30,	Evacuation of Scutari. Austrian action. In view of imminence of Austrian action it is important that Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs should decide on course he means to take (see Part VIII, No. 10)	369
647	To Sir F. Bertie ..	189 Tel.	30,	Albania. Removal of Turkish battery from San Giovanni di Medua to Durazzo. Admiral has enquired whether he is to allow passage of transports for this purpose. Instructs his Excellency to ascertain views of Government to which he is accredited (see Part VIII, No. 8)	369
	„ Sir E. Goschen ..	188 Tel.			
	„ Sir R. Rodd ..	162 Tel.			
	„ Sir G. Buchanan..	371 Tel.			
	„ Sir F. Cartwright	158 Tel.			
648	To Sir E. Goschen ..	190 Tel.	30,	Evacuation of Scutari. Austrian action. Sir E. Grey regards situation as critical, and urges importance of measures adopted by any Power or Powers being carefully considered in advance, with special reference to their possible effect on public opinion (see No. 656, and Part VIII, Nos. 46 and 116)	370
	„ Sir F. Cartwright	160 Tel.			
	„ Sir R. Rodd ..	164 Tel.			
649	To Sir R. Paget ..	87 Tel.	30,	Evacuation of Scutari. Servian attitude. Servia is to be advised to disinterest herself in Scutari, and to advise King Nicholas to submit, in order to prevent possibility of Servia being involved in Austrian action (see Part VIII, No. 54)	370
650	To Sir F. Bertie ..	290	30,	Evacuation of Scutari. Austrian attitude. Transmits memorandum expressing Count Berchtold's views to effect that only if Conference is able to agree as to coercive measures will Austria abstain from action	371
	„ Sir E. Goschen ..	111			
	„ Sir F. Cartwright	91			
	„ Sir G. Buchanan	174			
	„ Sir R. Rodd ..	118			
651	To Sir F. Bertie ..	291	30,	Ottoman Debt. Position of French and British holders of bills issued on 14th February, 1912, by the National Bank of Turkey and the Bank of Salonica. Refers to No. 495. His Excellency should inform French Minister for Foreign Affairs of instructions given to His Majesty's Ministers at Athens and Sophia to consult their French colleagues, and then discuss matter with Greek and Bulgarian Governments (see No. 654)	371
652	„ „ ..	296	30,	Evacuation of Scutari. Austrian attitude. Sir E. Grey and M. Cambon have agreed that, in view of Austrian Ambassador's [illegible] Count Mensdorff could only be asked what measures Austria proposed to take	371
653	„ „ ..	297	30,	Evacuation of Scutari. Austrian attitude. Informs him that French Government will support at St. Petersburgh British attitude [illegible]	371
654	To Sir F. Elliot ..	57	30,	Ottoman Debt. French and British holders of bills issued on 14th February, 1912, by the National Bank [illegible] Bank of Salonica. Transmits correspondence. Instructs him to discuss matter with Greek and [illegible] after consultation with his French colleague (see No. 651 and Part VIII, No. 134)	372
	„ Sir H. Rumbold	58			

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
655	To Sir R. Rodd	122	Apr. 30, 1913	Evacuation of Scutari. Informs of conversation with Italian Ambassador, who described views of his Government. Sir E. Grey thought public opinion in England would disapprove of punitive measures taken by Austria, but would probably admit need for forcibly compelling evacuation of Scutari	372
656	To Sir E. Goschen ..	148	30,	Evacuation of Scutari. Austrian action. Has spoken to German and Italian Ambassadors in sense of No. 648	372
657	To Sir F. Cartwright	96	30,	Evacuation of Scutari. Austrian action. Has spoken to Austrian Ambassador in same sense as to German and Italian Ambassadors	373
658	.. ..	100	30,	Evacuation of Scutari. Coercive measures. Austrian Government, in view of failure of collective representation at Cettinjé, give notice that they reserve the right of taking necessary action. They would attach great importance to British co-operation	373
659	To Sir G. Buchanan	179	30,	Evacuation of Scutari. Austrian action. Has pointed out to Russian Ambassador the importance which the nature of the proposed Austrian measures might have ..	374

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Turkish War.

Part VII.

[14747] No. 1.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 62.)

Sir, *Athens, March* 26, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 11 of the 24th January last, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a *note verbale* which I have received from the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs in reply to the memorandum which I sent to M. Coromilas on that date, embodying the substance of your telegrams Nos. 8 and 10 of the 23rd January on the subject of the sequestration of funds belonging to the Ottoman Public Debt at Salonica.

The note states that orders have been given to raise the sequestration and to notify the agency of the Debt, which, in return, will be required to acknowledge the formal reservations of the Greek Government with regard to eventual surpluses or other sums possibly reverting to the Turkish Treasury.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Note verbale communicated to Sir F. Elliot.

LE Ministère Royal des Affaires Étrangères a eu l'honneur de recevoir la note verbale que la Légation d'Angleterre a bien voulu lui adresser le 11 (24) janvier dernier, relativement à la saisie pratiquée par les autorités du royaume sur les fonds de l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane à Salonique.

L'esprit libéral dans lequel le Gouvernement hellénique a abordé l'examen des questions se rattachant à la Dette publique ottomane l'ayant conduit à décider de lever la mesure dont il s'agit, le Ministère Royal des Affaires Étrangères s'empresse de porter cette décision à la connaissance de la Légation d'Angleterre.

Les instructions nécessaires ont été déjà transmises aux autorités Royales de Salonique, afin qu'il fût procédé à la mainlevée de la saisie et que notification en fût faite à l'agence de la Dette publique, qui aura à donner, en retour, acte des réserves formelles du Gouvernement Royal en ce qui touche les excédents éventuellement disponibles ou toutes autres sommes pouvant revenir au Trésor ottoman.

Athènes, le 13 (26) *mars*, 1913.

[14775] No. 2.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 50.)

Sir, *Sophia, March* 28, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 34 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to report that since that date the Sobranjé has sat continuously, save for a brief suspension

in mourning for the King of Greece. For the most part, however, its time has been occupied with the passing of a law reorganising the service of public instruction, and of one remitting the compulsory contribution of a percentage of salarics in the case of officials employed in the occupied districts of Turkey, as well as with minor internal affairs, and it was only on the 14th, 15th, and 16th instant that international affairs were discussed.

Interpellations had been addressed to the Prime Minister respecting the dispute with Roumania, the state of the peace negotiations with Turkey, and the relations between Bulgaria and the other allies.

In his reply M. Gueshof stated, as regards Roumania, that negotiations had taken place in London between M. Danef and M. Take Jonesco, and he gave the terms of the protocol then signed, recording the concessions offered by Bulgaria. No acceptance of that offer having been received by Bulgarin, it must be considered to be withdrawn, now that the question had been submitted to the mediation of the Great Powers. This mediation had been agreed to by Roumania in the sense of article 6 of The Hague Convention of 1907, so that its result need not be regarded by Bulgaria as absolutely binding upon her either. The Bulgarian Government would defend the interests of a population which had at all times shown itself patriotically Bulgarian, and would endeavour to obtain from the mediators a decision which should not only end the present dispute, but should leave no further room for differences with a country bound to Bulgaria by long-standing ties of good neighbourship and unvarying friendship.

Negotiations for peace with Turkey could no longer, the Prime Minister said, be expected to take place directly, that country having appealed to the mediation of the Great Powers. This mediation the allies had just accepted, under conditions of which he gave the text, and without binding themselves to abide by the result. The sacrifices made, and the successes gained by the allies since the breaking off of the last negotiations justified them in making larger demands. He trusted "that the judgment of the Powers would be such as, by its wisdom and justice, to impose itself on both parties."

Relations between the allied Governments had, M. Gueshof said, been marred by no shadow of discord, all obligations had been readily and faithfully discharged, and unfortunate incidents between local authorities in the occupied districts, such as those at Sabotskoe and Nigrita, would be amicably settled. Bulgaria would continue loyally to fulfil her engagements, as she knew would her allies. Their union had already yielded magnificent results, and it must be continued in the future in order that it might be crowned with all the success it deserved.

In the discussion which followed next day, the leaders of the opposition parties approved the general tone of the Premier's statement, but did not share his optimism as to the final results of the Balkan Union, and complained of the attitude of Greece and Servia towards Bulgarian interests in the occupied territories.

The attitude adopted towards what were described as the extortionate and unfounded claims of Roumania was also criticised, but all the speakers declared that the Government might rely on their entire support in the defence of national interests.

The debate was wound up for the Government by M. Teodorof, the Minister of Finance, who said that the policy could only be judged later in the light of its results, and claimed that meanwhile all parties should join in presenting a united front to their country's enemies and rivals.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[14776] No. 3.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 54.)

Sir, *Vienna, March 29, 1913.*

UPON receipt of your despatch No. 39 of the 27th February, I did not fail to address to the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs a note enquiring the views of the Austro-Hungarian Government on the subject of the interference of the allied Balkan States with the administration of the Ottoman Public Debt in the territories occupied by them, enclosing at the same time, as instructed by you, copies of Sir F. Bertie's despatch No. 93 of the 19th February and of your reply thereto No. 147 of the 27th February, with their respective enclosures, for his Excellency's information.

I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the reply which I have

to-day received from Count Berchtold, stating the readiness of the Austro-Hungarian Government to join in a collective *démarche* at Belgrade, and explaining the reasons on the ground of which the Austro-Hungarian Government regard the Servian contentions in the matter as untenable.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

Enclosure in No 3.

Memorandum by Count Berchtold.

(Translation.)

WITH reference to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador's note of the 1st March, and in continuation of the note from this Ministry of the 24th February, the undersigned has the honour to inform His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador that up to the present no reply has been received from the Greek, Bulgarian or Servian Governments to the *démarche* taken by the Austro-Hungarian Ministers at Athens, Sophia, and Belgrade, in connection with the interference with the administration of the Ottoman Public Debt in the occupied territories.

In regard to the reply returned by the Servian Government to the representations made in this matter by the British Minister at Belgrade (the text of which reply was enclosed in His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador's note under reference), the Imperial and Royal Government are of opinion that exception should be taken to the standpoint of the Servian Government as expressed in their note, on the ground of the following considerations:—

Although it must be admitted that it is a recognised principle of international law that the occupying State is entitled itself to take over the administration and collection of taxes in the hostile territory which it has occupied, it is on the other hand an equally fixed principle of international law that the belligerent or occupying State is bound to respect the existing private rights of third parties in the territory in question.

Now, by the so-called "Muharrem Decree" of the 8th (20th) December, 1881, and by the "Décret-Annexe" of 1903, a series of State revenues were assigned to the creditors of the Turkish State as a security for their claims until the latter should be completely liquidated. These revenues were assigned to the creditors as personal property.

At the same time the Administrative Council of the Ottoman Public Debt was constituted as the representative, with full powers, of the holders of Ottoman State Bonds (that is to say, as a juridical person in the eyes of international law), and with the exclusive right of administrating, collecting, and employing the revenues assigned to it.

On this ground, and in view of the fact that the above-mentioned proceedings were formally notified to the Powers by the Turkish Government and agreed to by the former; and further in view of the fact that the organs of the Ottoman Public Debt exercise their functions in a matter entirely independent of the Ottoman authorities, there can be no question but that the administration of the Ottoman Public Debt bears an international character.

The assertion put forward by the Servian Government that this administration is a purely Turkish institution and the inferences drawn from that assertion would, therefore, appear to be incorrect. On the contrary, as is shown by what has been adduced above, the authorities of the Balkan States in the occupied territory are bound to respect and to secure the rights of the foreign bondholders of Turkey, and the most efficacious method of bringing this about (until another arrangement has been agreed upon) is to leave the organs of the Ottoman Public Debt, entrusted with the exercise of these rights, in the functions which they have hitherto performed, and to dispatch the revenues collected by them to the central administration in Constantinople.

A demand of this nature would appear all the more justified in view of the fact that the future nationality of the territory occupied by the Balkan States has not yet been settled. The Greek Government has, as a matter of fact (as is shown in the note of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, a copy of which was enclosed in your Excellency's note), declared its agreement in principle to the uninterrupted performance of their functions by the offices of the Ottoman Public Debt in the territory occupied by the Greek army.

Finally, as regards the argument of the Servian Government that they considered

it necessary to take over the control of the collection of the revenues of the Debt in order to prevent Turkey from indirectly receiving financial assistance thereby, it should be observed that the share in the surplus money produced by the revenues assigned to the Debt which would eventually accrue to the Ottoman Government serves, for the most part, as guarantee for certain Government loans, and would, therefore, not benefit the Turkish Government.

From the grounds adduced above, the Imperial and Royal Government consider the standpoint adopted by the Servian Government to be unjustified.

The Imperial and Royal Government would, therefore, in principle be ready to participate in a fresh identical *démarche* to be taken in Belgrade by the Powers interested for the protection of the Ottoman bondholders, as proposed by the French Government, and the Austro-Hungarian Government will be glad to accept a proposal with this object in view.

The undersigned avails, &c.
(For the Minister),
OTTO.

Vienna, March 28, 1913.

[14849] No. 4.

M. Cambon to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 1.)

L'AMBASSADEUR de France est chargé de faire savoir au Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères que le Gouvernement français adhère à la proposition formulée dans le nouveau mémorandum britannique du 13 courant et tendant à confier à la commission internationale de Paris le soin de rédiger le projet d'article concernant la dette publique ottomane qui doit être inséré dans le futur traité de paix balkanique.

Après avoir pris connaissance de la suggestion de Sir Edward Grey, le Ministre français des Affaires Étrangères a remis aux Ambassadeurs des cinq Puissances accrédités à Paris un aide-mémoire dont le texte est ci-annexé,* et M. Paul Cambon espère que le Gouvernement britannique voudra bien se faire représenter à la commission internationale de Paris dans les conditions indiquées par cet aide-mémoire.

Ambassade de France Londres,
le 29 mars, 1913.

[14824] No. 5.

M. Nekloudof to M. Sazonof.—(Communicated by Russian Chargé d'Affaires, April 1.)

(Confidentiel.)
(Télégraphique.) *Sophia, le 16 (29) mars*, 1913.

TOUTES nos démarches auprès de M. Guéchof ne peuvent dans les circonstances actuelles produire aucun résultat. Les décisions sont uniquement entre les mains du Roi et des généraux. Pour arrêter une attaque de Tchataldja, je ne vois qu'un seul moyen : nous adresser directement au Roi, qui revient ici lundi soir, et lui poser la question dans les termes les plus nets et précis.

Ces termes devraient être les suivants :

1. Nous demandons que l'armée bulgare n'attaque pas Tchaladja.
2. Que les Bulgares se contentent de la ligne droite Enos Midia.

Nous offrons—

(*a.*) Notre concours pour obtenir une indemnité de guerre, qui équivaudrait à la part afférente de la dette.

(*b.*) Nous déclarons ne pas pouvoir soutenir les prétentions que la Bulgarie pourrait avoir sur Salonique, mais nous lui promettons nos bons offices pour lui assurer une frontière avec la Grèce aussi favorable que possible. En présence des dispositions qui règnent ici actuellement, j'imagine que ce n'est qu'à ces conditions qu'on réussirait

* Part VI, Enclosure in No. 437.

à arrêter la marche ultérieure de l'armée bulgare, à faire cesser les hostilités et à obtenir la signature immédiate des préliminaires de la paix.

Si ces bases ont l'approbation du Gouvernement Impérial et l'assentiment des Cabinets de Londres et de Paris, je sollicite des instructions identiques à moi et à mes collègues de France et d'Angleterre pour tenir un langage ferme et énergique à Sa Majesté au nom de nos Gouvernements.

[15168] No. 6.

M. Sazonof to M. de Etter.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, April 13.)

(Télégraphique.) *Saint-Pétersbourg, le 17 (30) mars*, 1913.

PARTAGEONS entièrement opinion Grey sur nécessité nomination officiers européens pour milice albanaise. Souveraineté du Sultan devrait être conditionnée par création contrôle européen effectif. Détails organisation peuvent être réservés à discussion ultérieure.

[15169] No. 7.

M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, April 1, 1913.)

JE vous prie d'attirer l'attention de Sir Edward Grey sur la portée sérieuse que nous attribuons à la question des cultes et droits des minorités.

Il ne nous est pas possible de consentir à des garanties autres que celles stipulées par le Traité de Berlin. Tout élément de contrôle et d'ingérence dans questions d'ordre intérieur serait considéré comme un pas en arrière en comparison avec le régime reconnu par l'Europe lors du Traité de Berlin. Une diminution de souveraineté des États balkaniques serait d'autant moins justifiée qu'aucun de ces États durant ces trente-trois ans n'a donné lieu à des accusations d'abus en cette matière. Notre point de vue ne saurait être modifié dans cette question.

Saint-Pétersbourg, le 18 (31) mars, 1913.

[14825] No. 8.

Note communicated by Russian Chargé d'Affaires, April 1, 1913.

(Très Confidentielle.)

L'AUTORISATION d'appeler à Constantinople une escadre russe s'entend comme sauvegarde de la population chrétienne de la ville au moment d'une retraite de l'armée turque. La présence de notre escadre est désirable aussi pour le cas de l'occupation de Constantinople par les forces bulgares.

En tout cas, pour éviter tout malentendu, nous nous réservons d'user de la presse pour publier que nos forces navales ne resteront à Constantinople que jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix, après quoi elles reviendraient en Russie.

Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres,
le 1er avril, 1913.

[14817] No. 9.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received April 1.)

(Confidential.)
Sir,

Board of Trade, March 31, 1913.

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your two letters of the 15th March, with their enclosures, on the subject of the conditions for safeguarding foreign trade to be proposed to the Balkan States as a preliminary to the recognition of their acquisitions of territory on the partition of the Turkish European dominions.

1. The Board have carefully considered this matter, and find themselves in general agreement in principle with the views expressed in the memorandum from the German

Embassy (copy of which accompanied your letter). In particular they concur in the opinion that it should be stipulated that the Great Powers and their nationals shall be guaranteed full most-favoured-nation treatment in the territories to be acquired, and that a reasonable delay shall be accorded for the transition from the former to the new conditions as regards all that concerns trade and commerce with those territories.

2. I am accordingly to forward to you, in accordance with Sir E. Grey's request, the accompanying draft of a formula embodying the proposals relating to these and cognate matters which they think might be urged by the Powers upon the Balkan States.

3. It will be noted as regards paragraph 1 (3) of this formula that it is proposedto stipulate that the rates of customs duties leviable in the territories to be acquired by Bulgaria, Servia, Greece, and Montenegro respectively shall not, for a period of fifteen years, be raised beyond the level of those at present levied in the existing territories of those States. The Board are disposed to think that an effort should be made to secure acceptance of this condition on the ground that the Powers have at present an absolute veto on the raising of the Turkish customs duties now applicable in those territories. Should the period of fifteen years be considered too long, a compromise might be accepted on the basis of a ten years period.

4. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 1 have been drafted without limit of time, following the precedent of the Berlin Treaty. Should it be found necessary to agree to a time limit the Board suggest that this limit should be not less than twenty-five years.

5. Article 2 follows, generally speaking, the provisions of the Austro-Italian Treaty of 1866.

6. Article 3 will presumably not be submitted to the allied States, whom it does not directly concern. It may, however, be well to sound the Powers on the subject if this has not already been done.

7. It will be noted that no reference is made in the draft articles to shipping, as this was dealt with in a previous formula suggested by the Austro-Hungarian Government.

I am, &c.
H. LLEWELLYN SMITH.

Enclosure in No. 9.

Draft Formula.

ARTICLE 1.

IN the territories acquired as the result of the present war by any of the allied States:—

1. The subjects and citizens of each of the Powers shall enjoy the same rights and privileges as subjects of any of the allied States or as subjects or citizens of the most-favoured nation in all that relates to residence, travel, the carrying on of commerce or industry, taxation, ownership of or succession to property movable or immovable, access to Courts of Justice, monopolies, bounties, and in general to all personal rights and privileges.

2. The trade and commerce of each of the Powers shall, in respect of customs duties and all other burdens and facilities, enjoy full and unconditional most-favoured nation treatment.

3. Articles the produce or manufacture of any of the Powers shall not during fifteen years from the present date be subjected to any higher duties or burdens than those applicable immediately before the war to similar articles imported into the existing territories of the State to which the newly-acquired territory appertains.

4. In order to give time for trade to accommodate itself to the new conditions, the existing customs régime, viz., duties at the rate of 11 per cent. *ad valorem*, shall be maintained until the expiration of twelve months from the present date.

ARTICLE 2.

The allied States will succeed to the rights and obligations resulting from the contracts regularly entered into by the Ottoman Government for objects of public

interest specially affecting the newly-acquired territories. They will recognise and confirm the concessions accorded by the Ottoman Government for such objects in these territories.

ARTICLE 3.

The customs régime of Albania and all other matters affecting the trade or commerce of the Powers or the personal rights of their subjects or citizens in that State shall remain regulated by the Capitulations.

[14734] No. 10.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, March 31, 1913.*

SCUTARI.

It has been reported to the King that thirty-seven transports with Servian troops are off San Giovanni di Medua.

[14735] No. 11.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 39.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, March 31, 1913.*

ATTACK on Scutari has been vigorously resumed to-day.

No answer has been returned to joint representations with regard to mediation or the cessation of hostilities and raising of the siege of Scutari. A collective representation made yesterday with regard to transmission of Grand Vizier's message to commandant of Scutari is also unanswered.

[14816] No. 12.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 128.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, March 31, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 120 of 26th March.

First meeting of Ambassadors took place this afternoon. Ambassadors of Triple Alliance supported Roumania's claim to line of Silistria–Baltchik, inclusive of former town.

The German Ambassador, as senior, spoke first, dwelling on the strategical importance of Silistria to Roumania in view of the large accession of territory acquired by Bulgaria.

I followed, pointing out that this territory had been won at enormous sacrifices, so that the situation was not as it would have been had Bulgaria received a gift from Russia in 1878, that frontier then fixed was intended to be a permanent one, that Roumania from her geographical position could only be given compensation at Bulgaria's expense, that, while recognising Roumania's correct attitude, such a procedure could only be justified on the right of strongest, that, as concessions offered by Bulgaria were conditional on their being accepted as a final settlement, we were not bound by them, and were free to suggest whatever arrangement seemed the best calculated to ensure the maintenance of friendly relations between them in the future, that it was easier for a State to renounce an aspiration than to cede territory, that as Roumania's claim to Silistria was not supported by any sound argument, more especially if fortifications were dismantled, she ought to be content with some strategical advantage for her future security.

At the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I did not propose as I had intended that Roumania should be given strategical frontier, as his Excellency wishes, if possible, that Bulgaria should keep two triangles should Silistria be ceded.

The Austrian Ambassador supported the views of the German Ambassador, contending that Roumania was one of the States that had listened to the advice of the Powers, and that it would be unfair to punish her for her good conduct. Had she chosen, she could have imposed her own terms on Bulgaria. The Minister for

Foreign Affairs interpolated that this was a dangerous argument to advance. The Ambassador then said that we might find compensation for Bulgaria elsewhere, and suggested Salonica. Such an arrangement would avert the danger of a conflict between Bulgaria and Greece, as the former was determined to make good her claim to Salonica by force.

The Italian Ambassador agreed that some compensation should be found for Bulgaria, without, however, specifying where. He argued that Silistria should be ceded to Roumania in the interests of peace.

The French Ambassador said he could not share the view of the Austrian Ambassador that were Bulgaria to be compensated with Salonica the danger of a Greco-Bulgarian conflict would be averted. Greece was determined to keep Salonica. Moreover, we had no mandate to occupy ourselves with questions of compensation outside the actual question in dispute. After resuming the arguments on both sides, he contended that we must not now sow the seeds of future discord.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, summing up, said that we must look on the question from a strategical point of view. Roumania's claim could not be defended on any principle of international law. Apart from material interests, which were small, Bulgaria had sentimental interests in Silistria, as being the first episcopal see of the Bulgarian Church. He strongly opposed the idea of giving Bulgaria Salonica as compensation. Apart from economic and ethnological reasons, Greece claimed it by right of conquest, which was enhanced by the fact that it had been consecrated by the King's blood. We might try and find compensation in some other quarter.

In a long conversation which followed, no progress was made, except that it was conceded that concessions already offered by Bulgaria could only be regarded as indicating the line on which she was prepared to settle the question. The German and Austrian Ambassadors continued to press for fulfilment of Roumania's claim. I pointed out that Bulgaria's offer had been made for the sole purpose of saving the town of Silistria. Neither side would put forward any definite proposal, and the Austrian Ambassador finally asked for adjournment until 4th April in order to consult his Government.

[14850] No. 13.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 129.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, March 31, 1913.*

AT close of sitting reported in my immediately preceding telegram of to-day, M. Sazonof said that, not having time to speak to us individually, he would ask permission to speak to us collectively on the situation at Scutari. In order to ensure our reporting his Excellency's views correctly, the French Ambassador, at the request of the Austrian Ambassador, drew up the following identic telegram, which we agreed to send to our respective Governments:—

"D'après un télégramme de presse que vient de recevoir de Vienne M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, le Roi de Monténégro aurait ordonné un assaut général de Scutari, qui devrait avoir lieu aujourd'hui. Dans ce cas, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères pour prévenir ou arrêter cette reprise des hostilités ne lève aucune objection contre une démonstration navale immédiate, à la condition qu'elle soit collective. La Russie, n'ayant aucun bateau de guerre dans la Méditerranée, est dans l'impossibilité d'y prendre part. Cette démonstration pourrait consister dans le blocus d'Antivari. En même temps pour rendre plus facile au Roi de Monténégro, dont la situation personnelle est critique, sa soumission aux demandes formulées par les Puissances, celles-ci pourraient, dans la pensée du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, lui faire entendre qu'elles sont disposées à reconnaître sa bonne volonté en lui assurant par une compensation d'ordre financier sous une forme à déterminer."

[14860] No. 14.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 177.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 31, 1913.*

THE Turkish population, both civil and military, has been greatly impressed by the capture of the "impregnable" fortress of Adrianople, and by what seemed to them the unnecessary sacrifice of the allies entailed thereby, especially as its cession had been practically agreed to by Europe and Turkey.

There is an increasing desire for a prompt peace, and the populace are indignant against the Committee. As far as can be judged, the inner circle of the Committee are desirous of peace, provided that they can avoid compromising their position.

(Sent to Athens, Sophia, and Belgrade.)

[14940] No. 15.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 178.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, April 1, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 176 of 31st March.
Reply has been received from Porte.
It runs as follows. (End of R.):

"Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères a l'honneur d'informer leurs Excellences que le Gouvernement Impérial, appréciant les bienfaits de la paix, n'avait pas hesité à accepter la médiation amicale sous leurs Gouvernements en vue de mettre fin à l'état de guerre existant entre l'Empire ottoman et les États balkaniques.

"Guidé par les mêmes dispositions pacifiques, le Gouvernement Impérial accepte dans leur ensemble les bases préliminaires proposées dans la susdite communication, et s'en remet aux Grandes Puissances pour ce qui est du rétablissement de la paix."

[14942] No. 16.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.)
SCUTARI. *Athens, April 1, 1913.*

I sent translation of your telegram No. 51 of 31st March to Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, who replied that he had taken note of it and would come to an understanding with the allied Governments.

[14943] No. 17.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, April 1, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 39 of 31st March.

Montenegrin Government regret to be unable to accede to the last representation of the Powers respecting the civil population of Scutari, as the military authorities refuse to forward a cypher message to commandant of town. They are prepared to submit to commander-in-chief of the army a communication *en clair* signed by the Turkish Government.

[14944] No. 18.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, April 1, 1913*

MY telegram No. 39 of 31st March.

Following is the reply to representation made in accordance with your telegram No. 66 of 22nd March to Belgrade :—

"As regards agreement of the Powers respecting frontiers of Albania, Montenegrin Government reserve right of consulting their allies.

"As regards cessation of hostilities round Scutari and in territories which Powers declare to have abandoned to Albania, Montenegrin Government regret to be unable to accede to the desire of the Powers, as a state of war between Turkey and the allies continues, while Powers have declared that they will not impede hostilities and will remain neutral.

"As regards protection of Mussulman and Catholic Albanians in ceded territories, the only title of Montenegro to these territories can be a treaty of peace with Turkey. Moreover, these populations are under the protection of Montenegrin law, which affords every guarantee of civil and religious liberty."

[14947] No. 19.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 61.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, April 1, 1913.*

MONTENEGRO : Naval demonstration : French abstention.

Minister for Foreign Affairs begged me strongly to urge upon you following considerations :—

He is convinced that neither Austria nor Russia desires war, but he foresees grave danger in both of them relying on this conviction as regards the other. He maintains that he has positive knowledge that Austria will fight, even if it entails European war, to prevent Scutari from going to Montenegro, and fears that isolated action of Austria would force the hands of the Russian Government and make war inevitable.

Italy has done all that she could to prevent Austria from acting alone against Montenegro or without mandate from the Powers, and resolution of Ambassadors' conference seemed to have eliminated danger. Action by four Powers offered satisfactory solution. Refusal of France to participate in naval demonstration alters situation. In the circumstances he makes appeal to you for British adherence to policy recommended by Ambassadors in order to prevent Austria from acting alone. First step should be to obtain, if possible with assistance of St. Petersburgh, reconsideration of French decision. If this cannot be obtained, next best solution would be action by Great Britain, Austria, and Italy as mandatories of the Powers. He holds most strongly to at least one Power of *entente* group acting with two of alliance. He would also be be ready to act with Austria alone as mandatories, and, reluctant as he is that Austria should act unsupported by Italy, would even agree to withdraw if Great Britain would, with Austria alone, accept position of mandatories. Urgent point is that Austria should not act alone, and he feels that it would not prejudice general grouping of Powers, and would bear testimony to continued understanding between them, if we act in this matter with two of other group as mandatories of all six.

(Secret.)
Action of Italy alone with Austria would be very unpopular here.

[14948] No. 20.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 65.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, April 1, 1913.*

MONTENEGRO.

Russian Ambassador informs me that he has just communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs telegram from Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs supporting

proposal for a joint naval demonstration, in which, however, Russia, having no ships in the Mediterranean, could not herself take part, and for pecuniary compensation to Montenegro. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed, and promised to support idea of giving pecuniary assistance.

[14937] No. 21.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 39.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, April 1, 1913.*

A COMMUNICATION was issued here to-night to the effect that, contrary to reports circulated abroad, the French Government have decided not to join in a naval demonstration against Montenegro.

Certain newspapers declare it impossible for France to join if her ally abstain.

[14946] No. 22.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, April 1, 1913.*

MONTENEGRO.

Your telegram No. 144, of this afternoon.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I have just seen, says that a French ship has been sent to Corfu to be handy for a naval demonstration in which France will join provided that all the Powers take part in it, or that in the event of Russia not participating she authorises France to act for her.

As to Germany, he does not regard her abstention as entailing the non-participation of France, provided always that Russia consents to a naval demonstration without Germany.

He is against giving a mandate to Austria alone, or to Austria and Italy combined, unless Russian Government consent.

In fact, French Minister for Foreign Affairs will not do anything that has not the concurrence of the Russian Government. He would, he says, require such concurrence in order to justify French Government in making a demonstration against a small State such as Montenegro, and in opposition to Russian public sentiment. I could not move him from this attitude. He suggested that His Majesty's Government should use their influence at St. Petersburgh to bring round Russian Government to the views expressed in your telegram.

His Excellency's information is that Italian Government are unwilling to act with Austria. I suggested that Italy would prefer to join Austria rather than that Austria should act alone, which might happen if other Powers persisted in holding aloof, and that a naval demonstration of the Powers without Russia, and even Germany, might prevent a general conflagration.

[14945] No. 23.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 119.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, April 1, 1913.*

HEAD-QUARTERS staff reports repulse with loss of attack made on 30th March against Bulgarian right at Chatalja by three Turkish divisions supported by fire of fleet. Also similar attack on smaller scale yesterday.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[14939] No. 24.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 76.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, April 1, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 72 of 31st March : Scutari.

I have seen Prime Minister as instructed. He replied in the same sense as before that until the conclusion of peace Servia was obliged by its alliance to assist Montenegro. It would be dishonourable to desert Montenegro at the present moment, and if done would go down to history as a disgrace to the nation. He hoped you would recognise the good disposition as shown by Servia in agreeing to give up the Albanian littoral, in fact all through the war, and would understand her present difficulty. He referred to dynastic questions, and said that whenever the Servian Government urged moderation and a cessation of the siege of Scutari the King of Montenegro taunted them with hoping to upset his dynasty and annex Montenegro themselves. This rendered Servia's position still more delicate. He thought best thing would be for Scutari to capitulate, and the Powers could then deal with Montenegro as they liked, but he did not suggest a way to expel Montenegrins once they had taken possession.

I argued that the duties of the allies could surely only be binding as long as reasonable and useful operations were contemplated, but that if one ally apparently went mad and embarked in useless operations which could have no other effect than to entail bloodshed it could hardly be the duty of the other ally to assist in such madness.

Prime Minister pointed to recent capture of Adrianople and the present attacks against Chatalja, and asked why the Powers did not likewise interfere, as they had apparently already decided previously that Adrianople should belong to Bulgaria. I said that attack on Adrianople, which could not have held out more than a few days, seemed quite a useless sacrifice of life, and if he would look at the "Times" of 28th March he would see indications that public opinion in England considered that the Powers should intervene to stop further fighting at Chatalja also.

Prime Minister finally said he would again urge Montenegro to yield to the will of the Powers, and asked me to leave a memorandum of what I had said with the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

[14850] No. 25.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 200.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 1, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 129 of 31st March.

Austrian Ambassador has just informed me that Austrian ships are starting for Antivari to take part in international naval demonstration.

I understand that Russian Government desire us also to send ships, but French Government are hitherto reluctant, and though British ships have been sent to Corfu I cannot order them to proceed to Antivari without being sure that some other Powers, and especially the French, will do the same.

An agreement and decision having been come to about the Albanian frontier, it is essential to make it respected, and we cannot object to any measures that in the last resort may be necessary. But I agree with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that in the first place an international naval demonstration is the preferable method.

As to the solution by pecuniary compensation to the King of Montenegro, it will be a great relief if practicable, but it is for those who are prepared to give him money, Russia and Italy presumably, to act. The rest of us can do no good by talking about it.

You can inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[15062] No. 26.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 144.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 1, 1913.*

THE Powers having announced an agreement and decision about the Albanian frontier, I consider that no Power who is a party to that agreement can refuse assent to measures necessary to make it respected.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs will not act himself, and prefers an international naval demonstration to any more drastic action, and wishes England and France to take part in it. Failing a naval demonstration, I see no alternative except a mandate to Italy and Austria. I hope, therefore, that French Government will send a ship with ours to take part in the demonstration.

If the demonstration fails, I do not see how any of us can in the last resort object to action by Italy and Austria to make Montenegro respect the decision of the Powers, but I assume that French Minister for Foreign Affairs wishes to avoid this if possible, and a naval demonstration seems the only chance of doing so.

You should tell French Minister for Foreign Affairs these views, and say I am most anxious to know what he thinks ; it would be disastrous to let Montenegro defy the Powers, but I doubt whether Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs realises all that may be necessary to prevent it.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 286.)

[15702] No. 27.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 145.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 1, 1913.*

THE French Ambassador informed me yesterday that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs now thought that to secure peace some indemnity should be allowed, and the question referred to the commission in Paris.

I pointed out that an increase of Turkish customs dues would be necessary after the war, but that it would be impossible for us to agree to the increase if the revenue from it was to be devoted, not to help Turkey to establish order and develop her territory, but to pay an indemnity to the allies, who were going to increase the customs dues in Macedonia above what they had been under Turkish rule. In other words, we could not agree that trade with Turkey, of which some 60 per cent. was British, should be made to pay an indemnity to the allies.

[15357] No. 28.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No 146.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 1, 1913.*

AUSTRIAN Ambassador informs me that Austrian ships are already starting for Antivari in order to take part in international naval demonstration. I am most reluctant to order British ships to go until I hear that French Government is giving the same order, and I should like at once to know what is decision of French Government.

If we do not send ships we must acquiesce in a mandate to Austria and Italy.

It seems to me to be useless for Powers to consult any more about Balkan affairs unless they are prepared to make their decisions respected by Montenegro.

[15357] No. 29.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E.Goschen .**

(No. 148.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 1, 1913.*

AUSTRIAN Ambassador informs me that Austrian ships are already starting for Antivari in order to take part in international demonstration. Please enquire at once whether German Governments have given or will give similar instructions. British ships have already been ordered to Corfu, and will receive orders to proceed immediately to Antivari on hearing that other Powers have definitely decided to do the same.

[15354] No. 30.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 76.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 1, 1913.*

THE Austrian Ambassador informed me to-day that the information from the Austrian military attaché was that there was great danger for Scutari and its population. If they were to be saved, strong coercive measures ought to have been taken last night. The bombardment had been going on since Saturday the 29th March. A catastrophe might have been avoided if international measures had been taken in time. Now it was too late for action. Count Berchtold had, however, said that, even if one of the objects of international action seemed to have become impossible, international action should nevertheless not be abandoned: because the protection of the Albanian population in Scutari, as well as the rapid evacuation of territory occupied contrary to the wish and decision of the Powers, could be secured only by adopting coercive measures in time. Count Berchtold specially wished to draw attention to the fact that Scutari was defended not only by regular troops, but also by an armed rural and urban population, which would be delivered to all the excesses of the occupying force.

I cordially agreed that international action should not be abandoned.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[15357] No. 31.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 77.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 1, 1913.*

THE Austrian Ambassador informed me to-day that, after the resolutions of the Ambassadors' meeting yesterday, by which all the Powers acquiesced in a naval demonstration, a division of Austrian men-of-war, accompanied by a small cruiser and some torpedo-boats, under the command of Contre-Amiral Negovan, was starting for Antivari by order of the Emperor, to take part in an international naval demonstration. The Ambassador pressed me to give orders at once for the sending of British warships.

I said that I had promised to do so if other Powers sent ships. Russia, we knew, had no ships ready to send; but I must consult France, Germany, and Italy.

The Ambassador asked me if I would make the British instructions dependent upon the consent of all these three Powers.

I replied that I would not wait for Germany if she was reluctant to send ships, but I thought that at least France and Italy should participate. I would consult them at once.

The Ambassador pressed that I should urge them to send ships, and that I should not represent the Austrian action as other than part of an international action.

I said that I quite understood that this was the character of the Austrian action, and I would certainly urge the other Powers to take part.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Also to Sir R. Rodd (No. 127). *mutatis mutandis.*

[15355] No. 32.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 231.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 1, 1913*

I TOLD the French Ambassador to-day of the fact that the Austrian Government were sending warships to Antivari, and of what I had said to the Austrian Ambassador about sending British warships. I observed to M. Cambon that the meetings with Ambassadors here had been of great use in bringing about an agreement as to the north and north-east frontier of Albania. This agreement had now been confirmed by the Governments of the Great Powers; but, if the Governments were not prepared to take measures to make the agreement and their decision respected, it would be no good to continue the Ambassadors' meetings. It would be waste of time to labour to bring about an agreement between the Great Powers if they did not make the agreement respected.

M. Cambon said that there was considerable feeling manifested in the French press against French participation in the naval demonstration. M. Pichon did not make French participation depend upon Russian participation, but only upon acquiescence by all the Powers.

I pointed out that if the naval demonstration did not take place, or if it failed, a mandate to Austria and Italy to deal with Montenegro was the only alternative.

M. Cambon said that M. Sazonof would never agree to this.

I urged that no Power that was a party to the agreement about the Albanian frontier could object to whatever measure might be necessary in the last resort to make the agreement respected. I repeated that unless this was done the Ambassadors' meetings could not continue.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[15356] No. 33.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 232.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 1, 1913.*

M. CAMBON told me to-day that Russia had urged M. Pichon to take the initiative in proposing that the Allies should receive an indemnity. M. Pichon had declined.

I observed that Bulgaria was playing with M. Sazonof. First of all she had induced him to get the Turks to accept a direct line from Enos to Media for the frontier, under the impression that if this was conceded Bulgaria would cease hostilities. The line having been agreed to, Bulgaria did not cease hostilities, but was trying to get M. Sazonof to secure an indemnity. There was no guarantee that, if this was promised, Bulgaria would cease hostilities, and I am afraid that she was deliberately wasting our time.

M. Cambon entirely agreed, and said that he thought the King of Bulgaria had made up his mind to enter Constantinople. If the lines of Chatalja were forced and peace was not concluded, the Russian Government intended to send warships to Constantinople to protect Christians in the event of a disorderly retreat of beaten Turkish troops into the city, or of Bulgarian troops entering it. M. Pichon wished me to be informed of this, and thought that England and France should arrange what they should do in such an event. M. Cambon urged that Russia could not be left to go to Constantinople alone.

I said that I would not put it exactly in this way, but would say that, if the contingency which he contemplated arose, all the Powers had better send ships to Besika Bay, or some other place near the Straits, and ask the Turkish Government for a Firman to go to Constantinople in order to give protection. We wished to act closely with France in this matter. As to an indemnity, I thought that the utmost that could be promised was that all financial questions resulting from the war, without making special mention of indemnity or debt, would be referred to the Commission in Paris, in which the belligerents should participate.

M. Cambon agreed, and said that this was what had already been intimated. He said that, if Bulgaria went to Constantinople, a European Congress would certainly be necessary.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[15165] No. 34.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 151.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 1, 1913.*

COUNT BENCKENDORFF gave Sir A. Nicolson to-day the memorandum of which I transmit herewith copy to your Excellency.

Sir A. Nicolson told his Excellency that, at this moment especially, it would be most inadvisable for three Powers to take action independently of the other Powers, and, moreover, it seemed to him that fresh proposals tumbling over each other daily would confuse the situation. His Excellency knew what the Ambassadorial meeting had decided yesterday, and it would be better to let those decisions have their effect before taking any other course.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 34.

Memorandum communicated by Count Benckendorff.

(Confidentiel.)

M. SAZONOF pense qu'il y aurait lieu de prescrire aux représentants anglais, français et russes à Sophia de faire au Roi la communication collective suivante :—

1. Cessation immédiate des hostilités.
2. Acceptation ligne frontière Énos–Midia, condition fixe.

Si ces deux conditions étaient acceptées, les trois Gouvernements représenteraient à la Porte la nécessité de consentir au principe d'une indemnité de guerre, pour la cessation immédiate des hostilités.

Ambassade Impériale de Russie,
Londres, le 3 avril, 1913.

[15353] No. 35.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 32.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 1, 1913.*

I EXPLAINED to M. Skouloudis to-day that I had communicated to the meeting of Ambassadors his desire to be consulted, but that there was a feeling that, if he was admitted to the meeting after it had been an understanding from the beginning that only Roumania should be admitted, on the ground that she was neutral, the Servians and Montenegrins might complain that they had not been heard about the part of Albania which concerned them, and even the Bulgarians might complain also. We felt, therefore, that it was difficult to invite M. Skouloudis to a meeting. On the other hand he ought to have an opportunity of replying to what M. Misu had said. M. Misu had given us a written résumé dealing with everything that he had put before us. I gave M. Skouloudis confidentially a copy of this, that he might send a written reply to M. Misu's arguments. I said that the meeting of Ambassadors would not take any decision on the points submitted by M. Misu till the reply of M. Skouloudis had been received.

M. Skouloudis promised to send a reply in a few days.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[15167] No. 36.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 10.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 1, 1913.*

M. POPOVITCH, Montenegrin delegate, called this afternoon to enquire whether it was true that a naval demonstration was about to be made against Montenegro. Sir A. Nicolson told him that unless Montenegro accepted the decision of the Powers and raised the siege of Scutari, it was extremely probable that a naval demonstration would be made; and that it was to the interest of Montenegro to accept without delay the decisions of the Powers. He said that a naval demonstration would have no effect. Sir A. Nicolson replied that in such a case it might be necessary to employ other measures. Sir A. Nicolson said that it would be unfair if he did not state very clearly to M. Popovitch that the Powers had unanimously come to the decision—and Montenegro must not count upon any divisions among the Powers—that Scutari was to be included in the future Albania. On that point the Powers were immovably firm, and it would be but common prudence for Montenegro to bow to that decision. Even if Scutari were to fall the situation would not be changed, and Montenegro would have to evacuate it. Why then continue a siege which was quite without any object, and which only led to a useless waste of men? Sir A. Nicolson did not wish to employ harsh terms, but it was really an act of folly for Montenegro to set herself up in opposition to the will of Europe. By accepting the decisions of the Powers, Montenegro would secure their good-will, and her future would be assured. M Popovitch said that the Montenegrin people could not possibly abandon what had been the chief object of their going to war; they could not live without some means of securing a simple livelihood which their barren mountains and the desolate tracts which the Powers proposed to give them could not afford. He proceeded in this strain at some length, appealing to the equity and benevolence of His Majesty's Government not to be hard on a small people who had lost much, had always struggled to gain a bare existence, and who were now condemned to perpetual poverty. Sir A. Nicolson said he could only repeat his former statements, and that he could hold out no hope to M. Popovitch whatever that the Powers would modify their decisions. M. Popovitch was much distressed, and said that Montenegro would then have to perish, or be absorbed by Austria-Hungary, as she could not possibly yield.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[14960] No. 37.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 246.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 28, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna, reporting on the invasion of Castellorizo by Greeks and Cretans.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 37.

Vice-Consul Sir A. Biliotti to Consul-General Barnham.

(No. 16.)
Sir, *Rhodes, March 17, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that a gang of thirty-six insurgents, mostly Cretans, having taken passage at the Piræus on board the Pandaleon Greek Company's steamer "Roumeli," were landed on the 14th instant in a remote place on the island of Castellorizo with their rifles and ammunition. During the night they entered the town and surrounded the dwelling-houses of the kaïmakam and other Turkish officials, keeping them prisoners.

It is to be noted that the greatest number of the inhabitants of Castellorizo have many properties on the Anatolian coast, where more than 200 families are spending

part of the season, and where, at all events, they have important commercial interests. On the other hand, seventy or eighty large sailing ships belonging to the island of Castellorizo are exclusively engaged in carrying timber, firewood, charcoal, &c., from the opposite coast of Anatolia to Egypt.

In consequence of this incident two parties have arisen in the island. One, consisting of the wealthier inhabitants, who have important interests on the mainland, do not wish any change in their present situation, the other consisting of the very low class, who have nothing to lose and aspire to annexation to Greece. It is said that a great number of the former, fearing the presence of the insurgents, have already fled to the mainland.

The island of Castellorizo, which is only two miles distant from the Anatolian coast, entirely depends on it even for water.

It is said that this gang of insurgents has been instructed to proceed to Castellorizo by some Pan-Hellenic committee, whilst the Greek Government have wired to their consul at Rhodes, informing him of the intended expedition to Castellorizo, and asking him to try to prevent their landing.

I cannot confirm this news, as I have no direct information from Castellorizo.

I have, &c.
A. BILIOTTI.

[14961] No. 38.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 247.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 28, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note which I have received from the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in which complaint is made that Greek torpedo-boats are attempting to seize the only pilot boat in the Gulf of Smyrna.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 38.

Circular Note verbale.

Sublime Porte, le 26 mars, 1913.

IL appert d'une communication des autorités Impériales de Smyrne que les torpilleurs hellènes essaient de s'emparer de l'unique bateau qui fait gratuitement le service de pilotage dans le golfe de Smyrne.

Bien que toutes les mesures sont prises pour parer à une telle éventualité, le Ministère Impérial croit devoir aviser les missions étrangères que dans le cas où ledit bateau viendrait à être saisi par l'ennemi, le Gouvernement Impérial ne saurait assumer aucune responsabilité du chef de la stagnation complète de la navigation commerciale.

[14962] No. 39.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 248.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 28, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a circular *note verbale* which I have received from the Sublime Porte, requesting that steps may be taken to secure the restitution of Ottoman fiscal stamps seized by the Greek and Bulgarian authorities.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 39.

Circular Note verbale.

IL résulte des rapports officiels parvenus au Ministère des Finances que les autorités hellènes et bulgares ont saisi les timbres et autres papiers de valeur fiscaux que les autorités Impériales de Salonique, de Drama et de Dédéagatch avaient déposé dans les agences respectives de la Banque ottomane.

Ces valeurs destinées à la perception d'impôts et taxes ne peuvent être utilisées dans les régions occupées. Le seul usage que l'on pourrait en faire, ce serait de chercher à en réaliser la contre-valeur dans les autres parties de l'Empire. Or, une telle réalisation, qui constituerait une atteinte aux droits régaliens du Gouvernement Impérial, irait à l'encontre des principes du droit international.

Quoique les autorités compétentes aient été munies d'instructions en vue d'empêcher la mise en circulation de ces valeurs dans lesdites parties du territoire ottomans, le Ministère Impérial n'en croit pas moins devoir prier l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique de vouloir bien interposer ses bons offices auprès des Gouvernements hellène et bulgare en vue de faire prescrire leur restitution aux agences susvisées.

Sublime Porte, le 24 mars, 1913.

[15079] No. 40.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 2.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, April 2, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a cypher telegram dated the 1st instant, which has been sent to the Vice-Admiral, H.M.S. "King Edward VII" at Corfu.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 40.

Admiralty to Vice-Admiral "King Edward VII."

(Telegraphic.) *Admiralty, April 1, 1913.*

A SHIP of the French navy is proceeding to Corfu. Confer with her commanding officer, and whenever he is instructed to make for Antivari, proceed there with your ships along with the French.

German and Austrian ships are proceeding there, and Italian co-operation in naval demonstration may be expected. Russia, however, holds aloof for the present. When you reach Antivari confer with the senior officers of the International Fleet as to the best means of inducing Montenegro to accede to the wishes of the Powers. Unless you receive further instructions, you should not land field guns, or detachment of marines, nor should you undertake a bombardment. Full and frequent reports should be sent to the Admiralty.

[15076] No. 41.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 58.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, April 2, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 143 of 1st April.

German cruiser "Breslau," which was at Athens, was instructed yesterday to proceed straight to Antivari immediately.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs thinks she must have left Athens last night.

His Excellency explained to me very confidentially that the Emperor gave permission for either "Goeben" or "Breslau" to be sent, but that, as an admiral was on board the former, and would probably, from his seniority, have had to take supreme command of the entire demonstrating squadron, they had thought it best to send the small vessel. Their view was that, as Germany was only sending one ship, it would have been out of place for German officer to be in supreme command.

[15127] No. 42.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Cettinjé, April 2, 1913.*

FOLLOWING for Director Military Intelligence :—

"Lieutenant-Colonel Thomson has arrived at San Giovanni di Medua with Servian Expeditionary Corps, and will await further instructions at Servian headquarters at Alessio."

[15078] No. 43.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 77.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, April 2, 1913.*

MY Bulgarian colleague informed me confidentially yesterday that he had heard that Servians and Greeks were conspiring together to refuse to evacuate Albania, and that this would certainly be one of the results were Scutari to fall.

I can scarcely believe this information to be correct in the face of the solemn assurances given by the Servian Government that they would submit to the will of the Powers, but in view of the source from which this information comes I have repeated this telegram to Sir F. Elliot.

[15108] No. 44.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 78.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, April 2, 1913.*

PEACE negotiations.

According to my Bulgarian colleague, his Government were ready with their draft reply some time ago, but the Servian Government suggested alterations. Bulgarian Prime Minister did not consider these satisfactory, but the Servian Government insisted, and has submitted its own suggestions to Greece and Montenegro; hence the delay.

[15119] No. 45.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, April 2, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 37 of 23rd March: Conditions of peace.

Reply is still delayed, Servian Government requiring alterations in draft proposed by the Greek Government.

[15121] No. 46.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, April 2, 1913.*

MONTENEGRO.

I showed the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon my telegram No. 40, Urgent, to you of yesterday, which he said correctly described his views, and I gave

him a memorandum of contents of the reply No. 147, Urgent, of to-day. He was very much perturbed ("ému" was his word) at the communication, and requested me to inform you that it will be considered at once in consultation with the President of the Republic, and an answer will be made as soon as possible.

German Ambassador has informed the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day that the German ship "Breslau" has been ordered to join in any naval demonstration and blockade instituted by the Powers, but not to land any men.

Italian Ambassador has informed the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that Italy will take part in the naval demonstration but not make one with Austria only.

French Government have not yet received from St. Petersburgh an answer to their request for authority for acting for Russia in a naval demonstration.

[15123] No. 47.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, April 2, 1913.*

AUSTRIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that he had sent an urgent message to Count Mensdorff to ascertain from you precisely what was the exact attitude of England towards the naval demonstration. The point he wanted cleared up was whether England would take part in the demonstration only if the other Powers did so, or whether she would join in it if only some of the other Powers took part. The matter was urgent, as he understood that the bombardment of Scutari would begin again to-morrow. Minister for Foreign Affairs hoped that British ship would be sent to Antivari, and that commanders would be given a certain latitude of action, so long as they acted in unison with each other. He is of opinion that it will be found necessary to extend the blockade as far as Durazzo, and spoke very strongly of the advisability of preventing further Servian troops from being shipped to Albanian ports.

Minister for Foreign Affairs regretted the delay of France in deciding if she would take part in the naval demonstration. If she abstains it will mean, according to his Excellency, that a breach of views has arisen between the Powers, as France cannot plead, like Russia, that she has no ships in the Mediterranean.

I enquired of the Minister for Foreign Affairs what would be the next step if the naval demonstration failed. He avoided answering, but gave me to understand that his wish at present was to continue to work in concert with the other Powers.

His Majesty's consul at Serajevo telegraphs to me to-day that 7,000 additional troops have just arrived in that district.

[15116] No. 48.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 179.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, April 2, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 163 of 31st March.

Figures under heads 1 and 2 are being prepared by a commission under Sir R. Crawford. They will not be ready till next week. (3.) Sir A. Block's explanation goes by post to-morrow.

Is going to Paris and will see Sir P. Harvey.

[15083] No. 49.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 66.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, April 2, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 127 of 1st April.

Italian squadron has received orders to go to Antivari. Commanding officer to concert with British and Austrian commandants as to measures to be taken as soon as squadrons unite.

[15110] No. 50.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 120. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, April 2, 1913.*

MEDIATION proposals.

The Prime Minister informs me that he hopes to give an answer of the allies very soon; he was still awaiting further communication from Athens.

I gather that the allies will insist on indemnity in principle, and will ask for further information respecting the frontiers of Albania, and that Servia and Montenegro will only cease hostilities on condition that Scutari surrenders. The reply will be evasive, as foreshadowed in my telegram No. 112 of 27th March.

My French colleague states that he has not received instructions in the sense of your telegram No. 86 of 31st March.

I have every reason to believe that great effort to pierce Chatalja lines is intended to be made between 12th April and 17th April.

Even the most chauvinistic circles here do not suggest retaining Constantinople; what is desired is the triumphal entry.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[15245] No. 51.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.**

(No. 149.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 2, 1913.*

AN agreement having been come to by the Powers about the Albanian frontier, it seems to me to be useless to proceed with the meetings of the Ambassadors unless it is clear that steps will be taken to make the agreement respected.

Powers who are parties to the agreement must, it seems to me, either take part in steps necessary to make it respected or not object to steps taken by others.

I have told Austrian Ambassador that I must consult my colleagues as to making the attitude and view of His Majesty's Government quite clear on these points, and that for this reason I have postponed the meeting of Ambassadors from this afternoon till Friday morning.

Ambassador will no doubt explain to his Government, and you should not speak to Minister for Foreign Affairs unless he mentions the subject.

(Confidential.)

French Government hesitate to take part in naval demonstration. We cannot do so without either French or Russian participation, but in that event only honourable course would be for His Majesty's Government to declare that they will not object to Austrian and Italian action, but I hope collective action will yet be taken.

[14946] No. 52.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 147.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 2, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 40 of 1st April.

I have understood throughout that Russia desired both France and England to take part in naval demonstration. It is for this reason that I have supported it, and agreed to participate.

Instructions have been sent to British naval officer at Corfu to proceed thence to Austria with the French ship when commander of latter is similarly instructed.

But if French Government will not take part in naval demonstration the whole project will fall through and there will be left only separate action by Italy and Austria or by latter alone, to which Russia objects. I do not see how, being parties to the agreement about Albania, we can object to Austria taking action to make agreement respected if we are unwilling to take any action ourselves.

* Also to Sir F. Cartwright (No. 129), and Sir R. Rodd (No. 128), *mutatis mutandis.*

It seems to me to be useless to continue meetings with Ambassadors here to formulate agreements which the Powers accept and notify, but decline to enforce, and I cannot continue to be a party to these meetings until it is clear that measures will be taken to make the Albanian agreement respected.

I propose to state this as my personal opinion at meeting of Ambassadors this afternoon, and to say that I shall consult Cabinet to-morrow as to suspending any further meetings of Ambassadors as far as His Majesty's Government is concerned. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 292.)

[15245] No. 53.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 148.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 2, 1913.*

I POSTPONED meeting of Ambassadors from this afternoon till Friday morning. I have explained to French and Russian Ambassadors that I do not consider His Majesty's Government can take part in naval demonstration without either France or Russia, but that, if we do not take part, we must declare that we raise no objection to steps taken by others to make agreement about Albanian frontier respected; that this is, in my opinion, the only honourable course for us to take, but I must consult my colleagues as to announcing it and as to saying definitely that meeting of Ambassadors must be suspended, as far as His Majesty's Government is concerned, unless agreement about Albanian frontier is to be respected.

(Confidential.)

Russian Ambassador said positively that Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs desired collective naval demonstration, and I said this had been made abundantly clear to me. French Ambassador said Russian Ambassador at Paris must have conveyed a different impression.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 295.)

[14946] No. 54.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 293.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 2, 1913.*

SIR F. BERTIE'S telegram No. 40 of 1st April and my telegram to Sir F. Bertie No. 147 of 2nd April: Naval demonstration.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs

[13365] No. 55.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 91.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 2, 1913.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 224 of the 20th ultimo, transmitting a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Mosul reporting the issue of an inflammatory article in that town with a view to invite subscriptions for the new internal loan and his own action to secure its withdrawal.

Your Excellency should convey to Mr. Hony an expression of my approval of his action in the matter.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[15451] No. 56.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 234.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 2, 1913.*

I SAW the French and Russian Ambassadors together this afternoon. I communicated to them the first paragraph of your Excellency's telegram No. 40. I said that this put me in an exceedingly difficult position for the reunion this afternoon. The Austrian, Italian, and German Governments had all given instructions for warships to be sent to Antivari. They were quite entitled to do so, knowing that every Great Power had acquiesced in a naval demonstration. They would press me to have orders sent to British ships, but I could not send British ships without either French or Russian ships, and so appear alone, without France or Russia, as a partner with the Triple Alliance. If, however, we did not participate in the naval demonstration, we must declare that we raised no objection to the action taken by others to make the Albanian agreement respected. Any Power that was a party to this agreement must either join in taking steps to make it respected or, if not prepared to do so, must not obstruct the steps taken by others. This was the only honourable course. I felt also that the British Government ought not to be a party to further agreements unless it was clear that the agreement already come to was to be respected, and, as far as we were concerned, the meetings of Ambassadors must be suspended till this was clear. I must, however, consult the Cabinet before making an announcement on behalf of the British Government, and I thought it better to postpone the reunion that had been called for this afternoon. I would see the other Ambassadors separately this afternoon.

The Russian Ambassador said positively that M. Sazonof wished the naval demonstration to take place.

I said that this had been made abundantly clear to me. It was because I knew that M Sazonof desired a naval demonstration that I had, when the German Ambassador proposed a mandate to Austria and Italy, suggested a naval demonstration. It was because I knew that M. Sazonof desired England and France to take part in it that I had supported it, and had declared my willingness to participate.

The French Ambassador agreed in this statement of my own part in the matter, and as to the impression that had been received here of M. Sazonof's attitude. Apparently a different impression had been conveyed in Paris.

Both Ambassadors cordially agreed in the postponement of the reunion, and said that they would telegraph very seriously to their Governments.

I am, &c
E. GREY.

[15617] No. 57.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 120.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 2, 1913.*

IN speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the postponement of the reunion, as recorded in my telegram No. 149, to your Excellency, I said that I was quite clear that the agreement about Albania must be respected. Things would have been very serious now if this agreement had not been arrived at in time. It was the anchor by which we must hold in order to preserve peace.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[15146] No. 58.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 5.)
Sir, *Canea, March 27, 1913.*

IN my despatch No. 65 of 15th August, 1912, I reported that my colleagues and I had informed the Cretan Government that the continuation of the 3 per cent. surtax had

* Also to Sir G. Buchanan (No. 145), *mutatis mutandis.*

been provisionally sanctioned on the understanding that the proceeds should be deposited in the Bank of Crete in the name of the six Powers.

I have now the honour to report that the sums so deposited up-to-date amount to fr. 359,746. This money being entirely at the disposal of the Powers, it might be devoted in the first place to the payment of M. Zaimis' indemnity as well as to compensation for the family of the murdered Mussulman rural guard. (Foreign Office despatches No. 12 of the 28th May and No. 16 of the 26th July, 1912).

I further venture to remind you that in any eventual settlement of the affairs of Crete there still remains the advance of fr. 4,000,000 made by the protecting Powers to Prince George of Greece as high commissioner.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

[15153] No. 59.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 9. Commercial.)
Sir, *Salonica, March 27, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 4, Commercial, of the 12th instant, I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of a further despatch, with its enclosure, which I have addressed to Sir Ralph Paget on the subject of the difficulties placed by the Servian authorities in the way of the trade of this place with the interior.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 1 in No. 59.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir R. Paget.

Sir, *Salonica, March 27, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 12th instant on the subject of the impediments intentionally placed by the Servian authorities in the way of the trade of Salonica with the territories in the occupation of their troops, I have the honour to annex hereto copy of a paragraph in to-day "Indépendant," showing that they have so far yielded to pressure as to make a grudging and altogether insufficient concession to local interests in the matter of railway transport between Gumendja and Uskub.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 2 in No. 59.

Extract from the "Indépendant" of March 27, 1913.

LE TRANSBORDEMENT À GUMENDJA.

L'ON sait que onze wagons étaient en panne en gare de Gumendja et que quarante-trois autres wagons chargés de marchandises à destination de la ligne d'Uscub se trouvaient en panne en gare de Salonique.

Les négociants d'Uscub firent une demande collective auprès du commandant militaire de cette ville, le priant de vouloir bien mettre à leur disposition une cinquantaine de wagons, afin de leur permettre de prendre livraison des marchandises qu'ils avaient déjà mises en wagon et qui se trouvaient en gare de Gumendja ou de Salonique, leur occasionnant des frais de chômage que les marchandises ne pouvaient supporter.

Le Gouvernement serbe finit par se rendre aux prières des commerçants d'Uscub et mit à leur disposition une cinquantaine de wagons. Chaque négociant, sur demande, obtint un permis lui donnant droit à un ou plusieurs wagons vides, et les cinquante wagons offerts par le Gouvernement serbe furent ainsi placés.

Le service de transbordement commença immédiatement et vingt-neuf wagons chargés sur cinquante-quatre ont déjà été transbordés. Vingt-cinq autres restent

encore en panne, dix-sept en gare de Salonique et huit en gare de Gumendja. Les marchandises de ces wagons ne peuvent ni ne pourront avant longtemps être transbordées, car leurs propriétaires n'ont pu obtenir de permis. Les négociants qui n'avaient pas de marchandises en panne ont obtenu environ vingt-cinq wagons et ils s'en servent pour transporter à Uscub des marchandises qu'ils achètent actuellement.

Quoi qu'il en soit, le commandant militaire serbe d'Uscub a fait savoir qu'il a fait le maximum d'efforts et preuve de la meilleure bonne volonté en donnant au commerce autant de wagons qu'il avait demandés et qu'il se trouve dans l'impossibilité absolue de donner de nouveaux wagons vides. Un placard placé à la porte du commandement général informe les commerçants d'Uscub que toute démarche pour obtenir de nouveaux permis pour wagons vides serait inutile et superflue.

[15166] No. 60.

Russian Minister at Cettinjé to M. Sazonof.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, April 3.)

(Très Confidentiel.)
(Télégraphique.) *Cettigné, le 28 mars*, 1913.

MON collègue d'Autriche a repris aujourd'hui avec moi un entretien sur un aide économique à fournir au Monténégro. M. de Giesl m'informe qu'il a reçu la visite de M. Grégovitch, Maréchal de la Cour, qui lui a décrit sous couleurs sombres la situation du Roi, placé entre l'exigence des Puissances d'avoir à renoncer à Scutari et les obligations tenaces de ses Ministres et quelques membres de sa famille, désirant l'obliger à passer outre et ne céder en rien aux Puissances.

Selon M. Grégovitch, si le Roi pouvait déclarer à ses Ministres et ses généraux que les Puissances sont prêtes à porter assistance au royaume sur le terrain économique et qu'il puisse faire cette déclaration sans retard, la crise perdrait de son caractère aigu.

En me communiquant ce qui précède, M. de Giesl me demanda si je pouvais en référer à mon Gouvernement. Il en a fait de même à nos autres collègues. Il a, pourtant, ajouté qu'il nous priait de ne pas considérer sa communication comme une proposition formelle de sa part. J'ai répondu que j'informerai immédiatement votre Excellence.

Minute by Sir A. Nicolson.

Sir Edward Grey.

We have received already practically the substance of this through Count de Salis. I think that if Russia and Italy, protectress and relative of King Nicholas, wish to buy the raising of the siege, the purchase would be well worth the money; but it is hardly a matter for the Powers as such to take up, especially when we are putting real pressure on Montenegro. Marquis Imperiali gave me to understand some communications were passing between Rome and St. Petersburgh on the subject.

A. N.

Foreign Office, April 1, 1913.

[15130] No. 61.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 168.)
Paris, April 2, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you, with reference to your despatch No. 207 of the 27th March, that the Minister for Foreign Affairs accepts the amendment proposed by you to the fifth paragraph of the draft note drawn up by the French Government protesting against the interference on the part of the Servian authorities with the administration of the Ottoman Public Debt.

M. Pichon informs me that, in accordance with the suggestion which I made to his Excellency under the instructions conveyed to me in your despatch above referred to, he yesterday forwarded the draft note in question to the French Ambassadors at Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Rome, with instructions to bring the matter to the notice of the Governments to which they are respectively accredited with a view to securing the dispatch of instructions authorising the representatives of those Powers at Belgrade to make the representation which you desire.

I beg leave to point out that in my note to M. Pichon I suggested the communication of the draft note to the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Italian Governments only.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[15614] No. 62.

Memorandum communicated by Count Mensdorff, April 3, 1913.

TANDIS que le texte accepté par la réunion de Londres et approuvé par toutes les Puissances assure la protection nationale et religieuse, la version choisie par les représentants de la Triple Entente à Belgrade a passé complètement sous silence la protection des minorités au point de vue national.

Il y aurait lieu de remarquer que le mot "culte" employé ensemble avec le mot "albanais" constitue une contradiction.

Le fait d'avoir modifié un texte accepté par toutes les Puissances à l'occasion d'une démarche collective donne en principe matière à des objections; dans le cas dont il s'agit le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal pense que la différence dans le texte de la déclaration a fait surgir chez le Gouvernement serbe certains espoirs qui ont eu pour résultat la réponse si peu satisfaisante de M. Pachitch.

Dans ces conditions le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal estime qu'il serait équitable et indiqué dans l'intérêt européen de ne pas laisser de doute au Cabinet de Belgrade sur la volonté unanime des Puissances, exprimée dans la réunion de Londres, et de communiquer au Gouvernement serbe le texte précis de la décision des Ambassadeurs.

Ceci paraît d'autant plus nécessaire que les décisions ultérieures au sujet de la protection des minorités ne pourront évidemment être prises que sur la base de la résolution de la réunion de Londres.

Ambassade d'Autriche-Hongrie, Londres, le 3 avril, 1913.

[15120] No. 63.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, April 2*, 1913.

MY telegram No. 39 of 31st March.

So far no positive information can be obtained here with regard to the attack on Scutari, but I am under the impression that an attempt on Tarabosch has been beaten off with severe loss.

It is reported that twenty-two transports with Servian troops are at San Giovanni di Medua, and that four Austrian ships of war are cruising between Antivari and Dulcigno.

[15261] No. 64.

Consul-General Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.) *Odessa, April 2*, 1913.

FOLLOWING telegram received from Sevastopol, repeated to St. Petersburgh and Constantinople:

"I am informed that 13th artillery brigade has orders to be ready to embark for Constantinople at any time.

"I notice that the 'Kronstadt' is ready to embark troops and horses; fodder is in readiness alongside."

[15195] No. 65.

Sir C. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 130.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, April 2, 1913.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs spoke to French Ambassador and myself this afternoon on the subject of Scutari. He said that the situation was becoming most serious; that the town might fall at any moment; that the Austrian ships were already on their way, while the Italian Government had refused to send theirs, and French and British Governments were hesitating and had not yet given the necessary orders.

Turning to me, he said that you had from the beginning taken up most uncompromising attitude and had insisted that Powers must make their decision respected. He regretted that you had laid down such stress on enforcement of our decision, as this was calculated to encourage Austria, and it would have been better had you put it in a milder form. Having done so, however, he could not understand why His Majesty's Government were now apparently drawing back from participation in the demonstration.

I explained that our ships had been sent to Corfu and that we were only waiting for French to act with us. His Excellency could hardly expect us to make a joint demonstration with Austria alone without participation of any other Powers. If we did we should at once be represented here as having abandoned Russia and joined forces with Triple Alliance, and a serious blow would have been struck at Anglo-Russian understanding.

Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that Austria must not be allowed to act alone, as if she did he could not answer for the consequences. Presence of British ships might save the situation even were they only ones besides Austrian.

His Excellency then appealed to the French Ambassador to represent the seriousness of the situation to his Government.

French Ambassador said he believed the two cruisers had been sent to Corfu, where they were to await instructions. The delay might perhaps be due to reluctance of his Government to join in a demonstration, in which Russia declined to be represented, that was intended to bring force of pressure to bear on a Slav State.

Minister for Foreign Affairs explained that, even if Russia had ships to send, which she had not, it was impossible for her to join. He then said, "Tell your Government that we beseech them to send their ships."

He added that he did not wish the French Government to publish the fact that they were being pressed by Russia to take this step. Russia had expressed her acquiescence in international demonstration, and that was all that need be known. There was not a moment to lose. Some untoward incident might arise at any moment. Were Austrians to attack transports with Servian reinforcements, war could hardly be averted in present excitable state of Russian public opinion.

I spoke to him in the sense of last paragraph of your telegram No. 290 of 1st April, and urged him to submit some definite proposals for a communication at Cettinjé which might convince the King that the Powers would make things very disagreeable for him both financially and otherwise if he was recalcitrant, while they would do all they could to assist him if he yielded to their wishes. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that there was no time to concert any such proposals. Only thing possible was to offer the King a bribe, and even a large one would be cheaper than a European war. He had himself during the past month exhausted all his means of pressure and persuasion at Cettinjé.

[15226] No. 66.

Sir C. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 132.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, April 3, 1913.*

FOLLOWING is translation of official communiqué issued to Russian press by Ministry of Foreign Affairs:—

"In view of fact that conference of Ambassadors in London has pronounced a naval demonstration in Montenegrin waters indispensable, Russia, although not herself taking part in above-mentioned demonstration, has expressed opinion that demonstration ought to have an international character, and that French and British ships ought to take part in it."

[15283] No. 67.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 79. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Belgrade, April 3, 1913.*

NEGOTIATIONS for peace.

My Bulgarian colleague, speaking in the strictest confidence, informs me that the following is substantially what has occurred:—

Under instructions from his Government he communicated to the Servian Government on the 29th ultimo a draft reply to the Powers, adding that it was essential that this answer should be handed in as promptly as possible, if feasible on the following day.

M. Toshef read the draft to me. It was approximately as follows (I quote from memory):—

"Mediation of Powers is accepted by allies on the following conditions:—

"1. Line Enos-Midia shall be taken as basis, but not as a rigid basis, for a frontier.

"2. Islands to be ceded.

"3. Principle of war indemnity to be agreed to by Powers. The amount thereof to be determined by the International Commission to sit at Paris on which the allies shall be represented.

"4. Epirus to be ceded to Greece, and the frontiers of Albania to be made known by the Powers.

"5. Cessation of hostilities to synchronise with agreement of Powers to accept the above conditions."

On the following day (the 30th March) an amended draft was received from the Servian Government.

These amendments were accepted by the Bulgarian Prime Minister, though he did not approve of them, in order to avoid further delay. But on the 31st March yet further amendments were proposed by the Servian Government. These amendments, which the Bulgarian Government have also accepted, are to the following effect:

To condition 1 add "To the west of this frontier all Turkish forces and fortresses to be ceded to the allies."

Condition 2, "Islands and all Turkish garrisons to be ceded."

No change in condition 3.

The following statement is made in regard to conditions 4 and 5:—

"The allies can furnish no undertaking in regard to cessation of hostilities until the Powers have made known to them the frontiers of Albania, and it is found that these frontiers are in accordance with their wishes."

Greece and Montenegro, to whom these draft conditions have been submitted, have not yet sent replies.

My Bulgarian colleague asks that the above may be considered as strictly confidential in view of the fact that were Servian Government ever to ascertain that the information had been communicated to me by him it would place him in a very awkward position.

[15195] No. 68.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir C. Buchanan.

(No. 296.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 3, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 130 of 2nd April.

If I had thought that an agreement about the Albanian frontier was not to be respected and upheld, I would never have worked for it nor even become a party to it.

If we send ships alone with the Triple Alliance without the participation of either France or Russia, while France, the ally of Russia, with a ship already alongside ours

at Corfu, refuses to proceed, nothing will make public opinion in France and Russia believe that we are working with France and Russia and not with the Triple Alliance.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs should remember that it was because he preferred an international naval demonstration that I supported it, and because he expressed the desire for England and France to participate that I promised to send ships. British ships have orders now to proceed to Antivari as soon as the French ship is prepared to go also.

[15246] No. 69.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 88.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 3, 1913.*

FRENCH Government complain that your latest instructions differ from the formula sent in my telegram No. 86 of 31st March to you. I have said there must be some misunderstanding. Any further representation at Sophia should be solely in the terms of the resolution given in my telegram No. 86 to you, and should adhere to the text of it without special mention of indemnity or debt.

[13081] No. 70.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 227.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 3, 1913.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 147 of the 21st ultimo, transmitting copy of a note from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the proposed international commission in Paris for the examination of all questions affecting the rights and interests of foreign holders of Turkish bonds, I have to request your Excellency to inform M. Pichon that His Majesty's Government accept the proposals made in that communication.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[15895] No. 71.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 235.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 3, 1913.*

IN speaking to the French and Russian Ambassadors together to-day I observed that the Russian Government had suggested that France, England, and Russia should make representations in Sophia to prevent Bulgaria from advancing to Constantinople. These representations would be useless; nothing but a direct intimation that force would be used against Bulgaria if she did advance would have any effect. Indeed, representations by three Powers would be worse than useless, for they would have no effect on Bulgaria, and would give the impression of division amongst the Powers.

The French Ambassador assented to this, and the Russian Ambassador did not dissent from it.

I then said that, as far as the British Government were concerned, we had agreed to certain terms which the Powers had all endorsed as reasonable conditions of peace between Turkey and the allies. We stood by these terms, but we were not ourselves prepared to do more than suggest that warships should be sent to Constantinople by the Powers as on a previous occasion, with the consent of the Turkish Government, to protect our embassies and nationals in case of a *débâcle*. Having agreed, however, to what we considered reasonable terms of peace, we could not object to any other Powers taking action that they thought desirable to confine the actual terms of peace within these limits.

The Russian Ambassador said that his Government would send a squadron to remain off Constantinople as long as the Bulgarians stayed there.

* Also to Sir G. Buchanan (No. 146).

The French Ambassador said that it would be possible to land sufficient forces from the ships of the Powers to guard the embassies, to occupy the Porte, to protect the Palace, and to retain the Sultan in Constantinople.

I said that the matter had been discussed by the British Government this morning, and we were not prepared to suggest more than I had said.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[16030] No. 72.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 238.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 3, 1913.*

M. CAMBON conveyed to me to-day M. Pichon's suggestion that England and Austria might act together as the mandatories of Europe in the naval demonstration against Montenegro, one representing the Triple *Entente* and the other the Triple Alliance.

I said that I was sure that British public opinion would not allow the British Government to undertake the responsibility of being one of two executors for Europe in this matter. For us to act with Austria would be for the Power with almost the least direct interest to act with the one that was most interested.

M. Cambon did not press the suggestion further.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[15000] No. 73.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 3, 1913.*

THE Bulgarian Minister called on the 31st March to say that the reply of the allies would be given on that day. Bulgaria had abandoned her request for the Rodosto line, and would be ready to accept a line running from a little to the south of Enos to Midia, following during a portion of its course the River Ergene. He did not mention a direct line from Enos to Midia, but I expect it is more or less direct. In any case we shall know when we receive the reply. Enos apparently was to go to Bulgaria. He said Russia would probably accept the proposed line, and he trusted that the other Powers would also consent. Further, Bulgaria asked that an indemnity would be accepted in principle. The amount could be settled later by European commission. If these two questions were settled in accordance with Bulgarian wishes hostilities could be suspended. He himself was of opinion that a continuance of the war was purposeless, but perhaps the generals were of a different opinion. Of course if the war were to continue it could only be to the detriment of Turkey. Bulgaria was not exhausted—agricultural operations had been satisfactorily concluded by women and children—and Bulgaria was quite in a position to pursue hostilities, though he did not himself see what she could gain beyond what she had already secured.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[14995] No. 74.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 143.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 3, 1913.*

THE Councillor of the Russian Embassy called at this Office on the 29th ultimo and was received by Sir L. Mallet, to whom he stated that the Russian Government were favourable to all financial questions being discussed by the Commission at Paris, and to the admission of delegates from the belligerents.

I am also in favour of this arrangement.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[15164] No. 75.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 95.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 3, 1913.*

TEWFIK PASHA communicated to Sir A. Nicolson on the 31st March the document of which I transmit herewith copy to your Excellency.* His Highness said that his Government were anxious to ascertain as soon as posible the views of His Majesty's Government on the Russian proposal. Tewfik Pasha said that it was a most extraordinary suggestion that Turkey should herself propose a line of frontier so disadvantageous to herself, and after that she had accepted the mediation of the Powers, and he did not understand how Russia could separate herself from the other Powers and depart of her own initiative from the decisions taken by all the Powers and make proposals seriously modifying such decisions. Tewfik Pasha insisted on the urgency of hostilities ceasing, and he was convinced that the Bulgarians would not rest till they had occupied the Straits and Constantinople. It was most essential, therefore, that the Powers should hasten the reply of the allies and should do what was possible to cause hostilities to cease. His Highness would be glad of an early reply.

Tewfik Pasha was subsequently informed on the 1st April that a collective step had been taken at Constantinople recommending Turkey to accept the Enos-Midia direct line.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[15894] No. 76.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 95.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 3, 1913.*

THE Italian Ambassador informed me to-day that the Italian Government were prepared to join in a collective international demonstration in which France, for instance, should take part as well as the other Great Powers, or to join in a demonstration composed by England, Austria, and Italy; or to acquiesce in Austria and England acting as the mandatories of the Powers; or, in the last resort, Italy would act with Austria alone, but only if she did so with a direct mandate from the Powers.

I said that I assumed that he had stated these courses in order of preference. He assented.

I said that it was out of the question that Austria and England should act alone. This country would never agree to the British Government taking the responsibility of being one of the executors for Europe in a matter in which we had no direct interest. For the rest, I said I would give him my answer about a naval demonstration, as far as the British Government were concerned, at a meeting with the Ambassadors to-morrow morning at 11 o'clock.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[15893] No. 77.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 96.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 3, 1913.*

I OBSERVED to the Italian Ambassador to-day that I thought that the reunion of Ambassadors should put on record what had been accomplished in our meetings in the bringing about of an agreement between the Great Powers respecting Albania and its frontier, and in the formulating of conditions of peace between Turkey and the allies which the Great Powers had endorsed as reasonable. We should now state that the first agreement was disputed by Servia and Montenegro, and that the second had received the assent of Turkey, but had failed to receive the acceptance of the allies. We should say that it was of no use for us to discuss other questions at present, and

* Part VI, No. 605.

that we could only refer to the respective Governments the consideration of what should be done as regards the agreements already reached.

With regard to mediation, the Ambassador asked whether the allies were to be allowed to trifle with the Powers as much as they liked.

I replied that it was a question of whether Bulgaria meant to go to Constantinople. She would try to do so unless she was told that, when she reached Constantinople, she would be fired upon by some people other than Turks. Was there any Power prepared to say this to Bulgaria? We ourselves were prepared only to send warships to Constantinople to protect our Embassy and nationals in case of need.

The Ambassador said that Russia was the only Power that could possibly take action against Bulgaria.

I said that, if this was so, I did not see what the Powers were to do effectively to enforce the conditions of peace.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[15892] No. 78.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 78.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 3, 1913.*

THIS morning, as I was not able to see Count Mensdorff, he sent me the accompanying communication, in order that I might have it without delay. In sending it, he explained that it was intended to be only a verbal communication, and he let me have it in the informal shape of the translation of a telegram from Count Berchtold to him. When Count Mensdorff came to see me this afternoon, he explained that this was not the form in which it would have been given had there been time, but that he hoped that there was nothing in it to which I took exception.

The only comment that I made upon the communication was that, though I was correctly quoted as having said that we would send ships as soon as we heard that similar instructions had been sent by other Powers, and though it was quite a correct inference that I did not mean to make our action depend upon that of all other Powers, I had meant by the expression "other Powers" that there should be sufficient other Powers to give the demonstration an international character. I told Count Mensdorff that I would give him a reply to his communication to-morrow morning at the meeting with the Ambassadors, but that I could not do so before then.

After this, Count Mensdorff did not press further for an immediate reply, but he pointed out the difficult position in which Austria was placed. It would be felt in Austria that the naval demonstration had been delayed in order to give time for the Servian guns and reinforcements to arrive, and to make sure of the fall of Scutari After Scutari had fallen, it would be urged that the situation had been altered, that the Slav peoples must stand together, and that Austria must not be allowed to take isolated action against them. She would be accused of having precipitated isolated action by sending her warships, whereas she had done so only on the assumption that other Powers acquiesced in a naval demonstration and were going to send ships as we had declared our intention of doing, and but for the statement that we would send ships if other Powers did so, the Austrian ships might never have been sent at all. With the feeling that existed at present in Russia, this appearance of isolated action on the part of Austria might produce the very war that it had been hoped to avoid. If we sent ships, this charge of isolated action could not be brought against Austria; but if we and other Powers did not send ships now, Austria would appear to have been manœuvred into this invidious position.

I repeated that I would give our answer about sending ships to-morrow morning. Meanwhile, I could only say that, whether Scutari fell or not, I felt myself bound to stand by the agreement about the Albanian frontier.

As Count Mensdorff had said that Austria had relied upon us to see the agreement through, I observed that that would put too much responsibility upon us. We had not undertaken the responsibility of seeing the agreement enforced, but I considered that it was fair to say that we were bound to support, or not to oppose, the measures necessary to make it respected.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 78.

Copy of Telegram received by Count Mensdorff from Count Berchtold.

(Translation.)

THE order for the sailing of our men-of-war was determined by the declaration of Sir E. Grey in the Ambassadors reunion of the 31st March, that the order for the British cruisers to leave for Antivari would be given "aussitôt qu'il sera informé de l'envoi de semblables instructions par d'autres Puissances."

From this, as well as from all your reports of Sir E Grey's conversations with you, it did not appear that he meant to make the participation of England in the naval demonstration conditional on the participation of any particular Powers like France and Italy.

Still less could I assume that, in view of the acquiescence of all the Powers to the naval demonstration already expressed by the reunion of Ambassadors, Sir E. Grey would now ask again and wait for the consent of any particular Power. All the more so, as such an exchange of views would render illusory the enforcing of the first demand decided upon by the Powers, *i.e.*, the stopping of the siege of Scutari in view of the very critical position of that town.

Unless some misunderstanding has occurred, I would be very surprised at any further delay on the part of Sir E. Grey, as he must have received information by now; that, besides Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy will take part in the demonstration, so that the condition expressed by Sir E. Grey of the participation of two or three Powers appears completely fulfilled.

There is no isolated action on our part, as you rightly observed to Sir E. Grey. The sailing of our men-of-war only represents our participation in the naval demonstration decided by all the Powers, as our ships have received the explicit order to await the arrival of the other vessels in the open sea and then to consult with them on the action which is to be taken.

I also am of the opinion that in the general interest any appearance of an isolated action ought to be avoided. Should, contrary to expectations, England hold back with the dispatch of her ships, just this impression might be created.

[15370] No. 79.

Minute by the Earl of Onslow.

Sir A. Nicolson,

MEHEMED BEY KONITZA and M. Philippe Noggaf (Albanian delegates) called on me this morning and gave me the memorandum attached. They begged that careful attention should be given to it, and they expressed the hope that His Majesty's Government would do their best to give effect to their wishes. They said that now that the towns in Northern Albania had been taken away, there remained no hope for a self-supporting Albania unless their wishes regarding the south were given effect to.

They said it was ridiculous for the Powers to say that an independent Albania should be constituted if the country was to consist of "nothing but stones."

I told them I would see that their memorandum and their remarks were brought before Sir Edward Grey.

O.

Foreign Office, April 3, 1913.

Enclosure in No. 79.

Memorandum.

LE Gouvernement hellénique a soumis aux représentants des Puissances à Londres un mémoire imposant ses revendications au sujet des nouvelles frontières de l'Albanie et de la Grèce. A l'appui de ces revendications, il publie des statistiques basées sur des prétendues considérations religieuses et ethnologiques, complètement erronées, dans le but évident de fausser l'opinion publique.

Tout d'abord, nous nous permettons de signaler à l'attention de votre Excellence le fait suivant, qui a son importance capitale :—

Il est de notoriété publique que la Grèce n'a jamais voulu faire une distinction entre la question religieuse et la question nationale, qu'elle amalgame dans un même ordre d'idées. Ainsi, dans l'Albanie du sud, elle considère l'Albanais chrétien non pas comme un Albanais, mais comme un Grec, parce qu'orthodoxe. La Turquie agissait de même, du reste. Contestant, ou plutôt ne voulant pas reconnaître la nationalité individuelle, elle subdivisait l'élément albanais en deux catégories bien distinctes : musulmans et chrétiens. Toutes les statistiques turques ont été dressées sur cette même base. On n'a qu'à examiner, pour s'en convaincre, les actes d'état civil délivrés par la Turquie, les Hamidiés d'abord et les Osmanlés ensuite, portant mention "chrétien" si le sujet était orthodoxe, fût-il Albanais, Bulgare, Serbe, Syrien ; ou bien la mention "islam" si le sujet est musulman, fût-il de Roumélie, d'Anatolie, de l'Arabie ou de l'Afrique.

On n'ignore pas que les métropolites nommés par le Patriarcat œcuménique de Constantinople sont les agents les plus actifs de la politique de la Grèce. Leur mission consistait, dans l'Albanie du sud, à implanter la politique grecque et à persuader à la population chrétienne qu'orthodoxie et nationalité grecque ne forment qu'un lien indissoluble et indivisible. Vains efforts, car, malgré cette propagande séculaire, les Albanais orthodoxes ont su toujours garder le sentiment de leur nationalité, malgré toutes les pressions exercées sur leur conscience.

L'Église orthodoxe en Albanie du sud, n'étant pas autocéphale, relève naturellement de la juridiction ecclésiastique du Patriarcat œcuménique. Conséquemment, les Métropolites sont reconnus par notre population comme chefs spirituels et jouissent de tout le respect qui leur est dû. Ceux-ci continueront à l'avenir à jouir des mêmes avantages spirituels, en tant que pasteurs du peuple, avec cette différence, qu'ils ne devront plus s'ingérer dans les affaires politiques qui ne sont pas de leur ressort.

La Turquie nous interdisait formellement l'enseignement de notre langue et, partant, ne tolérait l'ouverture d'aucune école nationale ; celles que nous avions instituées à Elbassan et à Kortcha lors de la promulgation de la Constitution ottomane ont été fermées aussitôt, d'ordre du Gouvernement. Par contre, elle favorisait singulièrement les Grecs et Slaves à multiplier leurs écoles et leurs sièges épiscopaux dans les différentes parties de l'Albanie. Il est à relever ici que dans toutes les tentatives faites par les Koutzo-Valaques d'ouvrir des écoles pour l'enseignement de la langue roumaine les bandes grecques se chargeaient de terroriser les professeurs et parents des élèves au point que les écoles devaient se fermer.

Ces procédés ne réussissant pas toujours, les Grecs insinuent maintenant que la création d'un État albanais musulman constituerait un péril pour la population chrétienne orthodoxe. Or, de tous les peuples balkaniques, seuls les Albanais ne se sont jamais servis de la religion comme but politique, le sentiment national chez eux primant toute considération religieuse. S'il en était ainsi, les musulmans albanais seraient restés Turcs, tandis que ce sont eux la plupart des fois qui ont voulu secouer le joug turc. Ces insinuations, toutes gratuites, ne peuvent tromper personne. L'Albanie n'entend pas créer un État musulman, mais, au contraire, elle entend respecter et faire respecter les croyances de tout chacun.

Relevons, en terminant, ce qu'il y a d'inexact dans les statistiques que la Grèce fait publier dans tous les journaux d'Angleterre et du continent sur les populations des territoires albanais qu'elle occupe actuellement et qu'elle entend, dit-elle, garder. Elle donne comme population totale un chiffre de 463,000 habitants, dont 148,000 musulmans et 314,000 Grecs. Il est fort singulier de voir la Grèce réclamer pour elle une population qui n'a rien de commun avec la nationalité hellénique, si ce n'est la religion. Il convient de redresser cette statistique absolument erronée, et puisque les chiffres parlent, nous dirons que, sur une population totale de 460,000 habitants (et non de 463,000, d'après les données des Grecs) formant les territoires occupés actuellement par la Grèce, il y a 160,000 Albanais musulmans, 97,000 Albanais chrétiens, 17,000 Valaques* et 186,000 Grecs. Nous ne voyant pas où les Grecs trouvent le chiffre de 314,000 Grecs qu'ils veulent s'attribuer.

Second point : D'après la proposition faite par certaines Puissances—basée sur des chiffres erronés fournis par les Grecs—environ les deux tiers des territoires réclamés par la Grèce, sur une population de 393,000 habitants, devraient aller à l'Albanie, ce qui donnerait au nouvel État 252,000 Grecs et 141,000 musulmans non Albanais. C'est à se demander s'il n'y a pas un seul Albanais dans tout ce pays !

* Nous ne parlons pas de la population valaque du coté du sud-est, qui est très dense.

La vérité est tout autre, cependant, et la voici : Sur une population de 334,000 habitants (et non de 393,000, d'après la version grecque), il y a 151,000 Albanais musulmans, 95,000 Albanais chrétiens, 12,000 Valaques et seulement 76,000 Grecs.

Tandis que sur une population de 125,300 habitants du territoire avoisinant Janina et Prevesa, qu'on se propose de céder à la Grèce, se trouvent 9,000 Albanais musulmans, 1,300 Albanais chrétiens, 5,000 Valaques et 110,000 Grecs.

Pour résumer, nous dirons que :

1. La Grèce est mal inspirée en faisant d'une question religieuse une question d'hellénisme, qui n'existe pas dans l'Albanie du sud.

2. Elle ne peut se prévaloir des statistiques turques pour fonder ses prétentions.

3. Elle ne peut alléguer en sa faveur la création des institutions d'éducation et des sièges épiscopaux dans cette contrée pour justifier un centre d'hellénisme.

4. Les statistiques publiées par elle sont manifestement fausses et de nature à induire en erreur.

5. Enfin, les demandes que la Grèce veut imposer à l'Europe ne sont nullement justifiées ni en droit ni en fait par l'occupation d'un pays non belligérant, le droit de conquête ne primant pas celui de la nationalité.

Par la délimitation des frontières nord et nord-est, l'Albanie se voit enlever des populations compactes, purement albanaises, ainsi que des territoires très fertiles. La viabilité et la tranquillité de l'Albanie risquent, dans ces conditions, d'être très problématiques. Si, après cela, on permet à la Grèce d'autres appropriations de territoires albanais dans le sud, la création d'un État albanais, contrairement au principe des Balkans aux peuples balkaniques, établi et adopté par les Grandes Puissances elle-mêmes, n'a plus sa raison d'être.

Les Délégués du Gouvernement albanais :

MEHMED KONITZA.
PH. NOGGAF.

Londres, le 3 avril, 1913.

[15365 No. 80.

Sir R. Crawford to Sir W. Tyrrell.—(Received April 4.)

Dear Tyrrell, *Constantinople, March 19*, 1913.

THE financial situation, though still desperate, has improved slightly since my last letter. The following advances—

£T. 300,000 on a mortage of 1,500,000*l.* on the Tarim land and barracks;
£T. 300,000 from the Bagdad Railway;
£T. 300,000 from the Ottoman Debt against the 3 per cent. surtax for the current year.

have enabled the Government to pay the salaries due on the 14th January and the 14th February. The March salaries are in arrear, and cannot be paid this month.

As regards the renewal of bills and advances due on the 13th March and the 14th April, the National Bank of Turkey, in conjunction with the Banque de Salonique, declared that they were unable to accept the Government offer to renew the bills for the short loan of 1912, 1,500,000*l.* at 7½ per cent., with ½ per cent. commission. They accordingly pressed for a letter dispensing the banks and holders from protest and accepting the legal rate of interest (9 per cent.). I had to advise the Minister to give this letter in order to avoid formal public protests, which would have had a bad effect on all Turkish holdings abroad. Unfortunately news of the refusal of the National Bank to renew has spread to Paris and Berlin, and may give rise to difficulties in renewing the bills for £T. 2,500,000 held by the Ottoman Bank, which fall due on the 16th April next. In the meantime I have advised the Ministry to propose the renewal of these bills for six months at 7½ per cent. and ½ per cent. commission.

On the other hand, I succeeded yesterday in concluding successfully negotiations for the renewal of the Deutsche Bank advance of £T. 3,000,000, which fell due on the 14th instant. By a contract signed yesterday the advances are renewed for four

months at the Reichsbank rate for bills, minimum 6 per cent. and ½ per cent. commission.

If the arrangement comes off with the Ottoman Bank we shall, I hope, manage to pull the financial situation through without collapse until peace is signed.

I am acting as president of a joint committee of the Debt and the Ministry of Finance for the preparation of the Turkish case in regard to the share of the Ottoman debts to be taken over by the allies. I have advised the Ministry to base the Government case on the specialisation of the securities for every debt secured on revenues in the occupied territories. The principle is to treat the revenues assigned for these debts as being in the nature of mortgages adherent to the territories occupied. The Ottoman Government should, I think, take this line for all the debts, and not only for those administered by the Council of the Public Debt. The "floating debt" cannot be treated on this principle, and there may be some difficulty in getting it recognised at all.

The Ottoman Government has asked me to accompany their delegation for the financial conference. The Minister asked me to act as chief delegate, but I told him that it was desirable that a Turk should occupy this position. At present Djavid is designated, but it is possible that somebody else may be named at the last moment, as Djavid is not *bien vu* abroad just now.

Yours, &c.
R. F. CRAWFORD.

[15308] No. 81.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 51.)

Sir, *Sophia, March 29*, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 101 of the 22nd instant, I have the honour to enclose copy of the communication handed to the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs on that date by myself and by my colleagues representatives of the other Great Powers, in identical terms.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 81.

Joint Note presented to Bulgarian Government.

LES Gouvernements des Grandes Puissances prennent acte avec satisfaction de l'acceptation de leur médiation par les États alliés et leur font observer qu'avant l'ouverture d'une discussion sur les conditions de la paix il appartient aux Puissances de formuler leurs vues sur les bases de négociations qui devraient être adoptées.

Les Grandes Puissances sont d'avis que les bases de négociations doivent être les suivantes :—

1. La frontière de l'Empire ottoman en Europe partira d'Énos, suivra le cours de la Maritsa, puis le cours de l'Ergene et aboutira à Midia. Tous les territoires situés à l'ouest de cette ligne seront cédés par la Turquie aux États alliés, à l'exception de l'Albanie, dont le régime et la délimitation seront fixés par les Puissances.

2. La question des îles de la mer Égée sera réglée par les Puissances.

3. La Turquie se désintéressera complètement de l'île de Crète.

4. Les Puissances ne peuvent se montrer favorables à une indemnité, mais elles admettront les alliés à prendre part aux discussions de la commission internationale de Paris pour un règlement équitable de leur participation à la dette et aux charges financières des territoires qui leur seront attribués. La Turquie sera invitée à prendre part aux travaux de cette commission.

Les Grandes Puissances déclarent en même temps que dès l'acceptation de ces bases, les hostilités devront prendre fin.

[15332] No. 82.

Vice-Consul Young to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 4.)

Sir, *Philippopoli, March* 29, 1913.

ON my return to-day from a journey to Adrianople, undertaken (with the sanction of His Majesty's Minister at Sophia) in order to report upon the state of affairs immediately after the fall of the town, I have the honour to transmit to you, by desire of Major L. L. R. Samson, His Majesty's consul at Adrianople, the following despatches addressed by that officer to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople:—

1. Major Samson's No. 65, of the 31st December, 1912.
2. Major Samson's No. 1, of the 2nd February, 1913.
3. A preliminary memorandum by Major Samson dealing with the latter stages of the siege.

In order that these despatches may reach you as soon as possible, the original only of these papers has been forwarded to Constantinople, the duplicate being sent to you direct.

I have, &c.
H. E. W. YOUNG.

Enclosure 1 in No. 82.

Consul Samson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 65.)

Sir, *Adrianople, December* 31, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of your Excellency, the following report on the political and military situation in this district from the 26th October to the present date.

I do not propose in the present despatch to give more than a general outline of the military operations which have taken place in the neighbourhood of this fortress since the commencement of hostilities. The military authorities have throughout maintained absolute secrecy with regard to these, and no information has been furnished either to the consular corps or to the population of the town. Such particulars as I have been able to collect are the result of personal observation, but this has often been a matter of considerable difficulty owing to my being unable to approach the line of fortifications.

I propose, therefore, with your Excellency's permission, to defer a detailed description of the operations until I have had an opportunity of comparing notes with an officer of the headquarter staff of this garrison, an arrangement to which Shukri Pasha informs me he will give his consent on the conclusion of peace.

My despatch No. 64 of the 25th October last described the state of affairs here up to noon on that day, and reported the movements in a north-easterly direction on the 21st October of a portion of the garrison of this fortress under Shukri Pasha. The force in question consisted of the 10th and 11th Divisions, the 4th Nishanji Regiment and three squadrons of the 12th Cavalry Regiment, which, on the 22nd October, was distributed as follows: 10th Division, Sufilar: 11th Division, Haziraga; 4th Nishanji Regiment, Demirhanli; cavalry at Etapkeui and Chomlekkeui.

This movement was undertaken with the object of attacking the right flank of the Bulgarian army simultaneously with a frontal attack by the IVth Army Corps, which had been reported at Havsa on the 20th October. For reasons which have not as yet transpired here, Abuk Pasha with this Army Corps failed to come into line with the forces on his right and left, with the result, I am informed, that he was attacked with an overwhelming superiority of numbers at Haskeui on the 22nd, and compelled to retire on Lule burgas.

Shukri Pasha, anxious apparently lest the return of his force to Adrianople should be prevented, retired on that fortress on the 24th, after having been engaged on the two preceding days in the neighbourhood, of Sufilar and Karayusuf.

The sortie of Shukri Pasha had meanwhile left Adrianople garrisoned only by redifs,

the majority of whom were entirely lacking in military training and incapable of loading a rifle or of adjusting the sights. The Bulgarian forces to the west of Adrianople profited by this fact to attack the outlying positions to the west of the town on the afternoon of the 22nd, whilst during the night of the 23rd and in the early hours of the morning of the 24th attacks were made on the north-western and western portions of the line of fortifications. Ismail Pasha, who, in the absence of Shukri Pasha, was in command of the Adrianople garrison, withdrew 2,200 fortress artillerymen from the eastern line of defences, and launched two counter attacks, one with 1,700 men along the Mustapha Pasha road, and a second with 500 men against the Ekmekjikeui Chiflik. The Bulgarian attack was thus repulsed. Shukri Pasha's force re-entered Adrianople on the morning of the 25th October, on which date railway communication with Constantinople was interrupted at Lule Burgas and Muradli. The interruption was reported here to be caused by the destruction of two culverts by Bulgarian peasants. The military authorities however, published a notice attributing it to a collision between a goods train and a flock of sheep. Instructions were received by the railway authorities to prepare to move all rolling stock to Cherkesskeui station.

Definite news of the retirement of the Turkish eastern army from Kirk Kilisse reached here on the 27th October, on which date, the damage to the line near Seidler having been repaired, a train containing the whole of the Adrianople railway staff was prepared for departure, leaving at 2 A.M. on the following day. On the 27th, also, a train of wounded left for Constantinople. At 5 P.M. on that day my colleagues and myself were informed by the Pera telegraph office that only telegrams *en clair* would be accepted for delivery, and that certain messages which had been dispatched on the two previous days remained undelivered.

The situation here on the 28th October was therefore as follows: Adrianople was invested on the north and west, whilst the Bulgarian forces were closing in on the east also. To the south the railway line to Dedeagatch was intact, but, owing to the absence of rolling stock, communication with that town was not maintained. Telegraphic communication with Constantinople was still open viâ Uzunkeupru and Keshan, but this ceased on the 31st October.

With the exception of a few Mustafiz troops, who were holding the railway line to Dedeagatch, the whole of the force at the disposal of Shukri Pasha for the defence of Adrianople was, on the 28th October, concentrated in this fortress, being composed as follows:

	Strength.
10th Nizam division	12,000
11th " "	7,500
Cavalry, 5 squadrons (various)	500
Adrianople Redif Division	7,000
Baba Eski " "	10,000
Gumuljina " "	8,000
Fortress artillery	11,000
2 Mustafiz regiments	2,000
Total	58,000

The 4th Nishanji Regiment was attached to the 10th Division and the Brussa Redif Regiment to the 11th Division, to replace the 31st Regiment, which had been sent to Kirjali. From this number should be deducted 1,000 casualties in engagements which had already taken place, leaving 57,000 as the actual strength of the garrison under the command of General (Ferik) Shukri Pasha, with Major Fuad Bey as chief staff officer. General (Liva) Ismail Pasha, who until the arrival of Shukri Pasha had commanded at Adrianople, was relegated to the command of the fortress troops only. The 10th and 11th Divisions, commanded respectively by Colonel Husameddin Bey and General (Liva) Ibrahim Edhem Pasha, were, during the subsequent operations, used as mobile troops, being moved from point to point of the defences as occasion demanded. The two divisions were rarely used simultaneously, one of them being as a rule in the main infantry barracks.

The Adrianople defence works fall naturally into three sections, the eastern and western faces being divided by the River Tundja, which, flowing from north to south, joins, about the centre of the fortress, the River Maritza, which separates the southern section from the other two. Thus the eastern section includes all works on the left bank of Tunja, the western those on the right bank of that river, and the southern those on the right bank of the Maritza. A Redif division was permanently allotted to each of these sections, the general officer commanding the division being responsible for

the defence of the section, under the general directions of Ismail Pasha. The divisions were distributed as follows: eastern section, Babaeski Division; western, Adrianople Division; southern, Gumuljina Division. The Bulgarian forces operating against Adrianople on the 28th October consisted of 15,000 men, of which 9,000 were between Kuyunli and Yurush, 3,000 at Kemal, and 3,000 at Akbunar, headquarters being at Mustapha Pasha. On the 29th October the first action in the immediate vicinity of Adrianople took place, an attack being carried out on the Bulgarian advanced positions at Hadikeui and Kuyunli, to the west of the town. The attack was repulsed, with a loss on the Turkish side of 500 killed and wounded. During this engagement the Bulgarians used a captive balloon for observation purposes. On the following day two Bulgarian deserters from the Turkish army, who had been captured on the Mustapha Pasha road, were shot, after trial by court-martial, the bodies (to which placards stating the reason for execution were attached) being subsequently hung in the centre of the town. On the 31st October a Bulgarian aeroplane passed over the town, scattering packages of a notice demanding its surrender, or, in the alternative, threatening its destruction. The notice—a translation of which I append hereto (Enclosure 2)—stated the desire of the Bulgarians to establish organisation and security in the Balkan Peninsula, and described the military position at the time of publication. To this Shukri Pasha replied by the publication of a notice (Enclosure 3) on the following day, depicting the military situation from the Turkish point of view. A paragraph of the notice in question charges the Bulgarians with killing Turkish women and old men and with the destruction of villages—a matter which will be dealt with later in this despatch. Towards the close of the month of October small bodies of Bulgarian cavalry, accompanied by machine guns, had been dispatched to the south of Adrianople. They were supported by the Greek and Bulgarian population from the Maritza valley and neighbouring districts, and the irregular force thus formed captured Demotika, and moved northwards along the railway line, thus completing the investment of Adrianople on the 31st October, on which date telegraphic communication with Constantinople was interrupted.

Situation in the Town of Adrianople.

For some days previous to the declaration of war those of the non-Moslem population who were in a position to do so had been steadily leaving Adrianople for Constantinople, after the 18th October the daily exodus showed a marked increase, the chief Turkish residents and officials sending their families also the capital. Owing to the majority of the rolling-stock being required for the concentration of troops in the neighbourhood of Usun Keupru and Babaeski the accommodation at the disposal of the railway authorities was limited, consisting chiefly of ordinary closed trucks. Foreign subjects were warned by their respective consulates that should they desire to remain in the town they would do so at their own risk. No difficulty was however experienced in obtaining accommodation for those of their number who ultimately decided to leave, the Consular Corps having previously obtained an assurance from the vali that this would be forthcoming if required. The Bulgarian attack on the night of the 23rd October, and the heavy firing which accompanied it produced a great effect on the population, so that on the following day large numbers presented themselves at the railway station. The majority were able to leave before traffic was finally interrupted on the 28th October.

The total number of persons leaving Adrianople between the 1st and 27th October is estimated at 10,000. By the last train also there were dispatched to Constantinople 139 Bulgarians, Ottoman subjects, who had been arrested with a view to ridding the town of their presence which was considered undesirable. Included in this number were the teachers of the Bulgarian school. This measure was rendered necessary by the discovery of an alleged band of komitajis at Koummahalle, one of the poorer quarters of the town. A han, where they were assembled, was surrounded by gendarmes, three committee-men being killed and the remainder captured.

The advance of the Bulgarian forces on Adrianople had driven into the town the inhabitants of the Turkish villages lying between it and the frontier, the influx of whom added approximately 25,000 persons to the population, a number which more than counterbalanced the outward movement above referred to. These people, who had fled hastily from their homes, brought practically no food-stuffs with them, their carts being laden chiefly with bedding and cooking utensils. Their presence greatly increased the difficulty of the problem of supply with which the authorities were faced. The population of Adrianople may be taken at normal times at 100,000, of whom, as

previously stated, 10,000 left for Constantinople; the 25,000 villagers above mentioned would, therefore, bring the civil population up to 115,000 which, added to the garrison of 57,000, gives a joint total for population and garrison of 172,000.

Supplies.—The stock of grain on hand on the 8th October, the last day on which trucks were available for bringing supplies to the town, was 7,500,000 okes (9,463 tons), distributed as follows:—

	Okes
Miller's stocks	1,500,000
Government stocks	1,500,000
Private stocks	2,000,000
Total	7,500,000

In addition to this 6,000 sacks of flour were brought in from Constantinople by train before the 8th October. This stock was sufficient for the garrison and population for fifteen weeks, the demand caused by the influx of villagers having reduced by two weeks the period for which it was originally calculated that supplies would hold out. The syndicate of army contractors owning the steam flour mills in the town had imported large quantities of grain as soon as war seemed probable. The 4,000,000 okes, referred to in the preceding table as miller's stocks, represents the amount thus imported. The purchase of this large quantity of grain was, however, a purely speculative transaction, being unsupported by any Government guarantee. Had the military authorities been dependent on Government and private stocks alone these would have furnished supplies for seven weeks.

On the 23rd December only private stocks remained unconsumed. These were nearly all in the depôts of the banks with whom they had been lodged as security for advances, many of their owners being absent from the town. Owing to this fact and to the price at which the authorities were prepared to purchase, the stocks being a low one, the banks demurred to handing them over, managers were, however, informed in writing that should they decline to comply with the request of the Government the stocks would be seized, whereupon they withdrew their opposition. In discussing the question of supply with the vali about the middle of October, his Excellency informed me that he had been directed by the Minister of the Interior to provide sufficient supplies for two months. Had his calculations not been upset by the arrival of the 25,000 villagers previously referred to, the Government and private stocks of grain would have amply sufficed for this period without taking into consideration the millers' imports.

There was at no time any deficiency of meat, large quantities of cattle having been driven in from the surrounding villages before the investment of the town was completed. On the other hand, it became apparent early in the siege that there was a considerable shortage of certain necessaries, of which the chief were salt, sugar, petroleum, and fuel. The supply of the first named soon gave out, and the offices of the Public Debt, where alone it was procurable, were daily besieged by crowds anxious to purchase small quantities. For the purpose of bread-making bakers used the salted water in which cheese had been packed for preservation, but by the 15th December all bread was being made without salt. With a view to preventing the hoarding of stocks by dealers and the undue inflation of prices the municipality fixed a tariff of prices at which certain food-stuffs would be sold. This tariff was published by the commandant on the 20th October, together with a notice that persons selling at a higher rate than that authorised would be tried by a military court. The conviction and punishment of a few offenders was instrumental in ensuring the observance of this regulation, but by the end of November neither sugar, salt, nor petroleum were to be purchased openly, though small quantities of all three were undoubtedly obtainable privately at very high prices. The fuel in general use in the town is wood, of which considerable stocks were in the hands of dealers; these were all requisitioned by the military authorities shortly after the declaration of war and handed over to the steam flour-mills. The coal lying in the yards of the Oriental Railway Company was also requisitioned, but the public were allowed to purchase small quantities of this on production of an order from the fortress commandant. Wood for fuel is brought under normal conditions from distant villages, but the failure of this source of supply necessitated the cutting of trees from plantations in the town itself and along the river banks; sufficient fuel for cooking purposes was therefore always obtainable. Taking any average of the price of food-stuffs during the months of October, November, and December the cost of living has been about three times that obtaining under peace conditions.

Water Supply.—The water supply of the town, which is brought in pipes from Provadia, was cut off by the Bulgarians on the 21st October. The poorer classes thereupon used water from the Arda for drinking and that from wells in the town for other purposes. Small quantities of drinking water were brought from springs outside the town, but inside the line of fortifications at very high prices owing to the scarcity of transport.

Sickness.—Considering the conditions which prevailed during the last three months of the year 1912 the town was singularly free from sickness. On the 10th December a disease made its appearance whose symptoms were those of a mild form of cholera. It was confined chiefly to the patients in the military hospitals, and by the close of December it had begun to decrease.

Investing Forces.—The Adrianople headquarter staff admit that they have at no time been certain of the actual number of troops investing the fortress. I learn, however, that they are of opinion that at the commencement of November these consisted of one and a-half Bulgarian divisions, which were shortly afterwards increased to two divisions. These troops were subsequently reinforced by the arrival of a Servian division on the 14th November, the investing forces being thereupon distributed as follows :—

Servian division : Yurush and Kuyunli to the Arda.
Two Bulgarian divisions : the remainder of the line of investment.

The total strength of the above is estimated at 60,000 men under the command of the Bulgarian general Ivanof, whose headquarters were at Mustapha Pasha. Ten siege batteries were employed by the attacking forces, eight of which were of 12 centim. calibre and two of 15 centim., two of the former being Servian batteries.

I would beg your Excellency to understand that I am unable to guarantee the correctness of the figures quoted above, but I have good reason to believe that they do not differ materially from the estimate of Shukri Pasha's staff.

Military Operations to the 4th December.—Operations round Adrianople from the 1st November until the announcement on the 4th December of the conclusion of an armistice consisted, in the main, of a series of attempts by the investing forces to compel the retirement of the defenders from positions held by the latter in advance of the line of permanent fortifications. These were varied by sorties on the part of the Adrianople garrison with a view to preventing the establishing of the enemy in positions favourable to them. Operations centred mainly round the following three positions held by the Turkish forces :—

1. Hadin Keui–Ekmekji Keui;
2. Kartal Tepe;
3. Marash Tepe;

all of which lie to the west and south-west of the fortress. The last named, which is the most important of the three, is situated west of the village of Marash, point 410, General Staff map. This position, locally known as Papas Tepe, lies in the angle formed by the junction of the Rivers Arda and Maritza, and labours under the disadvantage of extreme narrowness, necessitating the concentration of the defending artillery in a confined space, whilst that of the attackers can be disposed over a wide area. The position, which was throughout commanded by General Ibrahim Edhem Pasha, was entirely unfortified at the outbreak of the war, a fact for which the German officers responsible for the organisation of the Adrianople defences have been much criticised. As soon as it became apparent that it would be the first Bulgarian objective, field works were hastily constructed on the western slopes of the hill, and a garrison of a division allotted to it. The number of batteries employed varied from day to day, the guns being separated as much as possible, and their position being constantly changed.

Kartal Tepe, although the scene of numerous encounters, was never actually fortified, but a number of field works were constructed on the Hadin Keui–Ekmekji Keui position.

By the 1st November the Bulgarian forces had reached Musubeili and Skender Keui on the east, whilst the irregular troops previously referred to were at Urlu to the south; the force operating against Marash had occupied the line Hadi Keui–Kuyunli (from which the defenders had withdrawn on the 20th October), that to the west being at Keual. A pontoon bridge had been constructed across the Arda—it is believed at Kumarli.

The first week of November was noticeable for two sorties to the east of the town on the 2nd and 5th, and for a third, also on the latter date, from the southern front. The two former were directed against positions in which the Bulgarians were establishing themselves at Musubeili and Skender Keui, the object of the third being apparently that of preventing a hostile advance on Kartal Tepe. All three sorties failed in their object, and on the 7th the Bulgarians commenced a general movement against the advanced posts to the west and south-west of the defences from Ekmekji Keui to Kartal Tepe. This movement was directed specially against Marash Tepe, where it was checked, being met on the subsequent day by a counter-attack lasting from midday to sunset, in which the Turkish forces gained some ground. This advantage proved to be merely of a temporary nature, and was quickly neutralised by a Bulgarian night attack in which the lost ground was regained. In a notice published on the 9th November (Enclosure No. 4) Shukri Pasha stated that the Bulgarians had sustained severe losses in the neighbourhood of Marash on the two preceding days, being driven from their entrenchments by a bayonet charge.

On the 5th November telegraphic communication between Adrianople and Constantinople was restored viâ Keshan; it was again interrupted on the 7th, and, after having been re-established for twenty hours on the 11th, was finally cut off on the following day. The military authorities, however, maintained communication with Constantinople throughout the siege by means of a wireless telegraphic apparatus said to be of Austrian manufacture.

Operations during the second week in November were confined entirely to the south and south-west of Adrianople and alternated between sorties of the garrison and assaults by the investing troops. Two Turkish columns moved out simultaneously on the 9th from Hadin Keui and Marash against the Bulgarians, retiring again at nightfall, whilst on the 10th an attack, commencing at 11 P.M., was launched against the Turkish position at Ekmekji Keui, the assailants retiring after an engagement lasting half an hour.

The Bulgarian force to the south of the Arda having now reached Doghanja Arazi, Shukri Pasha ordered the evacuation by the inhabitants of the Greek village of Chorek Keui. The wildest rumours were current in the town as to the alleged cruel behaviour of the Turkish troops towards the peasants of this village, but after careful enquiry I have been unable to discover any evidence to justify the rumours in question. Chorek Keui village was now placed in a state of defence, and on the 12th two Turkish columns moved against Doghanja Arazi and Kartal Tepe, which hill was threatened by the Bulgarians. The Turkish troops, after an engagement lasting from 7 A.M. to 1 P.M., succeeded in occupying Kartal Tepe itself, the Bulgarians retaining possession of the hill to the west of it.

Whilst this engagement was in progress the Bulgarian batteries nearing Kuyunli concentrated their fire on Marash Tepe. Two early morning attacks on the 13th and 14th, the former against Ekmekji Keui and the latter against Marash Tepe closed the second week in November, when, as far as could be seen from the interior of the line of fortifications, the Bulgarians had advanced their line of investment considerably to the south-west but had made no perceptible impression on the western defences.

Alleged Firing on Red Crescent Parties.—Considerable difficulty was experienced in removing the wounded after the engagements in the neighbourhood of Marash. The vali, at the request of Shukri Pasha, conveyed to the consular corps on the 17th November a protest against the firing on parties working under the red crescent flag, copy of which I attach (Enclosure No. 5). All accounts of the state of the battle-field concur as to the large number of wounded who were compelled to remain unattended owing to the difficulty in approaching them, and the quantity of dead bodies which remained unburied for some days. Whilst unable to state from personal observation that Shukri Pasha's complaints are correct, I observed on the 12th November that a Bulgarian Red Cross party were permitted to move along the hills to the west of Marash Tepe without being interfered with.

The investing force having been strengthened by the arrival of a Servian division, it is believed on the 14th November, the succeeding week witnessed an increase in the vigour with which operations were pushed forward. Under cover of the fog which shrouded the valleys of the Arda and Maritza on the 15th November the Bulgarian forces which had established themselves on the slopes to the west of Kartal Tepe made an unsuccessful attempt to capture the hill itself. This action, which lasted until noon was followed by a bombardment of Marash Tepe which was also attacked at night. On the afternoon of the same day a force consisting of six Redif Battalions with three Field Artillery Batteries moved out north of the Constantinople road with a view to checking

the advance of the Bulgarians who, from their position at Musubeili were threatening the Turkish advanced posts at Mal Tepe and Mezar Tepe. The movement which commenced on the afternoon of the 15th was continued on the two following days, being supported by the permanent batteries between the Constantinople road and Topyolou fort, aided by a battery of 10·5 centim. Heavy Field artillery. It was successful in checking the Bulgarian advance. Until the 14th November the Bulgarian forces to the south-east of Adrianople had been composed of irregular tooops only with a small quantity of regular cavalry, and little progress had been made in the advance against the defences in that direction. The arrival on that date of a Servian division, which was thence-forward responsible for all operations between the Arda and the Maritza enabled more energetic action to be taken in that quarter. On the 16th and 17th early morning attacks were directed against Marash Tepe by the Servians, the movement on the first of these days being extended against the Turkish advanced posts near Kazan, Yeshil, and Yassi Tepes the latter positions being attacked by the Bulgarians. The result of fighting on both these days seems to have been indeterminate. On the 19th the fire of five Serbo-Bulgarian siege batteries near Kuyunli was, during the early portion of the day concentrated on Marash Tepe, whilst the Bulgarians, having previously repelled a Turkish attack on Doghanja village moved on Kartal Tepe which they succeeded in occupying at 6 P.M. Fighting also took place during the day at Ahirkeui.

Sorties were made from the southern front on the 20th and 21st against Kartal Tepe and Doghanja in the hope of recapturing the former position but without success. The close of the third week in November was signalised by the commencement of the bombardment of the town by Bulgarian batteries which had been established to the east of it, a matter which will be dealt with in detail later in this despatch.

The efforts of the Bulgarians on the 22nd were chiefly concentrated on retaining their hold on Kartal Tepe which was subjected to a heavy fire from the Turkish batteries near Arda (Marash) Fort, and in particular from a 10·5 centim. field battery which had been posted there some days previously. Fighting continued near Ahirkeui, from which village according to Turkish accounts the Bulgarian troops were compelled to retire. A series of small infantry engagements took place along the southern front on the 23rd, which developed on the following day into a general attack on the Turkish lines between Doghanja and Chorekkeui and Pamoukdere and Ahirkeui, the latter being reoccupied.

The 25th and 26th November were devoid of military interest, but it was clear that some uneasiness was being felt as to the safety of the southern line of defences, and the construction of shelter trenches in Karagach village was commenced. By the 27th the Servians had succeeded in mounting a 12 centim. battery on Cheshme Bair and Pamoukdere hills to the west of Kartal Tepe which engaged the batteries of the southern defences. A telephone exchange and searchlight were also established on Kartal Tepe, enabling firing to be continued at intervals during the night. Observation of the Marash position now disclosed the fact that the batteries which had been hitherto stationed on the upper and western portions of the hill had been withdrawn, and that guns had been placed in position on the lower slopes commanding the approaches to Chorekkeui from the west.

On the evening of the 28th the Bulgarians twice attacked the Turkish position near Chorekkeui, but without penetrating to the village, whilst the battery on Cheshme Bair directed its fire on the works near Arda (Marash) Fort, the artillery on both sides being engaged along the southern face from 6·50 to 8·30 P.M. A number of shells fell in the village of Karagach. The artillery dual thus commenced was resumed in the late afternoon of the 29th, when the fire from the Bulgarian batteries compelled the evacuation of the barracks at Karagach south to the railway station. At the close of the fourth week in November, so far as could be judged without visiting the positions, the Turkish advanced troops whilst maintaining their positions on the eastern and western faces were being gradually forced back on the permanent works to the south.

On the 30th November the artillery to the west of Kartal Tepe fired a few rounds in the early morning against the southern defences, and firing was continued at intervals during the 1st December. During the night of the 1st–2nd December Shukri Pasha was instructed by telegram from Constantinople to receive with due honours delegates from the allied forces who would present themselves at Adrianople to discuss the local particulars governing an armistice. At 2 P.M. on the 2nd December two Bulgarian delegates, consisting of a colonel and a member of the Sobranjé who is an officer of the reserve, met the Turkish representatives at the bridge on the Mustapha Pasha road south of Hadinkeui, bringing a letter which asked for the

surrender of the town. The Turkish delegates replied that they could not discuss the matter, and stated that they had thought the Bulgarians had come to arrange the details of an armistice, to which the latter replied that they would probably do so in one or two days' time.

A little firing took place on the 3rd December in the course of the morning from the direction of Pamoukdere, but this ceased by noon. At 3 P.M., however, a very heavy artillery fire was opened on the Turkish position at Marash from Servian and Bulgarian batteries placed in a semicircle near Epcheli, Kuyunli, Yurush, and Kemal. This ceased about 9·30 P.M., at which hour a desultory infantry fire commenced to the east of the town, increasing in intensity until 11·15 P.M., when the artillery of batteries Nos. 2 to 8 opened fire.

The firing in question was the result of an attack against the Turkish positions at Mal Tepe, Mezar Tepe, and Pamoukdere, the object of the assailants being evidently to secure certain positions before the commencement of the armistice. The headquarter staff assure me that the Bulgarians also attacked the Hadinkeui position at daybreak on the 4th December.

Announcement of Armistice.—On that date the vali notified the Consular Corps that an armistice had been concluded with Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro as a preliminary to peace negotiations.

On the following day a joint Turkish and Serbo-Bulgarian commission met at Papas Cheshme, on the Mustapha Pasha road, for the purpose of arranging certain details in connection with the armistice and of fixing the neutral zone, the line of which was subsequently marked out with white flags.

The position of the Turkish advanced posts on the 4th December was as follows: Eastern face, from Pashachair, on the left bank of the Maritza, to Meza Tepe, Mal Tepe, Hassanagha, Geubaba Marsh to the Tunja; western face, between Havaras and Akbunar, through Ekmekjikeui and Kadinkeui, to the Maritza; southern face, 3 kilom. west of Marash; thence between Doghanja and Chorekkeui to Pamoukdere, and between Ahirkeui and Bosnakeui to the right bank of the Maritza.

In the above résumé of military operations I have endeavoured to describe events as they presented themselves to me. I would, however, beg your Excellency, in reading it, to bear in mind that I am unable to guarantee the accuracy of figures, and that the limited opportunities which I have had of observing movements outside the fortress may possibly necessitate the correction of my appreciation of the situation on certain dates as fuller information becomes available.

Bombardment of the Town.—The bombardment of the town of Adrianople commenced at 3·15 P.M. on the 21st November, a few shells being fired into the suburb of Karagach on the 28th and 29th November; it continued until the night of the 3rd December, being carried out by a battery of four guns (12 and 15 centim.) of the Shumla Regiment of Fortress Artillery. These guns were undoubtedly very skilfully placed, and their position was never actually located, it was probably varied from time to time. The individual guns were also separated, but their approximate position was probably as follows: two guns on the line Musubeili-Keushen Chiflik, about 3,000 yards from the first named, and two further to the south, in the neighbourhood of Skender-keui. The projectiles fired were mainly common shell of cast-iron, from 7 to 10 years old, with a charge of black powder, which exploded on impact. The Turkish official return gives the total number of shells fired into Adrianople and Karagach as 1,070, of which 139 were shrapnel. The actual damage done by the bombardment was comparatively small having regard to the number of shells fired, the material of which the greater number of houses are constructed being of so flimsy a nature that in many cases the shells passed through them without exploding. The official return referred to above gives the particulars of the damage as 16 killed, 53 wounded, 333 buildings destroyed. Although this is probably correct as regards the first and third items, the number of wounded is undoubtedly in excess of the figures given, persons having been wounded in the neighbourhood of this consulate on days on which the official return of wounded is given as nil. The bombardment was at first confined to the day-time, but subsequently ten or twelve rounds were fired during each night, with the exception of the 3rd December, when fifty rounds were fired. Although the actual result of the bombard-ment was comparatively small, its moral effect on the inhabitants was undoubtedly very great. It was at first confined to the northern and eastern quarters, which are inhabited by the Turkish section of the population, but subsequently all quarters within range of the guns were shelled indiscriminately, though the Turkish quarters received the greater part of the fire. A state of panic prevailed amongst the populace, many of whom fled hastily from their homes, whilst the various Turkish officials

removed first to the centre of the town and subsequently, when this came under fire, to the quarters of Yildirim and Koum Mahalle, on the right bank of the Tunja, which were out of range of the projectiles. To these quarters also removed most of the prominent members of the non-Moslem communities, including religious chiefs. The vali and Shukri Pasha continually changed their residences, the military headquarter offices being temporarily transferred from the centre of the town to the main infantry barracks.

Foreign subjects were assembled in the school of the Sœurs d'Agram, an Austrian religious community, the basement of which being of solid construction offered a certain amount of protection from shell fire, though the security was far from being absolute. On the 27th and 28th November, the bombardment having increased in intensity, I directed the transfer to this building, where my Austrian and French colleagues, with their respective colonies, had already taken up their residence, of all British subjects residing in the town and at Karagach. In view of the extreme state of nervous tension prevailing amongst British and other foreign subjects, I considered it advisable to myself sleep on five occasions in the building in question, remaining at the consulate during the day. No casualties occurred amongst the foreign colonies, who returned to their homes on the 5th and 6th December. Although a shell struck the Sœurs d'Agram School, it happily did not penetrate to the basement, exploding in one of the upper rooms. The Russian consulate, which is situated in the Turkish quarter, became early in the bombardment a centre of shell fire, and my Russian colleague was compelled to remove to the Greek consulate, which was, on the 29th November, struck by a shell, necessitating his further removal to a school of the Resurrectionist Community. Several fires having been occasioned by the first few days' bombardment, I deposited in the cellars of the above-mentioned building certain bulky and non-confidential archives of this consulate, which it would have been difficult to remove in the event of fire breaking out. At the request of my colleagues and myself, a guard of two gendarmes was supplied to each consulate to assist, in case of necessity, in keeping back the crowd which invariably assembles at the scene of a fire.

Shukri Pasha published on the 22nd November a notice (Enclosure 6) which was intended to reassure the population, but was noticeable chiefly for its fatalism. Beyond the publication of this notice, no steps were taken by either the civil or military authorities to mitigate the effects of the bombardment, and no attempt was made to instruct the people in the excavation of bomb-proof shelters, which would undoubtedly have done much to restore confidence.

Your Excellency has, I understand, duly received two telegrams which were addressed by the members of the consular corps to their respective embassies on the subject of the bombardment. The first of these was sent in response to a suggestion from the vali, who was anxious that it should be made clear to the foreign missions that the bombardment of the town was not merely the result of shells directed at the fortifications. The second message was dispatched partly with a view to describing the result of the bombardment, and partly also by way of reassuring the foreign colonies. I append hereto copy of circular letter addressed to the consular corps by the vali, protesting against the bombardment as contrary to the customs of war. It contains a statement to the effect that mosques and hospitals are the special objectives of the bombardment. Very little damage was, as a matter of fact, done to the mosques, that of Sultan Selim in particular, the solo beautiful architectural feature of the town, being struck by one shell only with very slight results. Its size rendered it an easy mark of artillery fire had it been intended to destroy it. The buildings utilised as temporary hospitals were the largest in the town, and as such were more liable to be struck than smaller edifices, but though shells fell near them none of them were actually hit, although they were all situated in the Turkish quarter, against which the bombardment was chiefly directed prior to the date of vali's letter (Enclosure No. 7).

An exception must be made in the case of the Red Crescent Hospital, installed in the non-commissioned officers' school at Karagach, which was struck by a shell from the guns on Cheshme Bair. Happening to be in this hospital on the 29th November and the 1st December, when shells fell near it, the superintendent, Dr. Behaeddin Shakir Bey, directed my attention to the fact that it was being made the deliberate mark of bombardment. There is, however, no reason to suppose that the shots were specially aimed at the hospital; it seems more probable that they were directed against the new infantry barracks and a depôt of flour and biscuits, both of which are in the neighbourhood of the hospital, and between it and the position from which firing was taking place. Moreover, on the 29th November an infantry battalion was encamped close to the hospital. I venture to express to your Excellency my conviction that

the statement contained in the vali's letter referred to above is not capable of justification.

The bombardment in general appears to me to have been carried out with a due regard to humanity, in that only a reasonable number of shells were fired intothe town, and that these contained no high explosives.

December 4 to 31.—There is little of interest to chronicle between the 4th December and the close of the year. The idea which at first prevailed amongst the rank and file of the army and the lower classes of the population was undoubtedly that success had crowned the efforts of Turkish arms. The belief appears to have been founded on the first two paragraphs of a notice published by Shukri Pasha on the 4th December (Enclosure No. 8), and on a statement of the vali, which was not actually published, that the Bulgarian losses amounted to 100,000. It was doubtless with a view to the correction of this latter that Shukri Pasha published a further notice on the 6th December to the effect that no communication could pass between Adrianople and Constantinople otherwise than through the medium of the headquarter staff office, and that no credence should be attached to the rumours which were circulating in the town. On the 5th December the vali read to my colleagues and myself portions of a telegram which he had received from the Grand Vizier in which it was stated that the fortress of Adrianople would benefit by the armistice, and it was generally believed locally that this would be the case. It was therefore with much disappointment that the garrison and the population learned after the lapse of a few days that neither telegraphic nor postal communication between the town and the outside world would be permitted until the conclusion of peace, and further that the conditions of the armistice would not admit of the reprovisioning of Adrianople. On the 13th December trains of supplies for the Bulgarian army began to pass through here, and the fact that they were permitted so to pass whilst Adrianople itself was unable to receive supplies was the first intimation which the general public received of the true state of affairs. I am informed that 2,430 trucks of supplies passed through Adrianople station between the 13th and 31st December. The staff of these trains dropped packets of newspaper, French, German and Bulgarian, in passing through the Turkish lines, and by this means the truth as to the military situation at length leaked out despite the efforts of the authorities to conceal it from the people.

Shortly after the 4th December a certain proportion of the garrison was withdrawn from the trenches and stationed in the infantry barracks performing outpost duties for a week at a time.

About the middle of the month the supply question began to occasion some anxiety to the military authorities, and by the 31st December the bread ration of the troops had been reduced by 25 per cent., meat being issued only three times a week. The civil population began to suffer towards the close of December from the scarcity of food-stuffs, and in particular from the shortage of flour, bread being the staple food of the majority of the people. Bakers were only permitted to purchase a limited quantity of flour daily from the millers, and although the cost of a loaf did not exceed the normal price of 1 piastre, its weight was only 200 dirhems (1·4 lbs.) instead of an oke (2·82 lbs.) Your Excellency will readily understand that this state of affairs pressed very hardly on the poorer classes, many of whom were unable to pursue their usual calling, owing to the stagnation of trade. The 25,000 refugees referred to earlier in this despatch were the principal sufferers, though the Government distributed flour to them daily.

Local Authorities.—On the establishment of martial law a town commandant was appointed who combined with the ordinary functions of this office those of a provost-marshal. The town police, who were placed under his orders, continued to perform their ordinary duties, being assisted in them by military patrols. Excepting during the first few days of the bombardment, the most absolute order has been maintained up to the date of this despatch. The position of the vali was under the circumstances a somewhat curious one, but he appears to have worked in complete accord with Shukri Pasha, in whom of course all real authority was vested. The vali does not, however, possess the qualities which are so desirable in a Governor-General under the trying circumstances of a siege, not having the gift of instilling confidence into the people. He was but rarely seen away from his office, and it appears to be the general opinion in Turkish circles that the past three months have added nothing to his reputation.

Relations between the consular corps and the local authorities have been of a most cordial nature and devoid of friction of any kind, but information as to the military operations whether in the immediate neighbourhood of the town or elsewhere

in the theatre of war was systematically withheld by the latter. On the proclamation of martial law the vali at first adopted the view that he was unable to deal with any matters affecting the foreign colonies, and that representations concerning them should be made to Shukri Pasha. On behalf of my colleagues, however, I pointed out to him that this was a question entirely between himself and the last-named officer, and it would be more satisfactory that we should continue the relations which had existed prior to the declaration of martial law. The vali ultimately concurred in our view with the result that on the rare occasions on which Shukri Pasha desired to make a communication to the consular corps it was addressed to them through the medium of the vali. The question of the position of foreign subjects under martial law presented itself on the 18th November in consequence of an Austrian subject having been arrested, tried, and condemned by court-martial without the presence of a representative of the consulate which had not been informed of the man's arrest. The efforts of my Austrian colleague to procure the release of this person who had been sentenced to four day's imprisonment having proved unavailing, the consular corps made representations to the vali on the subject. On behalf of my colleagues and myself I pointed out to him that whilst appreciating the difficulties of the existing situation, which we were anxious to do nothing to increase, we were unable to admit that the establishment of martial law in the town affected the status of foreign subjects. To this the vali agreed, and expressed his regret at the circumstances of the arrest and trial, stating, however, that the military authorities had believed the man to be an Ottoman subject. He assured us that should a similar case present itself he would arrange it to the satisfaction of the consulate concerned provided that he were informed before the trial had taken place.

Hospitals.—The hospital accommodation at the disposal of the military authorities was totally inadequate to the demands made on it during the period of hostilities. The Sultanie and Idadie Schools, and subsequently the Bulgarian school, were utilised as supplementary to the regular military hospitals, but though means of housing the wounded was thus found the numbers of these were frequently so large that it was beyond the powers of the staff to deal with them. Consequently wounded men were often obliged to remain for hours without being attended to even after their arrival at the hospitals, and lay on the floor without bedding and even in some cases without food or water. Owing to the absence of hospital clothing the clothes in which they were admitted could not be changed, and the insufficient numbers of the hospital staffs rendered the satisfactory dressing of wounds a matter of extreme difficulty. Furthermore there was an inadequate supply of hospital stores, these not having been forwarded from Constantinople. Although the Turkish medical officers strove hard to cope with the demands made on them, working for long hours under extremely difficult conditions, it was clear that aid must be provided from other sources if much human suffering was to be averted. Under the circumstances the British colony in the town, with the assistance of this consulate, organised a branch of the Red Crescent League to supplement the efforts already being made by that society which had established a hospital in the non-commissioned officers school a Karagach. The sum of 125*l.* was raised by local subscription which was not confined only to British subjects. The premises of the school of the British Society for the Propagation of the Gospel among the Jews were offered by the missioner as a hospital, but the building was subsequently found not to be suitable for the purpose. The authorities, therefore, placed at the disposal of the Committee a new building which had recently been erected as a primary school where a hospital for fifty beds was opened on the 10th November. Owing, however, to this building being considered unsafe during the bombardment of the town the hospital was subsequently transferred to the main Red Crescent Hospital at Karagach a wing of which was specially set apart for it. The Committee comprised, in addition to representatives of the British Colony, members of other communities who were good enough to give their services, but though officially described as an Anglo-Ottoman Hospital, it was locally known as the British Hospital and the management has throughout been in British hands, the Secretary being the Rev. Paul Dressler of the mission named above. The actual nursing was performed by the Sisters of the Assumptionist Community. It is impossible to speak too highly of the devotion of these ladies to the duties which they undertook or of the coolness and courage which they displayed under fire. The work of the hospital could not have been carried on without their assistance and I beg that your Excellency may be pleased to consider the advisability of communicating my remarks on this subject to the French Ambassador with a view to his forwarding the same to the French Government.

Both the civil and military authorities were most appreciative of the efforts of the

British colony in this direction, and the vali addressed to this consulate a letter conveying the thanks of the Ottoman Government for the establishment of the hospital.

General Remarks.

Although this fortress has been successfully defended up to the present, the *moral* of the Turkish troops has not recovered from the shaking which it received at the commencement of the campaign when the forces covering the town were driven into it. The Turkish rank and file with whom I have spoken on the subject freely admit the superiority of the enemy, and seem to have lost confidence in their own officers. Many of the latter also allow that the redif divisions are of doubtful value, and that it is courting disaster to oppose them to the Bulgarian regular troops. These divisions have, of course, by now gained a certain experience in fighting, but it is not yet safe to employ them in the open, for their officers are not equal to the task of handling them. There is, however, every reason to believe that behind earthworks they could be depended upon to give further proof of the stubborn defensive qualities which have characterised the Turkish soldier in past campaigns. The officers speak in the highest terms of the efficiency of the Bulgarian officers' corps, which they consider much superior to that of the Servians, but this opinion does not extend to the rank and file of their enemies. I have had but little opportunity of judging of the accuracy of this estimate, having only seen the Bulgarian troops in action on one occasion. Although I conveyed to the vali my hope that I might be afforded an opportunity of seeing something of the operations at close quarters, Shukri Pasha has not apparently found himself able to comply with my suggestion. His inability to do so may possibly be due to his unwillingness to allow a foreign officer to visit the fortifications, without which a close view of the fighting would be impossible. The failure of Turkish regular troops is generally considered in the army to be due to the presence in their ranks of non-Moslems, and especially of Bulgarians, many of whom deserted on every possible occasion; the uncertainty as to the attitude of the non-Moslem element has no doubt contributed to the failure of the Turkish *moral*.

Alleged Bulgarian Cruelties.—Allusion has been made elsewhere in this despatch to the charges of cruelty brought against the Bulgarians by Shukri Pasha in his notice of the 1st November (Enclosure No. 3), paragraph 9 of which alleged that Turkish women and old men were killed and villages burned. There is unfortunately reason to believe that there is a certain amount of truth in these charges. It will, however, be noticed that the paragraph in question does not state that these atrocities were committed by the Bulgarian troops. The villages where they are said to have taken place are those to the south of Adrianople, in the Maritza valley, as far as Demotika, in which town the Moslem quarter is believed to have been destroyed by fire. At the period of the campaign when these cruelties are said to have occurred the Bulgarian forces operating in the district in question consisted in the main of armed peasants with a sprinkling of regular troops. Any excesses that may have been committed were probably the work of the former, who, as irregulars, would naturally be difficult to control.

Political Parties.—Prior to the conclusion of the armistice political parties may be said to have been non-existent in the town, but since that event the Union and Progress party, who were represented here by Aziz Bey, a member of the Central Committee, and Dr. Behaeddine Shakir Bey, have shown signs of activity, and severely criticise the action of the Government in agreeing to the terms on which the suspension of hostilities has been arranged. Shukri Pasha is known to be an opponent of this party, but the officers in general take but little interest in internal political affairs. Both in civil and military circles a very general desire for peace exists, provided this can be obtained on conditions compatible with the honour of their country.

I have, &c.

L. L. R. SAMSON, *Major*.

Enclosure 2 in No. 82.

Bulgarian Notice, dated October 31, 1912.

(Translation.)

We Bulgarians, inspired by hatred and disgust, are fighting against the Turkish Government. We have no quarrel with the Moslem people.

We inform you that we do not desire bloodshed. We wish to deliver you from the hands of the cruel and pitiless Ottoman Government. We desire to establish organisation and security in the Balkan peninsula. The four powers who are your neighbours have occupied your country on four sides. Since some days Kirk Kilisse has been in the hands of the Bulgarian army (whilst) Baba Eski, Lule Burgas, Demotika, Uskub, Prishtina, Koumanova, Elassona, and several other towns have been taken some time since. The town of Adrianople is beseiged on one side whilst on the other communications with Constantinople are cut. Know that Adrianople can receive no help from nowhere. Is bloodshed then necessary. And what end can it serve. The satisfaction of your brigand Government? We have 1,000 guns for use against Adrianople.

Should Adrianople not yield it will be utterly destroyed and ruined. Is it not a pity for the population?

Enclosure 3 in No. 82.

Proclamation by Military Authorities, dated November 1, 1912.

(Translation.)

THE Bulgarians have distributed notices from an aeroplane.

2. The fortress commander issues the following statement in order that credence should not be attached to the inexactitudes contained in the notices.

3. Our field army continues the war in a regular manner and a heroic spirit.

4. The retirement of our army to the eminences of Kirk Kilisse and Lule Burgas is dictated by the military exigences of our strategy.

5. The Bulgarian and Servian armies at Koumanova are so ruined that they are in a hopeless condition.

6. By the help of God, in a very short time, your will hear the defeat of the enemy by our heroic army.

7. Our fortress is capable of resisting not only 1,000 but 10,0000 guns and 100,000 men, and defend the town for many months.

8. Our fortress is guarded from every kind of attack and damage.

9. There is no reason to believe the Bulgarian notice or other malevolent publications or to be anxious. Many persons have seen with their own eyes the cruel Bulgarians killing the Moslem women and old men, the burning of Moslem villages.

10. Those who desiré bloodshed, will, by God's help, shortly learn how dearly these must be paid for.

11. The fortress commander expects calmness, firmness, and patience of the people.

MEHMED SHUKRI, *Ferik*,
Fortress Commander, Adrianople.

Enclosure 4 in No. 82.

Notice by Shukri Pasha, dated November 9, 1912.

(Translation.)

THE western or Roumelian army has gained decisive victories on the Greek frontier. In the engagements which have taken place a large quantity of arms, guns, and ammunition has been taken from the enemy. The number of prisoners is also considerable.

2. After the engagement, the Greek army was pursued, and during the pursuit a large quantity of guns, arms, ammunition, and hospital stores were taken.

3. Simultaneously, our western army continues to cause great losses in the ranks of the Servian army; it has routed a detachment of cavalry and captured many arms and colours from the enemy.

4. In the engagement in the neighbourhood of Ourli a detachment of Bulgarian cavalry was dispersed and a large quantity or arms and horses taken. The horses have been handed over to our cavalry.

5. In the sanguinary encounters on the successive days of the 25th and 26th October (7th and 8th November), near Marash, the enemy sustained severe losses, and was driven from his entrenchments with the bayonet by our soldiers, being pursued beyond Kuyunli with great courage. Hundreds of arms were taken.

6. Our eastern army has engaged the enemy with much coolness and with perfect discipline, it is to be hoped that he will shortly be driven into Ergene.

7. The fortress commandant desires the population to display calmness, courage, and patience.

MEHMED SHUKRI, *Lieutenant-General*,
Fortress Commandant.

Enclosure 5 in No. 82.

Vali of Adrianople to Consular Body.

(Translation.)

Sir, *Adrianople, 4 Tishrini Sani*, 1328 (*November* 17, 1912).

A COMMUNICATION addressed to the vilayet by Lieutenant-General Shukri Pasha, fortress commandant, states that the enemy fires on our soldiers of the medical corps whose duty it is, whilst carrying the Red Crescent flag, to collect the enemy's dead and wounded who fell in front of line of the battle during the engagements at Marash. We draw the attention of the consuls of the friendly Powers to this fact, the result of which is to leave a large number of the enemy's wounded to die miserably on the battlefield and further, as time passes, decomposition of the bodies commences. This state of affairs is contrary to the Geneva Convention and not in accordance with civilisation.

I have, &c.
HALIL.

Enclosure 6 in No. 82.

Notice by Shukri Pasha, dated November 22, 1912.

(Translation.)

THE enemy has commenced the bombardment of the town.

2. Although such a bombardment may produce considerable excitement, the damage caused will not be very great.

3. But every person should attend to his business as usual, and during the bombardment persons should not leave their shops or houses nor assemble in the streets. Should this recommendation not be acted upon the casualties caused by the projectiles will undoubtedly be more.

4. Escape from the death fore-ordained by God is impossible, Moslem priests and heads of other religious communities should give the necessary advice to their peoples.

5. By the grace of God we expect success in a few days time. We enjoin on the people moderation, calmness, patience and firmness, and we give notice that persons who cause undue excitement amongst the population will be severely punished.

MEHMED SHUKRI, *Lieutenant-General*,
Fortress Commandant.

Enclosure 7 in No. 82.

Vali of Adrianople to Consul Samson.

(Translation.)

Sir, *Adrianople, November* 11 (24), 1912 (1328).

THE batteries with which the enemy is bombarding the town throw shells which kill poor women and children and non-combatants, inhabitants of the town. This is against all laws of humanity and of war. Mosques and hospitals are the special objectives of the bombardment. The fortress commandant brings these facts to the notice of the consular representatives of the Great European Powers, the protectors of humanity.

I have, &c.
HALIL.

Enclosure 8 in No. 82.

Notice by Shukri Pasha, dated December 4, 1912.

INFORMATION received to-day from the Acting Commander-in-Chief and from the Grand Vizier states that the Bulgarians have opened negotiations for an armistice.

2. We learn from trustworthy sources that the losses of the Bulgarian army to the present date have been very heavy.

3. The *moral* and the strength of our army at Chatalja is excellent, praise be to God.

4. The fortresses of Scutari and Janina are steadily and courageously held by our brave army.

5. The fortress of Adrianople is in no danger and has nothing to fear from the enemy.

6. The army, which has honourably and bravely performed its duties to the present will devote its existence to the defence of the fortress of Adrianople. The inhabitants are informed that courage and patience will shortly meet with their reward.

MEHMED SHUKRI, *Lieutenant-General,*
Fortress Commandant.

Enclosure 9 in No. 82.

Consul Samson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 1.)

Sir, *Adrianople, February 2, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of your Excellency, the following report on the political and military situation in this town from the 1st January to the present date, thus bringing to a close the period covered by the armistice, part of which is dealt with in my despatch No. 65 of the 31st ultimo.

Situation in the Town.

During the first week of the year it was generally believed here that hostilities would be shortly resumed. This belief was, however, dispelled by the publication by Shukri Pasha on the 8th January of a notice (Enclosure No. 10) conveying the appreciation of the Government of the manner in which the garrison and the civil population had sustained the siege, and cautioning the public against believing the rumours which were in circulation. A certain colour was, however, given to these by the dispatch to the outpost lines of large quantities of ammunition and a number of machine guns.

By the middle of the month the opinion was generally held that it was the intention of the Government to yield to Bulgarian demands for the surrender of Adrianople. This opinion was strengthened by the arrival in the town on the 16th of a copy of the Bulgarian journal "Dnevnik," which contained a résumé of a note which the Powers were said to be about to present to the Sublime Porte, and by the publication on the 17th January of an announcement that peace would shortly be concluded (Enclosure No. 11).

The greatest despondency prevailed amongst the Government officials and the officers, many of whom began to make arrangements for the sale of their furniture and effects.

During the course of a visit which I paid to the vali on the 19th he referred to the existing state of affairs as a great misfortune for the Ottoman Empire, and, whilst not committing himself to a definite statement on the subject, he gave me to understand that the surrender of Adrianople was probable. On the 21st the territorial force (Mustafiz) of 2,000 was discharged, whilst small bodies of infantry and cavalry patrolled the streets with a view, it is to be presumed, to the checking of any possible popular manifestation against the proposed surrender of the town. There were, however, at no time any indications of a movement of this nature; indeed, the population has throughout maintained the apathetic attitude which has characterised it during all the events of the past four years, except for the panic caused by the bombardment in November and December last.

Since the beginning of the year certain signs had been apparent of a recrudescence of Union and Progress influence, the leaders of the party, Dr. Behaeddine Shakir Bey and Aziz Bey, having displayed much activity in agitating against the Government, who they declared had made a grave mistake in consenting to an armistice. It was stated that the Bulgarians had been defeated at Chatalja, and that a continuation of the war must have resulted in their retreat. It was also pointed out that little or no impression had been made on the defences of this town in the course of the five weeks during which siege operations had been in active progress, and that there was no reason why it should not hold out for at least another two months. Great capital was also made of the fact that the Bulgarian supply trains had been permitted to pass whilst the town itself had not been revictualled during the armistice. The agitation, however, had little or no effect in the army, where great confidence was felt in Nazim Pasha, who, as your Excellency will doubtless recollect, was for nearly a year in command here. It was generally agreed amongst the officers that nothing short of absolute necessity would have compelled the War Minister to sign the armistice, or to give his consent to the terms of a peace which was considered to be imminent. Further, the tone of the European press, of which the principal journals continued from time to time to reach this town, depicted the situation in colours unfavourable to Turkey, and counselled the signing of peace.

It does not, therefore, seem probable that any local movement organised by the Union and Progress party would have succeeded, and this fact seems to have been recognised by its leaders. The lack of means of communication between the latter and their chiefs in Constantinople doubtless hindered their action, and Dr. Behaeddine Shakir Bey admitted this to me in subsequent conversation.

Change of Government.—Information as to the fall of Kiamil Pasha's Cabinet reached here on the 24th January by means of an official communiqué to the vali from Talaat Bey, followed shortly afterwards by a telegram from Mahmoud Shevket Pasha announcing his appointment as Grand Vizier, and the nomination of the new Cabinet. When the first impression of surprise caused by a turn of events which was wholly unlooked for here had evaporated, the resumption of hostilities was regarded as certain. The probability was welcomed by the officers who saw in it the possibility of saving the town, whilst the civil population, though oppressed by the fear of another bombardment, seem to have believed that hostilities would be of short duration, and preferred possible danger to a continuation of the past two months of uncertainty. Regret at the death of Nazim Pasha, who was extremely popular whilst in command here, was general throughout the army, where the hope seems to have been entertained that the return to power of the Union and Progress party might be followed by a change of attitude on the part of Germany. Herr Abel, the local agent for several prominent German firms, who enjoys a certain influence amongst the officers by reason of the prominent part he has taken in the matter of army contracts, spared no pains to encourage this belief.

Interview with Behaeddine Shakir Bey.—In discussing the situation with Dr. Behaeddine Shakir Bey at the commencement of December he had expressed himself in unfavourable terms as to the military capacity of Shukri Pasha, stating his belief that he would be assassinated should he attempt to surrender the town.

In the course of an interview which I had with him on the 29th January I expressed my regret at the death of Nazim Pasha, and my conviction of the unfortunate impression which this must have created throughout Europe. In view also of the conversation quoted above, I thought it well to express the hope that there was no probability of a similar fate overtaking Shukri Pasha, whose safety I believed to be essential to the best interests of the country. He replied that the end of Nazim Pasha was due to his having been instrumental in bringing about the fall of the last Union and Progress Cabinet, and assured me that every means had been taken to ensure the safety of Shukri Pasha and to avoid any disturbance in the town. My Austrian colleague informs me that he also received similar assurances from him.

With the return to power of a Union and Progress Ministry came a return to the system by which the Government officials were controlled by the local members of the Committee, of whom Behaeddine Shakir Bey and Aziz Bey were frequently in consultation with the vali.

Consular Telegrams.—In view of the probable resumption of hostilities the Consular Corps drew up a telegram to their respective missions suggesting the advisability of the establishment of a neutral zone for foreign subjects in the event of a recommencement of the bombardment of the town. Together with my colleagues I called upon the vali on the 27th January to ask him to dispatch it. He replied that it

was not yet certain that hostilities would be resumed, but that should it become so he would inform us and arrange for its dispatch. On the 31st January, the vali having intimated to the Consular Corps that the armistice had been denounced, a further visit was paid to him, in the course of which the original telegram was again presented. The vali expressed his readiness to forward it, but suggested that a request should be added for permission to enable foreigners to leave the town. This, after discussion between my colleagues and myself, was agreed to, the telegram being redrafted and handed to the vali. As I understand that it was transmitted in Turkish, I enclose, for the information of your Excellency, a copy of the actual message presented, which was drawn up in French (Enclosure No. 12).

Supplies.—The population had begun to suffer considerably during the month of January from the scarcity of bread, the bakeries being besieged by crowds of would-be purchasers. The daily number of sacks supplied to bakers by the millers on the 1st January was reduced by one-half on the 15th of the month. Bread was made of wheaten flour only up to the 19th, on which date a mixture of maize and wheat was used.

On the 13th January Shukri Pasha issued a notice calling upon dealers possessing stocks of any kind of grain to deliver them to the authorities at fixed prices within ten days, failure to comply with the order entailing a penalty of confiscation. During the last week of the month committees were formed for the purpose of visiting houses in the different districts of the town with a view to ascertaining the quantities of flour and grain still remaining in private hands. The search was far from being efficiently carried out, many houses being left unvisited, but considerable quantities of grain were discovered hidden in the Greek houses of the Kirish Hane district, whilst 10,000 okes (12½ tons) was found in the possession of a Turkish notable, a member of one of the committees. The houses of foreign subjects were not visited.

Desertions.—There have been a large number of desertions during the armistice, but these have been mainly confined to non-Moslems. Many of the civil population have also succeeded in passing the outpost lines, there being, I am informed, a regular tariff of payment for egress at certain points. As several hundreds of the non-Moslem population have left the town in this manner, it is to be supposed that the authorities have intentionally permitted their departure, having regard to the rapidly diminishing quantity of food-stuffs.

Preparations for Renewal of Hostilities.—In view of the probability of a renewal of the bombardment to-morrow, a great movement of Turkish families is taking place to-day from the Kalk quarter to Yildirim, a district on the extreme west of the town, which is considered by the population to be out of range of the bombarding batteries; it is, however, very doubtful if this is the case. It probably owes its immunity from shell fire during the bombardment of November and December to the fact that it is almost entirely inhabited by Christians. The vali and Shukri Pasha with the head-quarter staff and the chief civil officials have moved to-day to the main infantry barracks.

It is generally known in the town that the period of armistice expires at 7 P.M. to-morrow, though no official notification of the fact has been published.

I have, &c.

L. L. R. SAMSON, *Major.*

Enclosure 10 in No. 82.

Notice by Shukri Pasha, dated January 8, 1913.

(Translation.)

TELEGRAMS received from the offices of the Grand Vizier and of the Minister of War, the contents of which are guaranteed, state that the courage and self-denial which the defenders of Adrianople, its officials and its inhabitants, have shown during the siege have been greatly appreciated by the Ottoman nation, and that the continuance of the resistance and devotion shown by its defenders and its population constitute a guarantee for the conclusion of an honourable peace.

In communicating the above information I request the population not to attach credence to certain rumours of unknown origin which are circulating in the town.

MEHMED SHUKRI, *Lieutenant-General,*
Fortress Commandant.

Enclosure 11 in No 82.

Notice by Shukri Pasha, dated January 17, 1913.

(Translation.)

THE fortress of Adrianople has done, and will continue to do, everything possible for the security of the population and the defence of the town against the enemy.

2. Although the conclusion of peace is expected, there still remain some points for discussion between the belligerents; a little delay is therefore necessary, and the people are expected to display patience, firmness, and contentment.

3. Sufficient provisions exist for the army and civil population during this delay; householders in possession of food-stuffs should not, therefore, have recourse to the bakers or the markets, but should consume their own supplies; failure to comply with these instructions will, if discovered, entail severe punishment.

4. Persons of all ages, irrespective of position, who criticise the politics of the Government, the military department, or the local authorities, will be punished with the utmost rigour of martial law.

5. All persons should therefore attend to their business as usual, and should patiently await the speedy conclusion of peace, whilst using their utmost endeavours to comply with the regulations and provisions of martial law.

MEHMED SHUKRI, *Lieutenant-General,*
Fortress Commandant.

Enclosure 12 in No. 82.

Copy of Telegram dispatched by the Consular Corps to the Missions at Constantinople, January 31, 1913.

VU la difficulté de garantir la sécurité des colonies étrangères dans le cas du renouvellement du bombardement, le corps consulaire croit de son devoir de suggérer à leurs missions respectives l'opportunité d'obtenir un terrain neutre constituant un refuge efficace pour les étrangers qui voudraient rester à Andrinople, ainsi que les autorisations nécessaires et les moyens pécuniaires pour ceux d'entre eux qui désireraient quitter la ville.

L. L. R. SAMSON.
HERTZFELD.
M. CUINET.
S. KLIMENKO.

Enclosure 13 in No. 82.

Consul Samson's pencilled Memorandum on the latter Stages of the Siege of Adrianople, dated Adrianople, March 28, 1913.

BEYOND a sortie on the part of the defenders on the 9th February, in the hope of capturing the guns which were bombarding the town, and a counter attack on the part of the Bulgarians on the 12th February, military operations were confined to a bombardment of the town until the preparation for, and execution of, the final assault on the 25th and 26th March.

The bombardment was of a far more severe nature than that which preceded the armistice, especially during the days from the 3rd to the 7th February. Such of the inhabitants as were able to do so took refuge in the larger and more solid buildings, especially in those with cellars.

On the 7th February the consular corps forwarded to their respective missions at Constantinople a telegram [? describing] the bombardment by the Bulgarians, which was unaccompanied by any operations against the troops. By the 15th February the bombardment was much less severe, and by the 18th *idem.* was slight only, being [illegible] by that time directed chiefly against the Turkish quarters and the barracks. On the 19th February the vali informed the consular corps that the Bulgarians had agreed to the establishment of a neutral zone for foreigners, and suggested the suburb of

Karagach, which was accepted by the consuls, whose acceptance was duly communicated by Shukri Pasha to the Bulgarian commander. The acceptance by the latter of the place mentioned as a neutral zone was not notified by the Turkish authorities to the consuls, and it is understood that the Bulgarian authorities were not prepared to accept the principle of a neutral zone. In view of the effect which the departure *en masse* of the foreign colonies from the town would have produced on those of the inhabitants who would have been compelled to remain, the consular corps considered it necessary to inform their respective missions that they would not advise this step being taken. The foreign colonies accordingly remained in the town until its fall.

The fact that, with the single exception named above, no movement of an offensive nature had been undertaken by the investing forces, was responsible for the belief which was general among the civil and military officials that it was the intention of the Bulgarian commander to await the moment when the surrender of the town would become necessary owing to the lack of food. Consequently, the question of supply became one of paramount importance. Committees were formed, who carried out a house-to-house search throughout the town, leaving to each family a sufficient subsistence for a few days only, and collecting the remainder into a central store. Considerable quantities of wheat and flour were thus obtained, which were mixed with a large proportion of broomseed and bran, from which mixture bread was made. Very small loaves were sold at the bakeries, whilst the soldiers' ration was reduced to ½ lb. of bread per diem, eked out with a small quantity of [?] cheese. There was, however, always an ample supply of meat in the town, and the Government during the last week of the siege took over the butchers' shops, from which meat was sold at a very cheap rate, while to the indigent it was distributed gratis. Latterly also, bread has only been sold in exchange for permits issued by the mukhtars of the different quarters, a certain control being thus obtained over the amount sold to each individual. It seems, however, certain that, on the date on which the town fell, the supply of bread-stuffs, including biscuits, would not have sufficed for more than seven days.

On the 25th March preparations for a general attack on the fortress commenced at 2·50 A.M., and continued throughout the day. On the eastern face the Bulgarians drove in the Turkish advance line, capturing a field battery and two machine guns, also the position of Mezar Tepe, establishing their heavy batteries in the neighbourhood of the junction of the Kirk-Kilisse and Constantinople roads, and drawing [?] in closer to the town on the line Musubeili-Skanderkeui. At 7 A.M. the Turkish infantry retired in disorder from the plain north and south of the Constantinople road. Aided by a mist which blew in from the eastward, and shrouded the operations from 7·45 A.M., the Bulgarian infantry were enabled to entrench themselves in the position to which they had advanced. A duel between the artillery of both sides continued during the day, the fire of the Bulgarian batteries being chiefly directed on two 15-centim. [?] batteries immediately to the north of the Constantinople road. On the south an attack was launched from Kartal Tepe against the batteries south of the railway line at 3 A.M., which was repulsed in forty-five minutes. At Chorek-Keui, to the east, the Bulgarians are said to have taken the trenches in the valley between that village and Dochansa. A heavy fire was also directed against Papas Tepe and Kazan Keupru, an attack also being launched against Karagenz Tabia, where the attackers gained a good deal of ground. Considerable progress was also made in the direction of Sinekli, at the south-east corner of the defences.

In the evening the military authorities requested the Ottoman Bank to telegraph immediately to Constantinople all Government funds, and it became generally known that the town would probably fall within the next twenty-four hours.

On the 26th March the Bulgarians, who had entrenched themselves on the previous day within striking distance of the line of eastern defences, commenced their advance at 3·50 A.M., at which time a fierce infantry fire broke out from the Turkish lines. This ceased along the Constantinople road by 4·30, but at 6·30 A.M. the attack was clearly concentrated against the slopes from Top Yolu to Armautkeui. At about 7 A.M., as nearly as I could judge, the Bulgars captured the batteries near Armautkeui, and by 8 A.M. the line of defences (eastern) was captured. At 7·45 A.M. I received a note from the commander of the eastern defences, saying that the last moment had arrived, and sending me a packet of papers and a Bulgar rifle. At 9·35 A.M. the white flag was hoisted at Khaderlik fort and over the fire-tower of the town. Ismail Pasha, who was at the military headquarter offices, received orders from Shukri Pasha by telephone to surrender the town. He therefore sent to the Bulgar general a letter surrendering the town. This, however, was unsigned, and the Bulgarian general sent

57

it back for signature. In the meantime the Bulgarian artillery had been brought up on Kaik ready to shell the town. The surrender document having been signed, the Servian and Bulgarian cavalry entered the town, and were at the military headquarter offices by 9·45 A.M., at which hour the chief of gendarmerie came to the consulate to announce, on behalf of the Vali, that the town was being surrendered. The Bulgar infantry commenced to arrive in the main streets at 11 A.M. Turkish soldiers had, in the meantime, broken their rifles and thrown away their cartridges and pillaged all the bakers' shops but none others. The arrival of the troops was greeted with applause by the few people—all non-Moslems—who remained in the streets. The arrival of the troops continued during the day, when great quiet generally prevailed, save that the Christians fired off revolvers in the streets as at Easter. Streets patrolled by cavalry and later (?) infantry pickets.

A good deal of looting was carried out in certain quarters by the civil population but otherwise good order prevailed.

L. L. R SAMSON, *Major.*

[*Note.*—Major Samson wished it to be explained that the foregoing memorandum was hastily written on the morning of the 28th March (Friday), in order that the sudden and unexpected opportunity of communicating with the embassy and Foreign Office, offered by the presence of a colleague, might not be missed. Major Samson's full report (with map, &c.) will be forwarded later by the usual channels.]

[15309] No. 83.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 52.)

Sir, *Sophia, March* 30, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 116 of the 29th instant, I have the honour to report that it was not until that date that all my colleagues representing the Great Powers had received instructions similar to those contained in your telegram No. 55 of the 25th ultimo, so that our collective *démarche* could be carried out relative to the customs régime in Macedonia.

I have the honour to enclose copy of the identic communication left by my colleagues and myself with the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

I have, &c.

H. G. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[15301] No. 84.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 172. Confidential.)

Sir, *Paris, April* 2, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 144 of yesterday's date, in regard to the participation of France in the proposed naval demonstration against Montenegro, reached me late yesterday afternoon, and I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs between 6 and 7 o'clock. I did not receive your telegram No. 145, Urgent, of the same date until after I had left M. Pichon; but as I had the honour of reporting yesterday evening in my telegram No. 40, Urgent, I spoke to his Excellency in regard to the question of a mandate being given to Austria and Italy to act on behalf of the Powers, and represented to him the necessity for the Powers to make their decisions respected by Montenegro.

I left with M. Pichon a memorandum in French of your instructions, which has since been returned to me, as I requested his Excellency not to consider it as a written communication.

After I had explained to him the purport of your instructions, and he had read the memorandum, M. Pichon stated that a French ship-of-war had been ordered to Corfu to be in readiness for the projected naval demonstration, in which France would join, provided that all the Powers took part in it, or that, in the event of Russia not

* Not printed.

participating in it, the Russian Government authorised the French Government to act for them.

I suggested that Germany, owing to not having a ship available for the purpose, might also, though approving the demonstration, not take part in it; and I asked whether her abstention would cause France to abstain also. M. Pichon replied that in those circumstances France would not abstain, provided, however, that the Russian Government would consent to a naval demonstration taking place without German participation. His Excellency went on to observe that he was under the impression that it was thought in England that Germany had too many ships, to which I replied that as far as northern waters were concerned this was true, but that it was not so at present as regards the Mediterranean. M. Pichon then suggested that if Germany abstained it would be with the object of currying favour with the Balkan States.

I pointed out to M. Pichon that as the Powers had decided that Scutari should be included in Albania it would be injurious to their future authority and inconsistant with their dignity and self-respect to permit the King of Montenegro to defy them because his protectress, Russia, though acquiescing in their decision abstained from joining them in enforcing it because the Russian Government thought that such abstention would preserve the influence of Russia in the Balkan States. The authority and influence of Russia had, I said, practically disappeared except when Russian counsels might happen to coincide with what any particular State considered to be its own advantage. The policy of the Russian Government had changed from day to day. They had threatened Roumania if she asserted her claim to Silistria and later on they wished Bulgaria to be urged to cede the town to Roumania. Their representatives in the Balkan States were generally without instructions, or received them too late to be as serviceable as they should be whenever it was a case of joining with the representatives of the other Powers in making communications which were not agreeable to the Governments to which they were accredited. The Russian Government were parties to the decision of the Powers in regard to Scutari, but they declined to join in enforcing it. Their attitude was illogical, and might in the case of the Montenegrin difficulty bring about the conflagration which it had been the endeavour of the conferences of yourself and the Ambassadors to obviate. There had been too much indecision and procrastination on the part of the Russian Government, and I thought that if the French Government would join with His Majesty's Government in making serious representations at St. Petersburgh they would succeed in leading the Russian Government to a more logical frame of mind, and to an attitude more calculated to preserve the peace of Europe. I added that if the French Government, failing authority from the Russian Government to act for Russia, held aloof from the naval demonstration they could not reasonably object to the action of Austria and Italy jointly or Austria alone, if Italy declined to act with Austria.

M. Pichon said that his information was that the Italian Government, owing to public opinion in Italy, would be unwilling to act with Austria. I replied that the Italian Government would probably prefer to take action with the Austrian Government rather than that Austria should act alone—which certainly might happen if the other Powers persisted in holding aloof—and that a naval demonstration of the Powers without Russia and Germany might prevent a general conflagration.

M. Pichon then stated that nobody could regret more than he the absence of consistency at St. Petersburgh. The policy of the Russian Government, as he had noticed while he was out of office, had been most vacillating; but as Russia was the ally of France the French Government could not, with due regard to public opinion in France and public sentiment in Russia, take without the Russian Government's concurrence action such as a naval demonstration against Montenegro, in opposition to what was evidently public sentiment in Russia. He could not join in giving a mandate either to Austria and Italy combined, which he did not regard as a probable contingency, or to Austria alone, to which Russia would certainly raise the strongest objections.

I was not able to move M. Pichon from this attitude. His Excellency suggested, however, that His Majesty's Government should use their influence at St. Petersburgh in order to bring round the Russian Government to the views which you had expressed to me in your telegraphic instructions.

I made it quite clear to M. Pichon that all that I had said beyond what was contained in the memorandum of your instructions was private, and represented my personal opinion only.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[15302] No. 85.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 173.) *Paris, April 3, 1913.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No 170 of yesterday, I have the honour to acquaint you that the "Temps" of this evening's issue contains a further article on the subject of the international naval demonstration against Montenegro entitled "Pour sortir d'une impasse."

The whole of Europe, it states, is struggling under the initial error committed when the Conference in London allowed to pass without objecting to it the principle of an Austrian demonstration off the coast of Montenegro. Weighty arguments could have been brought against it. Austria could have been told that a naval demonstration, isolated or collective, would be the negation of the policy of Europe for the last six months; that it would be a violation of the most elementary rules of neutrality, and open the door to all kinds of subsequent complications, seeing that there was no reason why Italy should refrain from action in South Albania which Austria had already taken in North Albania.

The "Temps" remarks that it has energetically supported Russian policy throughout the Balkan crisis, and only yesterday criticised the weakness shown by the Russian Cabinet as to the Austrian intervention. It adds that many Russians will agree with it in thinking that it would have been better to prevent the Austrian demonstration than to try and dilute it in a collective demonstration.

England, says the writer, feels keenly the consequences which might ensue to the authority of the conference. While it was easy to prevent the demonstration, it is not so easy to evade it after it has been officially announced. England rightly finds that in so doing Europe's prestige will not be enhanced, and yet it cannot be denied that the French Government is right "de vouloir n'accomplir que dans des conditions très claires l'acte impopulaire et maladroit qu'on voudrait lui imposer en vertu des décisions de la conférence de Londres."

The "Temps" suggests that the only way out of the difficulty is to maintain the principle—since it is a question of principle, and since the dignity of Europe requires that the Conference of London should not be disavowed—and to reduce as far as possible the limits of its execution. The Triple Alliance and the Triple *Entente* were in agreement in London, let them show their agreement at Antivari, but on the smallest possible scale. One vessel would suffice to represent each of the two groups of Powers. "Et par là," the article concludes, "on dispensera d'une corvée vraiment intolérable les Puissances qui, c'est le cas de la France, n'ont point de responsabilité dans cette folle aventure de bluff, de crédulité et de faiblesse."

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[15462] No. 86.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 4.)

(Confidential.) *Admiralty, April 4, 1913.*

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram dated the the 4th instant from the Vice-Admiral, H.M.S. "King Edward VII," relative to the movements of ships in the eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 86.

Vice-Admiral "King Edward VII" to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April 4, 1913.*

THE French ship "Edgar Quinet" has been ordered to go with me to Antivari. She requires coal, which she will obtain here to-day. This evening she will proceed to Antivari with "King Edward VII." "Dartmouth" will coal and follow to-morrow morning.

[15437] No. 87.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 4.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April 4, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copies of cypher telegrams, dated 3rd and 4th instant, relative to the movements of ships of war in Near Eastern waters.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 87.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April 4, 1913.*

THE Greek ship "Psara" has arrived at Corfu, along with a torpedo-boat destroyer and a torpedo-boat. They allege that Servian troops were disembarked at San Giovanni di Medua yesterday. An Austrian fleet is there.

Enclosure 2 in No. 87.

Admiralty to Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII."

(Telegraphic.) *April 4, 1913.*

AUSTRIAN and Italian ships are now at Antivari, and it is desirable that the vice-admiral should join the French naval officer, who is to proceed to Corfu, and go with him to Antivari, in order to avoid the appearance of a demonstration by Austrian and Italian ships alone.

Enclosure 3 in No. 87.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April 3, 1913.*

PRINCE Henry of Prussia has left the Piræus for Brindisi on board "Geoben." The "Breslau" left the Piræus on April 2nd. Both ships will, it is believed, proceed to Corfu.

[15460] No. 88.

Note communicated by the Austrian Ambassador, April 4, 1913.

COUNT BERCHTOLD has been asked by the Ambassadors of the different Powers what measures should, in his opinion, be taken into consideration if the appearance of the international fleet in Montenegrin waters should not have the desired effect. Sir F. Cartwright has mentioned the idea that in this case a blockade of the Montenegrin coast might first be contemplated, and eventually international detachments landed.

In Count Berchtold's opinion a united action of the naval forces would be of the greatest importance.

The rear-admiral in command of the Italian and Russian war-ships has therefore received instructions to communicate with the commanders of the foreign vessels and to consult with them in view of establishing, according to international regulations, the command of the international fleet. He is further authorised to participate in a blockade as well as in an occupation of the coast by mixed detachments.

It seems to Count Berchtold, in the interest of the joint operation, that the officers in command of the naval forces should receive the same or similar instructions.

[15616] No. 89.

Memorandum communicated by M. Madjarof, April 4, 1913.

La Question de l'Indemnité de Guerre et la Déclaration faite par M. de La Boulinière, Président de l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane.

DÈS qu'il a été établi que les États balkaniques alliés avaient l'intention d'exiger une indemnité de guerre au moment de la conclusion de la paix avec la Turquie, une partie de la presse européenne et certains milieux politiques, appartenant principalement aux pays dont les ressortissants sont les plus intéressés aux finances turques, ont soulevé une protestation contre cette exigence des alliés, manifestant la crainte que les intérêts des créanciers ottomans ne soient compromis et insistant pour que ces intérêts soient entièrement garantis après l'annexion des territoires occupés. C'est là l'unique raison pour laquelle la demande d'indemnité de guerre formulée par les alliés n'a pas été accueillie partout comme fondée et juste, bien que, en fait, on n'y ait pas opposé jusqu'à présent des arguments sérieux pouvant établir que les intérêts des créanciers de la Turquie, sujets des Grandes Puissances européennes, sont effectivement menacés ou en passe d'être compromis par le fait de l'annexion des territoires susdits, ou encore par l'obligation imposée à la Turquie de payer une indemnité de guerre. Cette vaine crainte a, du reste, disparu aussitôt que les alliés se sont déclarés prêts à prendre à leur charge une partie de la dette publique ottomane consolidée—partie calculée en proportion des revenus concédés en garantie à percevoir dans les territoires conquis.

En ce qui concerne, cependant, la question de la garantie et du payement de l'indemnité de guerre—bien que cette question doive être réglée exclusivement entre la Turquie et les États balkaniques alliés, étant donné qu'elle ne porte aucune atteinte aux intérêts des tiers, c'est-à-dire des créanciers de la Turquie, ainsi que nous l'avons démontré au moyen des données énumérées dans l'exposé ayant spécialement trait à l'indemnité de guerre—nous croyons nécessaire de relever la dernière déclaration de M. de La Boulinière, président de l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, suivant quoi l'exercice de 1912-1913 a été clos avec un excédent de £T. 2,250,756, et ce malgré les circonstances tout à fait défavorables où la Turquie a traversées au cours de ces années de 1912 et 1913. La déclaration de M. de La Boulinière est plûtot en faveur de notre thèse sur l'indemnité de guerre ; elle dissipe en même temps toute crainte quant à l'impossibilité pour les finances turques de supporter la charge de l'indemnité après l'annexion des territoires conquis, ou quant au préjudice que subiraient les intérêts des créanciers de la Turquie. Et voici pourquoi : l'excédent de 1912, comparé à celui de 1911, comporte une différence de £T. 371,898·89 en moins (£T. 2,622,649·89 — £T. 2,250,756), ce qui constitue un 13·96 pour cent de l'excédent de 1911, alors que l'accroissement constant de cet excédent pour les années 1909-1911 est en moyenne de 10·67 pour cent. En d'autres termes, malgré la guerre de 1912 entre l'Italie et la Turquie, malgré les insurrections continuelles en Albanie et quoique la Turquie ait été effectivement privée, pendant plus de cinq mois (octobre, novembre et décembre 1912, janvier et février 1913), des revenus concédés ou confiés pour être encaissés à l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane dans le rayon des territoires occupés, les intérêts des créanciers ottomans, représentés par cette Administration, n'ont point été lésés, et l'on peut s'attendre, à juste titre, à ce que l'excédent constaté par M. de La Boulinière pour 1912 prenne, en temps normal, un accroissement constant, ainsi que nous le prouve l'expérience du passé, même si la Turquie est privée de celles de ses provinces que les alliés ont conquises. Il est, de plus, notoire que les recettes de la surtaxe douanière de 3 pour cent représentent à elles seules plus de 50 pour cent des excédents constants fournis exclusivement par les revenus concédés à l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane ; ainsi, l'excédent de ces revenus s'élevait à la date du 13 mars, 1912 (exercice 1911-1912), à £T. 9,511,893·33, somme à laquelle la surtaxe susdite de 3 pour cent contribue à elle seule avec £T. 4,760,811·77. Cette surtaxe, on le sait, a été introduite à condition que 75 pour cent des revenus qu'elle aura rapportés soient affectés exclusivement aux besoins des vilayets d'Europe. Il est évident, dans ces conditions, que la perte des territoires occupés par les alliés sera tout au profit de l'État ottoman, pour la raison que le chiffre susdit de 75 pour cent des revenus de la surtaxe douanière de 3 pour cent forme pour les années de 1909 à 1911 un 35·57 pour cent en moyenne de l'excédent global que l'Administration de la Dette publique

ottomane recueille des "revenus concédés et autres." Par conséquent, la Turquie pourra librement disposer de ces sommes après l'annexion par les alliés des territoires occupés.

Il résulte de ce qui vient d'être exposé que par rapport à l'excédent global que l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane a recueilli pour les années de 1912-1913, la Turquie se privérait, en mettant les choses au pis à cause des événements survenus en 1912, d'un 13·96 pour cent, c'est-à-dire d'un pourcentage moindre que celui de l'accroissement moyen constant de l'excédent pour les années de 1909 à 1911, qui est de 16·67 pour cent, le Trésor ottoman ayant en plus à sa disposition, pour faire face à cette perte, les 75 pour cent précités sur les recettes de la surtaxe douanière et qui constituent un 35·57 pour cent de l'excédent global. En admettant que la Turquie n'aura pas à subir des conséquences plus désavantageuses que celles qu'elle a traversées en 1912 (guerre italo-turque, &c.) et en mettant qu'après l'annexion des territoires conquis elle augmentera ses revenus de 35·57 moins 13·96 = 21·61 pour cent de l'excédent des "revenus concédés et autres," qui s'élève à £T.2,250,756 pour 1912—soit approximativement 12·96 pour cent sur l'excédent des seuls revenus concédés, en tenant compte du fait que ce dernier excédent constitue pour les exercices 1909 à 1911 60·63 pour cent en moyenne de l'excédent global de l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane—ce bénéfice évident de 12·96 pour cent de l'excédent des revenus concédés, bénéfice qui reviendra au Trésor Impérial ottoman après l'annexion des territoires conquis, en présence d'un excédent total de £T. 2,250,756, pourrait largement subvenir à l'amortissement extraordinaire de la Dette unifiée et des Lots turcs; il suffirait, à cet effet, d'augmenter la quote-part * de 25 pour cent affectée actuellement à cet amortissement. Cette opération permet aussi de rejeter la dernière objection soulevée sur la question de l'indemnité de guerre réclamée, à savoir que l'annexion des territoires occupés aurait pour conséquence de diminuer la proportion des sommes affectées aux annuités extraordinaires de la Dette unifiée et des Lots turcs. Dans ces conditions, après l'annexion des territoires conquis, et à la suite de l'économie réalisée dans les dépenses de la Turquie pour le compte de la surtaxe douanière de 3 pour cent, il est possible—sans que pour cela la nouvelle situation créée par cette annexion compromette l'état du Trésor ottoman ou lèse les créanciers turcs, en tant que ces derniers sont intéressés en l'espèce à obtenir des sommes plus fortes sur l'excédent que l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane recueille des revenus concédés en vue du payement des annuités extraordinaires de la Dette unifiée et des Lots turcs—il est possible, disons-nous, d'affecter à la garantie du payement régulier de l'indemnité de guerre réclamée par les alliés l'excédent net disponible ainsi que l'excédent qui provient des garanties dites kilométriques et qui est versé par l'Administration au Trésor Impérial ottoman. Si, en vue d'une augmentation éventuelle de 12·96 pour cent de la quote-part de 25 pour cent de l'excédent des "revenus concédés" affectés au payement des annuités extraordinaires de la Dette unifiée et des Lots turcs, on diminuait l'excédent global pour 1912 de 7 pour cent, en chiffres ronds, £T. 2,250,756 — £T. 157,552·92, le reste de cet excédent, soit £T. 2,093,204·08, avec une tendance constante à l'augmentation, pourrait être capitalisé en un certain nombre d'années pour le compte de l'indemnité de guerre et concédé à l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, afin de servir comme garantie pour la part de la dette publique ottomane que les Etats balkaniques alliés prendront à leur charge, sans que cela porte la moindre atteinte aux intérêts de la Turquie et encore moins à ceux de ses créanciers.

[15615] No. 90.

M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, April 4.)

(Télégraphique.) *Saint-Pétersbourg, le* 18 (31) *mars*, 1913.

LES représentants des Grandes Puissances à Saint-Pétersbourg envoient à leurs Gouvernements télégramme identique suivant :—

"D'après un télégramme de presse que vient de recevoir M. Sazonof, le Roi Nicolas aurait ordonné un assaut général de Scutari qui devait avoir lieu aujourd'hui. Dans ce cas, M. Sazonof, pour prévenir ou arrêter cette reprise d'hostilités, n'élève aucune objection contre une démonstration navale, à la condition qu'elle soit collective. La Russie n'ayant aucun bateau de guerre dans la Méditerranée, est dans l'impossibilité

* Les sommes suivantes sont affectées à l'amortissement extraordinaire de la Dette unifiée et des Lots turcs : £T. 135,000·3 pour 1909 ; £T. 177,239·12 pour 1910 ; £T. 192,305·50 pour 1911, ce qui prouve que l'accroissement moyen de ces sommes, pour la période de 1909 à 1911, est de 0·61 pour cent.

d'y prendre part. Cette démonstration pourrait consister dans le blocus d'Antivari. En même temps, pour rendre plus facile au Roi Nicolas, dont la situation personnelle est critique, sa soumission aux domandes formelles des Puissances, celles-ci pourraient, dans la pensée de M. Sazonof, lui faire entendre qu'elles sont disposées à reconnaître sa bonne volonté, en lui assurant, par exemple, une compensation d'ordre financier, sous une forme à déterminer."

[15612] No. 91.

Count Berchtold to the Marquis Pallavicini.—(Communicated by Count Mensdorff, April 4, 1913.)

(Télégraphique.)

LE refus du Gouvernement monténégrin de communiquer le télégramme du Grand Vizir au commandant de Scutari me paraissant trouver une explication suffisante par les raisons stratégiques que le Monténégro a fait valoir, je vous prie d'intervenir auprès de Mahmoud Schefket Pacha, afin qu'un ou plusieurs représentants des puissances neutres, par exemple, de l'Allemagne, soient autorisés à notifier à Essad Pacha l'ordre de la Sublime Porte, concernant la sortie de la population civile.

Ambassade d'Autriche-Hongrie,
Londres, le 4 avril, 1913.

[15296] No 92.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 133.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, April* 3, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 293 of 2nd April.

Memorandum from the Russian Government states that the object of the communiqué reported in my telegram No. 132 of to-day was to indicate clearly the attitude of the Russian Government, and to facilitate the task of the French Government in explaining their participation in the naval demonstration at the expressed wish of the Russian Government.

Russian Government trust that His Majesty's Government will take into due consideration their extremely delicate position as regards Russian public opinion, and the impossibility of acting otherwise without risking a violent and very natural outburst of Russian public sentiment on behalf of Montenegro.

Russian Government, whilst deeply appreciating the eminent services rendered by His Majesty's Government to the cause of peace, trust that, at a moment when Europe anxiously awaits the prompt conclusion of a lasting peace, you will not refuse your help in work over which you have presided with so much merit, and in which you have earned the respect and gratitude of all the Great Powers.

[15466] No. 93.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 135.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, April* 1, 1913.

I TOLD Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day what you had said in your telegram No. 296 of 3rd April. He replied that he was happy to say that incident was now closed, as French Government had agreed to participate.

[15467] No. 94.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 136.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, April* 4, 1913.

MY telegram No. 128 of 31st March.

At meeting of Ambassadors to-day Austrian Ambassador proposed that we should discuss each of Roumania's claims separately. I remarked that this would not

advance matters, as question of Silistria would block the way. Minister for Foreign Affairs asked whether anyone would submit a definite proposal. I then, by a preconcerted arrangement with his Excellency, said that, as the only satisfaction which it was possible to give Roumania was one of a strategical nature, and as it had been shown that cession to Roumania of Medjidie Taba would render situation of Silistria as a Bulgarian town impossible, I would propose following settlement:—

Bulgarians should dismantle that fortress and engage under Russia's guarantee not to erect any fortifications whatever within a given zone; they should cede a little territory to the north-east of the town to enable Roumania to erect a fort to defend bridge to be constructed, and they should also cede two triangles.

A lively discussion followed, in which German and Austrian Ambassadors insisted on importance of Silistria strategically and otherwise to Roumania. French Ambassador eventually said that if this was the case, and if Roumania attached such value to cession of the town, he would ask whether she would in return for it be prepared to renounce all her other claims. Though he was not authorised to consent to cession of Silistria, he was willing to discuss settlement on these lines. In discussion which followed French and Austrian Ambassadors took the leading part, the latter holding out strenuously for cession of the two triangles as well. Minister for Foreign Affairs declared that since fall of Adrianople Bulgarians were less inclined than ever to cede anything, and that it would be impossible to make them consent to anything like cession of Silistria. I said that, although personally averse to cession of that town, I would, in order that our decision might be unanimous, agree to it were nothing else asked for. Finally, we agreed to submit following for approval of our Governments:

"Les représentants de la Russie, de l'Angleterre et de la France accepteraient en principe la cession de Silistrie à la Roumanie à condition:

"1. Que tombent toutes les autres revendications de la Roumanie.

"2. Que le Gouvernement roumain dédommage les habitants bulgares de Silistrie qui voudraient quitter cette ville et la partie de son territoire qui passerait à la Roumanie.

"Il est entendu que pour donner à la Roumanie tous ses apaisements au point de vue stratégique, la Bulgarie prendra l'engagement de n'élever aucunes fortifications le long de la frontière actuelle de Silistrie à la Mer Noire."

As we meet again on 7th April, and as it is important that we should settle the whole question by evening of 9th April, when French Ambassador leaves for Paris, I should be grateful if instructions could be sent to me at once.

Minister for Foreign Affairs will make a determined stand to save triangles, while Austrian Ambassador will press for their cession. He may also suggest that Bulgaria should be reconciled to their cession by some compensation elsewhere.

May I support and accept, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, any settlement that satisfies Minister for Foreign Affairs?

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs told us that Bulgarian Government had begged that our decision, whatever it was, should not be made public at present.

[15457] No. 95.

Sir G. Barclay to Edward Grey.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, April 4, 1913.*

MILITARY attaché learns from General Staff here that Bulgaria is sending considerable reinforcements to Shumlah and Varna, and that General Ivanof with 2,000 men has arrived at Rustchuck from Adrianople. General Staff [group undecypherable] also state that fort of Mejidie Taba at Silistria has been recently armed with six guns.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[15359] No. 96.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Paris, April 4, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 41 of 2nd April.

Following communiqué appears in press this morning:—

"Le Gouvernement russe ayant fait publier qu'il souhaite de voir la France et l'Angleterre s'associer à la démonstration navale des Puissances, le Gouvernement de la république a résolu de participer à cette affirmation solennelle des volontés de l'Europe. Le commandant de l'' Edgar Quinet,' qui avait été envoyé à Corfu, a donc reçu l'ordre de s'entendre avec le commandant des navires anglais pour se rendre conjointement avec eux à Antivari."

[15406] No. 97.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 121. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, April 4, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 118 of 31st March.

Reliable Bulgarian official just returned from Adrianople informs me that all the best troops of the besieging force are being moved to Chatalja, as well as all available artillery.

[15463] No. 98.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 122.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, April 4, 1913.*

MEDIATION proposals.

Misunderstanding was the French Minister's. I have informed him fully of the instructions contained in your telegrams Nos. 86 of 31st March and 88 of 3rd April, with which he agreed, and is ready to act [group undecypherable]. Remaining colleagues have now also received instructions.

(Confidential.)

I do not expect action suggested will in any way alter determination of the King and of general to attack the Chatalja lines.

[15352] No. 99.

Consul Samson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 4.)

(Telegraphic.) *Adrianople, April 4, 1913.*

BULGARIAN authorities have now 1,000 officers, 50,000 men prisoners, but only 15,000 rifles forthcoming. All prisoners being gradually drafted out of town. Understand not proposed send men across frontier at present, owing to sickness amongst them, but officers proceeding to various Bulgarian towns. Great difficulty feeding population prisoners owing lack of supplies in town and destruction of Marash railway bridge. King attended requiem of late King of Greece at Greek church on 3rd April, but has not yet made official entry.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[16187] No. 100.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 166.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 4, 1913.*

IT is probable that King of Bulgaria means to enter Constantinople. I do not think His Majesty's Government could resort to force to prevent this, but I should like your opinion on two points:—

1. Should we not ask consent of Turkish Government to send warships as before to Constantinople to protect Embassy and British subjects in emergency?

2. Could naval force do anything to protect mosques, sacred places, or relics from being violated in a way that would be offensive to Mahommedan feeling? Anything of this sort that is practical is due to our regard for feeling of Mahommedan subjects of the Crown in India and elsewhere or under British protection in Egypt.

Please consider these points and let me have your views for consideration of His Majesty's Government.

[15296] No. 101.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 209.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, April 4, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 133 of 3rd April.

Please thank Minister for Foreign Affairs most cordially for sentiments in last paragraph of your telegram.

Russian communiqué appears to have removed difficulties of the French, and I trust British and French ships are already on their way together from Corfu to Antivari.

[14339] No. 102.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 229.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 4, 1913.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copies of correspondence relative to a contract, dated the 14th February, 1912, between the Ottoman Government, the National Bank of Turkey, and the Bank of Salonica, with reference to an issue of Treasury bills amounting to 1,500,000*l.**

It will be seen that these bills were sold half in London and half in Paris, and that the customs of Salonica and Adrianople, as well as those of three other districts, were assigned exclusively, irrevocably, and inalienably for their payment.

The National Bank have expressed the hope that this matter may not be lost sight of when the general financial questions arising out of the war come to be considered.

The whole case has been submitted to Sir P. Harvey, who, as your Excellency is aware, is to represent His Majesty's Government on the International Commission which it is proposed shall meet in Paris to examine these questions.

Sir P. Harvey has expressed the opinion that little can be done to help the holders of these bills except as a part of the general settlement.

He observed that their position appears to be substantially the same as that of the bondholders at large. They have, in virtue of their contracts, claims against the allies in respect of part of the revenues of the conquered territories both during the period of occupation and after the general settlement.

Sir P. Harvey, however, draws this distinction between the holders of these bills and the bondholders: That whereas the latter's interests are being protected to some extent by the agents of the Ottoman Debt administration in the occupied territories, who have doubtless warned the occupying Powers of the claims which will be raised

* National Bank of Turkey, December 23rd, 1912; ditto, February 18th; to National Bank of Turkey, February 26th; National Bank of Turkey, March 3rd; (2) ditto, March 19th; Sir H. Babington Smith to Sir Louis Mallet, February 28th, 1913.

against any revenues in course of collection, nothing has been done to warn the allies of the claims of these billholders against the customs revenues of Salonica and Adrianople.

On this ground he suggests that the French Government should be consulted as to the advisability of taking special steps for the protection of their rights. As, however, the French Government are opposing the principle of "spécialisation des gages," he expresses a doubt whether they will care to take the matter up.

Your Excellency should therefore ascertain the views of the French Government, and enquire what action they propose to take in defence of the interests of the French billholders.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[16032] No. 103.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.**

(No. 79.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 4, 1913.*

AT the meeting of the Ambassadors to-day it was ascertained that all the Governments, except the Russian Government, who had no warships in the Mediterranean, had sent instructions to their warships to participate in a naval demonstration.

The French instructions were as follows:—

"Le commandant de l'' Edgar-Quinet,' qui avait été envoyé à Corfu, a reçu l'ordre de s'entendre avec le commandant des navires anglais et de se rendre à Antivari avec eux."

The Italian Ambassador announced that the Italian ships had left Brindisi yesterday for the waters of Antivari. The commandant had received instructions to consult with the other naval officers, with the condition that no operation ought to be undertaken before the arrival of the ships of the other countries.

I told the Ambassadors that, on the 1st instant, instructions had been sent to the British vice-admiral to proceed from Corfu to Antivari with his ships in company with the French ships. On arrival at Antivari he was to join the senior officers of the international squadron in consultation as to any means which might be practicable to exert pressure on the Montenegrin Government to defer to the decision of the Powers. The landing of naval brigades and field guns or actual bombardment was not to be undertaken without further instructions. I explained that these instructions had been sent on the 1st instant in order that there should be no delay in the action of the British ships as soon as the other ships received instructions also. Our instructions had now been confirmed.

I observed that it was of little use for us to proceed with the meetings until we received the reply of the allies as to the terms of peace, or until some Government had a proposal to make respecting the difficulty of Scutari or the enforcement of the terms of peace. I remarked that the only possible thing that the Powers could do with regard to the terms of peace was to consider the application of pressure upon the allies to accept them. So far as I was aware, there was not any Government prepared to propose pressure.

The German Ambassador said that we ought to consider the contingency of the naval demonstration failing to impress the King of Montenegro. There was a suggestion that money compensation might induce him to give way.

I said that I was sure that the British Government would be delighted if any solution could be found which would avoid the necessity for further coercive measures against Montenegro; but the British Government could not themselves give money to Montenegro, and this was a matter to be dealt with by any Powers that were prepared to compensate the King of Montenegro by dealing with him direct. No doubt the naval demonstration might fail, but till we saw what the effect of it was we could hardly initiate proposals in the reunion which went beyond it. If it failed, or if Scutari fell, and any Government thought it necessary to make a further proposal, we should of course have to consider it.

* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 240), Sir E. Goschen (No. 121), Sir R. Rodd (No. 99), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 148).

In the course of the discussion, the following resolution was passed :—

"Des malentendus semblent s'être produits au sujet de la communication à faire au Gouvernement bulgare conformément à la formule arrêtée dans la réunion du 31 mars et adoptée par tous les Gouvernements. La réunion pense qu'il y a lieu de prescrire de nouveau aux représentants des Puissances à Sophia de se conformer à cette formule ainsi conçue sans y rien ajouter."

The Russian Ambassador raised the question of communicating the formula referred to at Constantinople, but the general opinion was that this was neither necessary nor opportune.

I read to the meeting my telegrams Nos. 86 and 88 to Sir Henry Bax-Ironside, which I thought ought to clear up any doubt.

The French Ambassador urged that we should not separate without fixing a date for the next meeting, and this was therefore fixed for Tuesday next, the 8th instant, at 4 P.M.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[16031] No. 104.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 98.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 4, 1913.*

THE Italian Ambassador told me privately to-day that his Government knew that it would be a most dangerous illusion to suppose that Austria would not go to war to prevent Scutari from being annexed to Montenegro. His Government were considering the question of pecuniary or other compensation for Montenegro. They were urging this in Vienna, and he asked me to support it.

I said that I should be delighted at any solution that avoided further coercive measures, but I thought that Count Berchtold would resent any pressure from me at this moment, or even a suggestion that he should make concessions to Montenegro. As for the British Government, delighted as we should be if a solution could be arrived at in this peaceful way, we could not propose to Parliament, nor, if we did, would Parliament vote the grant of a sum of British money for the King of Montenegro.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[15442] No. 105.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 4, 1913.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that the French naval officer at Corfu has received instructions to proceed to Antivari.

Sir E. Grey would therefore request that, with the concurrence of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, the British commanding officer should be so informed, and instructed to the effect that the sooner he and his French colleague can proceed to Antivari the better, in order to avoid the appearance of an isolated demonstration by the Austrian and Italian ships which are there already.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[15460] No. 106

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 4, 1913.*

WITH reference to my immediately preceding letter of to-day's date, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum communicated by Count Berchtold, respecting the action of the international squadron off the Montenegrin coast.*

Sir E. Grey has informed the Ambassadors of the Powers of the instructions sent to the British vice-admiral on the 1st April.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[15500] No. 107.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 63.)

Sir, *Athens, March 28, 1913.*

WITH reference to Sir G. Buchanan's telegram No. 117 of the 26th instant, I have the honour to report that my Russian colleague, having at last received his instructions, the representatives of the Great Powers have to-day addressed to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs a collective note, copy of which I have the honour to enclose, conveying the decision of the Powers with regard to the customs régime applicable in the Turkish territories occupied by the Balkan allies, as laid down in your circular telegram No. 55 of the 25th February to Sophia.

A law recently passed by the Greek Chamber, and promulgated as No. 4134 of the 28th February (13th March), provides for the administration of the occupied districts. A translation of the articles relating to financial matters is enclosed herewith. It will be seen that as regards customs duties it does not conflict with the demands of the Powers, excepting in the admission duty free into the occupied territories of Greek produce, and perhaps in the admission duty free into Greece of the produce of those territories.

The same law confirms the Royal Decree of the 24th October last appointing M. Dragoumis Governor-General of Crete (see my despatch No. 163 of the 26th October).

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 107.

Law 4134 of February 28 (March 13), 1913.

(Translation.)

ARTICLE 7. The entire existing legislation in the occupied territory, civil including commercial), administrative in general, and financial, including fiscal laws, is maintained in force as a rule with the exception of those provisions which are contrary to Greek laws concerning public order, as well as whenever there is any insurmountable impediment to the application of any local law. In these instances Greek law is, as a matter of course, put in force.

However, Greek penal and police laws are exclusively applied in the territory occupied from the (commencement of the) occupation. With regard to previous offences tried after the occupation the rule of the application of the more lenient provision takes effect.

Art. 8. The administrative division of the territory occupied is maintained intact with such modifications as may be dictated by expediency in the view of the Governor, who is generally entitled to fix or change the district, headquarters, and area of jurisdiction of each official.

As to the taxes, their basis and rate being generally maintained, changes, especially as regards the mode of their verification and collection, may be introduced by decisions of the Governor. Military contributions may be imposed in the occupied territory by agreement between the Governor and the military chief.

The customs duties are applied from the (commencement of the) occupation on such merchandise as is imported from the remainder of the enemy's territory ; but, on the contrary, merchandise or other produce is imported from Greece duty free into the territories under military occupation (except goods the importation of which is prohibited). Goods of foreign origin transported to Greece from those territories pay the difference in excess between the duty already paid and that in force in Greece ; whilst the natural and industrial products of this territory are imported free of duty,

* No. 88.

except those especially excepted by an act of the Ministerial Council, which are subject to the same or a lower duty.

The importation duty free into the territories under military occupation of raw materials employed in industrial undertakings may also be permitted by an act of the Ministerial Council, provided the same freedom from duty obtains in Greece.

[15504] No. 108.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 13. Commercial.)

Sir, *Athens, March 28, 1913.*

IT was not until the arrival of the last bag that I had cognisance of the proposals respecting shipping in the Levant which the Austro-Hungarian Government desire to see imposed upon the Balkan States among the international arrangements to be effected at the conclusion of peace (Confidential Print, February 8, Section 11).

One object of these proposals is obvious. The Austrian mercantile marine do not enjoy the right of participating in the coasting trade in Greek waters, as the Austrian Government decline to grant reciprocity in this matter to Greek vessels. It is now proposed to apply international pressure to acquire this right under the specious guise of the "open door," without assuming any obligation of reciprocity, to the disadvantage not only of the Greek mercantile marine, but of those countries with whom Greece has arrangements of reciprocity in this matter.

I have, &c.

F. ELLIOT.

[15590] No. 109.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 68.)

Sir, *Belgrade, March 30, 1913.*

I HAD the honour to report in my despatch No. 66 of the 28th instant on the difficulties encountered by me in executing your instructions to make joint representations together with my colleagues, and I mentioned that at the time of writing my Russian colleague had, as yet, not received his instructions to invite the Servian Government to recall their troops from operations against Scutari, &c.—instructions which had been in the possession of my other colleagues and myself on the 23rd and 24th instant, therefore, some three days earlier.

As soon as your telegram No. 70 reached me on the 29th March I called at the Russian Legation myself. M. de Hartwig received me with the phrase that I had come very *à propos*, as he had just received instructions from St. Petersburgh. I expressed surprise that they had not reached him until the 29th, as a telegram I had just received from London stated they had been dispatched to Belgrade on the 27th. M. de Hartwig explained the delay by saying the telegram had reached him in an undecipherable condition the previous day, and he had had to ask for a repetition. Parenthetically, I may observe that the same instructions appear to have reached the Russian Minister at Cettinjé without any undue delay, and were acted upon on the 28th instant, and further that I discovered, in the course of my subsequent conversation with M. de Hartwig, that he had for some time been in possession of instructions similar to those conveyed to me in your telegram No. 64 of the 20th instant, which directed me to state that no action on the part of Servia or Montenegro in Albania could create any *droits acquis*—a circumstance which he had denied to me on several occasions previously.

With regard to the telegram he had just received, M. de Hartwig said that, as it contained merely an account of a resolution of a meeting of Ambassadors, he did not know whether he could consider it in the light of instructions. Should he make a written communication to the Servian Government, and, if so, what form should it take? I replied that from the telegrams which had reached me I felt quite clear as to what was the intention of His Majesty's Government, and it had probably been thought best to leave us a certain amount of latitude as to the form in which the communication should be made to the Servian Government. I had brought the draft

of the communication which I proposed to make with me, and which I believed resembled those of the other representatives, and I would be glad to read it to him.

When I had finished reading it M. de Hartwig said that he had no objection to the text except as regards the phrase "protection des populations catholiques," &c., and he read me a telegram from M. Sazonof to the effect that the word "protection" was entirely inadmissible, as it was derogatory to the sovereignty of the Balkan States, and would afford a pretext for the interference of other Powers. "Under the circumstances," continued M. de Hartwig, "you will see that the *démarche* cannot take place until I have fresh instructions from St. Petersburgh." I said that, although "protection" was the word used in the telegram I had received from my Government, I felt it was imperative there should be no further delay in calling upon the Servian Government to withdraw from operations against Scutari, and I would therefore be willing, if he would make a suggestion, to alter that part in my draft to some extent. The suggestion made by M. de Hartwig was that the words "liberté de culte" should be substituted for "protection." This substitution I accepted, and said I would inform my other colleagues, who had also seen my draft, of the fact. M. de Hartwig thereupon agreed to join in making the *démarche* the same afternoon.

As I was leaving he said that all these representations were quite useless, as Servia was bound to support Montenegro, and to desert Montenegro at the present moment would be looked upon as treachery; moreover, how could King Peter fail to honour the conditions which he had himself subscribed in the treaty of alliance? I replied that King Peter or the Crown Prince had also affixed their signature to a convention with Bulgaria regarding spheres in Macedonia, and that the Bulgarian sphere included Monastir and other places, but, nevertheless, the Royal signature was apparently not sufficiently binding to prevent talk of Servia now retaining Monastir.

I subsequently saw M. d'Ugron and my French colleague and told them of M. de Hartwig's objection to the word "protection," and that in order to ensure the *démarche* being no longer delayed I had accepted the words "liberté de culte" instead. M. d'Ugron said it would not be in accordance with his instructions to depart from the text he had received, but I understood him to agree also to make the alteration in his communication to the Servian Government and to undertake to inform his German and Italian colleagues of the fact.

On reaching the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, however, I found, greatly to the indignation of M. de Hartwig, who had already presented his communication to M. Pasitch, the Austrian and German Ministers and the Italian chargé d'affaires had adhered to the word "protection."

This is, perhaps, somewhat regrettable, as it increases the impression of want of complete accord which was already sufficiently pronounced owing to the tardiness of instructions from St. Petersburgh.

I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of the memorandum which I handed to M. Pasitch. In doing so I expressed the hope that the Servian troops would at once be withdrawn from the siege of Scutari. I reminded his Excellency of the declaration he had made some months ago that, in regard to Albania, Servia would submit to the decision of the Powers (see my telegram No. 91 of the 1st December last), and I called his attention to your recent remarks in the House of Commons as to the regrettable effect that a useless continuation of operations in Albania, after Servia and Montenegro had received this notification from the Powers, would produce.

M. Pasitch's first words to me were almost identically those used by M. de Hartwig in the morning, namely, that Servia was not a free agent in the question of Scutari, that she was bound by the treaty of alliance to support Montenegro, and that to desert Montenegro now would be tantamount to treachery. He then went on to say that there was no need to put pressure on Servia, as the Government knew well enough there was nothing to be gained by the continuation of hostilities, and had, in fact, been waiting for peace for the last three months. Pressure should be put on Montenegro, and he hoped the King would finally be amenable to reason. But meanwhile he thought it right to make it clear that any attempt at aggression by Austria would be considered as constituting an attack on all the allies, and would find them quite united to resist bullying, by force if necessary. He readily admitted having declared some time earlier that Servia would submit to the decisions of the Powers, but contended that the war was not yet at an end, and he pointed out, moreover, that the Powers had not yet fixed the southern limits of Albania, and that Greece might also still call upon Servia for assistance.

M. Pasitch then referred to the phrase in the memorandum "pour assurer la liberté de culte effective." He explained to me that in Servia "liberté de culte" is guaranteed under the Constitution and its insertion was, therefore, entirely unnecessary, whilst as to the version in the memorandum presented by the German Minister and others, viz., "pour assurer la protection effective des populations catholiques," &c., he said with a good deal of heat that Servia would never admit anything in the nature of protection by others inside her frontiers and that the stories of outrages, forcible conversions, &c., said to have been perpetrated by Servians, and which had given rise to the insertion of such a phrase, were nothing but malicious inventions originating in Austria.

The tenor of M. Pasitch's reply was very different from what most of my colleagues and I had expected a few days previously, our expectations being based on statements made to us at various times by M. Pasitch and M. Stefanovitch. My Austrian colleague, however, had warned me, the day before, as reported in my telegram No. 70 of the 29th instant, that M. Pasitch appeared to have suddenly changed front. I enclose some notes which have been confidentially sent to me by M. d'Ugron, and which show that he was fully justified in believing that a declaration by the Powers that the frontiers of Albania had been definitely determined would have the desired effect of causing the Servian troops to be withdrawn from further operations at Scutari. But in addition I have the honour to refer you to my telegrams Nos. 46, 49, 65, and 67 which were sent immediately after conversations with M. Stefanovitch.

In the face of statements thus made to my colleagues and myself I find it very difficult to explain M. Pasitch's failure to take advantage of the opportunity to retire from Scutari offered by the declaration of the Powers unless it be that other influences and considerations have intervened. There is no reason to suppose that the Servian Government are less amenable than before to orders from Russia and under ordinary circumstances, therefore, especially as it is in Servia's own interests, the invitation of the Russian Government to retire from the siege of Scutari should have produced a more satisfactory result than at present seems probable from the reply given by M. Pasitch. If this has not been the case, the inference is either that the delay in sending instructions to M. de Hartwig from St. Peterburgh has given rise to the impression that the Russian Government have joined in the *démarche* only with reluctance, or M. de Hartwig, who is far more concerned with spiting Austria and advancing Panslavism than securing the peace of Europe, has been again coaching the Servian Government in his own ideas.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure 1 in No. 109.

Memorandum communicated to Servian Government.

LE Ministre d'Angleterre a l'honneur de notifier au Gouvernement Royal serbe que les Puissances sont définitivement d'accord sur les frontières nord et nord-est de l'Albanie.

Dans ces circonstances et la question albanaise n'étant nullement affectée par la continuation de la guerre, les Puissances invitent le Gouvernement Royal serbe à lever le siège du Scutari, à mettre fin aux hostilités dans les territoires abandonnés à l'Albanie et à procéder rapidement à l'évacuation de ces territoires.

Les Puissances considèrent en même temps qu'il convient de prendre d'urgence des mesures pour assurer la liberté de culte effective des populations catholiques, musulmanes et albanaises dans les territoires cédés au Monténégro et à la Serbie.

Belgrade, le 29 mars, 1913.

Enclosure 2 in No. 109.

Notes communicated to Sir R. Paget by Austrian Minister.

(Confidentielle.)

M. PACHITCH m'a déclaré, le 11 ou 12 mars seulement, "que la Serbie sûrement se soumettra à la décision des Grandes Puissances relativement à Scutari."

Il s'est prononcé analoguement mais encore plus clairement à Rinella (the Italian Chargé d'Affaires), le 24 février et les 13 et 19 mars.

C'est M. Stefanovitch qui m'a déclaré, le 12 mars :—

"Nous ne tenons pas beaucoup à verser notre sang pour le Roi Nicolas et nous serons très contents si les Grandes Puissances nous mettaient devant un fait accompli."

Lorsque je lui ai demandé ce qu'il entendait par cela, il continuait :—

"Si la réunion des Ambassadeurs finissait vite la question de la délimitation de l'Albanie et déclarait que Scutari en doit faire partie, et si cette décision venait nous être communiquée, la Serbie ne pourrait s'opposer, puisque nous avons déclaré reconnaitre la décision des Grandes Puissances. Dans ce cas, nous devrions déclarer au Monténégro que nous sommes liés par la décision des Ambassadeurs et nous devons nous soumetre. Il ne pourrait alors plus être question de notre aide pour la prise de Scutari."

J'avais transmis cette réponse à mon Gouvernement.

M. Pachitch tient aujourd'hui un tout autre langage.

La Serbie ne peut pas abandonner le Monténégro : ça serait de la traitrise. Tout dépend du Roi Nicolas, qui est le commandant en chef.

A ce qu'il paraît, il est soutenu dans cette décision par notre ami et collègue Hartwig.

[15591] No. 110.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 69.)

Sir, *Belgrade, March* 30, 1913.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 68 of to-day's date, I have the honour to enclose copy of the communication issued by the Servian Government to the press bureau relative to the joint *démarche* of the representatives of the Powers. Its sole interest consists in the manner in which the discrepancy between the communication has been noted by the phrase: ". . . les uns disent, pour l'assurance de la protection réelle des nationalités catholiques, musulmanes et albanaises, et les autres, pour l'assurance de la liberté religieuse des nationalités catholiques, musulmanes et albanaises."

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 110.

Communication issued by Servian Government.

LES représentants des Grandes Puissances se sont présentés hier à 5 heures du soir chez le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères M. Pachitch, et lui ont remis une note mandant que les Puissances sont complètement d'accord au sujet des frontières au nord et nord-est de l'Albanie, et que, d'après cela, la continuation de la guerre n'aura pas d'influence sur la question de l'Albanie. Les Puissances invitent le Gouvernement serbe à lever le siège de Scutari et à interrompre les hostilités sur les territoires appartenant à l'Albanie, ainsi qu'il évacue au plus tôt les territoires susdits. En même temps, les Puissances considèrent qu'il est necessaire de prendre des mesures urgentes, comme les uns disent, pour l'assurance de la protection réelle des nationalités catholiques, musulmanes et albanaises, et les autres, pour l'assurance de la liberté religieuse des nationalités catholiques, musulmanes et albanaises.

M. Pachitch, prenant acte de cette communication des représentants des Grandes Puissances, a déclaré qu'il se concertera avec les alliés, puis donnera une réponse.

Belgrade, le 30 mars, 1913.

[15555] No. 111.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 249.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 30, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul-General at Salonica, relative to a petition addressed to some

of the foreign consular representatives at Salonica by the inhabitants of Pehtchevo concerning the forcible conversion to Christianity by Bulgarians in occupation of that region.

A copy of this despatch has been sent to His Majesty's Minister at Sophia.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 111.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 22.)
Sir, *Salonica, March* 22, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 13 of the 16th ultimo and to previous despatches on the same subject, I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of a petition which has been addressed to some of the foreign consulates in Salonica on behalf of the Mussulman inhabitants of the district of Pehtchevo, or Osmanieh, complaining of the outrages committed on their women and of the forcible conversion of their villages to Christianity by the Bulgarians in occupation of that region.

Pehtchevo is the district from which I heard the earliest mention of these forced conversions, but nothing in the way of definite particulars had hitherto come into my possession.

I am, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 2 in No. 111.

Petition presented to some of the European Consulates in Salonica by a Deputation of the Inhabitants of Osmanieh.

(Translation).

WE are inhabitants of Behdjova, the chief town of the Kaza of Osmanieh. The Mussulman population of our Kaza, fearing massacre, punishment, and torture, had, at the beginning of the occupation of this region by the Bulgarian army, taken refuge in the Kazas of Serres, Demir-Hissar, Doiran and Strounnitza.

Thinking that the Bulgarian atrocities had come to an end, and confiding in the promise which had been made to safeguard the rest of their property and to respect their honour and above all, their religion, which is very precious to them, the Mussulmans had returned to their homes.

But alas! as soon as they returned, the inhabitants of the villages of Borovo, Burbanie, Djirtik, Istimenik, Ihsanie, Tirtovichta, Virdje, Grade, Istamer, Isvekre, Gabrovo, Klimantha, Hunguiar, Tchurova, were attacked by the Bulgars and all sorts of punishment were inflicted upon them.

All the young girls of these 14 villages were violated, and all who were good-looking were forced to adopt the Christian religion. All the widows were made to marry Christians. To compel the whole population to accept Christianity, all possible and imaginable atrocities were committed. Some villagers who would not become Christians were beaten and killed. Terrified by these dreadful spectacles, some Mussulmans were obliged to accept the Christian religion and to sign a paper which was presented to them and by which they were made to declare that no violence had been used to effect their conversion.

Finally it came to the turn of the chief town, Behdjova. One day an order was given out that everybody was to proceed to church on the ringing of the bell, and it was added that whoever disobeyed should at once be shot.

It was then that we fled, at the risk of our lives, to come and inform you of the wretched condition of our fellow-citizens of Osmanieh. Such is at present the lamentable [? state] of that population. And, as we are informed, the inhabitants of the neighbouring Kazas are in the same plight. Those especially of Djouma, Petritch and Melnik are undergoing the same tortures.

Have civilised nations lost all feeling of pity? Has humanity disappeared from the earth? How can people remain calm spectators of atrocities surpassing those of the Dark Ages?

We lay our complaints before you, begging you in the name of our unfortunate brethren to do what is needful to put an end to this state of matters.

SHUKRI-BIN-SALIH.
AHMED-BIN-MENICHE.

(Of the Bala quarter of Osmanieh).

February 21, 1328 (*March* 7, 1913).

[15556] No. 112.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 250.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March* 30, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's acting vice-consul at Cavalla on the subject of Græco-Bulgarian relations in that district and their possible effect on the tobacco trade.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 112.

Acting Vice-Consul Morgan to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 10.)
Sir, *Cavalla, March* 17, 1913.

THE unfortunate quarrels between Greeks and Bulgarians, and their inability to agree, even temporarily, to a partition of Macedonia into zones where the authority of one or the other would be supreme, has resulted in the setting up in various places of two different authorities—a state of affairs most unsettling to the general public.

In the district of Cavalla, Bulgarian rule is established at Cavalla, Sarishaban, and Drama; Greek and Bulgarian in the village of Pravishta and district; Greek rule at Leftera Bay, west of the Gulf of Cavalla; and a Greek Governor of Mount Pangheion and surrounding communities has his seat at Radolivos, on the eastern slopes of Mount Pangheion, west of the plain of Drama.

The representative of this Governor has just issued a notice forbidding the export of tobacco from the villages under his jurisdiction into the parts occupied by "foreign armies," *i.e.*, parts under Bulgarian administration.

Most of the tobacco in such villages is already bought and paid for by foreign houses in Cavalla, and is usually brought down to Cavalla at this season for "manipulation." This latter operation cannot be carried out in the villages, owing to the lack of skilled workmen there. It is feared, therefore, that the result of the issue of the above order will be the rotting of a good part of the tobacco in the villages unless the order is speedily revoked.

I have, &c.
JAMES MORGAN.

[15558] No. 113.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 252.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March* 30, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 171 of the 28th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's acting vice-consul at the Dardanelles, reporting more fully on the presence of ten Greek transports in Besika Bay and on the consequent movements of Turkish troops.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 113.

Acting Vice-Consul Harris to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 55.)

Sir, *Dardanelles, March* 26, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that ten Greek transports, escorted by torpedo-boats, are reported in Besika Bay.

It is supposed that the Greek army, which was formerly engaged in investing Janina, will now be directed on some point of the coast of Asia Minor to effect a landing.

Three batteries, *i.e.*, twelve guns of 7½ calibre, each drawn by six horses, were disembarked here at 3 A.M. in the night of the 23rd to 24th, and immediately took the Ezineh road towards Besika. I have not been able to find out to what regiments they belong.

I have it on unimpeachable authority—that of Mrs. Calvert, of Thymbra Farm—that 30,000 troops are shortly expected in the district round Besika. A bridge is now in course of construction over the Scamander on her farm, where also half a tabur teptchi are stationed. Mrs. Calvert recently put up several officers at her farm for the night, and all this information comes from them. These officers also admitted that the whole of the Turkish peasant population of this district had been armed by the Government. I had heard well-substantiated rumours to this effect, but hesitated to give any credence to them. Mrs. Calvert was also told that these arms were for the express purpose of perpetrating a massacre among the Greek population of Erenkeuy, Yenishehr, and Nichori if the Greeks attempted a landing in the district, and that her own farm servants run a great risk. On her declaring that she would take them all into her farm, the officers said that that would alter the case. So apparently they are safe. They have, nevertheless, borrowed a flag from this vice-consulate.

The local leader of the Committee of Union and Progress, Mehmed Effendi, told her, too, that a "fenalik" would undoubtedly take place if the Greeks landed.

Mrs. Calvert is by no means an imaginative woman; the fullest confidence can be placed in all her statements. All goes to show that the Turkish peasants are preparing a *coup* against the local Christians with the connivance and active assistance of the Young Turk Government.

In case of immediate urgency I will communicate in French with His Majesty's Embassy by translations of the code his Excellency was good enough to approve, which was enclosed in my No. 3 of the 15th February to His Majesty's Embassy.

I have, &c.

M. G. HARRIS.

[15560 No. 114.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 256.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 31, 1913.

WITH reference to your telegrams Nos. 141 of the 15th and 159 of the 28th instant, I have the honour to transmit the text of the note presented to-day by the Ambassadors to the Minister for Foreign Affairs containing the proposals for the preliminary basis of peace.

We were all received by his Highness Saïd Halim Pasha at the same time, and the note was read to the Minister by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 114.

Joint Note addressed to Sublime Porte.

LES Ambassadeurs soussignés d'Autriche-Hongrie, d'Angleterre, de France, de Russie, d'Allemagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur de faire connaître au Gouvernement Impérial ottoman que les Puissances, dont la Turquie a accepté la médiation, se sont

accordées pour proposer aux États belligérants les bases préliminaires de paix résumées ci-dessous :—

1. La frontière de l'Empire ottoman en Europe sera tracée suivant une ligne droite d'Énos à Midia. Tous les territoires situés à l'ouest de cette ligne seront cédés par la Turquie aux États alliés, à l'exception de l'Albanie, dont la délimitation et le régime seront réservés aux Puissances.

2. Le règlement de la question des îles de la mer Égée sera laissé à la décision des Puissances.

3. La Turquie se désintéressera complètement de la Crète.

4. Les Puissances ne peuvent se montrer favorables à une demande d'indemnité de guerre. Elles admettent les belligérants à prendre part aux discussions de la commission internationale de Paris pour un règlement équitable de la participation des États alliés à la dette ottomane et aux charges financières des territoires qui leur seront attribués.

5. Dès l'acceptation de ces bases préliminaires de paix, les hostilités devront prendre fin.

PALLAVICINI.
GERARD LOWTHER.
M. BOMPARD.
M. GIERS.
WANGENHEIM.
GARRONI.

Constantinople, le 31 *mars*, 1913.

[15502] No. 115.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 64.)

Sir, *Athens, March* 31, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 56 of the 19th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a continuation of the diary of the war, taken from the official bulletins, from the 19th to the 30th instant. It may be hoped that no further continuation of the diary will be called for.

I have, &c.

F. ELLIOT

Enclosure in No. 115.

Diary of War for March 20 *and* 27.

Jannina, March 20.—I have the honour to report that the 8th Division has occupied Tepelen after a few shots from the enemy's batteries against our cavalry. Some guns were captured. The inhabitants received our troops with characteristic enthusiasm.

The Mussulman inhabitants of the villages of Gardiki, Ekklesaki, and Souliatis begged our troops to occupy those villages.

DANGLIS.

Jannina, March 27.—Official telegrams to-day announce the occupation of Phrassari by the Greek troops. The people, who had been exposed to desperate attempts to persuade them to join the Albanian idea, received our troops with exceptional warmth, manifesting their Greek sentiments and all bearing Greeks flags.

[Unsigned.]

[15503] No. 116.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 65.)

Sir, *Athens, March* 31, 1913.

WITH reference to Sir A. Biliotti's despatch enclosed in Sir Gerard Lowther's No. 246 of the 28th instant, I have the honour to state that I received some time ago

similar information as to the intimate connection between the island of Castellorizo and the Turkish mainland from the director of the British School of Archæology, who had visited the island last summer.

I had previously, in informal conversation with M. Venizelos, alluded to Castellorizo as being so remote from any other island, and so close to the shore of Asia Minor, that it would be a mistake for Greece to try to annex it. He appeared inclined to agree, but said that inhabitants were clamouring for annexation. He added jokingly that it would be a good thing if it were annexed to Cyprus. I replied in the same tone that I suppose what he really meant was that Cyprus ought to be annexed to Castellorizo, but he deprecated that interpretation.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[15528] No. 117.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 81.)
Sir, *Rome, April 1, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Ismaïl Kemal Bey has arrived in Rome, having been able to avoid the blockade on board the Duke of Montpensier's yacht the "Mekong," whose previous movements I have already reported, and which seems to have gone to Vallona, whether or not viâ Corfu, which was announced as her destination on leaving Brindisi. He came to see me this afternoon, having made my acquaintance many years ago, and announced that he was on his way to London, calling at Vienna on his way, his object being to protest, on behalf of the Albanians, against what they regarded as the dismemberment of Albania in favour of Servia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria. Ismaïl Kemal had just seen the Marquis di San Giuliano, and appears to have gleaned from him certain indications of the contemplated northern and eastern frontiers. He appeared to have less objection to make to the general lines which had been indicated in the press as likely to be adopted for the regulation of the southern frontier.

I told him that I had little time to listen to his views, as it was my messenger day, and the time left at my disposal was very short.

One point which he mentioned was of some interest, always assuming that he speaks for a considerable number of his countrymen, and that was that they would prefer, if possible, a Prince who was independent of any of the three religions prevailing in Albania—who was, that is to say, neither Orthodox, Catholic, nor Moslem. He maintained that the national idea had now taken such a strong hold on the minds of the Albanians that internal rivalries would now be set aside, and all the various elements were ready to work together for a common end.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[15710] No. 118.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 5.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, April 5, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram, dated the 5th instant, from the Vice-Admiral H.M.S. "King Edward VII," relative to the movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 118.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April 5, 1913.*

REACHED Antivari with French "Edgar-Quinet"; Austrian "Franz Ferdinand," bearing flag of rear-admiral; Italian "Ammiraglio di Saint Bon" and "Francesco Ferrucio"; Austrian "Radetzky," "Zrinyi," a cruisor of "Aspern" class, and three destroyers; and German "Breslau." All these ships are at anchor 8 miles off Antivari. Join me this forenoon when I hold a conference.

[15613] No. 119.

Note communicated by M. Cambon, April 5, 1913.

GOUVERNEMENT allemand: Le Baron de Lancken, conseiller de l'Ambassade Impériale, et M. Pritsch, délégué allemand à la Dette ottomane, auxquels seront adjoints MM. de Schwabach et Helferich.

Gouvernement russe: MM. Raffalovitch, oncle et neveu.

Gouvernement austro-hongrois: M. de Janko, délégué austro-hongrois à la Dette, et M. d'Adler.

Gouvernement français: M. Gout, Ministre plénipotentiaire, sous-directeur au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères; M. Luquet, directeur du Mouvement général des Fonds au Ministère des Finances; M. de la Boulinière, délégué français à la Dette ottomane, et M. Sergent, sous-gouverneur de la Banque de France.

Les Gouvernements britannique et italien n'ont pas encore désigné de représentants.

Légation de France, Londres,
le 5 avril, 1913.

[15725] No. 120.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Belgrade, April 5, 1913.*

FOLLOWING is text of reply to Powers concerning basis for peace negotiations:—

"Les États alliés expriment leur reconnaissance aux Grandes Puissances pour leurs efforts à amener la conclusion de la paix et, désirant sincèrement leur faciliter la tâche, acceptent leurs conditions pour la médiation sous les réserves suivantes:

"1. Lors de la fixation définitive de la frontière en Thrace, la ligne indiquée dans les conditions formulées par les Puissances sera prise comme base et non comme ligne définitive.

"2. Les îles de la mer Égée seront cédées par la Turquie aux alliés.

"3. Les alliés estiment qu'ils doivent connaître au préalable les frontières projetées de l'Albanie, espérant qu'elles seront conformes à celles qu'ils ont proposées à Londres.

"4. La demande d'une indemnité de guerre doit être acceptée en principe, en laissant le soin d'en fixer le montant à la commission qui étudiera les questions financières, commission dans laquelle les États alliés seront représentés.

"5. Les États alliés acceptent que les opérations de guerre cesse dès que les conditions ci-dessus exposées seront favorablement accueillies et admises."

[15692] No. 121.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, April 5, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 42 of 30th March.

I asked the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs as a personal suggestion whether the Greek Government would be prepared not to fortify the coast of Epirus if they were allowed to keep it. He replied certainly, and added that they would make the same engagement with regard to the Ægean islands.

[15722] No. 122.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, April 5, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 44 of 2nd April.

Reply of the allies to the collective note was delivered to the six representatives by Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs as follows :—

[Here follows French text of reply as telegraphed *en clair* by Sir H. Bax-Ironside and Sir R. Paget : see No. 120.

[15733] No. 123.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, April 5, 1913.*

IT is reported to the Montenegrin Government from Antivari that the following ships of war have arrived and are lying in a semi-circle round the harbour : Two Italian, three Austrian, one German, one British, and one French.

[15734 No. 124.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, April 5, 1913.*

BRITISH vice-admiral informs me that an international squadron is off Antivari.

[15717 No. 125.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 183.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, April 5, 1913.*

MY telegraphic communication with Smyrna being cut off, I have no absolutely reliable news, but my information points to the fact that there has been some trouble there lately, and it would perhaps be desirable to send a ship there, perhaps "Yarmouth" from Salonica.

[15754 No. 126.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 184.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, April 5, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 166 of 4th April.

Point 1. Our present naval landing force here is larger than in November last before the armistice, and ought consequently to be ample for the protection of the Embassy and the Pera zone as then contemplated. As far as an analogy lies with Adrianople, where there was street fighting, danger to foreigners ought not to be great.

Such danger would come not from the ordinary Moslem population, who are already manifesting symptoms of alarm and of wish to seek protection with Christians (as in 1877 when the Russians approached the capital), but from the Jacobin element in the Committee, which, if given time, might resort to desperate methods of arson and disorder, and might endeavour to provoke an explosion of fanaticism among the low-class Moslems directed against Christian native element.

Point 2. If the Bulgarians force the Chatalja lines, and enter not only Pera quarter, but even Stamboul, there is no likelihood that the native Christians or Bulgarian troops would violate mosques or sacred places.

As regards even mosque of St. Sophia, in which there might be a desire to hold a Christian service, it would appear to me that, canonically, it would require forty days' previous purification. Here, again, danger might come from extreme Committee element, who might attempt to destroy edifice for fear of its falling into Christian hands.

In the scheme of last November it was arranged that some of the foreign ships should lie off Stamboul with the object of affording protection to native Christian elements there and as a deterrent to disorderly tendencies. This would constitute protection of law-abiding Moslem elements, mosques, &c. As regards relics, they would probably be taken away by the departing Court and Government. Much would depend on length of interval between forcing of Chatalja line, disappearance of Turkish authority, and the arrival of Bulgarians. Latter would presumably endeavour to arive quickly and thus minimise danger of disorder. When the serious invasion occurs the Committee may, as in November last, disseminate in Europe highly-coloured accounts of horrors in hope of disturbing the public mind in Europe, bringing about some European intervention and thus perhaps internationalising the situation, as opposed to direct settlement with the Balkan allies.

In the event of Bulgarians entering Constantinople, Moslems in Asia Minor, and especially in the western portion, whose minds have been poisoned by exaggerated tales of Macedonian atrocities, might attempt massacres of the Christian element there, so that presence of a ship or two at Smyrna would seem desirable.

[15728] No. 127.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 123.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Sophia, April 5, 1913.*

MEDIATION proposals.

Following is text of reply of allies :—

"Les Etats alliés expriment leur reconnaissance aux Grandes Puissances pour leurs efforts à amener la conclusion de la paix et, désirant sincèrement leur faciliter leur tâche, acceptent leurs conditions pour la médiation sous les réserves suivantes :

"1. Lors de la fixation définitive de la frontière en Thrace, la ligne indiquée dans les conditions formulées par les Puissances sera prise comme base et non comme ligne définitive.

"2. Les îles de la mer Egée seront cédées par la Turquie aux alliés.

"3. Les alliés estiment qu'ils doivent connaître au préalable les frontières projetées de l'Albanie, espérant qu'elles seront conformes à celles qu'ils ont proposées à Londres.

"4. La demande d'une indemnité de guerre doit être acceptée en principe, en laissant le soin d'en fixer le montant à la commission qui étudiera les questions financières, commission dans laquelle les Etats alliés seront représentés.

"5. Les Etats alliés acceptent que les opérations de guerre cessent dès que les conditions ci-dessus exposées auront été favorablement accueillies et admises.

"*Sophia, le 23 mars (5 avril)*, 1913."

[15729] No. 128.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 124.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, April 5, 1913*

ROUMANIA.

Bucharest telegram No. 63 of 4th April.

Prime Minister informs me that Bulgarian Government have not sent reinforcements either to Shoumla or Varna, and that General Ivanof has not gone to Rustchuk, but is residing at Philippopoli with his family on leave. This latter statement I have been able to verify from other sources. Prime Minister added that he knew nothing of troops being sent to Rustchuk or of new guns being mounted at the fort mentioned.

General movement of troops from Adrianople is south, although some of the war-worn soldiers have been allowed to go home.

Policy of the Bulgarian Government as regards Roumania continues to be as reported in my telegram No. 67.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

[15730] No. 129.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 125.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, April 5, 1913.*

MEDIATION proposals.

In concert with my colleagues I carried out to-day instructions contained in your telegram No. 86 of 31st March.

Prime Minister asked me to thank you, and said that he considered this new step as a considerable advance in the direction of peace. Bulgarian Government would, however, wish frontier to be as follows: Media–Sarai–Mourtli station, south of Airabol, between Keshan and Malgara, following watershed to the Ægean Sea to the east of Enos.

Prime Minister will give an official reply after consultation with other allies.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[15745] No. 130.

Consul Samson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Adrianople, April 5, 1913.*

ORDER completely restored here. British committees distributing relief to civil population and prisoners. Forwarding despatch by messenger shortly.

[15649] No. 131.

Vice-Consul Young to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(Telegraphic) *Philippopoli, April 5, 1913.*

YOUR telegram of 3rd April.

Contents shall be communicated to His Majesty's consul at Adrianople immediately.

I have returned from a second visit to Adrianople, taking sixteen tons of supplies from here. There are about 30,000 Turkish prisoners at present penned in the open like sheep, without [group undecypherable] or any other protection; there is great suffering, rain, cold, wind; cholera appeared and is likely to spread. Bulgarian authorities are not necessarily to blame for this at present, provided that conditions described are not permitted to continue longer than the impossibility of finding other accommodation renders unavoidable. Meanwhile, practical evidence of British sympathy might be given without offence to Bulgarian susceptibilities by generous

subscription to benefit of the Turks, and should have effect of inducing the Government to improve conditions sooner than would otherwise be the case.

I would suggest that as much as you may think fit of the above be confidentially communicated to Amir Ali and others likely to help in India, Egypt, or elsewhere. Condition of Moslem prisoners in Bulgaria is in most cases deplorable.

[15467] No. 132.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 300.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 5, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 136 of 4th April: Roumanian-Bulgarian frontier.

You should give your support to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and may accept any settlement that satisfies him.

[16107] No. 133.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 304.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 5, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 150 of 5th April to Sir F. Bertie.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[16107] No. 134.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 150.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 5, 1913.*

FOLLOWING has been communicated to me by Austro-Hungarian Ambassador:—

The naval officers in command should agree to make a notification to the Montenegrin Government, stating that the presence of the international squadron in Montenegrin waters is for the purpose of giving effect to the decision of the Ambassadors arrived at on 22nd March, owing to the refusal of Montenegro to yield to the collective *démarche* of the Powers. In case Montenegro does not yield within a limited period, say of twenty-four hours, to be fixed by the naval officers in command, the latter should proceed to the blockade of the Montenegrin coast and of the Turkish coasts in Servian and Montenegrin occupation. The line of the proposed blockade should run from Spizza to latitude 41° 15′ north. The decision to blockade should be taken by the naval commanders and notified to the Montenegrin and Servian harbour authorities. The Austrian Government would be grateful if similar instructions could be sent to the officer commanding the British contingent.

Twenty-four hours' delay seems to me to be too short, and I would suggest three days. The rest of the instructions appear to me acceptable, but please ascertain as soon as possible views of Minister for Foreign Affairs so that French and British commanders may be furnished with identic instructions.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 303.)

[14961] No. 135.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 167.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, April 5, 1913.*

YOUR despatch No. 247 of 28th March: Apprehended seizure of pilot boat at Smyrna.

What is nationality of boat? Is it the only one plying in Gulf of Smyrna, or are there others which ply for hire? In the latter case how many?

[15353] No. 136.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 233.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 5, 1913.*

I HAVE to request your Excellency to inform the French Government unofficially that Sir Paul Harvey has been designated to represent His Majesty's Government on the forthcoming international commission in Paris to effect the settlement of the financial questions arising out of the present war.

Your Excellency should also, if possible, ascertain how other Powers will be represented, whether there will be more than one representative for each Power, what rank the representatives will hold, and what is to be the official title of the commission.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[16107] No. 137.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 5, 1913.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to state, for the information of the Lords Commissioners, that the Austrian Ambassador to-day communicated the instructions sent to the rear-admiral commanding the Austrian squadron at Antivari.

The instructions are to the following effect:

The naval officers in command should agree to make a notification to the Montenegrin Government, stating that the presence of the international squadron in Montenegrin waters is for the purpose of giving effect to the decision of the Ambassadors arrived at on the 22nd March, copy of which I am to enclose herewith for convenience of reference, owing to the refusal of Montenegro to yield to the collective *démarche* of the Powers. In case Montenegro does not yield within a limited period, say of twenty-four hours, to be fixed by the naval officers in command, the latter should proceed to the blockade of the Montenegrin coast and of the Turkish coasts in Servian and Montenegrin occupation. The line of the proposed blockade should run from Spizza to 41° 15′ north latitude. The decision to blockade should be taken by the naval commanders and notified to the Montenegrin and Servian harbour authorities. The Austrian Government would be grateful if similar instructions could be sent to the officer commanding the British contingent.

The French Ambassador also communicated the instructions sent to the commanding officer of the "Edgar Quinet." These are as follows:—

"This demonstration consists solely in the presence of a naval force off the Montenegrin coast; it therefore excludes all coercive measures such as disembarkation, seizure, or bombardment."

Sir E. Grey is consulting with the French Government concerning the instructions to be sent to the British and French naval officers in order that these may be of an identic nature. The tenour of the instructions concerted will be communicated to your Department later for the information of the Lords Commissioners, so that the necessary instructions may be sent to the British vice-admiral.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[16116] No. 138.

M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, April 6.)

(Télégraphique.) *Saint-Pétersbourg, le 3 avril, 1913.*

DANS notre réponse à l'aide-mémoire de l'Ambassadeur britannique nous nous référons à notre communication officielle à la presse, ayant pour but de préciser l'attitude du Gouvernement Impérial et faciliter à la France sa participation à la démonstration navale.

Nous voudrions attirer l'attention du Gouvernement britannique sur notre situation extrêmement délicate devant notre opinion publique et le danger d'explosion violente de sympathies, d'ailleurs naturelles, du public russe pour le Monténégro.

Appréciant hautement les services rendus par le Gouvernement britannique, nous espérons que, au moment où la paix semble plus rapprochée, Sir Edward Grey ne voudra pas refuser son concours à l'œuvre à laquelle il a su présider avec tant de mérite, en s'attirant la gratitude et le respect de toutes les Grandes Puissances. Nous espérons aussi que la France ne s'abstiendra plus de participer à la démonstration.

[15721] No. 139.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 137.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, April 5, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 299 of 4th April.

I gave your message. Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs begged me to say how grateful he was for all that you had done to bring about international naval demonstration. It had relieved his mind of a great anxiety. On my remarking that our difficulties were but beginning, as King Nicholas was not likely to yield unless recourse was had to more drastic measures, his Excellency said that all he asked was that England and France would not leave Austria to act alone, as so long as they were associated with her in whatever measures it might eventually be necessary to take, it was possible to explain them here.

I trust that his Excellency is right in thinking that he will be able to do so, but public opinion is in a very excitable state, and may get out of hand if military action is resorted to.

I asked what truth there was in the story that Montenegro had just received a supply of Russian arms and ammunition. His Excellency said that they were given as a present when King Nicholas was here in the spring of last year, and that, as when the war broke out they could not pass the Dardanelles, the King had sent an agent to bring them overland to Salonica. This had been done months ago, but they had only now been dispatched from that port.

(Very Confidential.)

M. Sazonof apprehends an attack on the Chatalja lines by the Bulgarian army. In the event of the latter occupying Constantinople I asked his Excellency what action should, in his opinion, be taken by the Powers. He replied to me in confidence that Russian fleet would be despatched thither.

[15735] No. 140.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 46.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, April 5, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 27 of 22nd March: Mediation.

Montenegrin Government have answered in the same terms as the other allies. I am sending, by post, text, but will not telegraph it unless you instruct me to do so.

[15736] No. 141.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 47.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, April 5, 1913.*

IT has been settled that Servian General Boiovitch is to be in supreme command of the combined operations against Scutari. General has stated here that the forces at his disposal at the present moment are insufficient, and that he must await arrival of sixteen transports which are on the way before commencing attack. If, therefore,

San Giovanni di Medua is blockaded before they arrive operations against Scutari will be impeded.

I learn confidentially that the Emperor of Russia has telegraphed direct to the King to urge him to yield to the unanimous decision of the Powers. The King has refused. There is no sign so far of any coming to reason.

[15737] No. 112.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 48.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, April 5, 1913.*

NAVAL demonstration.

Vice-admiral has repeated to me telegram which he states he has addressed to Montenegrin Government. I presume that the text is based on instructions from you, and that it is unnecessary for me to repeat it to you. At his request, I have communicated telegram to the representatives of the Powers.

[15742] No. 113.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, April 6, 1913.*

I COULD not obtain an interview with French Minister for Foreign Affairs until this evening, as he was absent from Paris. He is telegraphing to French Ambassador a reply to your telegram No. 150 of yesterday evening, of which I sent a memorandum to Ministry for Foreign Affairs this morning, to the following effect:—

French Government, being most anxious to act in co-operation with His Majesty's Government, accept the Austrian proposal on the following conditions:—

1. There shall be, as proposed by you, three days' notice of blockade, but as to the length of notice French Minister for Foreign Affairs will not be "intransigeant."

2. Blockade shall be pacific, that is to say, vessels that attempt to break it shall be arrested, but neither sunk nor confiscated.

3. Blockade shall be established on coast comprised between Antivari and mouth of River Drin.

[15755] No. 114.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, April 6, 1913.*

I TOLD Prime Minister yesterday that I feared that the reply of the allies respecting the conditions of peace would not please the Powers.

With regard to islands, he said that to admit a doubt as to Greek tenure of those already occupied would be to weaken arguments of those, who like His Majesty's Government, supported the Greek claim.

With regard to Southern Albanian frontier, he said that, since the Powers professed to be guided by the principle of nationalities, the methods of a plébiscite was the only fair one.

If that were rejected, Greece would hold what she had won, and he did not think that public opinion in Italy would allow Italian Government to eject her by force. If the Italian objection was based on strategical grounds he thought that it would be met by an undertaking not to fortify coast.

With regard to war indemnity, he said, that although allies would have been content to waive it at Conference of London, they could not do so now that they had been put to three months' unnecessary loss and expense by the obstinacy of Turkey, which after all remained richer than the allies. Moreover, amount of indemnity was left for discussion in the commission at Paris.

[15756] No. 115.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 48. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Athens, April 6, 1913.*

THE attitude of Montenegro and Servia is a cause of great embarrassment to M. Venizelos. On the one hand the terms of the alliance are binding upon him, and if they ask for help he cannot refuse it. On the other hand, he is aware that there is no use in their setting themselves against the will of the Great Powers in the matter of Scutari, and he has done all he could to convince them of the expediency of conforming to it. He sees clearly that if a general conflagration were to break out it would be the small Powers who would "payer les pots cassés." It would therefore actually be a relief to him to be told by His Majesty's Government that if Greek ships transported Servian troops to the Albanian coast His Majesty's ships would stop them. Nothing more than the mere intimation would be required. It was not necessary that all the Great Powers should join in making it; indeed, my impression is that it would be more palatable to him if it came from England alone. Of course, it must not become known that the suggestion was his.

[15723] No. 146.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 49.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, April 6, 1913.*

BELGRADE telegram No. 77 of 2nd April.

In view of my conversation with Prime Minister yesterday I do not believe in conspiracy of Servia and Greece respecting Albania. It is more probable that any understanding between them is directed against Bulgaria. Greek troops are being sent rapidly back to Salonica. Prime Minister, however, persists in considering the maintenance of the Balkan alliance intact.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

[15856] No. 147.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 81.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair. Belgrade, April 6, 1913.*

FOLLOWING is text of official reply of Servian Government to representations concerning Scutari and evacuation of Albania handed to me this morning:—

"La paix avec la Turquie n'étant pas encore conclue et les troupes ottomanes se trouvant en état de guerre avec celles des États alliés, le Gouvernement Royal ne peut retirer ses troupes du siège de Scutari que lorsque ce fort sera pris ou la paix avec la Turquie sera conclue. Toutefois, le Gouvernement Royal maintient sa déclaration antérieurement faite aux Puissances par rapport à l'évacuation des régions abandonnées à l'Albanie après la conclusion de la paix. En tout cas, pour être en mesure d'effectuer sa déclaration, le Gouvernement Royal aura besoin de connaître au préalable les frontières projetées de l'Albanie, lesquelles, le Gouvernement Royal se plaît de croire, seront conformes à celles que les alliés ont proposées à Londres. En ce qui concerne les mesures à prendre afin d'assurer la protection des populations catholiques, musulmanes et albanaises, le Gouvernement Royal ne saurait admettre l'ingerence étrangère dans les affaires intérieures du pays, ce qui constituerait une atteinte à sa souveraineté, d'autant plus que la constitution et les lois du royaume garantissent efficacement la liberté des cultes la plus large."

[15726] No. 148.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 82.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, April 6, 1913.*

I HEAR that Bulgarian Government are endeavouring to prevail on Servian Government to agree to an immediate cessation of hostilities, and with a view to this have suggested to the Greek Government to declare that, owing to blockade by the Powers, they are unable to transport any more Servian troops for Scutari. Servians could then state to Montenegro their opinion that they have not sufficient troops at Scutari to attack.

Bulgarian Minister told me that Servian Prime Minister appeared prepared to entertain suggestion, but latter's word is not to be depended on.

(Repeated to Athens.)

[15727] No. 149.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 83.
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, April 6, 1913.*

FOLLOWING received to-day from Salonica :—

"Nine transports loaded with Servian troops and artillery now ready to sail."

[15731] No. 150.

Sir H. Rax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 126.)
(Telegraphic.) *Dwcode. Sophia, April 6, 1913.*

BRITISH consul at Adrianople has been requested by inspector of Ottoman Public Debt, Dedeagatch, to undertake protection of that department at Adrianople.

British consul requests instructions.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 170.)

[15732] No. 151.

Sir H. Rax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 127. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, April 6, 1913.*

MEDIATION proposals.

Prime Minister told me that he was strongly in favour of cessation of hostilities, but feared that a second armistice concluded by Bulgaria apart from Greece might give renewed offence to Greek Government, whose demand for the islands was still to be dealt with. He would welcome any suggestion for meeting this difficulty. He spoke to French Minister in the same sense.

In view of his Excellency's apprehension it might be advisable to press Greek Government to give prompt consent to affirmative—Bulgarian reply to *démarche*, about which they are being consulted (see my telegram No. 125 of 5th April.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[15757] No. 152.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 64.
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, April 6, 1913.*

My despatch No. 55, first paragraph.

I gather, in conversation with Secretary-General yesterday, that the impression still prevails at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that Great Britain is hostile to

Roumania's claims, and that it is thought of the *Entente* Powers Russia is the least and Great Britain is the most unfavourably disposed.

Secretary-General said that if Roumania, at the Congress of Berlin, had not incurred Russia's indignation by her opposition to cession of Bessarabia, she would have been able to obtain much more territory than she is now asking for, and it would be therefore only fair that Great Britain, whose attitude until her arrangement with Russia of May 1878 had been one of encouragement, and whose encouragement was partly responsible for Roumania's opposition to Russia which had had such unimportant results, should be now favourable to Roumania in the matter of Silistria.

[15718] No. 153.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 185.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, April 6, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 167 of 5th April.

From report from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna, Turkish alarm appears to have been groundless and founded on misapprehension.

Report by post.

[15746] No. 154.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) *Salonica, April 6, 1913.*

GREEK 4th division arrived in eleven transports.

[15747] No. 155.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Salonica, April 6, 1913.*

NINE transports loaded with Servian troops and artillery now ready to sail.

[15751] No. 156.

Consul Samson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(Telegraphic.) *Adrianople, April 6, 1913.*

CAN you arrange fund subscribed Indian newspaper "Comrade" for assistance Moslem war sufferers be placed my disposal Ottoman Bank here?

[15794] No. 157.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 106.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, April 1, 1913.*

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 128 of yesterday's date, the first meeting of the Ambassadors charged with the duty of mediating in the difference that has arisen between Roumania and Bulgaria was held yesterday afternoon at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, under the presidency of M. Sazonof.

His Excellency, in opening the proceedings, said a few words in regard to the matter in dispute, and dwelt on the importance of our arriving at an equitable decision that would leave no feeling of bitterness behind it. He then invited the German Ambassador, as the senior Ambassador present, to state his views on the subject.

Count Pourtalès commenced by referring to the attitude of reserve observed by Roumania, in conformity with the advice tendered her by the Powers and in con-

sequence of the assurances which she had received that there was to be no change in the territorial *status quo*. The Powers, however, had not found it possible to give effect to these assurances, and the Balkan States were about to acquire a large accession of territory. Unless, therefore, some compensation were accorded her, Roumania would be punished for having followed the counsels of Europe. His Excellency then proceeded to speak of the strategical importance of the line Silistria Baltchik for the defence of the Dobroudja, and attempted to prove that, strategically speaking, Silistria was of far greater importance to Roumania than to Bulgaria, more especially as it was situated at the only point where it was possible to construct a bridge across the Danube.

M. Sazonof then called on me, as next in the order of seniority; and I have the honour to enclose a copy of the statement that I had prepared, which corresponds almost textually with what I actually said. It had been my original intention to argue that while Roumania's claim to Silistria could not be entertained, she ought, in view of Bulgaria's aggrandisement, to be given a good strategic frontier that would secure her against the possibility of attack. M. Sazonof, however, to whom I mentioned this, begged me only to speak of "un avantage stratégique," and not of "une frontière stratégique." His Excellency explained that though the Bulgarians had declined to say so officially, he had reason to believe that they were prepared to cede Silistria, provided that they had not to cede anything else, and provided that they received a money indemnity for the town. It was, therefore, necessary not to commit ourselves to the cession of any portion of the Black Sea littoral, or even of the two triangles. At first his Excellency was also anxious that we should not take up an attitude about Silistria which would make our eventual abandonment of it appear a victory for the Triple Alliance. I pointed out, however, that unless we stood out in the first instance for Silistria we should have nothing to bargain with when the time came for insisting on the [illegible] Bulgarians to the two islands and [illegible] slice of territory on the coast. His Excellency eventually agreed; and the stand that we are now making for Silistria has only for its object the attainment of this latter end.

The Austrian Ambassador, who followed me in the discussion, repeated many of the arguments already advanced by Count Pourtalès. He contended that it would be [illegible] for us to make Bulgaria accept the cession of Silistria than to induce Roumania to renounce this long cherished aspiration. The present Dobroudja frontier was very weak [illegible] Silistria was the key [illegible] held in Roumania if the Bulgaria of 1878 had had the same dimensions as that kingdom will have when the war is concluded. While Silistria was of great importance to Roumania for defensive purposes, more especially for the protection of the future bridge over the Danube, it would only be a weapon of offence in the hands of the Bulgarians. The cession of the fort of Medjidieh Tabia, promised by the Bulgarians, would, moreover, enclose the town in Roumanian territory and lead to endless friction. Nor must it be forgotten that the Balkan allies would never have been able to bring the war to a successful termination had it not been for the neutrality of Roumania; and the latter could have at any moment imposed her own terms on Bulgaria. He quite agreed that it was necessary to find an equitable settlement that would be acceptable to both of the interested parties, and the Bulgarian Government might be indemnified for the expenditure which it had incurred in the development of the town of Silistria. It might also, he thought, be possible to find some compensation elsewhere that would reconcile Bulgaria to the loss of Silistria. Count Thurn then proceeded to speak of the danger of an acute conflict arising between Greece and Bulgaria on the subject of Salonica. From the language held to him by M. Danef, the Bulgarians seemed determined to have recourse to force should the Greeks refuse to evacuate that town, and the danger of such a conflict might be averted were the Powers to let it be known that Bulgaria was to be compensated for the loss of Silistria by the promise of Salonica.

The Italian Ambassador, who spoke next, said that Silistria ought to be ceded in the interests of peace, as its position as a Bulgarian town, almost entirely surrounded by Roumanian territory, would be impossible and occasion endless frontier incidents. He would not, he added, repeat all the arguments already used by his German and Austrian colleagues, but would merely say that, in his opinion, some compensation ought to be given to Bulgaria for ceding Silistria, and the only question was where to find it.

The French Ambassador followed. He could not, he said, share the views expressed by Count Thurn on the subject of [illegible] far from averting a conflict, the cession of Salonica to Bulgaria would but add a Greco-Bulgarian quarrel to the existing Roumano-Bulgarian one. We had, moreover, no mandate to discuss the question of Salonica, nor could we occupy ourselves by searching for compensation

outside the limits of the question on which we were called to mediate. The Treaty of Berlin, his Excellency then proceeded to say, had received the signatures of all the Powers, and possessed all the force of an international treaty. The Roumanians, however, regarded the frontier laid down as still open to question. Silistria was, in their eyes, a symbol of the injustice of Europe towards them and of Bulgarian menace, and they had never abandoned the hope of redressing both these wrongs. The *pourparlers* that had taken place between the two Governments offered useful indications of a possible settlement. The Roumanians wished to remain friends with the Bulgarians, but the insecurity of their frontier made them uneasy now that Bulgaria was about to be aggrandised. The Roumanians, he thought, were entitled to ask for strategical guarantees, and were these once granted we should be able to watch the future march of events with unconcern. The Bulgarians, on their side, also wished to see the ties of friendship with their Roumanian neighbours strengthened, but the idea of a rectification of the frontier was distasteful to them as likely to disturb, rather than to consolidate, their good relations. They would not, however, refuse to make some sacrifice of frontier, however painful it might be to them. It must not, however, be such as would leave a sting behind it. What, then, was this sacrifice to be? That was the question which we had to decide. In approaching it we must be mindful of the future. We must not sow the seeds of future discord, but endeavour to find a sound and lasting settlement.

M. Sazonof then proceeded to sum up. We must, he said, consider the question in its strategical aspects, as, so far as right or law was concerned, Roumania's claim was nil. Materially speaking, Silistria might not be of any great value to Bulgaria, but it possessed sentimental and historical associations which it would be a mistake to underestimate. It was the first episcopal see of the Bulgarian Church in the eighth or ninth century, and the Bishop of Silistria still ranked first in the Bulgarian hierarchy. As regards the question of compensation raised by the Austrian Ambassador, our competence to deal with it was more than doubtful. Europe had decided that the division of the spoils was a question for the belligerents to settle between themselves, and unless they appealed to our good offices we could only touch on it in very general terms. If there was to be compensation, it must not in any case be of a kind that would leave a sore behind it. This would, however, be the case were effect to be given to Count Thurn's suggestion. The situation that would then be created would, in fact, be far more dangerous than the present one. Greece was determined to keep Salonica. She had won it by the sword and it had been consecrated, in her eyes, with the blood of her King. There were, moreover, geographical and ethnographical reasons which made its possession of great importance to her. Finally, his Excellency hinted that if there was to be compensation, it must be in some other direction and at Turkey's expense.

A long discussion followed which led to no practical results. The Austrian and German Ambassadors continued to support Roumania's full claim, while no one on our side put forward any definite proposal. In the course of this discussion Count Thurn attempted to show, from books published in the Bulgarian military schools, that there was a real danger of Bulgaria one day attempting to seize the Dobroudja. To this, M. Sazonof replied that he could also produce Roumanian books which might likewise be cited as evidence of Roumania's designs on the Quadrilateral; but no attention, he maintained, need be paid to publications of this kind. Bulgaria, moreover, had given proof of her pacific intentions by offering to cede Medjidieh Tabia, by authorising Roumania to erect whatever fortifications she chose on her side of the frontier, and by engaging, under the guarantee of Russia, to abstain altogether from fortifying her own side.

The only point virtually decided was that relative to the concessions already offered by Bulgaria; it being generally agreed that while they could not be regarded as having any binding force, they were useful indications of what Bulgaria might concede.

In reply to a question from M. Delcasse, who enquired whether there was not any of the Roumanian pretensions that the Austrian Ambassador would be prepared to drop, Count Thurn said that he would have to consult his Government; and on his proposal the meeting was adjourned till Friday next, the 4th instant.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

P.S.—Since writing the above I have received the accompanying copies of the protocol of the sitting that has been drawn up by the French Ambassador. M. Delcasse had told me that he proposed restricting this protocol to the shortest possible limits, so I should not have troubled you with so long a report of our proceedings.

I notice that M. Delcassé represents the Italian Ambassador as having specified Salonia as a suitable compensation for Bulgaria, in return for the cession of Silistria. My own impression was that the Marquis Carlotti had only spoken of compensation in general terms.

G. W. B.

Enclosure 1 in No. 157.

Statement prepared by Sir G. Buchanan for the First Meeting of Ambassadors.

EN manifestant à prendre part à cette réunion mon Gouvernement n'est animé que par le désir de collaborer avec les autres Puissances dans le but de trouver une solution qui écartera tout danger de désaccord et conflit éventuel entre la Bulgarie et la Roumanie. Il ne m'a donc pas été donné d'aborder la question avec un désintéressement complet, dans l'espoir que nous puissions arriver à une décision qui rallierait toutes nos voix.

Du reste je désire vous le dire en toute franchise, dans le mémoire du Gouvernement roumain. Ce mémoire garde des raisons qui ont motivé la décision des Puissances en 1878 ainsi que du vœu exprimé par M. Waddington qu'il soit accordé à la Roumanie une extension de territoire qui comprendrait Silistrie. M. Waddington, il est vrai, a parlé dans ce sens et les plénipotentiaires russes, pour donner suite au vœu ainsi exprimé, ont proposé de prolonger la frontière le long du Danube dans la direction de Silistrie et d'y comprendre Mangalia. Cette concession a contenté tout le monde. M. Waddington en a remercié le Comte Schouvalof et la ligne frontière a été consentie à l'unanimité.

Mais, dit le mémoire, si la Bulgarie de 1878 avait eu les mêmes dimensions qu'aura la Bulgarie de demain les Puissances eussent certainement donné plus de territoire à la Roumanie. A cela je répondrais que la situation d'aujourd'hui est tout à fait autre que celle où la Bulgarie se trouvait en Europe en 1878. Quelque soient les territoires dont la Russie a voulu la doter par le Traité de San-Stefano. Ce n'est pas grâce à l'intervention d'une des Grandes Puissances, mais par le droit de conquête et au prix d'énormes sacrifices qu'elle vient d'acquérir une grande partie de la Thrace et de la Macédoine, et cela met les choses sur un tout autre pied. En outre, l'intention des Puissances au Congrès de Berlin était de fixer la frontière roumano-bulgare définitivement, même pour le cas où la Grande-Bulgarie du Traité de San-Stefano se réaliserait un jour. La Roumanie n'étant pas limitrophe de la Turquie, il n'est pas possible de l'associer à la revision de répartition des territoires ottomans, et c'est seulement aux dépens de la Bulgarie qu'elle peut espérer trouver une compensation territoriale. Il n'y a cependant aucun principe de droit international qui autorise un Etat à demander une cession de territoire à un Etat voisin à cause de l'agrandissement de ce dernier. Le seul principe qu'on peut invoquer en pareil cas c'est : la force prime le droit. La Roumanie pour le moment se trouve peut-être en état d'exercer le droit du plus fort, et le fait qu'elle n'accepte la médiation des Puissances mérite sans doute notre reconnaissance.

Le mémoire roumain aussi fait observer que tout ce qui a été convenu entre les délégués de deux Etats est acquis et que le différend roumano-bulgare se réduit aux points sur lesquels les délégués respectifs ne sont pas tombés d'accord.

Je ne saurais jamais admettre la force de ce raisonnement. La Bulgarie s'est déclarée prête à faire certaines concessions, à la condition expresse que la Roumanie les acceptera nécessairement comme règlement définitif de la question en litige. La Roumanie a refusé et en raison de ce refus les concessions promises conditionnellement sont devenues nulles et non avenues. Lorsqu'un différend surgit entre particuliers il arrive parfois que l'un d'eux propose un arrangement à l'amiable et se déclare disposé à payer à l'autre une somme ronde en liquidation de tous ses droits et prétentions. Si cette proposition n'était faite que sous réserve que le tribunal compétent, et il existe toujours de recours en dernière instance, accepterait le marché, nous considérerait qu'il y a là une offre positivement. Nous ne pouvons donc pas les par les concessions faites par la Bulgarie que sous réserve expresse, et nous sommes libres à trouver la combinaison qui nous paraîtra la plus propre à assurer des relations de bon voisinage entre les deux Etats à l'avenir.

Il est toujours plus facile pour un pays à renoncer à une aspiration quelconque qu'à céder du territoire national et à mon avis la Roumanie devrait se contenter d'un avantage stratégique qu'on pourrait lui accorder pour garantir sa sécurité. La-

prétention qu'elle a formulée au sujet de Silistrie ne paraît guère basée sur des arguments valables, d'autant que si la forteresse de Medjidie Tabia fût démantelée la ville de Silistrie ne pourrait jamais servir comme base d'attaque contre la Roumanie.

Enclosure 2 in No. 157.

Procès-verbal of First Meeting of Ambassadors, prepared by M. Delcassé.

APRES avoir ouvert les travaux de la conférence, réunie, a-t-il dit, pour faire œuvre de conciliation et de paix, M. Sazonof invite les Ambassadeurs à exposer leurs vues sur le différend roumano-bulgare.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne fait remarquer que la Roumanie est le seul Etat balkanique qui, au début de la crise, a cessé les accords de l'Europe et respecté le statu quo. Les autres Etats, qui ont violé les traités, n'ont recueilli de leur violation que des avantages. Si la Roumanie aujourd'hui, elle se trouve en face de sa déférence aux recommandations de l'Europe.

Le Comte de Pourtalès pense qu'il est nécessaire de bien déterminer, en droit, ce que la Conférence est appelée à faire. Il ne s'agit pas de refaire le Traité de Bucarest. Ce traité a été conclu entre la Bulgarie et la Roumanie. Il a été [illegible] la Bulgarie. C'est [illegible] Roumanie qui [illegible] Bulgarie. [illegible] Roumanie [illegible] Cette [illegible] pour [illegible] la Roumanie ne pourrait [illegible].

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre [illegible] Puissances [illegible] roumaines et bulgares, est avant tout en droit la Bulgarie ne doit rien. Quelles qu'aient pu être les divergences des représentants des Puissances pendant les séances du Congrès de Berlin l'unanimité s'est [illegible] sur [illegible] frontière actuelle a été tracée ; et cette frontière est définitive. La Roumanie veut qu'on la rectifie à son profit, en alléguant les annexions que vont faire les Bulgares. Mais ces annexions la Bulgarie [illegible] se croit en état de les imposer, c'est pratiquer le principe que la force prime le droit. Ce principe, Sir George Buchanan ne le reconnaît pas. Il n'admet pas davantage qu'on tienne pour [illegible] pourparlers de Londres [illegible] que la Roumanie [illegible] concessions [illegible] Ce qu'il importe d'établir, c'est la valeur de la Roumanie doit tirer un avantage d'ordre stratégique. La Bulgarie [illegible] des Ambassadeurs à la question [illegible] Enfin, la Roumanie devra [illegible]

L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche déclare que [illegible] conclusions différentes de celles de l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre. Envisageant la question du point de vue pratique, il estime qu'on [illegible] la plus large possible à la Roumanie, [illegible] règlement amiable. L'opinion publique est telle en Roumanie [illegible] que le Roumanie [illegible] sera plus facile à la Bulgarie de céder. Si elle [illegible] pour la Roumanie [illegible] Enfin, la Roumanie devra [illegible] sance. Quant aux Bulgares, on pourrait trouver pour eux une compensation sur un autre terrain, et Salonique pourrait leur être donnée sans risque d'un démêlé avec les Grecs.

L'Ambassadeur d'Italie [illegible] que l'Albanie [illegible] que [illegible] de Silistrie à la Roumanie [illegible] Bulgarie [illegible] d'un compte [illegible] Roumanie et Bulgarie. [illegible] sans [illegible] Roumanie [illegible]

L'Ambassadeur [illegible] Turquie [illegible] que la conférence ne saurait dépasser Salonique ; son mandat est limité à l'examen du litige entre Roumains et Bulgares. D'ailleurs, donner Salonique aux Bulgares [illegible] de la [illegible] ce qui n'avancerait pas le rétablissement de la paix dans les Balkans.

Ce que retient l'Ambassadeur de France de la lecture des [illegible] Bulgarie [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

reclame, dans ne soit pas tel qu'il fasse à l'âme bulgare une blessure qui serait bien lente à s'effacer.

Nous avons donc à déterminer la mesure du sacrifice bulgare. Dans cet examen doit dominer le souci de ne jeter à terre, de tout ce que comporte cette Roumanie et Bulgares des germes redoutables de discorde, mais, au contraire, de multiplier entre eux les raisons de confiance et d'amitié réciproque et, par là, de contribuer à créer dans les Balkans un état de choses stable dont profitera grandement la cause de la paix [illegible].

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères considère, comme l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, que la Roumanie ne peut à l'appui de ses revendications invoquer valablement ni droits ni titres. Mais on doit examiner ses réclamations au point de vue stratégique. Est-il [illegible] que la Roumanie de [illegible] par [illegible] le côté matériel. Mais il en est autrement du côté moral, de beaucoup le plus important. Il ne faut pas oublier que Silistrie [illegible] et qu'aujourd'hui encore l'évêque de cette ville a la primauté sur les autres prélats du [illegible].

On a parlé de compensations. S'il fallait en venir à des compensations, ne les chercherons pas en tout cas sur le terrain brûlant des alliés. Dès maintenant nous [illegible] Grèce et Serbie [illegible] Roi [illegible] avec les Grecs! D'ailleurs, comme l'a fait observer l'Ambassadeur de France, la conférence n'a [illegible].

En résumé, M. Sazonof croit qu'on doit tenir compte, au point de vue stratégique, [illegible].

L'Ambassadeur de France a rappelé que l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a soutenu les revendications de la Roumanie, en insistant sur Silistrie. Comme on ne peut [illegible] la paix entre Bucarest et Sophia, il demande à l'Ambassadeur quelles sont celles de ces revendications qu'il serait disposé à laisser tomber.

L'Ambassadeur a répondu qu'il ne pouvait les préciser avant d'avoir consulté son [illegible].

Il a été décidé de ne faire jusqu'à nouvel ordre aucune communication.

'15920 No. 158.

[illegible] Note communicated by the [illegible] Government to Sir E. Grey, April 7.

(No. 11.)

Sir, *Cettinje, April 1, 1913.*

ON the afternoon of the 28th March the representatives of the Powers made to the Montenegrin Government [illegible] decision adopted at the meeting in London on the 22nd instant with regard to the agreement arrived at touching the north and north-eastern frontier of Albania. The Montenegrin Government were invited to raise the siege of Scutari, to discontinue hostilities in the territory to be abandoned to Albania, and to evacuate rapidly that territory.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the communication made to the Montenegrin Government and of the reply received from them this morning.

I have, &c.

J. DE SALIS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 158.

Joint Note communicated to the Montenegrin Government, March 28, 1913.

[illegible] frontières nord et nord-est de l'Albanie, ont décidé de le déclarer sans retard au Monténégro et à la Serbie.

En cette qualité, les représentants des Puissances ont l'honneur de communiquer à votre Excellence qu'ils ont reçu l'ordre d'inviter le Gouvernement Royal à—

1. Lever le siège de Scutari.

2. Mettre fin aux hostilités dans les territoires abandonnés à l'Albanie en vertu de l'accord précité.

3. Procéder rapidement à l'évacuation de ces territoires.

Nous avons, en même temps, reçu l'ordre de faire savoir au Gouvernement Royal monténégrin qu'il est indispensable de prendre d'urgence des mesures pour [illegible] protection effective des populations [illegible] les [illegible] territoires [illegible].

Enclosure 2 in No. 158.

Note communicated by the Montenegrin Government, April 1, 1913.

[illegible] Grandes Puissances, le Gouvernement Royal a l'honneur de [illegible].

1. Le Gouvernement Royal, quant à l'accord intervenu entre les Grandes [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

2. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Strong patrols are to be met with everywhere, and all persons entering or leaving the town have to show passports or papers.

One can only connect this increase in the garrison and the closing of the port of Cavalla, reported in my immediately preceding despatch, with the quarrels between Greeks and Bulgarians at Nigrita and elsewhere.

The population of Cavalla is Greek, and has been, perhaps, too indiscreet in its expression of annoyance at the Bulgarian occupation of the town and its desire for the arrival of Greek troops, and it may be that the Bulgarian authorities wish to give the inhabitants a lesson by the display of their force, and at the same time to ensure the town against any surprise attack on the part of their Greek allies.

I have, &c.

JAMES MORGAN.

[15808] No. 160.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7.)

(No. [illegible])

Sir, *Berlin, April 3, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Budget Committee of the Reichstag resumed its sittings to-day, when it dealt with the estimates for the Foreign Office. According to the report of the proceedings issued to the press, the Chancellor sent a message to the President apologising for his absence from the sitting, and stating that he would make a statement in the Reichstag on the foreign situation on the 7th instant.

In reply to an enquiry from Herr Bassermann, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gave information, partly of a confidential nature, in regard to various questions connected with the Balkan war. He began by discussing the origin of the Balkan League. This league, he said, was originally intended to be a union of all the Balkan States, including Turkey, but, as the result of the refusal of the Porte to take part in it, it took definite shape about June 1912 as a union of non-Turkish Balkan States directed against Turkey. The Secretary of State then passed to the question whether the outbreak of the war had taken German and European diplomacy by surprise. As a matter of fact, he said, until a few days before the outbreak of war, there had been much hesitation on the part of the Governments of the Balkan States as to whether they should proceed to extremities or not, and the war had been begun, against the intentions of the other allies, by the premature action of Montenegro. The Secretary of State then discussed the various diplomatic phases of the war, the abandonment of the *status quo* formula, which was superseded by the formula of localisation adopted by all the Powers, and also the development of the Albanian question, on which German diplomacy had always sided with Germany's allies, whilst taking advantage of every opportunity for mediatory intervention. Throughout this question Germany had, he said, remained true to Austria-Hungary, and had also been ready at once, at the desire of her ally, to take part in the naval demonstration on the Montenegrin coast. Nothing could yet be said as to how this affair would further develop in the event of continued obstinacy on the part of Montenegro. The Secretary of State stated in this connection that all the Powers were agreed that Scutari, the largest city inhabited by Albanians, should fall to Albania, after an agreement had been reached in regard to the allocation of Ipek, Prisrend, and Djakova to the Balkan allies.

Details could, he said, not at present be announced as to the course of the negotiations in regard to the Bulgarian-Roumanian arrangement. Germany had in this question endeavoured to further, so far as was possible, the realisation of Roumanian wishes. Herr von Jagow next dealt with the object of the joint note addressed to the Porte before the fall of the Kiamil Cabinet. The intention was, he said, after the break-up of Turkey to preserve as much as possible for her. Events in Constantinople had rendered the efforts of the Powers fruitless. Financial questions would be discussed as a whole in Paris with the aid of experts. Preliminary discussions had been going on for some time. The frontier Midia-Enos had been proposed by the Powers to the belligerents at the suggestion of Russia with a view to terminating hostilities as soon as possible, and it had been already accepted by Turkey. The replies of the Balkan allies to the mediatory proposals had not yet been received. The question of the islands, the solution of which the Powers had reserved to themselves, presented considerable difficulties. Germany's policy aimed at settling this question as far as possible in such a way as not to endanger the Asiatic possessions of Turkey. As regards the latter, the efforts of German diplomacy were directed

towards the preservation of the *status quo*, and the maintenance of Turkey's ability to live ("Lebensfähigkeit"). No Power had hitherto raised the question of the Dardanelles.

Herr Zimmermann, Under-Secretary of State of the Foreign Office, next made a statement in regard to the question of the Turkish Debt, and in regard to the protection by Germany of Turkish interests in the countries of the belligerents. Germany had unfortunately had neither the right nor the ability, he said, to prevent excesses committed in Turkish territory against the native population. Though exaggerated reports had appeared in the press, the actual occurrences were deplorable enough. It had, of course, not been possible to examine each individual occurrence, but all cases which had come to the knowledge of the Government had been brought to the notice of the Governments of the Balkan States, and every effort had been made to check the abuses. The German Government had indeed other Powers, especially England, to take similar steps.

In the course of the discussion which ensued, a member of the Centre urged the necessity for the maintenance of the open door. A Radical member said it was difficult to prescribe for the Government a particular course of action. German special interests [illegible] had to consider [illegible] Germany had [illegible] Austria-Hungary [illegible] Germany [illegible] into the negotiations in the Balkans [illegible] this, and referred to what he had said on the subject [illegible] National Liberal member and Conservative member [illegible] improvement in Anglo-German relations.

I have, &c.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

[15764] No. 161.

[illegible]

(No. 263.)

Sir, [illegible]

WITH reference to my despatch No. 261 of [illegible] to enclose herewith copy of a further despatch which I have received from His Majesty's acting vice-consul at Cavalla, reporting on the continued [illegible] between the Greeks and Bulgarians in that district.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER

Enclosure in No. 161.

Acting Vice-Consul Morgan to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 11. Confidential)

Sir, *Cavalla, March 26, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Bulgarian forces in the town continue to be augmented. At present, large numbers of Christian peasants are arriving from various parts of the interior of Macedonia to be trained here and incorporated in the regular Bulgarian army. It is reported that the permanent garrison of Cavalla and district will be 6,000 men.

[illegible]

The authorities here seem determined not to afford the local population any opportunity for causing a tumult. Guns have been posted outside the town and trained on it. The Greek Archbishop has been warned that he will be held responsible for any outbreak on the part of the populace.

Incidents at Pravishta might, however, by exciting the local Greeks, give the authorities a pretext for dealing severely with them.

Relations between the Bulgarian authorities of Cavalla and the local Greek population continue to be far from cordial.

I have, &c.
JAMES MORGAN.

[15766] No. 162.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 265.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 3, 1913.*

IN reply to your telegram No. 163 of the 31st ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of Sir A. Block's letter to me, dated the 1st instant, explaining the apparent discrepancy between the figures given in his memorandum of the 16th February, 1913 (see my telegram No. 91 of the 16th February), and those of M. de la Boulinière of the 15th November, 1912.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 162.

Sir Adam Block to Sir G. Lowther.

My dear Ambassador, *April 1, 1913.*

THE apparent difference between the figures given in my memorandum of the 16th February, 1913, and those of M. de la Boulinière of the 15th November, 1912, is due to their being calculated on entirely different basis; they are in no way comparable.

My figure of £T. 4,162,000 is made up as follows: Gross revenue (ceded revenues) of the Roumelian provinces, £T. 962,271, plus the receipts of the tobacco régie, say, £T. 200,000, which in round figures gives my total of £T. 1,162,000.

I am not able to say exactly how M. de la Boulinière calculated his figures, but as far as I can make out he took the nett of the ceded revenues for the Roumelian provinces, less Rodosto, Gallipoli, Chatalja, and the Dardanelles, and did not include the receipts of the tobacco régie; this would give approximately his figure of £T. 762,000, which he gave in November, before the returns of the year were known definitely.

The other figure, £T. 601,923, represents the "new revenues and tithes," calculated apparently on the same basis as above.

It is merely a coincidence that his total for the ceded revenues and the new revenues and tithes gives a total which approximates to my total of the ceded revenues and tobacco revenue.

The point of the whole question is that my figures refer to the gross receipts of the ceded revenues and tobacco only, whilst M. de la Boulinière's figures give the nett receipts of the ceded revenues, new revenues and tithes, and do not include the tobacco revenue. It is entirely a matter of appreciation, and M. de la Boulinière admits that his figures are not quite accurate.

Yours, &c.
ADAM BLOCK.

[15767] No 163.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 268.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 3, 1913.*

IN my despatch No. 256 of the 31st ultimo, I had the honour to transmit to you the text of the note presented on that day by the Ambassadors of the Great Powers to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, containing the proposals for the preliminary basis of

peace. I have now the honour to enclose the text of the reply sent by the Sublime Porte to our communication.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 163.

Note communicated by Sublime Porte.

Le soussigné, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, a pris connaissance de la note collective que leurs Excellences les Ambassadeurs d'Autriche-Hongrie, d'Angleterre, de France, de Russie, d'Allemagne et d'Italie lui ont remise, le 31 mars, 1913.

Il a l'honneur d'informer leurs Excellences que le Gouvernement Impérial, appréciant les bienfaits de la paix, n'avait pas hésité à accepter la médiation amicale de leurs Gouvernements en vue de mettre fin à l'état de guerre existant entre l'Empire ottoman et les Etats balkaniques.

C'est par les mêmes dispositions pacifiques que le Gouvernement Impérial accepte dans leur ensemble les bases préliminaires proposées par la susdite puissance médiatrice et s'en remet aux Grandes Puissances pour ce qui est du rétablissement de la paix.

Constantinople, le 1er avril, 1913. SAID HALIM.

[15768] No. 164.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 269.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 3, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith a report which has been made to me by Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell, relating to the fighting which has taken place on the Chatalja lines on the 26th, 27th, and 28th ultimo, and the points in which the Turks would seem to have met to be defeated and other events.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 164.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 17.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 1, 1913.*

IN my last despatch I reported that on the 24th, 25th, and 26th there had been fighting along the whole front, in the course of which the Chatalja lines [illegible] as a result of which the Turkish advanced troops had been driven in on the main position. I now have the honour to submit an account of the operations which, though necessarily vague and somewhat lopsided, contains all that my observations, with many rumours, and may serve to show the general trend of events and to indicate the present position.

I have practically no news of the centre of events on the Turkish right, and little of what took place in the centre, but I was told a Turkish officer from the head-quarter staff gave information agrees pretty well with what we have already heard from the left and is likely responsible for the following account.

When the Bulgarians came [illegible] the night of the 24th the Turkish army was still snugly [illegible] on the Chatalja lines [illegible] some twenty battalions in all, with [illegible] in front. [illegible] the Bulgarians [illegible] the Turks [illegible] the Bulgarians [illegible] the [illegible] the [illegible] the

already in full retreat, and when dominating points had already been captured by the enemy.

In their approach marches, the Bulgarians seem to have kept to the hilly and wooded country north of the railway line, where their movements would be more easily concealed; and a general trend from north to south is noticeable in their movements after the attack developed. Thus, it was a column moving south from Ak Viram which appears to have struck the Turks about Kadikeui on the evening of the 24th, and when on the 25th this column advanced towards Chatalja, its attack was seconded by that of another column also moving south. Similarly, I am informed that on the 26th, a Turkish counter-attack on the right was unexpectedly struck in flank by a Bulgarian column coming from north to south.

On the 25th the Turks were holding a position on the hill marked 327 on the Austrian map, west of Chatalja village, supported by six batteries, with two regiments from the IInd Army Corps and one regiment from the IIIrd Army Corps in advance west of Albasan. The Bulgarians developed a strong attack on this position, advancing simultaneously from Kadikeui and Injegiz. The Turks could not withstand this attack, and hill No. 327 was occupied by the Bulgarians. While this fight was in progress, the advanced guard of the 1st Army Corps, under the German Colonel Back, and consisting of the 2nd division reinforced, was on the line Shaiteros-Yenije, with a cavalry brigade on its left flank and the 4th division in rear, while two divisions from San Stefano and Makrikeui were arriving during the day (their leading troops camped near Kum Burgas that night.) Opposite the 2nd division was a small Bulgarian force entrenched at Surgunkeui, estimated at one battalion and three batteries, protecting the flank of the Bulgarian advance towards Albasan. Thus the Turks were on this day favourably situated at this point, and there appeared to be a fine chance of their successfully counter attacking with the 2nd and 4th divisions towards Surgunkeui and Albasan, on the flank of the Bulgarian advance. This was suggested, but the opportunity was lost by the timidity and hesitation of the head-quarter staff, which only sanctioned the move on the following day when the Bulgarians, having established themselves on hill 327 and in Chatalja village, became aware of the strength of the Turkish forces west of the Buyuk Chekmeje lagoon, and took steps to meet the situation. On the 26th the Turkish left was forced back, and on the 27th it was holding a position about five miles west of Buyuk Chekmeje, covering Armautkeui and Playa, the cavalry having been withdrawn east of the lagoon. There does not seem to have been any important fighting on the 26th and 27th. The official accounts merely say that the Bulgarian advances were checked by artillery fire. On the 28th the Bulgarians were advancing with two divisions (said to be the 1st and 10th, about 40,000) from Shaiteros, Yenije, and Chakil, and the position was considered to be critical. The commander-in-chief, Izzet Pasha, was at Kalikratia on this day. The 31st division (XIth Army Corps) was pushed up into line with the 2nd, on its left, while the 4th division was moved across to Playa. The only other troops west of the Buyuk Chekmeje bridge were those of the Anasia redif division, but empty transports were observed this day off San Stefano, and these had brought over from Tuzla the Kharput redif division (XIth Army Corps), which probably also arrived on the scene during the day. There appears to have been no actual fighting during the day of the 28th, but there was heavy firing for some hours on the night of the 28th and 29th, and it is reported, probably with truth, that the Bulgars made a night attack, for there was heavy artillery fire from both sides, during which it was noticed that the Bulgarians were using at least one searchlight. On the 29th the Bulgarians proceeded with their attack, and it seems that one of their columns advancing along the Kuyuk Dere, came under fire of the Turkish guns of the 3rd division in the Chatalja lines, and suffered severely. The advance of this column is said to have been careless and too precipitate (it probably exposed itself by advancing along the Chatalja-Famasakris road), and to have been defeated by artillery fire alone. The Bulgarians seem to have been repulsed all along the line, their attack failed, and they retreated. Save for the hurried advance of a mountain battery on the left flank, which was the only mobile unit available, there was no attempt to pursue, and the Turks did not press their advantage. I am told that Back was anxious to pursue the retreating Bulgars, but was told to stand fast, and orders were given for the 4th division, which was further back, to take up the pursuit, with the result that nothing much was effected. The official report says that the Bulgarians left 1,000 dead upon the field, and the figure does not appear to be exaggerated. On the 30th and 31st the fighting does not appear to have been important or to have resulted in any material change of position. On the 30th, two regiments of cavalry were again brought west of the Buyuk Chekmeje bridge. Had they been there on the previous day, they might have been of the greatest service, in the rôle of mounted riflemen, and might

well have turned the Bulgarian retreat into a rout. In the fighting west of Buyuk Chekmeje, on the 28th, 29th, 30th, the Turks do not seem to have had more than 400 wounded.

The present position on the Turkish left seems to be: 31st division, about Yales and Kum Burgas; 2nd division, about Geshikeui; 4th division, about Famasakris with the redif divisions of Amasia and Kharput in support. That is the five divisions—say 40,000 men at most—west of Buyuk Chekmeje, faced by the 1st and 10th Bulgarian divisions, of about equal strength, on the line Baghalik-Yenije-Chakil. Northwards from Chakil and Famasakris respectively, the two armies appear to occupy the positions they did in November, on either side of the Kara Su Valley. The Bulgarians are said to have two battalions in Chatalja village. It may be noticed that in the two Turkish divisions west of Buyuk Chekmeje, the 1st and 4th Army Corps are represented, and there seems to have been a good deal of mixing up in command, and more or less fusing, in consequence. The 2nd division belongs to the 1st Army Corps, the other divisions of which are east of the Kara Su. The 4th division belongs to the IVth Army Corps, the other divisions of which were last heard of at Tursunkeui. The remaining three divisions seem for the moment to be combined in the XIth Army Corps, though one of them does not properly belong to it. The [illegible] Army Corps are [illegible]

The ships [illegible] Kounbelun, Barbarossa, and "Torghoud R[illegible]" and two smaller vessels have been assisting the Turkish left during the fighting.

It is [illegible]

All [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Though this despatch is too long already, there are one or two points of general nature [illegible]

One is the uselessness of the Turkish cavalry. Whether [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] country is unsuited for cavalry action, but there should be some scope [illegible] country is "[illegible]" that the cavalry cannot [illegible]

As [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[

M. Sazonof's and M. Delcassé's view that we had no mandate to decide the ultimate fate of Salonica. I could not, however, help feeling that there was some truth in Dr. Daneff's contention that it was hardly fair that Bulgaria alone of the allies should be called on to pay what M. Maioresco had termed Roumania's "petite note," when they had all equally profited by her neutrality. I, moreover, thought that it was not to our interest to allow the belief to gain ground at Sophia that Austria and Italy were more friendly disposed towards Bulgaria than were the members of the Triple *Entente*. I should, therefore, like to propose at our next meeting that we should, in making known our decision, express the hope that Greece and Servia would, when the time came for the division of the conquered Ottoman territory between the allies, take into consideration the sacrifice which Bulgaria had had to make.

M. Sazonof, while agreeing that we must not give Bulgaria the impression of lukewarmness on her behalf, said that the course which I had suggested might be fraught with dangerous consequences and that it would be far better to give her our support in the question of the war indemnity. Servia, his Excellency proceeded to explain, was putting forward unjustifiable claims to certain districts in Macedonia, that were in direct contravention of the terms of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of Alliance. Under one of the clauses of that treaty the two Governments had engaged to refer any dispute with regard to its interpretation to the arbitration of Russia. This he believed the two Governments were prepared to do with regard to the districts at present in dispute, and in that case Russia would certainly decide the matter in Bulgaria's favour.

M. Sazonof then asked me whether I had any suggestion to make with regard to our attitude at our next meeting. I replied that the Austrian Ambassador, who was asking for further instructions from his Government, would probably drop part of Roumania's extreme claim and perhaps suggest a line from Silistria to Schabla, or even to some point still further north. In that case, as it was still too soon for us to speak of the cession of Silistria, we ought to be prepared with some counter proposal. The Austrian and Italian Ambassadors had shown that the position of Silistria as a Bulgarian town would be rendered almost untenable by the cession of Medjidie-Tabia, and we might therefore acknowledge the force of their arguments and say that we must look for some other combination that would safeguard Roumania's strategical interests. We might, I thought, propose that the fortress of Medjidie-Tabia should be dismantled; that Bulgaria should engage, under Russia's guarantee, to erect no fortifications whatsoever within a given radius; that a portion of the territory to the north-east of Silistria, between the town and the point fixed on by the commission of 1878 for the construction of bridge, should be ceded so as to enable Roumania to construct forts for the protection of that bridge, and that the two triangles, as well as a few kilometres of territory to the south of Mangalia should also be ceded, in order to facilitate the construction of a naval port at the latter place. The above line would, I honestly believed, give Roumania all the strategical security that she required, and when the time came for us to show our hand, our consent to the cession of Silistria and Medjidie-Tabia would be such a great concession that we should have good ground for insisting that, in return for them, Roumania must renounce her claims to the two triangles and the coast territory.

Both M. Sazonof and M. Delcassé expressed concurrence, but the former subsequently said that he would prefer that no mention should be made of the cession of any portion of the littoral to the south of Mangalia. At his Excellency's request I have undertaken to make a proposal in the above sense at our meeting on the 5th instant, as a personal one of my own, and as in no way emanating from His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[15927] No. 166.

[illegible]

(No. 262)
Sir, *Vienna, April 4, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that in the course of a meeting held yesterday in connection with the Vienna municipal elections the burgermeister, Dr. Weiskirchner, made a speech attacking Count Berchtold and the foreign policy of the Austro-Hungarian Government. Dr. Weiskirchner declared that the Government's foreign policy had caused deep dissatisfaction among the population of Vienna. Commerce

could not stand the present situation any longer. Thousands of people were suffering from this economic depression, and if a change did not soon take place they would be confronted with an economic catastrophe. The burgermeister proceeded to describe the difficulties of the various trades, and finally exclaimed, "I, as burgermeister of the capital of the Empire, feel constrained to cry to the Ballplatz, 'either—or.' Either we have an interest in the creation and existence of Albania, in which case we must realise it, or we have none, in which case we can let the matter drop. But we cannot put up any longer with this beating about the bush. I have now said a few words in plain German to Count Berchtold."

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX CARTWRIGHT.

[15935] No. 167.

Sir P. Harvey (National Insurance Audit Department) to Sir L. Mallet.—(Received April 7.)

Dear Mallet, *Tothill Street, London, April 5, 1913.*

APPORTIONMENT of the Ottoman Debt.

[illegible] propose an amendment to it at the conference in Paris.

The formula says that the annuity to be borne by the allies shall be convertible into capital on the basis of 4 per cent.

I do not think this practicable. The allies can certainly not borrow at 4 per cent. Their rate of credit is more like 5 per cent. The operation proposed would, therefore, be highly disadvantageous to them.

Moreover, it would be unduly favourable to the Turk for this reason, that Turkish 5 per cents. are worth only about 90. It follows that if the annuity allotted to the allies is determined on an equitable basis, this annuity capitalised at 4 per cent. will enable the Turk to pay off [illegible] the expenses of the allies.

You will see that the formula in this respect is out of harmony with the view that the allies should be encouraged to capitalise their annuity, and also, I may add with the suggestion that they should be let off easily in the matter of their share of the Debt as a compensation for their not obtaining an indemnity.

Yours sincerely,
H. P. HARVEY.

P.S.—No doubt a similar arrangement is prescribed by the Italo-Turkish Treaty of Peace. But Italian credit is far better than Greek and Bulgarian. Italy can probably borrow below 4 per cent. Moreover, I gather that the latter arrangement was, in effect, the veiled payment of a lump sum indemnity to Turkey.

H. P. H.

[15752] No. 168.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 7.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, April 5, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, two copies of a telegram dated to-day from the Vice-Admiral, 3rd Squadron, H.M.S. "King Edward VII."

I am, &c.
[illegible]

Enclosure in No. 168.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April 5, 1913.*

IT was decided at a conference at which the British Admiral, Austrian Admiral, German, French, and Italian Captains were present, to send the following message to the Montenegrin Government

That as a protest against the non-compliance with the wishes of the Powers by Montenegro, there is assembled off Antivari an international squadron consisting of ships of war from the Great Powers. It is observed that the presence of the squadron is a proof of the accord that exists between the Powers, and of their desire that their wishes may be complied with without further delay. Request that you will at once inform me that your Government is ready to accede to the expressed wish of the Powers.

If no reply is received to-morrow, the Montenegrin Government will be given six hours in which to reply, and if no reply, or an unfavourable reply is received, I propose at once to institute a close blockade of the Montenegrin coast between Durazzo and Antivari.

[16612] No. 169.

[illegible] Ambassador at [illegible] to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7, 1913.)

(Confidential.)

Note [illegible] [illegible]

1. Sur point premier nous n'avons pas d'objections. Il semble évident que le tracé définitif de la ligne Enos-Midia devra être établi par une commission internationale.

2. Il serait très désirable d'accélérer la solution de la question des îles et de [illegible]

Notre point de vue est connu: Nous voudrions attribuer toutes les îles à la Grèce, excepté Thasos, qui devrait revenir à la Bulgarie. Nous désirons en tout cas voir maintenir nos réserves pour les quatre des voisines des Dardanelles, à moins que [illegible] pour [illegible] Nous voudrions pour Imbros et Samothrace autant que possible les réserves qui seraient proposées pour le régime à établir à Chios et à Mitylène.

3. La paix préliminaire ne saurait être retardée par une communication préalable aux alliés de la délimitation de l'Albanie, celle-ci demandant quelque temps pour pouvoir être fixée définitivement dans tout son pourtour. La nécessité d'une prompte [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[15739] No. 173.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 50.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, April 6, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 40 of 1st April.

German Minister has received from Grand Vizier telegram *en clair* addressed to commandant at Scutari authorising him to allow civil population to leave the town. Montenegrin Government are being requested to forward this communication, with a letter from German Minister, asking the commandant whether he will avail himself of authorisation, and if so what steps he proposes in order to give effect to it.

[15740] No. 174.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, April 6, 1913.*

I LEARN privately that Montenegrin Government are sending to Central News statement to the effect that great excitement prevails here in connection with naval demonstration. So far there is no ground whatever to justify such assertion.

[16041] No. 175.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7.)

(No. [illegible])
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, April 7, 1913.*

NAVAL demonstration.

Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs said to me to-day that he understood British admiral had agreed, with certain reserves, that steps should be taken to intercept the further arrival of Servian troops by sea to Albanian ports. The reserves seemed to be connected with amount of force which should be used to compel the transports to turn back. Minister for Foreign Affairs is of opinion that it is essential that further arrival of troops to participate in siege of Scutari should be stopped, as the whole object of the demonstration is to put an end to it. His Excellency complained that the French naval commander was causing trouble, and he seemed to consider attitude of France most unsatisfactory, as she seemed to [illegible]

I enquired of Minister for Foreign Affairs what, in his opinion, should be done if the naval demonstration failed in its object. He replied that it seemed to him that only course to pursue was to send men-of-war into the harbours of the Albanian and Montenegrin coasts, and to disembark sufficient detachments to hold the town under the guns of the ships. I said that that would be a rather dangerous experiment, and that a large force would be necessary for this purpose, and that I did not see where detachments were to come from except from Austria and Italy. He seemed [group undecypherable] necessary troops, but he hoped that small detachments at least of other nations would be landed to display their respective flags. Should France decline to participate in landing troops, he is strongly of opinion that French men-of-war should not be withdrawn, but should remain off the coast and by its presence give moral support to the action taken by the other Powers.

Minister for Foreign Affairs assured me to-day that his great object was as long as it was possible to work in unison with the other Powers. He told me that he had no intention of breaking away from European concert just now, but that position was becoming very critical and very grave, and he hoped that the Powers would not abdicate before the truculent conduct of little Balkan States. He complained bitterly of the attitude of Servia and of shifty answers given by its Government. He was afraid that Greece and Servia would devise means for carrying on war for some time to come with the object of occupying securely the greater part of Albania.

His Excellency told me that up to the present Italy had behaved perfectly loyally towards Austria in the Albanian question. He hoped that relations between the two

countries would continue equally satisfactory whatever circumstances might arise. It was absolutely impossible, he said, that Greece should be allowed to retain all the territory she claims in Southern Albania.

(Confidential.)

In my opinion Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs' position is a most anxious and very difficult one, and he is being attacked bitterly on all sides for his policy [illegible]

[16042] No. 176.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 54.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, April 7, 1913.*

BULGARIA and Roumania.

Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs told me [illegible] personally satisfied. [illegible] Roumania [illegible] Bulgaria [illegible] Roumania [illegible] Bulgaria [illegible] Roumania [illegible] Bulgaria

are in fact already suspended by tacit agreement. Paper adds that allies are only waiting to know exact definition of frontier line before accepting it, and that reference of indemnity question to commission would satisfy them. Unlimited leave to older classes of reserve officially announced.

[15839] No. 179.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 84.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, April 7, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 79 of 3rd April: Peace negotiations.

My Bulgarian colleague informs me that Servian draft reply was modified at the last moment owing to influence in favour of moderation brought to bear by Bulgaria [illegible].

[16035] No. 180.

Sir C. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7.)

(No. [illegible])
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, April 7, 1913.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs, to whom I communicated contents of your telegram No. 150 of 5th April to Paris in a private letter of yesterday, has telephoned to say that he quite agrees that three days' notice must be given, and that after that blockade of coast from Cattaro to Durazzo might commence.

[16037] No. 181.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 139.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, April 7, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 136 of 4th April.

At meeting to-day Ambassadors of the Triple Alliance yielded in the matter of the two triangles, but held out for some 10 kilom. of coast. As we maintained that Bulgaria could not be asked to cede anything in addition to Silistria, they are referring to their Governments. Final decision will probably be taken on 9th April.

[15756] No. 182.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. [illegible])
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 7, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 48 of 6th April.

I do not see what more M. Venizelos wants than is contained in my telegram No. 51 of 31st March to you. I assume that international fleet, which is now about to establish a blockade, will stop any transports sent.

[15692] No. 183.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. [illegible])
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 7, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 45 of 5th April.

It will lead to confusion and misapprehensions if suggestions, even personal ones, are made at this juncture. Any suggestions you may wish to put forward should be addressed to me.

(Very Confidential.)

The whole coast of Epirus is more than even France has claimed for Greece under [illegible]

[15742] No. 184.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 151.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 7, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 44 of 6th April.

We entirely agree with French views, but as naval officers seem to have made notification to Montenegrin Government on the 5th, and Latter appears to have disregarded it, pacific blockade has begun at once. Buchanan told M. Isvolsky that if all his colleagues agree, a warning should be sent to Italian ports, and that in their way to San Giovanni with troops and guns to be used against Scutari that they will not be permitted to disembark or to enter the port.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 152; St. Petersburgh, No 305; Rome, No. 129; Constantinople, No. 168; Vienna, No. 131; Athens, No. 52; Cettinje, No. 57; and Belgrade, No. 74.)

[12931] No. 185.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, April 7, 1913.*

ON the 10th ultimo M. de Fleuriau was good enough to communicate to Sir E. Mallet a note containing certain observations suggested by the French Government to the amendment which His Majesty's Government have proposed to be made in article 1 of the suggested treaty between Turkey and the other Balkan States to regulate the participation of the latter in the Ottoman Public Debt.

Although as observed in the note in question this subject had to be examined by the international commission which is about to meet at Paris in order to avoid question arising out of the proposed Turkish loan, it was agreed that it would be well for the information of the French Government that a statement of the considerations which impelled His Majesty's Government to propose the amendment to which exception has been taken.

It appears to His Majesty's Government that the observations of the French Government are based on a misconception of the reasons which suggested the amendment inserted in the draft article, and of the extent to which it was intended to apply.

It occurs to His Majesty's Government that the French Government may have interpreted the amendment in the sense that the contribution of the allies might vary annually according to the yield of the assigned revenues which would be maintained in the ceded territories.

This was not, however, contemplated.

His Majesty's Government approached the question on the assumption that a certain sum is to be fixed at the outset once and for all as the contribution of the allies towards the debt, and that it will be impossible to continue to earmark towards the service of the debt the revenues now assigned thereto in the ceded territories, and they expressed themselves as generally in favour of the principle (which has obvious advantages) advocated by the French Government for determining the amount of the contribution to be made by the allies.

But it is evident that the aggregate contribution arrived at by taking a proportion of the Ottoman Debt corresponding to the proportion borne by the general revenues of the ceded territories to the total revenue of the Turkish Empire will not necessarily coincide with, and might be very different from, the actual amount heretofore contributed in the aggregate by these territories to the service of the debt; and if the former amount were substantially less than the latter the creditors of the Ottoman Government would to that extent be prejudiced.

His Majesty's Government had before them but few figures to show how the two methods would compare [illegible] that the result of the first method would substantially [illegible] the second.

In the case supposed His Majesty's Government think that a [illegible] should be [illegible] the [illegible] it should not be less than the past aggregate yield of the assigned revenues in the ceded territories so far as actually required for the service of debt, that

is, excluding the surplus (or "excédent") referred to in paragraph 3 of the note communicated by M. de Florian which has been carried to the general revenue of the Ottoman Treasury.

The French Government believe that either method of arriving at the total amount of the contribution payable by the allies produces the same practical result; if this is so the amendment becomes quite unnecessary, and should be abandoned as a superfluous and disturbing complication which (as pointed out by the French Government) may stimulate "la discussion et le marchandage" on the part of the allies.

His Majesty's Government are not in a position to say whether or not the French statement is correct, and I should be greatly obliged if I might be furnished with the calculations on which it rests in order that the question may be submitted to a further examination.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[16051] No. 186

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 111.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, April 5, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that a recent Slav demonstration in front of the Servian Legation formed the subject of a lively debate in the Duma on the 2nd instant, which was resumed and concluded yesterday. It appears that the Servian Minister, who had appeared at the window, quickly withdrew when the crowd was charged by the police. Several people are reported to have been injured as a result of the charge.

The debate in the Duma is noteworthy because the action of the police was on this occasion violently condemned by various reactionary deputies. M. Savenko (Nationalist) declared that the evidence of the injured and of certain eye-witnesses proved that the police had behaved disgracefully. He pointed out the deep abyss which separated the nation and the Government as regards foreign policy, and the humiliation which Russia now had to suffer. M. Purishkevitch (Extreme Right) laid the responsibility for the whole affair on the shoulders of M. Kokovtsof and M. Sazonof, since the action of the police only reflected the views of those members of the Government. The Minister of the Interior declared in reply that street demonstrations could not be allowed, but he admitted that they must be stopped in a proper way. He had ordered a strict enquiry to be made with a view to the severe punishment of any persons who might prove to be guilty. M. Maklakof's declaration was not well received, and the question of urgency was unanimously voted. The debate closed on the first day amidst a scene of great disorder brought about by the violent speech of the Constitutional Democrat deputy Rodichef, who in the course of a general attack on Russian police methods aroused the anger of the Right, and eventually made use of an expression which the censorship has not allowed to be published and for which he was suspended for five sittings. The debate was concluded yesterday in a much calmer atmosphere, and the interpellation was unanimously voted.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[16054] No. 187.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 111.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, April 5, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs invited delegates of the various groups of the Duma to take part in an exchange of [illegible] Balkan crisis. The meeting took place yesterday and lasted for about three hours, the only groups who did not accept M. Sazonof's invitation being the Right and the Nationalists. Their refusal to send delegates was based on the fact that his Excellency had included in his invitation the Constitutional Democrat party, whose existence had not been formally recognised by the Government. Particular objection was taken to

the presence of M. Milyukof, who it was [illegible] had sat with Azeff in the Revolutionary Congress at Paris in 1904. It is stated that the delegates and the groups who refused to attend will be received in private by M. Sazonof to-day. I may here recall that the Minister in general, and M. Kokovtsof and M. Sazonof in particular, have evidently attached little importance to the [illegible] circulated by the Liberal Press to the effect that M. Kokovtsof, on his return to Paris, that M. Isvolsky is to succeed him as Russian Ambassador to France, and that a Cabinet is to be formed without any [illegible].

M. Sazonof explained very fully to the deputies the reasons which had prompted the Government in their [illegible] policy, and had to answer numerous questions which were addressed to him and laid various documents before the deputies. His Excellency declared that [illegible] the Austro-Hungarian Government [illegible] to be ready to co-operate with the Balkan States.

It is reported that the Octobrist delegates showed themselves to be entirely unconvinced by M. Sazonof's explanations in regard to his having given way over the Servian port question. The press [illegible] that it appears from his [illegible] replies to questions put to him that relations between Russia and Austria [illegible] in danger. His Excellency declared that a naval demonstration against Montenegro could not be objected to, since the [illegible] necessary to reckon with the wishes of Greece. It was necessary also that efforts should be made to maintain unity amongst the allied Balkan States. In reply to enquiries as to whether Russia would raise the question of the Straits, M. Sazonof said that the [illegible]

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[16181] No. 188.

M. Cambon to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

LE Chargé d'Affaires [illegible] Foreign Office [illegible] Ministère des Affaires Etrangères une note relative au statut futur des îles [illegible] de l'Empire ottoman qui seront annexés aux États balkaniques [illegible] la paix.

Le Gouvernement [illegible] provoquer [illegible] Gouvernement ottoman, témoigne de la préoccupation du Gouvernement Royal de faire inviter par les Puissances les Gouvernements balkaniques à donner des garanties aux israélites.

Avant de faire connaître l'avis qui lui est demandé à ce sujet, le Gouvernement de la République [illegible] désire avoir [illegible] Gouvernement britannique.

M. Paul Cambon saisit, &c.

Foreign Office, London,
le 5 avril, 1913.

[16201] No. 189.

M. Madjaroff to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

THE Bulgarian Minister presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [illegible]

Royal Bulgarian Legation,
April 7, 1913.

Enclosure in No. 189.

Circular Telegram addressed to Bulgarian Representatives to Great Powers by M. Gueshof.

DANS notre exposé sur la question de l'indemnité de guerre, à côté des revenus dont la Turquie pourrait garantir le payement de cette indemnité, nous faisions mention aussi des revenus provenant d'une augmentation éventuelle des droits de douane actuels de 11 à 15 pour cent, augmentation que la Turquie réclame depuis longtemps. Il semble, cependant, que ce fait a été interprété dans le sens que les Etats balkaniques alliés demandent eux-mêmes ladite augmentation de 4 pour cent pour en faire une garantie supplémentaire de l'indemnité de guerre.

Par suite de cette interprétation erronée, le Gouvernement Royale de Bulgarie tient à déclarer d'une façon catégorique qu'il n'a pas sollicité l'augmentation des droits de douane en Turquie, mais il a seulement envisagé l'éventualité d'une telle augmentation, consentie par les Puissances, ainsi qu'il a été dit dans l'exposé. Nous considérons que la Turquie peut largement garantir aux alliés le payement de leur indemnité par les excédents constants de l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, en y ajoutant les revenus de l'impôt de guerre, ou bien d'autres revenus [illegible] Royal de Bulgarie n'a pas insisté [illegible] [illegible] en Turquie, mais il a [illegible] en 1907 à l'élévation des droits de douane en Turquie de 8 à 11 pour cent, ont stipulé expressément que l'augmentation de 3 pour cent concédée ne servira que pour subvenir aux dépenses des vilayets européens de la Turquie pour 75 pour cent. Or, il est tout logique [illegible] la garantie de l'indemnité de guerre, et, dans le cas où il y aura à l'avenir une nouvelle augmentation de ces droits, d'en faire [illegible]

De ce qui précède il ressort clairement que la garantie exigée pour le payement de [illegible] actuels de la [illegible] le payement complet des créanciers [illegible]

GUÉCHOF.

[16044] No. 190.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 8.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April 7, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram dated the 7th instant, from the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, relative to Montenegrin affairs.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 190.

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April 7, 1913.*

GREEK ship "Psara," torpedo-boats and torpedo-boat destroyers are at Corfu still, with all the transports. There is no sign of any activity there.

[16049] No. 191.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 8.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April 7, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegrams dated the 5th and 6th instant, relative to Montenegrin affairs.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 191.

Admiralty to Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII."

(Telegraphic.) *Admiralty, April 7, 1913.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 21 you ought to have avoided such action as you report until you had received direct orders from here, nor should you again communicate with the Government of Montenegro until you receive further instructions.

Enclosure 2 in No. 191.

Admiralty to Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII."

(Telegraphic.) *Admiralty, April 6, 1913.*

IF the senior naval officers concur, transports supposed to be making for San Giovanni di Medua should be warned that they will not be allowed to enter the port or to land troops or munitions of war.

You will receive very soon instructions as to the extent of the blockade of the coast, and the further notice to be given to Government of Montenegro.

16079] No. 192.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 8.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April 8, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegram dated the 7th and 8th instant, relative to Montenegrin affairs.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 192.

Admiralty to Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII."

(Telegraphic.) *Admiralty, April 7, 1913.*

IF you obtain the consent of your colleagues you should, at once, institute a pacific blockade of the coast between Antivari and the mouth of the River Drin. You should warn any transports conveying troops or munitions of war to abstain from proceeding within the blockaded area. If, as is most improbable, they disregard your warning, you should so place your vessels as to indicate your intention to prevent a landing being effected. Except in the case of aggressive action on their part, and then only in the last resort, you should not open fire upon them.

You should of course act in concert with all your colleagues in all measures of blockade, &c., and it is especially desirable that you should be in close touch with your French colleague.

If any case arises which is not covered by these instructions you should refer home for orders, unless it be a case of extreme urgency.

Enclosure 2 in No. 192.

Admiralty to Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII."

(Telegraphic.) *Admiralty, April 8, 1913.*

PACIFIC blockade sanctioned in telegram of 7th April does not imply any kind of warlike action such as the occupation of places on the coast, or the landing of men, in which you should refrain from joining. This must be clearly understood.

Enclosure 3 in No. 192.

From Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April, 7, 1913.*

A REPORT has been received from the "Yarmouth" at Salonica, stating that 16 transports with Servian troops, stores, and field guns on board have been waiting for a few days ready to leave.

[16500] No. 193.

Paper communicated by Count Mensdorff, April 8, 1913.

Le Territoire valaque.

LA région du Pinde, qui est le centre des Valaques, contient les villages suivants :—

(A.)—*Dans le Zagori de Yanina, versant occidental des Montagnes.*

	Nombre des Habitants.	
Baessa (Voyussa)	240	
Tsherneehi	1,700	
Makrinà	860	
Diagati	660	
Chechon	330	
Pleyon (Flamboutaron)	1,300	
Grebentzi	3,000	
Metzova	8,000	
Anilio	3,000	
Seracon	8,000	
		27,730

(B.)—*Sur le versant oriental*

Amoreu (Mika)	820	
Fatena (Baltumen)	250	
Resova	150	
Veloni (Belohma)	50	
Ciaritsa (Turia)	3,500	
Labanitza	180	
Pircoli	6,000	
Aboda (Avdela)	4,500	
Smilsi	1,500	
Samarina	10,000	
		26,550 54,740

(C.)—*Dans la vallée de la Voyussa.*

Lalata	5,900	
Polohori	650	
Dobrinova	1,450	
Levhnitza	2,500	
Bràza	1,580	
Arnata	260	
Padza	1,150	
Paltosséli	2,200	
Pourea	2,000	
		17,590

(D.)—*Dans la montagne Grammos.*

	Nombre des Habitants.		
Denisco	1,000		
Pelicadi	230		
Medjdié	2,500		
Grabouste	500		
	4,230	22,220	
		76,960	

En examinant la position géographique de la ville de Kortcha on arrive aux constatations que 20 kilom. au nord-est de cette ville est la rive sud des deux lacs de Presba. Or, les bords du lac de Presba étaient le centre et le berceau du second Royaume bulgare fondé par la dynastie des Asséenides (Jean Assen), et aujourd'hui aussi ce pays est bulgare et absolument pas grec, comme le prouvent du reste les nombreuses églises du lac de Presba : Svet-Ail (Saint-Achille), Svet-Bogoroditza, Svet-Pavle et Svet-Petar.

L'élément albanais de Kortcha confine directement et immédiatement avec l'élément bulgare de Presba.

Les premiers Grecs que l'on rencontre sont les citadins de Kastoria (des environs de la ville sont bulgares), laquelle ville est distante de Kortcha 42 kilom. vers l'est en ligne directe. Le pays entre ces deux villes est formé par le Haut-Dévol, région tout à fait albanaise, comme les noms des villages principaux Dardha–Kjutoza, &c., le prouvent, et par les vallées des rivières de Zelengrad et la Belica, région bulgare, comme ces noms l'indiquent.

Si Kortcha restait avec la Grèce comme la proposition russe l'entend, une enclave serait formée, entourée au nord-ouest, ouest et sud-ouest, par un pays albanais ; au nord-est, est et sud-ouest, par un pays bulgare.

Une telle création serait à déplorer, parce qu'elle donnerait lieu à de nombreuses frictions.

Le maintien de Kortcha avec l'Albanie n'est pas seulement un intérêt albanais mais aussi un desideratum roumain, car il y a des agglomérations valaques dans le district de Kortcha et des écoles et églises valaques existant dans les localités suivantes : -

	Nombre des Écoles.	Nombre des Maîtres.	Nombre des Élèves.	Nombre de Valaques.
Kortcha	2	5	137	1,200
Pleresa	2	1	129	500
Moscopole	2	3	51	2,500
Gliçeka	1	2	49	250
Bitcouki	1	2	24	200
Nieca	1	1	27	1,500
Lunca	1	2	47	1,000

Outre les localités nommées, encore les villages suivants ont une population valaque :—

	Nombre des Habitants.
Dichnitza	200
Stroyani	180
Ruhnochitza	80
Gabeova	350
Pogradetzi	140
Grameste	500

[16215] No. 194.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 50.)

(Telegraphic.) *Athens, April 8, 1913.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 51 to 54 of 31st March to 7th April.

I gave Prime Minister this morning translation of your telegram No. 53 of 7th April. He would have liked a more positive declaration that transports will be

stopped, but said he would consult Minister for Foreign Affairs as to informing Servian Government that his information from London led him to believe that this would be done. There are no transports now on the way to the Adriatic, but there are sixteen, with Servian troops on board, ready to sail from Salonica.

Minister for Foreign Affairs came to see me afterwards, and said he would telegraph at once to Belgrade to suggest deference to Powers as he had already frequently done. I could not get him to refuse to send the transports as he said it must be remembered that there are still Turkish troops near Berat and Elbassan, but I am convinced that they will not leave Salonica. He said that he understood that at present blockade was only of the Montenegrin coast and asked if it would be extended. I could not tell him, but said that your telegram No. 53 looked like it.

Both Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke of the retention of the frontier line acquired by right of conquest and of nationality as a question on which they could only yield to actual force. The whole press takes the same line. Both Ministers said that they would resign rather than give way. They are anxious to hear what you think of the suggestion of a plébiscite.

Italian Minister also made personal suggestion of non-fortification of coast as a possible means of obviating Italian objections.

[16214] No. 195.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 129.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, April 8, 1913.*

FOLLOWING from consul at Adrianople :—

"Great distress among prisoners and Moslem population. Consulate organising relief, with assistance of General Broadwood.

"In view of this urgent necessity, propose to postpone departure for the present.

"Please inform Foreign Office."

[16198] No. 196.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Belgrade, April 8, 1913.*

ACCORDING to a press telegram from Uskub yesterday, there has been renewed fighting between Servian troops and Djavid Pasha. It is stated Djavid's army was completely defeated and fled to Figeri.

[16204] No. 197.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 86.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, April 8, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 82 of 6th April.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informs me that orders were sent yesterday to stop transports with Servian troops on the way to Scutari from proceeding further.

I suggested that the military authorities before Scutari should be prompted to inform the Montenegrin commander-in-chief that they do not consider the troops at their disposal sufficient for a successful assault. Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that it had been left to the discretion of the Servian commander, and that, in the present state of public opinion here, the Government dare not take any [group omitted: ? step] such as I had suggested, as they would incur the hatred and contempt of the entire Serb nationality.

[16210] No. 198.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 65.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, April 8, 1913.*

ROUMANIAN-BULGARIAN frontier.

At his weekly reception to-day, Minister for Foreign Affairs seemed somewhat concerned at apparently inspired press telegram from St. Petersburgh to the effect that definite result of mediation would not be announced until the resumption of peace negotiations.

He expressed hope that there would be no unnecessary delay.

[16211] No. 199.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 61. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, April 8, 1913.*

MY French colleague informs me that yesterday evening he suggested to his Government by telegraph that Scutari difficulty might possibly be solved by Turkey ceding that town at once to the Powers, who, after the conclusion of the war, could hand it over to Albania. He urged that, if suggestion was approved, no time should be lost in approaching Ottoman Government on the subject.

[16097] No. 200.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 187.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, April 8, 1913.*

OTTOMAN Public Debt appeals to the Powers to obtain the withdrawal of prohibition of dispatch of silkworms' eggs by post which is imposed by the Bulgarian Government and is causing great prejudice to the silk industry.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[16421] No. 201.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.**

(No. 90.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, April 8, 1913.*

THE following reply is suggested to the note of the allies :—(End of R.)

"La réunion pense que la réponse des Puissances aux alliés pourrait être ainsi conçue : -

"Les Puissances, prenant acte avec satisfaction des dispositions des alliés pour la cessation des hostilités, répondent de la façon suivante sur les quatre points formulés dans la note des alliés : -

"1. Le premier point ne soulève pas d'objections.

"2. Sur le second point, les Puissances font observer que le sort des îles de la mer Égée ayant été réservé à l'appréciation des Puissances, ce point ne peut être admis que sous réserve des décisions à prendre au sujet de certaines de ces îles.

"3. Sur le troisième point, les Puissances déclarent qu'elles sont prêtes à faire connaître dès maintenant aux alliés la délimitation nord et nord-est de l'Albanie et que celle du sud-est et du sud leur sera communiquée aussitôt qu'elle aura été établie.

4. Sur le quatrième point, la solution de toutes les questions d'ordre financier ayant été réservée à la commission de Paris, à laquelle prendront part les délégués des belligérants, les Puissances estiment qu'il n'y a pas lieu de s'expliquer quant à présent sur le principe d'une indemnité."

* Also to Sir R. Paget (No. 74), Sir F. Elliot (No. 55), Count de Salis (No. 36), and Sir G. Lowther (No. 171).

(R.) You are authorised to join in communicating it collectively directly your colleagues are instructed.

You can also join in communicating the delimitation of the frontiers of north and north-east of Albania, as already decided by the Powers (see my telegrams to Belgrade Nos. 66 and 67 of 22nd March).

[15731] No. 202.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 169.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, April 8, 1913.*

SIR H. BAX-IRONSIDE'S telegram No. 126 of 6th April.

Ottoman Public Debt not being an exclusively British interest, we cannot take action alone. Moreover, in view of protest already made at Sophia, Belgrade, and Athens, further steps of the kind should be unnecessary.

Instruct consul accordingly, and explain situation to Sir A. Block.

(Repeated to Sophia, No. 89.)

[16035] No. 203.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 307.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 8, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 138 of 7th April: Naval demonstration.

I consider that, as the Montenegrin Government received notification on 5th April the three days' notice will expire on 8th April, so that instructions should be sent to commence the blockade at once. I have so informed the French Government. As to the extent of the blockade, I have agreed to the French proposal to blockade from Antivari to the River Drin. This does not include Durazzo, to which place, however, the blockade could be later extended, if it is found necessary.

[16419] No. 204.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 101.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 8, 1913.*

THE Italian Ambassador informed me to-day that the Italian Government were doing all they could in Vienna to induce Austria to give some further compensation to the King of Montenegro, who gave them to understand that, if he could get a little additional strip of territory and some money, he would defer to the decision of the Powers.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[16420] No. 205.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 102.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 8, 1913.*

THE Italian Ambassador informed me to-day privately that the Italian Government had been somewhat surprised by some language recently held by the German Government. It was to the effect that, if Scutari fell, Russia would probably object to Montenegro being obliged to evacuate it, and there would have to be war, in which Germany would stand by Austria.

I said that I saw no reason to suppose that, if Scutari fell, Russia would take the line suggested. I hoped, therefore, that, if Scutari fell, Austria would not take any precipitate or isolated action that might lead to war. It would be open to her to ask for an assurance that the fall of Scutari and its occupation by Montenegro did not alter

the agreement to which the Powers had come about the frontier of Albania. We could then proceed with the demand that Montenegro should evacuate Scutari.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[16108] No. 206.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 149.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 8, 1913.*

COUNT BENCKENDORFF gave to Sir A. Nicolson on the 4th April the memorandum of which I transmit a copy herewith to your Excellency. Sir A. Nicolson told his Excellency that, before making any further communication to the Porte, it would be well to await reception of a reply from the allies. As to any new formula preventing the entry of the Bulgarians into Constantinople, Sir A. Nicolson said, as his personal opinion, that no such rosewater measures would have the slightest effect. Sir A. Nicolson said that he was speaking entirely for himself, but he felt convinced that King Ferdinand intended to make a solemn entry into Constantinople, and that it was, so far as the effect throughout the Turkish Empire was concerned, immaterial whether his stay in Constantinople was temporary or permanent. King Ferdinand very likely would content himself with some theatrical displays at Constantinople and then retire, but the mischief would have been done. St. Sophia would have been desecrated in Moslem eyes, and the entry of the Bulgarians would be regarded as the final doom of Turkish rule. The Sultan would leave the capital, and once left he never could return, and his departure as a discredited fugitive before Christian forces would raise an uprising against Turkish rule throughout Asia Minor, and would be the precursor of serious events. And all this to gratify the vanity of a Balkan sovereign. The only Power who could prevent the entry was Russia, and she would have to announce her determination to prevent, by force if necessary, the advance of the Bulgarians on Constantinople and the Straits.

Sir A. Nicolson did not know if the Russian Government would be disposed, in face of Russian public opinion, to stop by force of arms the Bulgarian advance. It might be possible for Russian public opinion to support their Government in causing the Bulgarians to evacuate, as Sir A. Nicolson did not suppose Russia would care to leave the key of her front door in Bulgarian hands. Sir A. Nicolson feared, however, that the mere entry of Bulgarian troops would be benevolently viewed, but it would topple over the whole fabric of Turkish rule. These were Sir A. Nicolson's personal opinions, and they must be regarded as solely personal.

Count Benckendorff said, perhaps, the Sultan might be kept at Constantinople under foreign protection during a Bulgarian occupation.

Sir A. Nicolson said this would discredit the Khalif as much as a flight.

Count Benckendorff asked whether your Excellency could not be asked to talk over the matter confidentially with M. Sazonof, as he was not sure whether the latter realised the dangers of a temporary occupation of Constantinople by Bulgaria, though quite decided not to permit the stay of the latter should it be prolonged.

In my opinion, M. Sazonof must be aware of the danger, and in any case His Majesty's Government have nothing to suggest except the protection of embassies and nationals.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 206.

Memorandum communicated by Count Benckendorff.

NOUS sommes d'avis qu'une déclaration faite dans le sens de la résolution du 31 mars à Sophia implique une démarche analogue à Constantinople, pour éviter tout malentendu possible. Les Ambassadeurs pourraient être chargés de répéter, ou à la

Porte que cette formule, renvoyant toute question d'ordre financier à la décision de la commission de Paris, doit être substituée au point 4 antécédent.

Cette décision des Puissances pourrait être motivée par le désir d'éviter la prise de Constantinople par les troupes bulgares.

Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres,
le 4 avril, 1913.

[16421] No. 207.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.**

(No. 80.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 8, 1913.

AT the meeting with the Ambassadors this afternoon various proposals were discussed as regards the reply to the allies, and eventually we drew up the resolution recorded in my telegram No. 90 of this evening to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

I suggested that, as regards the frontier to the south of Albania, the question might be referred to an international commission.

The Austrian and Italian Ambassadors said that they would refer the point to their Governments.

I observed that it was no use to continue the discussion of this point until the settlement of the questions of the cessation of hostilities between Turkey and the allies and the blockade of the Montenegrin coast.

We had some discussion as to the stopping of transports with munitions of war for Scutari.

I said that the British naval officer was instructed to co-operate in a blockade down to the mouth of the Drin; to warn transports that they must not proceed; and, if they disregard the warning, which was very unlikely, to take up a position indicating an intention to prevent them from effecting a landing. He was not, however, to fire upon them unless they took aggressive action, and then only in the last resort.

The Austrian Ambassador emphasised the importance of preventing transports from landing at San Giovanni di Medua.

It was observed that the blockade down to the mouth of the Drin would include this port, and though it was understood that the Austrian and German Governments desired the blockade to extend to Durazzo this point was not pressed for the moment at the reunion.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[15717] No. 208.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 8, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople,† to the effect that, though in consequence of the interruption of telegraphic communication with Smyrna he has no absolutely trustworthy news, information in his possession points to the fact that there has been some trouble there lately.

Sir E. Grey would suggest that, if the Lords Commissioners see no objection, a warship, perhaps the "Yarmouth" from Salonica, might be sent there, in accordance with Sir G. Lowther's proposal.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 243), Sir E. Goschen (No. 124), Sir R. Rodd (No. 103), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 153).
† No. 125.

[9354] No. 209.

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 8, 1913.

WITH reference to your letter of the 26th February, relative to the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to safeguard the shipping and commerce of European Powers in the ports and territorial waters of the several Balkan States, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith draft of the note which he would propose to address to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at this Court in reply to his Excellency's communication on the subject, dated the 6th February last.

I am to explain that, as these proposals do not appear to Sir E. Grey to secure for His Majesty's Government any commercial advantages which they do not already possess, or, at any rate, any which are at all comparable in importance with the drawbacks involved from a political point of view, by supporting the scheme, he has thought it preferable to avoid committing himself on the subject.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey would be glad to receive the concurrence of the Board of Trade in the draft note, as well as any observations which they may wish to offer on it, with as little delay as may be convenient.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[14375] No. 210.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 8, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that Sir P. Harvey, at present chief auditor, National Health Insurance Department, has been asked to serve as the representative of His Majesty's Government on the International Commission about to meet at Paris to settle the financial questions arising out of the present war, and that he has accepted this invitation.

I am to suggest, for the consideration of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, that during the time of his employment he should receive a subsistence allowance of 2*l.* a day for himself and 12*s.* 6*d.* for a servant, and be authorised to engage a sitting room at the hotel where he may lodge, or else that his actual expenses of lodging and subsistence should be refunded to him. His locomotion expenses would, of course, be charged to public funds.

I am to point out that the amount to be expended by him under the head of maintenance will doubtless be increased by the necessity of entertaining his colleagues on the commission and other official persons, and of returning the hospitality extended to him.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[16220] No. 211.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 270.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April* 3, 1913.

THE publication of the Turkish reply to the collective note of the Powers has evoked but little, if any, hostile criticism in the local press.

The general tone is one of submission to the inevitable and of a mild hopefulness for the future, the impression being, as expressed in the "Tanin," that the Great Powers have refused to lend themselves to the "essai d'un nouveau marchandage" on the part of the allies, as shown in the reservations contained in their last reply. While doubtful of Russia's attitude, the journal is of the opinion that the unanimity of the other Powers will suffice to force the allies to yield and accept the conditions proposed, although it admits "qu'il y a une grande différence entre prendre une décision et l'exécuter."

The "Tasviri-Efkiar," while unwilling to give or withhold its approval of the decision come to by the Government, who can be the only judges, says that the country must look to the necessity of taking eventual vengeance on the enemies of Turkey and of looking to the causes of her failure to effect a regeneration and bring the nation again into the path of progress.

The "Ikdam" points out the discrepancy, to the disadvantage of Turkey, between the Turco-Bulgarian frontier as proposed in the previous note to the allies and that laid down in the collective note now accepted. "The whole question of the cessation of hostilities," this organ somewhat obviously concludes, "depends on the attitude of the allies."

The "Sebah" emphasises the importance of Europe taking into consideration the future relations of the two countries and "fixing natural limits instead of an artificial frontier which, without giving either side any real territorial advantage, could only result in producing further subjects of dispute and leading to further and dangerous aspirations and jealousies."

These last criticisms coincide with those made to me by the Grand Vizier in an unofficial conversation on this point, in which he argued that the river frontier (Maritza–Ergene) originally suggested would have been infinitely superior to the straight line as offering less opportunities for differences between frontier guards.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[16224] No. 212.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 274.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April 5, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Monastir on the subject of military movements and unrest in Albania.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 212.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 16. Confidential.)

Sir, *Monastir, March 27, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that Javid Pasha has advanced from Berat towards Elbassan with a force estimated by the Servian authorities at 10,000 men, of whom about two-thirds are irregulars, with five field-guns and two mountain batteries. His headquarters are reported to have been, since the 17th instant, between Rasa and Balaini (some 17 miles south-west of Elbassan). Turco-Albanian detachments have advanced as far north as the Durazzo-Elbassan road and are carrying on guerilla warfare in the country immediately south and south-west of Elbassan.

The advance of Javid Pasha from Berat was preceded by irregular hostilities on the part of the Albanian population south of Elbassan manifested by attacks on isolated bodies of soldiers and on the Servian communications between Elbassan and Durazzo.

On the 12th instant, a Servian patrol of ten men is reported to have been annihilated near Belish (14 miles south-west of Elbassan), the Serbs retaliating by destroying that village as well as Murzi, Papri, and Cherikou, which lie a little further north.

The attack on a Servian transport caravan near Pekinj (on the Durazzo-Elbassan road) by Albanians from Lioushniya was reported in my immediately preceding despatch. The Serbs are reported to have retaliated by burning Lioushniya.

Simultaneously with this, there have been signs of unrest in the Dibra district. It was reported in my last despatch that the Dibra Malissores were sending away their wives and families to Mirdita, and now reports have been received that Servian troops of the 14th regiment have had a series of encounters to the north-west of Dibra.

The irregular following of Javid Pasha is said to be drawn entirely from the

fanatical Moslem element, amongst whom "hodjas" from Asia Minor are believed to have been at work.*

The nationalist notables of Elbassan, largely Bektashis, who last summer took to the hills as a protest against the Young Turkish régime, have attempted nothing against the Slav invader. Some of them complain that they have been threatened by their more ardent Moslem neighbours for their inactivity.

Strenuous measures against the spread of unrest have been resorted to by the Servian military authorities. Rifles and other weapons have been seized throughout the Ressna, Struga, and Ochrida districts, and as far as possible elsewhere, and it is forbidden to proceed from one village to another without a permit.

In spite of all this the authorities in Monastir refuse to admit that anything except the profoundest peace reigns in Albania.

The Greeks have made no advance from Tepeleni. Berat is the headquarters of Kemsaid Pasha at the head of a force whose strength is quite unknown.

Various notes.

1. General Goisovitch, who left Monastir on the 20th, has arrived with the staff of the Morava 1st ban division at Elbassan after visiting Dibra.

2. General Yourishitch-Sturm, who is now the senior officer at Monastir, commands the 1st Danube Division, to which he was recently transferred from the 1st Drina Division, which has gone to Scutari.

3. The 4th battalion of the 3rd regiment has arrived at Dibra from Ochrida.

4. The 2nd regiment, which left Monastir on the 21st instant, has reached Dibra.

5. The 1st regiment is in the Ochrida district—not in the Perlepé–Krushovo–Morihovo region as reported in my last despatch.

6. The road between Kjuks and Elbassan has been partly re-made and is now available for artillery.

7. Voivode Putnik, chief of the Servian general staff, arrived here on the 24th instant. He visited Perlepé and Ochrida, and returned to Uskub to-day.

I have, &c.

C. A. GREIG.

[16225] No. 213.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 275.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April 5, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch, from His Majesty's vice-consul at Monastir, reporting on an incident showing the strained state of Serbo-Bulgarian relations.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 213.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 17. Confidential.)

Sir, *Monastir, March 27, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that an incident has occurred here which is further evidence of the strained state of Serbo-Bulgarian relations.

M. Takof, a Bulgarian ex-Minister of the Interior, arrived at Monastir by train from Salonica on the 26th instant, was forbidden to leave the railway station on his arrival, and was sent back in spite of his protests the same evening in a carriage attached to a goods train.

The Servian authorities are convinced that his mission was to encourage the belief amongst the local Bulgarians that the present occupation will be of short duration and that this district will shortly be annexed by Bulgaria.

* The Acting Chief-of-Staff at Monastir tells me that many "hodjas" have recently been arrested and expelled from Albania by the Serbs.

It is noticed that the visits of Bulgarian officers to Monastir, which were frequent in the early days of the occupation, have entirely ceased.

The recent seizure by the Servian authorities at Kuprilu of inflammatory matter emanating from the Bulgarian committee is a further source of indignation.

M. Protitch, a former Servian vice-consul in Monastir, who is at present on special duty here, has recently returned from a short visit to Belgrade and seems to be convinced from what he heard in the capital that his Government will be unyielding in its claims to Monastir and all the territory in Servian occupation between the Vardar and the Drin. The belief and hope prevail in local official circles that the rival claims will be submitted to Russian arbitration. The intensely Serbophil attitude of my Russian colleague and his conversation suggest that Russian umpires would be more favourable to Servian than Bulgarian claims.

His feelings, at first very Bulgarophil, have undergone a remarkable change during the past two months.

I have, &c.
C. A. GREIG.

[16318] No. 214.

Pro-memoriâ communicated by Turkish Embassy, April 9, 1913.

LE Gouvernement Impérial ottoman a déjà décidé en principe l'envoi de deux ou trois délégués à la Commission financière qui se réunira éventuellement à Paris pour le règlement des questions financières se rattachant au rétablissement de la paix entre la Turquie et les États balkaniques. Cependant, l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane étant tout aussi intéressée dans ces questions financières, la Sublime Porte estime qu'il serait utile et équitable que cette Administration soit également représentée au sein de ladite commission, où ses délégués pourront être à même de défendre les intérêts des créanciers de la Turquie et fournir en même temps des renseignements utiles et impartiaux sur la situation financière de l'Empire ottoman.

La Sublime Porte aime à espérer que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique voudra bien apprécier l'opportunité de la présence de délégués de l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane dans la future Commission financière de Paris, et qu'il appuiera cette proposition au moment voulu auprès des autres intéressés.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 8 avril, 1913.

[16293] No. 215.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 9.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, April 8, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram dated the 8th instant from the Vice-Admiral commanding 3rd Squadron, H.M.S. "King Edward VII."

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 215.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April 8, 1913.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 322. Conference was held this morning as early as possible. The French instructions, however, were not clear, and the time and date for commencement of the blockade could not therefore be settled.

I submit that as soon as the information is received, the Montenegrin Government may be informed. Local notice will be given to the ports concerned.

It was decided by the conference that no ships of any nationality whatever will be allowed to enter or leave the blockaded area after the commencement of the blockade, with this exception, viz., that ships within the blockaded area will, if they desire to leave the area, be granted forty-eight hours in which to do so.

I submit that I may be informed at once if conditions of blockade are not agreed to.

[16258] No. 216.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 9.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, April 9, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram dated the 8th instant, relative to Montenegrin affairs.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 216.

Vice-Admiral of "King Edward VII" to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April 8, 1913.*

FRENCH captain has received orders from his Government agreeing to the institution of the blockade on condition that three days shall elapse between the notification of the blockade to Montenegro and the commencement of the blockade.

I should be glad if I might be informed as soon as the Montenegrin Government has been informed on what date the blockade should commence.

[16252] No. 217.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, April 8, 1913.*

AUSTRIAN consul reports from Antivari that a Russian ship from Odessa has finished unloading war material, of which eighty waggon-loads have been forwarded to Vir. Cargo included eight 6-inch howitzers. Russian explanation appears to be that this is material ceded [*sic*] to Montenegro two years ago, which has been waiting ever since for transport, but you can of course judge the effect which will be produced here. Some of the ammunition is being sent to the Lovtchen batteries, above Cattaro.

[16261] No. 218.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 53.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, April 8, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 50 of 6th April.

The Montenegrin Government have refused to forward communication from the Grand Vizier to the commandant of Scutari respecting the civil population, on the ground that the military authorities object for reasons connected with military operations in progress.

[16269] No. 219.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 54.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, April 8, 1913.*

I LEARN from his sons in Montenegro that the British vice-consul in Scutari has been severely wounded by a shell which struck the consulate. The latter is in the middle of the Christian quarter, and, to the best of my recollection, nowhere near a military establishment.

[16380] No. 220.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 140.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, April 9, 1913*

YOUR telegram No. 307 of 8th April.

Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that blockade should be at once extended from Cattaro to Durazzo, as otherwise Servians may land troops and guns at the latter port.

[16381] No. 221.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 141.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, April 9, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 139 of 7th April.

Sitting has been postponed until 11th April, as the German and Austrian Ambassadors have not yet received their instructions.

[16385] No. 222.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, April 9, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 152 of to-day.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs was surprised when I informed him this evening of hesitation of French naval commander in regard to immediate enforcement of blockade.

On telephonic enquiry Ministry of Marine stated that in absence from Paris of the Minister of Marine the instructions had not been sufficiently precise to make it quite clear how the commander was to act in regard to notification and enforcement of blockade.

At French Minister for Foreign Affairs' instance instructions are now being sent to French naval commander to act in concert with British admiral in accordance with your request.

[16373] No. 223.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 130.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, April 9, 1913.*

THE King of the Bulgarians has just visited Rodosto. It is officially reported that he was received with the greatest enthusiasm.

I attribute some importance to this visit, as there seems to be reason to believe that it was prompted by military party, who have never hesitated to express frank determination to force the Bulgarian Government to retain that town.

His Majesty is just now much influenced by the leading generals.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[16376] No. 224.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 131.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, April 9, 1913.*

ONE hundred and seventy more Turkish officers have arrived. Fifteen officers have broken parole. Their recapture is expected, and their action will render the lot of the remainder much harder.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[16357] No. 225.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, April 9, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 8th April.

The Greek Government have informed the Servian Government that if transports proceed they will not be convoyed by Greek ships of war.

They learn that the Servian troops are being disembarked at Salonica.

[16288] No. 226.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 87.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, April 9, 1913.*

FOLLOWING received from Salonica to-day :—

"Servian troops mentioned in my telegram of 6th April are being disembarked again."

[16353] No. 227.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 56.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, April 9, 1913.*

FOLLOWING for Director of Military Operations from the military attaché :—

"The following information is from a good source: The 47th division from Castelnuovo is concentrated at Cattaro; the 1st mountain brigade from Mostar is at Novesinje; the 5th mountain brigade from Zara at Stolac; the 9th and 10th brigades from Sarajevo at Kalinavic; the 12th brigade from Banjaluka at Sarajevo. The 8th division at Bozen and the 28th division at Laibach are stated to be in readiness to move by sea to Montenegro if required."

[16388] No. 228.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 57.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, April 9, 1913.*

SCUTARI.

Minister for Foreign Affairs enquired of me to-day whether I had heard of an idea, which he implied came from Paris, that Turkey should be asked to order the commander of the town of Scutari to surrender the place to the Great Powers, who would then occupy it with detachments of their troops. I told him that I had not as yet heard of this plan from any quarter.

[16389] No. 229.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 58.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, April 9, 1913.*

NAVAL demonstration.

Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that he was considerably annoyed by the demand put forward by the French commander that a delay of three days should take place before the blockade became official. He said that there was no justifiable reason for such a course, and that the sooner blockade became effective the better would it be for reaching the object that the Powers had in view.

He enquired whether I thought England would take part in blockade if France stood aside at the last moment. I replied that I had no information on this point.

[16258] No. 230.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 152.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 9, 1913.*

TELEGRAM No. 29 of 8th April from Vice-Admiral, His Majesty's ship "King Edward," to Admiralty.

Please urge that instructions be sent without delay to French commander to agree to a notification being made by the British admiral to the Montenegrin Government through the diplomatic channel at Cettinjé that, in consequence of their reply declining to accede to the request of the Powers, a blockade has been established from Antivari to the mouth of the River Drin.

The original suggestion was that three days should elapse after the first intimation to the King of Montenegro; this intimation was made by the admiral on the 5th, and four days have already elapsed.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 172; St. Petersburgh, No. 308; Rome, No. 132; Vienna, No. 132; Berlin, No. 153; and Cettinjé, No. 37.)

[16097] No. 231.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.[1]

(No. 155.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 9, 1913.*

MY telegram to Sir H. Bax-Ironside, No. 91 of 9th April.

You should inform Government to which you are accredited, and ask that similar instructions be sent.

[16097] No. 232.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 91.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, April 9, 1913.*

SIR G. LOWTHER'S telegram No. 187 of 8th April: Prohibition of despatch of silkworms' eggs.

You may mention matter to Bulgarian Government, and ask them to withdraw prohibition.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 173; Paris, No. 154; Rome, No. 134; Vienna, No. 134; and Berlin, No. 155.)

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[1] Also to Sir R. Rodd (No. 135), Sir F. Cartwright (No. 135), and Sir E. Goschen (No. 156).

[16215] No. 233.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 56.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 9, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 50 of 8th April.

I doubt whether Italian Government could be got to accept a plébiscite; the difficulty would be to ensure that it would be taken without pressure. An international commission has also been suggested and non-fortification of the coast; but I have not so far had any indication that the Italian Government would settle satisfactorily to Greece on either of these considerations. Discussion of southern frontier of Albania is, however, in a very early stage, and the Powers can hardly be expected to make progress with it while questions of Scutari and of continuance of war between Turkey and Bulgaria, involving gravest issues, remain so critical.

[16769] No. 234.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 126.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 9, 1913.*

IN general conversation with the German Ambassador to-day, I observed that I hoped that Austria would not take any precipitate or isolated action if Scutari fell. If Scutari did fall, I assumed that Austria would probably ask for an assurance that the agreement about the Albanian frontier was not to be affected by the fall: and, if the assurance was given, we should then proceed to transform the demand that the siege of Scutari should be raised into a demand that Scutari should be evacuated.

The Ambassador did not dissent from this, and he said nothing to indicate that he was aware of the apprehensions which the German Government had expressed to the Italian Government, as told me by the Italian Ambassador yesterday, respecting what would follow upon the fall of Scutari; nor did the German Ambassador give any indication of entertaining those apprehensions himself.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12862] No. 235.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget

(No. 28.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 9, 1913.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 56 of the 15th March, 1913, respecting the outrages committed upon Moslems in territory in Servian occupation, you should mention to the Servian Government the reports you have heard from Mr. Cuben, and point out the deplorable impression that such accounts must give when brought home to England.

You should therefore urge the Servian Government to exercise a close watch in order to prevent excesses, and express the hope of His Majesty's Government that those who can be proved to have been responsible for them will be punished as justice demands.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[13363] No. 236.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 101.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 9, 1913.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 232 of the 20th ultimo, forwarding a request from the Sublime Porte that steps may be taken to safeguard the rights of the Ottoman Public Debt in the provinces occupied by the Allies, and to secure the restitution of the sums seized by them.

Your Excellency should inform the Porte, in reply, that His Majesty's Government have already made representations on this subject at Sophia, Athens, and Belgrade.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12661] No. 237.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 49.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 9, 1913.*

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, enclosing a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Cavalla, reporting on the massacres of Moslems in that district.*

You should, while saying to the Bulgarian Government that these accounts cause a painful impression, express satisfaction that those charged with perpetrating or conniving at massacres are to be brought to trial.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[16514] No. 238.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 50.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 9, 1913.*

SIR A. NICOLSON took the opportunity of a visit from the Bulgarian Minister on the 7th instant to mention to him unofficially that we had received some very unpleasant reports from good sources of forcible conversions and even massacres of Pomaks and other Moslems by Bulgarians. These reports had caused a very painful impression, and Sir A. Nicolson did not wish to go into details with M. Madjarof as you would bring them unofficially to the notice of the Bulgarian Government. Sir A. Nicolson thought it desirable, however, that M. Madjarof should be made acquainted with the fact that we had received such reports. M. Madjarof expressed great concern, and said that he was sure that M. Gueshof would take all necessary steps for punishing guilty parties and for preventing any such outrages being perpetrated. There might have been, he said, an interregnum of anarchy before a proper system of administering the occupied districts had been established. Sir A. Nicolson said that he was quite sure M. Gueshof would do all that was possible, and we doubtless would hear from you the results of your conversation with M. Gueshof

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[16414] No. 239.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 66.)

Sir, *Athens, April 4, 1913.*

AT about 8 in the evening of the 18th March the appalling news began to circulate that His Majesty King George had been assassinated at Salonica. It was, of course, alleged that the crime was the work of a Bulgarian.

As soon as I heard it I went out and was fortunate enough to find M. Venizelos just returned from a Ministerial Council. His Excellency, with great emotion, confirmed the news, and told me the assassin was a "déséquilibré" Greek. "It is a terrible thing to say," said M. Venizelos, "but it is the cause of great thankfulness that he is a Greek." How true this is Mr. Lamb's reports abundantly show. Not only was the first idea in everybody's mind that the crime was the work of the Bulgarians, but even in the face of the apparently well-authenticated fact of the man's Greek nationality, there is

* Part VI, No. 363.

hardly a Greek but still believes that Bulgarian instigation was at the bottom of it. The presence of the Prince of Tirnovo at the funeral has therefore been a source of great anxiety to the authorities, but there has been nothing like a hostile demonstration, although his reception has contrasted with the enthusiasm of the welcome accorded by the people to the Servian Crown Prince.

Her Majesty Queen Olga was in Athens when the news arrived, on her way back to Salonica from Prevesa. It was broken to her by Prince and Princess Andrew and Prince George, who left with Her Majesty the following morning for Chalcis, whither the Russian *stationnaire* had been sent overnight to take them to Salonica. The Government telegraphed immediately to the new King, begging him to return to Athens at once. His Majesty started without delay, after issuing to his army the proclamation of which I have the honour to transmit a translation, and arrived at Athens early on the 20th ultimo.

In the meantime, the news of the King's murder was announced to the Chamber by the Prime Minister on the 19th ultimo. I have the honour to enclose translation of M. Venizelos's speech, and of those of the other party leaders. They constitute a fitting recognition of the services of King George to his adopted country, and a tribute of the personal affection with which His Majesty inspired his Ministers, even though for political motives they had all frequently criticised his attitude towards them when they were out of office. Now, however, no discordant note was heard.

The same has been the case in the press, in which expressions of horror at the crime and of regret for the loss which the nation has sustained are universal. Anecdotes of King George's simple kindness abound. Great sympathy for the widowed Queen is common among the people, and I am told by one of the few who accompanied the train conveying the Royal coffin to Tatoi, where the final interment took place, that crowds of peasants had collected along the line, who all knelt as the train passed.

On the 21st March King Constantine proceeded to the Chamber, where in the presence of the representatives of the nation, of the Metropolitan and the members of the Holy Synod, of the municipality of Athens, and the principal Government officials, His Majesty took the constitutional oath. This is the only formality provided by the Greek constitution and customs on the accession of a new King. The Diplomatic Body attended in uniform. Immediately afterwards M. Venizelos tendered to His Majesty the resignation of the Government. His Majesty desired them to retain their portfolios, and assured the Prime Minister of his entire confidence.

On the same afternoon the King left for Salonica, but was delayed by a dense fog which prevailed for several days in the Ægean, and which also delayed the return of the Royal yacht conveying King George's remains and the members of the Royal Family. She arrived at the Piræus on the 26th, and the body was deposited in the Cathedral at Athens, where it lay in State until the funeral on the 2nd instant. An account of the ceremonies will be given in a despatch of the treaty series.

Tragic as was the manner of the King's death, he was at least happy in the moment of it. He had seen the edifice he had laboured to construct for fifty years crowned by the victories of his army under the leadership of his son and successor. He had the assurance that his dynasty was at last firmly seated upon the throne which he had often during his long reign been tempted to abandon in despair. He had seen his aspirations realised beyond his most ambitious dreams. He will live in the memories of his people as a martyr to the national cause. Ascending the throne as he has done at the moment he had become the popular idol, King Constantine has an unequalled opportunity. Inferior in intelligence to his father and wanting in his dexterous pliability, he is a man of stronger character, and may be well fitted to deal with the new problems which will arise in the new situation. It is to be hoped that there will be no conflict of opinion between him and M. Venizelos, a man of equally strong character, until the development of the new Greece has been fairly started.

The newspapers have agreed to dub his Majesty "Constantine XII," in succession to the last Emperor of Constantinople, whom the numeration accepted here recognises as the XIth. The King himself, however, wisely signs "Constantine," without any number whatever.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure 1 in No. 239.

Speeches in the Hellenic Chamber.

THE Premier read the following :—

"With the deepest grief I inform the Chamber that King George, wounded yesterday afternoon by the hand of an assassin at Salonica, while he was returning from a walk, expired after a few moments.

"Before even the results of the military triumphs, to which its victorious General led the national army, had received international sanction, the best of Kings fell in the execution of his Royal duty, the highest among the honoured dead of the glorious war.

"But he lived long enough to see that new Greece, for which he laboured during the fifty years of his reign, now clearly outlined, and he departs with the joy that the object of his life has been attained.

"He was above all a constitutional monarch. Full of charity, he always royally forgot that personal friction into which the execution of his Royal duties led him, and he invariably accorded his full aid to the statesmen whom the lawfully manifested will of the nation designated from time to time.

"All who had the honour to collaborate with him know how sure was his judgment on every subject, and his responsible councillors especially felt that they could not wish for themselves a more valuable counsellor than their King himself.

"He based his strength on the love of his people, and one may declare with confidence that that love never failed the departed King, not even in the most troubled moments of his long reign.

"How deep was this never-ceasing feeling of love for the King is shown by the depth of the popular sorrow at the announcement of the loss.

"Fortunately the King departs, leaving a flourishing tree of the Royal House, which has struck its roots deep in the national soil.

"Nation and Royal Family, bearing in common their most heavy grief at the death of the most good and popular King and chief of the race, will progress in unceasing union in elaborating the fortunes of New Greece.

"The anxiety, which the nation feels because it is deprived of so prudent and so experienced a King in the midst of such critical circumstances, is moderated by the deep conviction that the new King Constantine, who has enlarged Greece by his military triumph, and has covered her with the laurel of military glory, will lead her with a firm hand also to glorious victories of peace."

M. Theotoky, in a voice often broken by sobs and with difficulty restraining his tears, said :—

"Profoundly moved by the misfortune which has smitten the whole nation, I express my indescribable grief at the death of the popular King who has reigned for 50 years, and ever contributed within the circle of his constitutional action to the progress of the country, and always fought the good fight for its enlargement and for the liberation of our enslaved brethren.

"Divine Providence has permitted him during the last days of his life to see many of his dreams realised, and following the victories of his army under the command of the laurel-crowned general, his son, he hoped, together with the festivities of his jubilee, to celebrate the extension of the frontiers of Greece and the liberation of our enslaved brethren, but the hand of an assassin severed the thread of his life, plunging the whole nation into sorrow and grief and the deepest mourning in days of joy for the victories of the army and navy.

"The Premier has excellently interpreted the sorrow and grief of the nation, and I considered that it was my duty to state that the mourning and grief of the Greek people is shared by the party of which I have the honour to interpret the views."

M. Rhallys said :—

"The national mourning and grief are manifested by the silence both of the representatives of the nation and of the whole city. For the detested criminal did not only strike the breast of the King of blessed memory, but he struck the nation itself, and in his crime outdid Herostratos and Ephialtes. The late King carries with him the entire gratitude of the nation for what he has done for it during 50 long years. His departure is so much the more painful in that the nation was

preparing to celebrate the great fête of his jubilee. And it is just on the eve of that great celebration that the hand of the malefactor comes to strike the guardian of the national desires and national dreams.

"The glory of his reign will never wax old so long as the human race endures, and his martyr death places him alongside of Kodros and of Constantine Palaiologos.

"Truly it is a case of a royal martyr for the nation, who, in the execution of his duty, a sentry placed by the national idea, remained unshaken at his post, and the whole nation looked to him and his presence there. Fortunately, behind him he leaves a successor who is crowned with the crown of glory and of laurel. If the blank left by his death in the nation is great, the nation can with confidence look to him who is called to take up and complete the patriotic work of his revered father, a popular King who, as the Premier rightly said, was a pattern of charity, of dignity and of tact, who, by his unaffected manner managed to tame even wild beasts, and everyone wonders how a viper could be found to strike his breast.

"May he be cursed and anathema, for his crime is an insult and a national shame. The hand of the executioner will not be able to wash away the national disgrace, and I hope that it may be shown that the criminal is a madman, for he must be a very brute to conceive and execute such an abomination as to strike his country. To the hecatombs of our modern heroes it was fated that the life of the late King should be added as a crowning sacrifice.

"Let us pray that, far from us, he may direct our country which he served faithfully and which, during his long and happy reign, he enlarged in a truly wonderful way, in the firm conviction that his brave son will complete his work and contribute to the entire national restoration."

M. Mavromichalis said :—

"The destestable crime, the news of which came last night, shook the soul of the whole nation. The nation is indignant and is astounded at this crime, which was so unexpected. We, too, hasten to mourn the death of that king under whose reign Greece was aggrandised."

The President said :—

"I beg you to give a mandate to the President to present himself before His Majesty our King Constantine and Her Majesty the revered Queen Mother, and interpret to both the most profound grief and the morning of the Chamber and of the Greek people for the great loss which so deeply affects the Greek soul.

"I think, too, that I interpret the universal feeling and that I carry out a duty which is incumbent upon the Greek nation, in proposing that the Chamber shall decide to request the Government to introduce a project of law providing for the erection of a monument in perpetual remembrance of our murdered king.

"I further propose that the Chamber shall fix the duration of its mourning at six months.

"I think also that, before the Chamber rises, that cry which at this moment leaves every Greek lip should be heard in the Chamber: Long live King Constantine."

Enclosure 2 in No. 239.

Proclamation of King Constantine to the Greek Army, dated Yannina, March 19, 1913.

BEING now called by Divine Providence to succeed the King my father on the vacant throne which he occupied for many years with glory and honour, I announce this to my army, to which I have devoted my whole life, and to which I have been closely bound by an unsuccessful and a successful war.

All the misunderstandings of the past having been long ago removed, I declare to the army that whilst always leading it I shall never cease to care for the progress of the army and of the fleet whose glorious achievements have enlarged and exalted our country.

[16395] No. 240.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 183.)

Sir, *Paris, April 9, 1913.*

AS instructed by your despatch No. 233 of the 5th instant, I have informed the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs unofficially that Sir Paul Harvey has been designated to represent His Majesty's Government on the forthcoming International Commission in Paris to deal with the financial questions arising out of the Balkan war.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has informed me unofficially that the following delegates for other countries have been designated :—

Germany.—Baron de Lancken, Minister Plenipotentiary and Counsellor of the German Embassy; M. de Pritsch, German delegate on the Council of the Ottoman Debt; assisted by MM. de Schwabach and Helferich.

Russia.—M. Sevastopoulo, Counsellor of the Russian Embassy; M. Arthur Raffalovitch, Financial Adviser to the Russian Embassy; M. Soldatenkof, "fonctionnaire spécial chargé de missions du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères"; M. Nicolas Raffalovitch.

Austria-Hungary.—Count Soumssich, Minister Plenipotentiary and Counsellor of the Austro-Hungarian Embassy; M. de Janko, Austro-Hungarian delegate on the Council of the Ottoman Debt; M. d'Adler, banker.

France.—M. de Margerie, "Directeur adjoint" at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs; M. Cout, Sous-Directeur; M. Luquet, "Directeur du Mouvement général des Fonds" at the Ministry of Finance; M. Sergent, Vice-Governor of the Banque de France; M. de la Boulinière, French delegate on the Council of the Ottoman Debt; M. Ponsot, of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, secretary to the commission.

The Italian Government have not yet made known the names of their delegates.

The representatives of the Powers will be called delegates and will not be plenipotentiaries.

The title of the commission will probably be "La Commission internationale pour le Réglement des Questions financières balkaniques."

It is desired that the commission should hold its first meeting on the 19th April, and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is anxious to know whether His Majesty's Government accept this date.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

16438] No. 211.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received April 10.)

Sir, *Board of Trade, April 9, 1913.*

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 8th April, enclosing copy of a note which Sir E. Grey proposes to address to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador with reference to the proposals contained in his Excellency's communication of the 6th February as to arrangements in respect of shipping and commerce of the European Powers in the ports and territorial waters of the several Balkan States.

In reply I am to state that, subject to the following observations, the Board concur as to the nature of the reply which it is proposed to address to Count Mensdorff.

They are disposed to suggest, however, that the last part of paragraph 5 of the draft note (*i.e.*, from the words "and to secure" down to "subjects or citizens") might be omitted. As stated in the Board's letter of the 26th February the reference to the treatment of merchandise in the original Austrian proposal was probably not intended to extend beyond treatment in respect of the loading and unloading, &c., of the cargo of vessels. The question of trade relations with the allied States after the war, including that of customs duties, was fully dealt with by the Board in their letter of the 31st March, with respect to the proposals of the German Government.

As regards the earlier portion of this paragraph the Board are disposed to think that whilst it might suffice to urge the allies in a friendly way to refrain from declaring

trade between their existing ports and ports in newly acquired territories to be coasting trade, serious objection should be taken to any attempt to declare trade between the ports of the different allied States to be coasting trade. They suggest, therefore, for Sir E. Grey's consideration, that the paragraph in question might be worded somewhat as follows :—

"If negotiations are undertaken with the Balkan States and a disposition on their part should become manifest to restrict existing coasting trade to domestic ships, it might be desirable to urge the allies in a friendly way to refrain from any attempt to declare trade between their existing ports and ports in newly acquired territories to be coasting trade to the consequent exclusion of foreign shipping. If, as His Majesty's Government have no reason to anticipate, any attempt should be made to declare trade between the ports of the different allied States to be coasting trade, such a proposal would, of course, meet with serious objection."

I am, &c.
H. LLEWELLYN SMITH.

[16465] No. 212.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 10.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April 9, 1913.*

WITH reference to your letter of yesterday, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that His Majesty's ship "Hibernia" has been ordered to proceed to Smyrna, and to report by wireless telegraphy on the situation there.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

[16391] No. 213.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 10.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April 9, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram dated the 9th instant relative to Montenegrin affairs.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 213.

Admiralty to Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII."

(Telegraphic.) *Admiralty, April 9, 1913.*

PROPOSED conditions of blockade are agreed to. With reference to your telegrams Nos. 28 and 29, efforts have been made to induce French Government to send orders at once to French Commander instructing him to agree to your notifying the Government of Montenegro through His Majesty's Minister at Cettinjé that, as a result of their refusal to agree to the Powers' request, a blockade has been instituted between Antivari and the mouth of the Drin. When the French commander gives his consent you should notify direct to Cettinjé that blockade will be enforced at once.

[16523] No. 214.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 10.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April 10, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request that you will inform the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that, in order to facilitate

wireless communication with His Majesty's ships off the coast of Montenegro, His Majesty's ship "Medea" is to-day proceeding to Corfu from Malta.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

[16470] No. 245.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 10.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 10, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram No. 33, dated the 10th instant, relative to Montenegrin affairs.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 245.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April 10, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 325.

French commander has received orders, and blockade will commence at 8 A.M. to-day. I have telegraphed notification to Royal Government through the diplomatic channel at Cettinjé.

[16771] No. 246.

Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to Tewfik Pasha, dated April 10, 1913.—(Communicated by Tewfik Pasha, April 10.)

(Confidential.)
(Télégraphique.)

NOTRE Ambassadeur à Rome télégraphie que le Marquis de San Giuliano lui a de nouveau déclaré que l'Italie s'était décidée à nous appuyer dans la question des îles, mais que, pour faire triompher notre point de vue, nous devrions gagner à notre cause le Cabinet de Londres, qui paraîtrait hésitant à partager la manière de voir de la Triplice.

Dans son avant-dernier discours au Parlement, Sir E. Grey avait affirmé la nécessité de consolider l'Empire ottoman dans ses possessions asiatiques. Or, devant cette déclaration catégorique l'hésitation du Cabinet de Londres ne peut plus se concevoir, puisque sans les îles il nous serait impossible d'assurer la tranquillité et la défense de notre Empire asiatique et des Dardanelles.

Je ne doute pas que votre Altesse parviendra à faire dissiper cette hésitation du Gouvernement anglais et l'amener à se rallier à notre point de vue.

[16450] No. 247.

Sir C. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 142. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, April 9, 1913.*

I WAS informed by M. Sazonof to-day that he had had a short conversation with M. Delcassé yesterday, and that the latter had told him that the German Government had made representations to the Italian Government in regard to the present serious situation, and had sounded them as to the future attitude of Italy. Montenegro would never be permitted by Austria to retain Scutari in the event of its fall, while Austria would never be allowed by Russia to use force in expelling the Montenegrins from that town. Thus war was inevitable and only a question of time, and as such was the case it suited Germany that it should take place immediately.

The accuracy of the above was, M. Sazonof said, confirmed by a telegram which had been addressed to him by the Russian Ambassador at Rome, although it merely referred to the reply of the Italian Government. The gist of this reply was that Italy was entirely opposed to all idea of war, and that the terms of the Triple Alliance laid her under no obligation to take part in a war undertaken on account of Scutari.

M. Sazonof further informed me that he had received a communication from the German Ambassador, in which, although war was not mentioned, attention was drawn to the serious anxiety felt by the German Government, and to the excited state of public opinion in Russia, of which the recent demonstrations in St. Petersburgh bore witness, and in which enquiry was made as to the future attitude of Russia. M. Sazonof had declared to Count Pourtalès that any suspicion of Russian encouragement given to Montenegro was most unjust, as Russia had been using all her influence at Cettinjé for weeks past, and long before any move had been made by the other Powers, to induce the Montenegrin Government to listen to reason. The attitude of Russia was open to no misunderstandings. She had come to an agreement on the question of Scutari and Djakova, and she intended to abide by it. His Excellency then sent for text of the telegram which the Emperor of Russia had addressed to King Nicholas and gave it to the Ambassador to read. Latter expressed his satisfaction, but continued to speak of anxiety felt by his Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs then reminded him of communiqué published in this morning's papers, forbidding the holding of future demonstrations at St. Petersburgh.

I asked M. Sazonof what Russia would do if the naval demonstration failed to effect its object, and if Austria, as seemed probable, had recourse to more effective methods of coercion. His Excellency replied that Scutari was not of sufficient interest for Russia to justify a war, and that, therefore, she would have to let things take their course. The country did not want war. Only St. Petersburgh, Moscow, and "Novoe Vremya" favoured the idea. The worst was that people believed that Austria was bluffing. I told him that this view had been expressed to me in a conversation which I had recently had with the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaievitch and a Russian general, and that I had told them that this was a question on which Austria could not yield. His Excellency said it was a vital question for Austria. He would not, therefore, protest were she to have resort to military action against Montenegro; but such action must be restricted to Scutari, and must not be extended to Servia, even should the latter, as Montenegro's ally, offer resistance to any Austrian force sent to Scutari. Were Austria at the same time to threaten Belgrade, war would be inevitable. He proposed to prepare public opinion for some action by Austria by publishing to-morrow a statement showing how Montenegro had broken her engagements to Russia by commencing the war without Russia's permission and by refusing to listen to her advice. M. Sazonof added that the Emperor, who was extremely angry with King Nicholas, had stated yesterday that the latter must be left to his fate.

I subsequently received a visit from M. Delcassé, who saw M. Sazonof after I had done. His Excellency is very pessimistic in regard to the present attitude of Germany. He declared that facts must be taken into consideration. The economic condition of Germany was not nearly so good as that of France, and the rate of taxation was eight times higher in Germany than in France. The former could not, therefore, endure for long the strain put upon her by the new taxes which the increase of her armaments rendered necessary. Moreover, she preferred that the evil day should not be postponed any longer, realising, as she did, that in a few years' time the Balkan States would be far more powerful than they were now. War in the immediate future might be averted by Russia's pacific attitude in regard to Scutari; but before long some other pretext for war might be found. The only thing that Germany respected was force. It was necessary, therefore, for us to make our preparations beforehand.

[16386] No. 248.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 76. Confidential.) [By Post.
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Paris, April 9, 1913.*

I GATHERED from M. Pichon this evening the following information:—

The Servian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin has informed the German Foreign Office that in view of the blockade by the Powers the Servian Government will not attempt to send troops for the siege of Scutari.

The German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh having stated that it is believed in some quarters that if Scutari falls the attitude of Russia on the question of that town will change, he has been told by the highest authority that, the word of Russia having been given, there will be no departure from the decision that it shall be included in Albania, and there can be no doubt on the point on the part of the King of Montenegro, as he has been warned to that effect.

M. Pichon does not think now that the King of the Bulgarians will attempt to enter Constantinople.

[16459] No. 249.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 188.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Constantinople, April 10, 1913.*

FOLLOWING telegram has been received from British consul-general at Smyrna, dated 9th April :—

"Greek warships bombarded Aivali and Dikili to-day."

[16536] No. 250.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 56.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, April 10, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day : Blockade.

I have addressed a note to Montenegrin Government in sense of vice-admiral's telegram and have informed representatives of Powers.

[16524] No. 251.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 88.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, April 10, 1913.*

UNDER-SECRETARY of State for Foreign Affairs, whom I have just seen, told me that instructions have been sent to Servian troops before Scutari to undertake no operations till further orders. He thought that Servian Government would now find means of conforming to the wishes of the Powers.

In reply to my enquiry whether I could count upon this as reliable, he replied in the affirmative, but I will telegraph again as soon as I have been able to obtain confirmation.

[16532] No. 252.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 132. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, April 10, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 122 of 4th April.

Leader of Stambulofist party, to which General Savof belongs, informs me that, unless the Powers bring immediate pressure on the allies, he anticipated that strenuous efforts would be made very soon to force the lines at Chatalja, and especially at Bulair. He said that enthusiasm of the army is remarkable, and that it is increasingly difficult to restrain the troops. This is corroborated from other reliable sources.

M. Genadief is himself a man of peace, but he is in constant direct communication with General Savof, and I consider his knowledge of the situation to be even better than that of the Prime Minister. Only my German and my Austrian colleagues have as yet received instructions in the sense of your telegram No. 90 of 8th April.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[16380] No. 253.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 157.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 10, 1913.*

St. PETERSBURGH telegram No. 140 of 9th April.

Enquire of French Government if they would be willing to agree to blockade being extended to Durazzo. We have no objection.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 315.)

[16269] No. 254.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 76.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, April 10, 1913.*

CETTINJÉ telegram No. 54 of 8th April.

You should inform Servian Government, and say that I warned Montenegrin Government last month against indiscriminate bombardment ; that after the diplomatic support we have given on some of the points in which Servia was most interested it is most disappointing that this should have happened in the course of operations conducted, I understand, by a Servian general ; that pending further information I reserve decision as to what steps we should take.

[16450] No. 255.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 159. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 10, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 314 of 10th April to St. Petersburgh.

You may repeat to Minister for Foreign Affairs on first convenient opportunity the same language that I have used to Italian Ambassador.

[16450] No. 256.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 314.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 10, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 142 of 9th April.

Italian Ambassador mentioned to me privately the apprehension of German Government that if Scutari fell Russia would never consent to Montenegro being turned out, and war must ensue.

I replied that I did not believe Russian Government would take this attitude. I hoped, therefore, that if Scutari fell Austria would not take any precipitate or isolated action. She might naturally ask for assurance that Albanian frontier agreement was not affected by fall of Scutari, and on this being received an international demand would be addressed to Montenegro to evacuate Scutari.

I took an opportunity subsequently of saying the same thing to the German Ambassador, who, however, did not express to me any apprehension of war.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs, adding that I regard the Albanian agreement as the great safeguard for peace, and am very glad that he means to uphold it.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 158, Very Confidential.)

[16269] No. 257.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, April 10, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 54 of 8th April: Firing on non-combatants at Scutari.

You should at once make a strong representation, saying that, if the facts are as stated in your telegram, I shall have to consider very seriously what steps it is proper for His Majesty's Government to take, and whether I should not at once make the facts public, together with your telegram No. 23 to me of 19th March and the warning contained in my telegram No. 29 to you of 20th March.

[14849] No. 258.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 242.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 10, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 223 of the 5th instant on the subject of the International Commission, which is to meet in Paris to settle the financial questions arising out of the present war, I have to inform your Excellency that I have received a communication from the French Ambassador stating that the French Government propose that the participating Governments should be represented by the councillors of their embassies, assisted by technical experts.

Your Excellency should inform me whether you consider that any useful purpose would be served by the attendance of Mr. Carnegie at the meetings of the Commission in company with Sir Paul Harvey.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[17253] No. 259.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 249.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 10, 1913.*

M. CAMBON spoke to me to-day about the southern frontier of Albania. He pointed out the exceeding difficulty of enforcing an agreement unacceptable to Greece.

I said that this had been preoccupying me also. I was reluctant to become a party to an agreement unless it could be enforced. There could be no question of our joining in a naval demonstration against Greece.

M. Cambon confirmed my impression that France also would not join in a demonstration.

I said that Germany, whose Court was now much interested in the Greek Court, would presumably not like to take any forcible steps, and I did not suppose that Italy alone would undertake the task of turning the Greeks out.

M. Cambon asked me if I had discussed this difficulty with the German Government.

I replied that I had not yet done so. I was afraid of impeding the chance of securing a cessation of hostilities on the terms of our last reply to the allies. If we could settle the southern frontier of Albania in a week it would be a help to securing a cessation of hostilities. But to discuss the frontier without settling it would probably be an inducement to Greece to work for a negative or evasive reply about the cessation of hostilities. I had impressed upon the Greek Minister this afternoon that I thought that, until the critical question of the terms of peace had advanced sufficiently to secure a cessation of hostilities, and till the critical question of Scutari, which was so closely bound up with the first question, was settled, the Powers could not proceed to an agreement about the southern frontier of Albania. I wished Greece to feel that she had nothing to gain in this repect by prolonging the war. I would propose, therefore, that we should present our reply to the allies, as I hoped that we should do this week. We should then wait to know whether it resulted in a cessation of hostilities, and only after that should we proceed to discuss the south of Albania. When

the time came, it should be pointed out how essential it was to have some idea of how the agreement was to be enforced before we arranged it.

M. Cambon entirely concurred in this, and said that it would be necessary for Austria and Italy to make some proposal that Greece could reasonably accept.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[17254] No. 260.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 250.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 10, 1913.*

M. CAMBON spoke to me to-day of the various suggestions for avoiding an entry by the Bulgarians into Constantinople. The Russian Government were willing that the question should be raised by the Powers, and that France, England, and Russia should come to an agreement, which they might bring to the notice of the Powers. M. Cambon said that this might be done either by a proposal made by us three to the other Powers, or by my bringing the question before the meeting of Ambassadors.

I said that I would take this latter course. His Majesty's Government had come to a decision last week that all we were prepared to do was to protect our embassy and nationals, and Moslem holy places if this could be done.

M. Cambon asked what I thought of protecting the Sultan in his Palace, and preventing him from leaving Constantinople.

I said that we might protect the Sultan's person for the sake of Moslem feeling; but, as far as his prestige was concerned, I feared that we could not save it by retaining him in Constantinople under European protection.

M. Cambon said that M. Pichon wished to know what I thought of a representation in Sophia by France, Russia, and ourselves to deter the Bulgarians from going to Constantinople.

I said that I did not like this idea. If we three Powers made are presentation without the other Powers, the Bulgarians would at once infer that the Triple Alliance was not of the same mind, and that there was a division amongst the Powers. I thought, therefore, that either Russia should take in Sophia what steps she thought fit, and say alone what she liked, or else that anything that was said should be said by all the Powers.

M. Cambon said that his personal opinion entirely agreed with mine.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[17255] No. 261.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 251.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 10, 1913.*

M. CAMBON spoke to me again to-day of the threatening nature of the German communication to the Italian Government about the prospects of war.

I told him what had passed between the Italian Ambassador and myself, indicating the procedure that I thought natural, and my forecast of events, if Scutari fell. I said that this had been confirmed since by what M. Sazonof had said to Sir George Buchanan. Indeed, M. Sazonof now went so far as to say that the Russian Government were very angry with the King of Montenegro, and that, if the Austrians took separate action, so long as they did not take any against Servia, Russia would allow matters to take their course.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[17220] No. 262.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 252.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 10, 1913.*

M. CAMBON spoke to me to-day about the suggestion that Turkey should cede Scutari to the Powers, who could then dispose of it as they desired.

I said that I had no objection to make to the proposal, provided that the Powers would first consider what steps they were prepared to take to protect Scutari if it was entrusted to them. The King of Montenegro was really now defying the Powers and not Turkey. If to-morrow Turkey ceded Scutari to the Powers he might continue to defy the Powers, as he was doing to-day; but the Powers, having accepted Scutari, would become responsible for its protection. They ought not to accept this responsibility till they were prepared to take steps to give protection.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[15376] No. 263.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 152.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 10, 1913.*

M. DE ETTER called on the 1st April and communicated to Sir A. Nicolson the memorandum of which I transmit herewith copy to your Excellency.

On the 3rd April Sir A. Nicolson informed Count Benckendorff with reference to this document that Bulgaria could not, in view of the fact that most of the Powers are opposed to an indemnity, be promised more than that financial questions arising out of the war shall be referred to the commission at Paris in which the belligerents shall participate.

For any promise to make definite concessions it would be necessary to consult all the Powers.

If Bulgaria desired peace she would accept the conditions already proposed by the Powers. If she had really determined to go to Constantinople nothing but the use of force would prevent her: the Russian Government was the only Power that was likely to resort to this extreme. We could raise no objection to what steps Russia might consider it necessary to take against Bulgaria to prevent Russian interests being disturbed and prejudiced, but unless Russia made it clear at Sophia that she intended to act, if need be, diplomatic remonstrances were not likely to be of any use, and if made by one group of Powers only would cause Bulgaria to lean to the other group.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[16354] No. 264.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 11.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 10, 1913.*

M. POPOVITCH called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 8th April to plead once more the cause of his country. Sir A. Nicolson could do no more than press him to recommend to his Government to cede to the wishes of the Powers, but he maintained that this was impossible. M. Popovitch, however, hinted in a roundabout way that perhaps his Government would not be too intransigent over Scutari itself if the frontier could otherwise be amended more to the advantage of Montenegro. He went into no details, but dropped the hint.

M. Popovitch said that the town was short of provisions, but that Essad Pasha, an Albanian, was holding out, as the Austrians had promised to make him Prince of Albania, and as the Montenegrin Government had been unable to provide the 80,000*l.* for which he had been ready to sell Scutari. M. Popovitch said that Essad Pasha had murdered his colleague, the Turkish commander, and so was free to act independently. Sir A. Nicolson asked if Essad Pasha had actually asked to be bribed. M. Popovitch

Enclosure in No. 263.

Memorandum communicated by M. de Etter.

EN présence de la situation que créerait l'entrée éventuelle des Bulgares à Constantinople, la question d'une indemnité reprend une importance des plus sérieuses.

Il n'est guère à prévoir que la Bulgarie, une fois qu'elle aura atteint la mer de Marmara n'y renonce, autrement que sous pression armée.

En ce cas le sort de Constantinople et la liberté de la navigation dans les détroits deviendrait à tel point précaire que le Gouvernement Impérial ne pourrait s'abstenir de se munir de garanties réelles pour la liberté de son commerce de la mer Noire, qui autrement tomberait sous la dépendance de la Bulgarie.

Ceci pourrait modifier essentiellement les conditions qui ont jusqu'ici présidé aux efforts tentés pour la solution de la crise balkanique et ouvrir la porte à des complications sérieuses.

Une opposition énergique aux projets bulgares de la part des Puissances de l'entente semble, en conséquence, être devenue urgente.

Le Gouvernement bulgare devrait, selon M. Sazonof, être mis en garde contre toute exigence d'accès à la mer de Marmara. Il devrait être prévenu qu'elles y opposeraient une résistance décidée, et que les conséquences de sa tentative seraient au détriment direct, tant au point de vue d'indemnité de guerre, qu'à celui de ses règlements de comptes avec les alliés.

La demande catégorique formulée à Sophia devrait toutefois être suivie de la promesse que le principe d'une contribution de guerre serait admis si la Bulgarie se décidait à mettre sans retard fin aux opérations militaires, qui portent menace au sort de Constantinople et de l'Empire de Turquie.

Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres,
le 1er avril, 1913.

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said that Essad Pasha had not put it quite so crudely, but had said he had left a valise with 80,000*l.* in it behind him before he had entered Scutari, and it would be to the advantage of everyone if it could be found and restored to him.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[17064]

No. 265.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 35.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, April 10, 1913.

THE Greek Minister came to see me to-day and practically gave me to understand that the Greeks would agree not to fortify anything on what he called the Corfu Canal or on the coast from the south of Corfu northwards, about which the Italians were so anxious.

I said that I had already mentioned this to the Italian Ambassador as a possibility, and now that the Greek Minister had said this to me I would mention it again; but he must not infer from what I said that I had any indication that the Italian Government were going to be influenced by it. For the present I had no indication of this sort.

I told the Minister that, till the critical question of Scutari was settled, and some arrangement was reached on the question of the cessation of hostilities between Turkey and the allies—a question that had become critical also because, if the war continued, the question of Constantinople might be raised, and with it perhaps the question of the whole or a great part of Asia Minor—I did not see how the Powers could settle down to a discussion of the southern frontier of Albania.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[14849]

No. 266.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon.

HIS Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has the honour to acknowledge receipt of the French Ambassador's communication of the 29th ultimo, on the subject of the International Commission which is to meet in Paris to settle the financial questions arising out of the present war.

Sir E. Grey has the honour to state in reply that His Majesty's Government will be represented on this commission by Sir H. Paul Harvey, K.C.M.G., who will be prepared to go to Paris whenever the French Government are ready to open the discussions.

Foreign Office, April 10, 1913.

[16557]

No. 267.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 12.)
Sir,

Cettinjé, April 6, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 46 of the 5th April, I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of the communication made on the 22nd March to the Montenegrin Government by the representatives of the Powers at Cettinjé relative to the bases of negotiation to be adopted in the proposed mediation between the allies and Turkey, also the text of the reply received from the Montenegrin Government yesterday evening.

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 267.

Joint Note addressed to Montenegrin Government.

LES Gouvernements des Puissances sont d'avis qu'il convient de prendre acte avec satisfaction de l'acceptation de la médiation des Puissances par les alliés, en leur faisant observer qu'avant d'ouvrir une discussion sur les conditions de la paix il appartient aux Puissances de formuler leurs vues sur les bases des négociations qui devraient être adoptées.

Ces bases sont les suivantes :—

1. Frontières turques européennes Énos–rivière Ergene–Midia ; tous les territoires à l'ouest de cette ligne seront cédés par la Turquie aux États alliés à l'exception de l'Albanie, dont le régime et la délimitation seront réservés aux Puissances.

2. Le règlement de la question des îles de la mer Égée sera laissé à la décision des Puissances.

3. La Turquie devra se désintéresser complètement de la Crète.

4. Les Puissances ne peuvent se montrer favorables à une demande d'indemnité de guerre, mais elles admettront les alliés à prendre part aux discussions de la commission internationale de Paris pour un règlement équitable de leur participation à la dette ottomane et aux charges financières des territoires qui leur seront attribués. La Turquie sera de même invitée à prendre part aux délibérations de cette commission.

En communiquant à votre Excellence les conditions ci-dessus énumérées nous nous faisons un devoir de porter à votre connaissance que les Gouvernements des Puissances estiment qu'il convient de procéder à la cessation des hostilités dès l'acceptation de ces préliminaires.

Dans le cas où le Gouvernement Royal refuserait d'admettre les vues des Puissances, celles-ci déclarent qu'il ne pourra compter sur leur concours pour le règlement des questions financières et autres dont une solution s'imposera après la conclusion de la paix.

Cettigné, le 22 mars, 1913.

Enclosure 2 in No. 267.

Note communicated by the Montenegrin Government.

LES États alliés expriment leur reconnaissance aux Grandes Puissances pour leurs efforts à amener la conclusion de la paix et, désirant sincèrement les faciliter dans leur tâche, acceptent leurs conditions pour la médiation sous les réserves suivantes :—

1. Lors de la fixation définitive de la frontière en Thrace, la ligne indiquée dans les conditions formulées par les Puissances sera prise comme base et non comme ligne définitive.

2. Les îles de la mer Égée seront cédées par la Turquie aux alliés.

3. Les alliés estiment qu'ils doivent connaître au préalable les frontières projetées de l'Albanie, espérant qu'elles seront conformes à celles qu'ils ont proposées à Londres.

4. La demande d'une indemnité de guerre doit être acceptée en principe, en laissant le soin d'en fixer le montant à la commission qui étudiera les questions financières, commission dans laquelle les États alliés seront représentés.

5. Les États alliés acceptent que les opérations de guerre cessent dès que les conditions ci-dessus exposées auront été favorablement accueillies et admises.

Cettigné, le 5 avril, 1913.

[16535]

No. 268.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

Cettinjé, April 10, 1913.

FOLLOWING telegram received from Vice-Admiral Burney :—

"Beg you will convey my deep regret to his Excellency the President of the Council of Ministers of the Royal Government of Montenegro at his reply to my note received on 6th April, and to inform him that, in consequence of the Royal Government's decision not to comply with the wishes of the Great Powers of Europe, the international fleet have established a close blockade of the coast from Antivari to the mouth of the River Drin from 8 o'clock this morning, 10th April, 1913, and no vessels be permitted to enter the ports on that coast from that time. Vessels already in the ports and desirous of leaving will be allowed forty-eight hours from the time previously mentioned, that is, until 8 o'clock on 12th April, 1913, to leave the blockaded waters."

Please inform all representatives of the Powers at Cettinjé.

[16683]

No. 269.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 89.)
(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, April 11, 1913.

MY immediately preceding telegram of 10th April.

The Prime Minister informs me that orders have been sent to withdraw Servian troops from all further operations against Scutari.

I did not ask for any explanations of this sudden change of attitude after all the arguments so lately urged as to the impossibility of abandoning Montenegro, but the Prime Minister mumbled something about the pressure of the Powers, strong representations by Russia, and that treaty of alliance with Montenegro was at an end. He hoped that Servia would now regain the sympathies of the Powers.

[16681]

No. 270.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 90.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Belgrade, April 11, 1913.

CETTINJÉ telegram No. 54 of 8th April.

The Prime Minister does not think that Servian forces can be responsible for the shell which struck the consulate. Until a few days ago they had nothing but mountain batteries, not sufficient to cause much damage. The big guns now placed in position have not been used, and will not be, as order has been sent to withdraw. He thinks that the shell must have come from one of the field guns sent by Servia previously, and handled by Montenegrin troops, especially as the Servian commander's instructions have all along been to be particularly careful to avoid firing at hospitals, churches, consulates, &c., and also as after the check experienced some six weeks ago the Servian contingent was ordered to cease all operations until the arrival of reinforcements.

Could you inform me approximately of the date when vice-consul was wounded ?

[16692]

No. 271.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, April 11, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 159 of 10th April.

I spoke to-day to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in accordance with your instructions.

His Excellency said he was very glad to hear your views, and wished me to tell you that he had taken and was taking every opportunity to impress on Austro-

Hungarian Government necessity for avoiding precipitate and isolated action. He had begged them to abstain at all events from moving until European concert had exhausted its efforts and Montenegro still remained recalcitrant. In the latter case Austria would have to act and she would have Germany's diplomatic support, but best thing in his opinion would be that she should then have a mandate. He added that as the Russian Government had stated that they would abide by Albanian agreement he did not anticipate they would raise objections even if Austria acted alone. He was therefore easier in his mind, particularly since reading Russian communiqué.

He was, however, troubled by three things: (1) That besides Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had acted both loyally and courageously in this question, there were the Pan-Slavists to be reckoned with; (2) that the Servians were said to be sending troops to Scutari by land from Durazzo and elsewhere; (3) intense nervous excitement at Vienna.

I told him that Servian Chargé d'Affaires had told me only this morning that his Government had decided not to send any more troops, and his Excellency admitted that consul who had reported news might be mistaken.

On the whole Secretary of State seemed somewhat reassured, but he is evidently uneasy with regard to feeling in Vienna.

[16689] No. 272.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 71.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, April 11, 1913.*

YOUR circular telegram of 9th April: Silkworms' eggs.

Italian Government agree, and have sent instructions to their representative at Sophia.

[16690] No. 273.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 72.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, April 11, 1913.*

MONTENEGRO.

Secretary-General informs me that information received by Italian Foreign Office from Cettinjé is that King will, in spite of his declarations, accept idea of compensation, to which Austria-Hungary has now at length agreed, provided that proposal comes from some other Power. Italy would be prepared to make it.

[16676] No. 274.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, April 11, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 157 of 10th April.

The French Government have not yet heard from St. Petersburgh on the subject of an extension of the blockade to Durazzo, but as soon as M. Sazonof makes known his desire to that effect the French Minister for Foreign Affairs will at once acquiesce.

[16685] No. 275.

Sir G Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 145.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, April 11, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 314 of 10th April.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he had two days ago instructed Russian Minister at Belgrade to communicate to Servian Government text of Emperor's telegram to King Nicholas, and that, in consequence of what Russian Minister had said, Servian Government had given orders that their troops were to abstain from any further active operations against Scutari.

This, his Excellency said, ought to deprive Austria of any pretext for isolated action, and, as he had told German Ambassador, it was only such isolated action that could render situation dangerous.

[16686] No. 276.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 146.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, April 11, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 141 of 9th April: Bulgaria and Roumania.

At the meeting to-day Ambassadors of Triple Alliance adhered to their demand for the cession of a few kilomètres of the coast, while we declined to sanction any cession of territory in addition to Silistria.

Austrian Ambassador proposed that compensation might be found for Bulgaria by an assurance that when the Powers decided future destiny of Ægean islands Thasos and Samothrace should be assigned to Bulgaria. French Ambassador and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs objected that this would be going beyond our mandate and would cause friction between Greece and Bulgaria. The latter added that he could not accept it, as he was already bound to support Greek claims to the islands. His Excellency added that the only possible satisfaction that we could give Bulgaria was for us to recommend that the commission eventually appointed to fix Turco-Bulgarian frontier should be authorised to deflect proposed line a little to the south and east.

As the German and Austrian Ambassadors declared they could not yield on the question of coast without further instructions, meeting was adjourned till the 15th April.

[16678] No. 277.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 133.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, April 11, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 118 of 31st March.

Headquarters Staff report steady engagements in and around the villages of Yalos Castero and Kumbourgas, lying south of the village of Chatalja. The Turkish troops, although supported by the guns of the fleet, eventually gave way, and the above-mentioned places, together with the littoral as far east as Yalos Castero, are now in the possession of the Bulgarians.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[16677] No. 278.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 59.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, April 11, 1913.*

I LEARN from a trustworthy source that last night a detachment of about 500 German marines arrived in Vienna, and that they were immediately sent on in the direction of Trieste.

[16465] No. 279.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 177.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, April 11, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 183 of 5th April: Situation at Smyrna.

"Hibernia" ordered to Smyrna to report on situation by wireless telegraphy.

[16395] No. 280.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 161.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 11, 1913.*

YOUR despatch No. 183 of 9th April: International Financial Commission.

As other Governments are being represented by their Councillors in addition to other delegates, you should inform Mr. Carnegie that he is appointed as one of the delegates to represent His Majesty's Government. We are consulting Sir P. Harvey as to whether he wants a technical assistant.

[17452] No. 281.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 320.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, April 11, 1913.*

COMMUNIQUÉ issued by Russian Government should have a most excellent effect. It was the subject of most favourable comment by every Ambassador to-day without exception, in which I joined most cordially.

[17316] No. 282.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.**

(No. 83.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 11, 1913.*

AT the meeting with the Ambassadors to-day, the following was arrived at:—

"Après avoir déclaré que son Gouvernement accepte les trois premiers points de la réponse aux alliés, le Comte Benckendorff dit qu'il est chargé par son Gouvernement d'insister auprès de la réunion pour l'admission du principe de l'indemnité, que le Gouvernement Impérial considère de la plus haute importance comme étant seule de nature à assurer la cessation immédiate des hostilités.

"Des objections ayant été soulevées contre une modification de la formule précédemment adoptée, et la réunion ne paraissant pas disposée à revenir sur ses premières résolutions, le Comte Benckendorff déclare que, pour rester en accord avec les autres Puissances, son Gouvernement accepte le quatrième point tel qu'il a été formulé.

* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 255), Sir E. Goschen (No. 128), Sir R. Rodd (No. 106), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 156).

"L'Ambassadeur de France dit que son Gouvernement adhère à la formule en quatre points pour la réponse aux alliés.

"L'adhésion de toutes les Puissances étant acquise, la réunion pense que la communication aux alliés doit être faite dans le plus bref délai."

After some observations by the French Ambassador respecting the view of his Government, the following was recorded:—

"L'Ambassadeur de France fait connaître le point de vue de son Gouvernement, qui est le suivant: Le Gouvernement de la république est disposer à examiner si l'attribution d'une compensation pécuniaire aux alliés balkaniques peut se concilier avec les intérêts légitimes de la Turquie et la sauvegarde des garanties octroyées aux porteurs français.

"Sir E. Grey et les Ambassadeurs font part de cette information à leurs Gouvernements respectifs."

Subsequently we proceeded to discuss the possibility of a Bulgarian advance on Constantinople, and the following was recorded:—

"Sir E. Grey fait observer que, si les négociations pour la paix ne commencent pas, il convient d'envisager les conséquences d'une continuation des hostilités et d'une avance éventuelle de l'armée bulgare sur Constantinople.

"Alors l'Ambassadeur de France dit que, d'après les informations de son Gouvernement, de sérieux préparatifs d'attaque contre la ligne de Tchataldja seraient signalés d'Andrinople et de Sophia. Le Gouvernement français proposerait, en conséquence, d'examiner s'il ne conviendrait pas de procéder, le moment venu, à l'envoi d'une flotte internationale aux Dardanelles, à Redosto et à Constantinople. Cette flotte aurait pour mission

"(1.) De maintenir l'ordre à Constantinople;

"(2.) D'empêcher les opérations de guerre dans la presqu'île de Gallipoli, sur la rive septentrionale de la mer de Marmara et sur le Bosphore;

"(3.) D'assurer la liberté de la navigation dans les Détroits.

"Elle ne se retirerait qu'après la conclusion de la paix.

"Le Comte Benckendorff dit que son Gouvernement a déjà donné son adhésion à ce projet.

"Sir E. Grey se réserve d'en conférer avec le Premier Ministre.

"Les autres Ambassadeurs soumettront la proposition à leurs Gouvernements."

Finally, the question of compensation to Montenegro was raised, and the following was recorded:—

"Les Ambassadeurs d'Italie et de France ont été invités par leurs Gouvernements à entretenir la réunion de la situation financière du Monténégro et de rechercher les moyens d'y remédier, dans le but d'arriver le plus rapidement possible à la pacification du pays.

"On peut considérer un emprunt garanti par les Puissances comme le moyen le plus pratique d'assurer au Gouvernement monténégrin les ressources nécessaires.

"Sur le montant de cet emprunt il serait utile d'avoir quelques indications.

"Le Marquis Imperiali a entendu parler de 30,000,000 de couronnes.

"Sir E. Grey ne peut se prononcer sans consulter l'administration financière britannique.

"La réunion demande au Gouvernement italien et au Gouvernement français de formuler des propositions et de fixer éventuellement le montant de l'emprunt."

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[14493] No. 283.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 51.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 11, 1913.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 44 of the 21st ultimo, relative to complaints made by the inspector of the Ottoman Public Debt at Dedeagatch against the Bulgarian director of customs at that place and I approve the terms of the note which you addressed to the Bulgarian Government on the subject.

I have forwarded a copy of your despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople with instructions to discuss with the British commissioner, of the debt the proposal contained in Mr. Vice-Consul Heard's memorandum, in order that, if Sir A. Block thinks it feasible, he may suggest to his colleagues that it should be adopted.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[14493] No. 284.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 105.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 11, 1913.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Sophia°, relative to complaints made by the inspector of the Ottoman Public Debt at Dedeagatch against the Bulgarian director of customs at that place.

Your Excellency should discuss with the British commissioner of the debt the proposal contained in Mr. Vice-Consul Heard's memorandum, in order that, if Sir A. Block thinks it feasible, he may suggest to his colleagues that it should be adopted.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12272] No. 285.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 30.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 11, 1913.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 52 of the 11th March, transmitting copy of Mr. Peckham's despatch No. 14 of the 21st February requesting that the official name of His Majesty's vice-consulate at Uskub may be changed to "Skoplyé."

In reply, you should inform Mr. Peckham that it will be time enough to carry out this change when the Servian annexations of territory are recognised by the Powers.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[14747] No. 286.

Sir Edward Grey to Prince Lichnowsky.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, April* 11, 1913.

WITH reference to my communication of the 24th January last, respecting the sequestration by the Greek Government of funds belonging to the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, I have the honour to inform you that I have received a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Athens reporting that the Greek Government have given orders to raise the sequestration and to notify the agency of the debt, which, in return,

° Part VI. No. 593.

will be required to acknowledge the formal reservations of the Greek Government with regard to eventual surpluses or other sums possibly reverting to the Turkish Treasury.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[14747] No. 287.

Foreign Office to Council of Foreign Bondholders.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 11, 1913.

WITH reference to my letter of the 24th January last, respecting the sequestration by the Greek Government of funds belonging to the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that he has received a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Athens stating that the Greek Government have given orders to raise the sequestration and to notify the Agency of the Debt, which in return will be required to acknowledge the formal reservations of the Greek Government with regard to eventual surpluses or other sums possibly reverting to the Turkish Treasury.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[16733] No. 288.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 12.)

(No. 276.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April* 4, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 247 of the 28th of last month, in which I forwarded, for your information, copy of a *note verbale* from the Sublime Porte, in which it was stated that Greek torpedo vessels were trying to seize the only pilot-boat which works gratis on the Gulf of Smyrna, I have the honour to state that I have now received a report from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna on the subject.

It appears from this report that there are two pilot-boats which carry on the pilot service in the Gulf of Smyrna gratuitously, but as these always remain close to the fortress, near which the minefield is, it is extremely unlikely that the Greek vessels could ever reach them, and, so far, no attempt of this nature has been made.

Mr. Barnham suggests that the Sublime Porte's note, enclosed in my above-mentioned despatch, was possibly based on a misapprehension of an incident that occurred on the 17th ultimo, when a small ferry-steamer, plying not far from the entrance to the gulf, was cut out by a Greek torpedo vessel and carried off to Scio, where it was detained by the Greek Government.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[16759] No. 289.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 12.)

(No. 71.)

Sir, *Belgrade, April* 4, 1913.

I CALLED on M. Pasitch on the morning of the 21st instant and in compliance with your instructions repeated to him the substance of your conversation with the Servian Chargé d'Affaires concerning the attitude of the Servian Government regarding Scutari, and communicated to him the message contained in the concluding paragraph of your telegram No. 72.

M. Pasitch did not appear at first to take the communication in good part. He adopted an injured, and at the same time stubborn, demeanour.

He regretted that Servia would lose British sympathy, and possibly find the weight of British diplomatic action against her, but he did not see how he could now abandon

Montenegro; it would be a national disgrace. If the Powers thought it right to back up Austria, and if, unfortunately, the resistance offered by Montenegro and Servia were to reopen the whole question of Prizrend, Ipek, Djakova, and Dibra, as you had suggested, it would be plain that, irrespective of right or wrong, Austria was to have it all her own way in the Balkans, and the best thing for Servia would be to throw in her lot with the Monarchy.

I said it seemed to everyone who could look at the matter dispassionately that the Servian Government were taking an entirely mistaken view of their obligations as allies; that, surely, if the commander-in-chief of an army chose for pure vanity's sake to expose his troops to wholly useless sacrifice and slaughter it could not be incumbent on an ally to do likewise.

M. Pasitch replied that the position of the Servian Government was extremely delicate. Whenever they gave counsels of moderation at Cettinjé, King Nicholas taunted them with wishing to upset his dynasty in the hope of subsequently bringing Montenegro under the Servian Crown. He hoped you would understand the difficulty, and that Servia has national considerations to take into account. He wished Scutari would capitulate, and the Powers could then deal as they thought best with Montenegro without Servia being in any way implicated, as he considered the obligations to be binding only in hostilities against Turkey. M. Pasitch did not, however, attempt to suggest any means of expelling the Montenegrins from Scutari once they had taken possession. He made some caustic observations with regard to the sense of justice of the Powers, who put pressure on a small country like Montenegro with the object of depriving her of her just dues, and he asked why Bulgaria had not been prevented from attacking Adrianople. I replied that it was, indeed, somewhat surprising the Bulgarians should have thought it worth while to attack Adrianople when it would shortly have been theirs without any sacrifice of life. As regards the fighting now going on at Chatalja, he would see from the press that public opinion in England considered it was time for the Powers to intervene to arrest further bloodshed.

M. Pasitch finally said he would again endeavour to influence Montenegro to conform to the wishes of the Powers.

I may mention that the gist of my representations and the Prime Minister's reply thereto appeared in the Servian press two days later, and can only have been communicated by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs; also, that M. de Hartwig is, I am informed by my colleagues, going about exulting over the snub administered to England, and calling attention to the nobility of M. Pasitch's answer, which he interprets as having been that "Servia preferred her honour to British friendship."

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[16747] No. 200.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 12.)

(No. 67.)

Sir, *Athens, April 5, 1913.*

M. COROMILAS called upon me this morning to say he was now ready to return the answer of the allies to the collective communication of the Great Powers with regard to the conditions of peace.

The delay was due to the Servian Government having proposed amendments to his original draft, and to his having been unable to accept them without further alteration.

Having collected my colleagues, I waited upon his Excellency with them at the Ministry, when he read and handed to each of us the communication, which I telegraphed *in extenso* in my No. 46, but of which I nevertheless enclosed a copy for the sake of accuracy. No one made any remark on it.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[16748] No. 291.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 12.)

(No. 68.)

Sir, *Athens, April 7, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a despatch from the British delegate on the International Financial Commission requesting instructions as to the disposal by the commission of the sum relinquished by His Majesty's Government in favour of the Civil List of His late Majesty King George of Greece under the Treaty of the 29th March, 1864.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 291.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.

(No. 2.)

Sir, *Athens, April 7, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to request that I may in due course be furnished with instructions as to the disposal by the International Commission of the sum of 4,000*l.* relinquished annually by His Majesty's Government under article 6 of the Treaty of the 29th March, 1864, in favour of His late Majesty King George of Greece. The sum in question has hitherto been remitted, together with the amounts renounced by the French and Russian Governments under the same treaty, to the Ministry of Finance in December of each year, but I understand that it was always paid in advance, in monthly instalments, with the rest of the Civil List to His Majesty by the Ministry.

My French and Russian colleagues are requesting similar instructions from their respective Governments.

I have, &c.
H. D. BEAUMONT.

[16760] No. 291.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 12.)

(No. 72.)

Sir, *Belgrade, April 6, 1913.*

IN my telegram No. 77 I had the honour to report information given me by my Bulgarian colleague, namely, that the Servian and Greek Governments were meditating the possibility of refusing to evacuate Albania in accordance with the desire of the Powers.

As I subsequently saw this statement in the Austrian press, with reference at least to Servia, I asked the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs whether he had noticed it, and I expressed the hope that it was untrue.

M. Stefanovitch repudiated the suggestion indignantly, and said that what the Servian Government had promised they would, of course, adhere to. Nevertheless, the tone latterly adopted by the Servian Government in its communications to the Great Powers does not strike one as submissive and respectful as it might be, *e.g.*, in their reply to the recent *démarche* about Scutari the phrase that "they hoped the boundaries of Albania would be found to conform to the views expressed by them in London"—and there are unquestionably influences at work here encouraging them to disregard the decisions of the Powers, and pointing out that as the latter are unable to enforce their decisions Servia has nothing to fear.

It is scarcely necessary to say that should the Powers fail to carry through the question of Scutari to a successful issue the effect here will be nothing short of deplorable.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[16766] No. 292.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 12.)

(No. 13.)

Sir, *Cettinjé, April 7, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 49 of the 6th April, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the telegram addressed by the British vice-admiral to the Montenegrin Government, as repeated to me, as well as the text of the reply which was yesterday returned to him.

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 292.

President of Montenegrin Council of Ministers to British Vice-Admiral commanding International Squadron off Antivari.

LE Gouvernement Royal de Monténégro exprime son profond regret de voir rassembler dans les eaux monténégrines une flotte internationale dans le but d'exercer une pression sur le Monténégro en vue de son adhésion au désir des Grandes Puissances. Si le Gouvernement Royal interprète exactement la pensée de votre Excellence, ce désir comporterait l'abandon du siége de Scutari, ainsi que la cessation des hostilités de la part du Monténégro dans le territoire abandonné à l'Albanie.

Le Gouvernement Royal a déjà exprimé ses vues dans sa communication du 2 avril, année courante, adressée aux représentants des Grandes Puissances. Il ne lui reste, par conséquent, que de réitérer à votre Excellence la déclaration que, malgré la pression qu'implique la présence de la flotte internationale à Antivari, le Gouvernement Royal ne saurait se départir de son attitude, qui est conforme aux exigences de l'état de guerre entre les alliés et la Turquie, ainsi qu'au principe de neutralité qui fut proclamé par les Puissances dès le début de s hostilités et qui est violé au détriment du Monténégro par la présence de la flotte internationale dans les eaux monténégrines.

Cattaro, le 6 avril, 1913.

Enclosure 2 in No. 292.

British Vice-Admiral commanding International Squadron off Antivari to Count de Salis.

Cattaro, April 5, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you that the following note has been telegraphed to the chief of the Montenegrin Government at Cettinjé, and I beg to request that the contents may also be communicated to the representatives of the Great Powers at Cettinjé:—

"Your Excellency,

"I have the honour to inform you that an international squadron consisting of ships of war from the Great Powers of Europe has assembled off the Montenegrin port of Antivari as a protest against the non-compliance by Montenegrin with their wishes. I would beg to point out to your Excellency that the presence of this international squadron is a manifest proof that the Powers not only are in accord, but are also desirous that their wishes should be complied with without further delay. I would also request that your Excellency will be so good as to inform me immediately that your Government are prepared to accede to the expressed wishes of the Powers."

[16739] No. 293.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 12.)

(No. 284)

Sir, *Constantinople, April 8*, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a memorandum from Sir Adam Block, in which he furnishes his observations on the communication received from the Bulgarian Minister in London, on the question of the share which the Balkan States must bear in the Ottoman Debt, as requested in your despatch No. 82 of the 17th ultimo.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 293.

OBSERVATIONS on a communication from the Bulgarian Government entitled "Exposé sur la question de la part contributive des États balkaniques dans la Dette publique Ottomane," and dated February 1913.

THE Bulgarian Government contend that the allied States are not under any obligation to furnish a proportional contribution to the Ottoman Public Debt, but express their willingness nevertheless to contribute a maximum sum of 375,000,000 fr. for the consolidated Ottoman Debt secured on guarantees existing in the conquered territory. The Bulgarian Government claim, at the same time, in the name of the allied States a war indemnity of 1,500,000,000 fr., and demand that the surplus of the revenues ceded to the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, as well as certain other revenues of Turkey, should be assigned to the service of this war indemnity, the Public Debt Council being authorised to administer the new revenues with the right to reserve the amount necessary for the payment of the contributive parts of the Balkan States.

First.—The Bulgarian Government lay down the principle that there is no precedent which obliges a State annexing territory belonging to another State to assume part of the public debt of the latter. The Bulgarian Government maintain that as victors they cannot be called upon to support the obligations of the vanquished.

This statement of the Bulgarian Government is not supported by international law, and the obligation which the Bulgarian Government contend to be non-existent has been confirmed and consecrated in various forms by numerous international Acts. The treaties of 1814 and 1815, the treaty of 1839 relative to the separation of Belgium from Holland, the Treaty of Zurich of 1859, the treaty of 1866 confirming the Union of Venice to Italy, the treaty of 1860 ceding Savoy and Nice to France, the Acts by which

after the Treaty of Prague certain German States were annexed to Prussia, the agreements made in 1866 for the partition of the debt of Denmark between that State and Schleswig-Holstein, the Treaty of Berlin, the protocol of London of 1832, and the treaty of 1881 relative to Greece, the Italo-Turkish Treaty of 18th October, 1912, concerning the annexation of Tripoli and Cyrenaica to Italy—all these international Acts would go to prove that the Bulgarian contention cannot be supported.

M. Poincaré, to-day President of the French Republic, stated quite recently in the French Chamber: "C'est un principe de droit public aujourd'hui reconnu par tout le monde, qu'en cas de démembrement d'un État, l'État annexant ne saurait prendre possession du territoire annexé qu'avec les charges qui le grèvent, et qu'il doit équitablement supporter une part de la Dette publique contractée par l'État démembré."

If, in the history of international law, there exist adverse precedents they may be considered as derogations to a principle which has been generally admitted and applied, and I venture to think they are violations of international law which the Balkan Governments are not justified in quoting as precedents.

Second.—The Bulgarian Government reject the system of a proportional contribution to the Ottoman Public Debt according to the ratio between the revenues of the ceded territories and the general revenues of the Ottoman Empire. The Bulgarian Government make a distinction between the consolidated debt guaranteed on the revenues of these territories and the consolidated debt not guaranteed on these revenues. They declare that the allied States will assume no share of this latter category of debt, which they state has been contracted to put down insurrections and to prepare for the war still in progress, but as regards the consolidated debt of the first category, namely, guaranteed on the revenues of the ceded territories, the memorandum under review admits that the Balkan States, in order not to prejudice the guaranteed creditors, will be prepared to continue the payment of the existing assignments valued at a maximum of 375,000,000 fr.

The fixation of contributive parts to be borne by annexing States in the proportion existing between the annexed territories and the general revenues of the dismembered State is the most reasonable method of applying the rules of international law as above exposed, with this important reserve, that the proprietary rights or mortgages secured to creditors in those territories should be scrupulously respected. The public debt of the State is inherent to the territory of that State. It is contracted on the whole of the State of the debtor and all the resources of the State constitute a general guarantee, with the exception, however, of those which have been assigned by special contracts. It follows that every part of the territory of the debtor State which is detached should carry with it a part of the public debt of the State in the proportion as mentioned above.

This system was followed in various instances in the international Acts above quoted.

Third.—The Bulgarian Government state that Turkey, having lost its sovereign rights over the conquered territories, loses *ipso facto* the revenues of these territories, and that compensation is due only to third parties who are entitled to compensation for the loss of the revenues specially assigned to them.* It seems to me, however, that the point to decide is rather whether, independently of the proprietary rights possessed by the creditors of the Ottoman Empire, the conquered territories are to participate in the Ottoman Public Debt, and that, if so, in what manner should they participate. If the system of the proportional part is invoked, it is only with the desire to fix the contributive share in an equitable manner. The loss of the revenues in Roumelia for Turkey is not in question; the question is the loss to creditors.

Fourth.—The Bulgarian Government maintain further that the taxes are unequally distributed in the various provinces of Turkey; that, for example, the tax on sheep, which is 1½ piastres and 5½ piastres per head in European Turkey, is only 1 piastre and 3½ piastres per head in Asiatic Turkey; that the same disproportion exists for the military exemption tax and for the port dues, and that therefore the proportional system applied to the conquered territories would result in the conquered territories having more than their real share. As far as I am aware, the indications found by the Bulgarian Government with regard to the repartition of taxes in Turkey is not in accordance with facts. If, as regards the sheep tax, there is inequality in various provinces of the Empire, this inequality exists equally in Roumelia and in Asia. For

* The text contains a word here which is illegible in the copy received. It appears to be the word "exposé" or "exposés" [illegible] the sense of the sentence is not clear. The French text reads: "Il n'y a donc pas lieu de tenir compte des revenus cédés pour les appliquer aux créanciers pour lesquels des revenus déterminés ont été spécialement affectés."

instance, the tax is 5½ piastres at Constantinople, Salonica, and Adrianople, 5 piastres at Monastir and Mitylene, 4½ piastres at Kossovo, 4 piastres at Janina, 3½ piastres at Scutari, Rhodes, and Debra, 3 piastres at Berana and Mitrovitza, 2½ piastres at Novi-Bazar, Senidje, and Tashlidja; whilst, on the other hand, it is 5 piastres at Brusa, Ismidt, Karassi, and Smyrna, 4½ piastres at Monteche, 4 piastres at Erzeroum, Adana, Angora, Bitlis, Beirout, Aleppo, Diarbekir, Sivas, Trebizond, Kastamuni, Koniah, and Van, 3½ piastres at Basra, Bagdad, and Mossul. The average in Asiatic Turkey does not fall below 3½ piastres, except in the Yemen and Assyr, where it is 1 piastre per head.

The military exemption tax is a uniform tax of £T. 50 (now £T. 60 by the increased war tax) for the active army and £T. 30 (now £T. 40) for the reserve. As to the port dues, they are uniform, except as regards the taxes collected by foreign societies which have constructed certain ports in the Empire.

Fifth.—I am prepared to admit that a distinction can be made between the Ottoman Public Debt secured specially on the revenues of the conquered territories and that debt which has no such special guarantee, but this distinction does not imply that the annexing States would be justified in refusing to participate altogether in the latter category of debt. Such participation, as I have stated above, is in accordance with the general principles of international law.

Nor does it seem to me relevant to discuss the object or use of loans issued by Turkey. It appears to me to be straining the point to state that the Ottoman Public Debt, or any part of it, which is not secured on special revenues of the ceded territories, has been contracted to put down insurrections or to prepare for war against the allied States. No loan has been contracted for with such object, avowed or not. Further, various loans of the Turkish Government have been created when there was no anticipation in Turkey of actual war, or even of the insurrections which preceded it, and as regards loans contracted in recent years even, it would be difficult to maintain that the total deficit of respective annual budgets—which has been covered by successive loans—was caused by the Balkan question, that it was only with money obtained by means of these loans that the expenditure in the Roumelian provinces was covered, and that the ordinary resources were reserved for the other needs of the Empire. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove that such was the case.

Sixth.—The contributive parts of the Balkan States should, in my personal opinion, be calculated on two different systems. For the debt without special securities the proportional system might be applied, but as regards the debt secured on special revenues of the annexed territories there can be no question as to the principle which should decide the establishment of the contributive parts. In this case we are confronted by absolute proprietary rights or by mortgages which have been agreed to by Turkey—in some cases under pressure from the Great Powers—in favour of the creditors of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Government, as the result of the victories of the allies, could in fact only lose what it possessed; the sovereignty of the Balkan States in the conquered provinces cannot be exercised in principle except in the measure of the sovereignty which Turkey exercised over them.

The conference of Brussels has formulated precise rules to secure the respect by belligerents of private property.

The Balkan States taking over from Turkey the annexed territories are bound to conform in those territories to the clauses of the conventions exchanged between the Ottoman Government and their creditors, or at least to pay the exact equivalent of the sums which were collected by these same creditors. The Italo-Turkish Treaty mentioned above, and which the Bulgarian Government themselves mention in their *exposé*, consecrates the respect due to the proprietary rights of the creditors of Turkey.

It is therefore not by pure condescension that the Balkan States should indemnify the holders of the Ottoman Public Debt secured on the revenues of the conquered territories—it is rather in virtue of a right recognised by international law and confirmed by precedents.

Seventh.—The sum of 350,000,000 fr. that the Bulgarian Government indicate as a maximum of the contributive part which the Balkan States should pay in capital in compensation for the revenues secured in European Turkey to the creditors of the Ottoman Empire is far below the capitalised amount of the net product of these revenues. In the table annexed to these observations are set forth all the loans and advances before the Balkan war as well as the dates of their amortisation. In the same table (system B) are inscribed the net product, based on an average of three years, of the revenues drawn from the ceded territories and assigned to loans and advances secured on various revenues in Turkey in Europe. The sums representing

the capital of these average receipts calculated according to the period to run to their extinction are also shown for each of these loans. The total of these sums is £T. 27,569,231 or 634,092,313 fr. It is this sum, plus a sum to be established for the advances contracted before the war and guaranteed by the revenues of the Roumelian provinces, that the Balkan States should pay if they are to act in conformity with the engagements they declare they are ready to take in the *exposé* under consideration.

Eighth. The Bulgarian Government maintain that the allied States should not contribute to the floating debt because this floating debt was created for advances, for military requirements unpaid before and during the Tripolitan and Balkan wars, for salaries due to civil and military functionaries, and was secured on the general credit of the Ottoman Empire, and its recognition and repayment depend upon the existence of Turkey as a State.

The floating debt of the Ottoman Empire can be divided into two categories. First, advances concluded with financial establishments, either before or during the Balkan war, some of which are specially guaranteed on the revenues of European Turkey; secondly, the old floating debt.

If the Balkan States are not to pay a contributive part towards the reimbursement of advances contracted during the present war their position in respect to other advances of the first category made before the war cannot differ from their position with regard to the loans of the Ottoman Empire as regulated by international law and by precedents. The Balkan States, therefore, are in duty bound, with regard to these last advances, to contribute a part calculated on the basis of the system of the specialisation of guarantees, or on the proportional system as the circumstances of the case require. As to the second category of floating debt, the holders of which are partly of foreign nationality, it is difficult to distinguish it from the general Ottoman Public Debt—it is after all a financial obligation of the Ottoman Empire of the same nature as its other financial obligations for which loans have been concluded to which the Balkan States are called to pay a contributive part.

If the Ottoman Government had at the time of the creation of the floating debt, or previous to the war in progress, contracted a loan abroad for the liquidation of the floating debt, would not part of this loan have been incumbent upon the allied Governments? It is true that the Turkish Government have not yet come to an arrangement with this category of creditors, and that its actual capital amount is not definitely known, but an arrangement on the subject would not appear to be impossible, taking, for instance, as a basis the draft of the law already submitted to the Chamber of Deputies.

Ninth.—In estimating the contribution of the Balkan States to the Turkish debt, I would desire to touch upon a point not mentioned in the *exposé* of the Bulgarian Government, but which should be taken into consideration at this juncture.

The Balkan States, with the exception of Bulgaria, which has been exonerated by the Treaty of May 1909, still owe to Turkey the contributive parts, the payment of which was decided in principle by the Treaty of Berlin (articles 33 and 42) and the Turko-Greek Convention of the 24th May, 1881 (article 10). These contributive parts due by Greece, Servia, and Montenegro were fixed in a note dated the 6th November, 1883, addressed to the Sublime Porte by the British Ambassador at Constantinople, and were as follows:—

	£T.
Greece	2,130,873
Servia	2,107,457
Montenegro	98,986

This sum was to be amortised by an annuity of £T. 42,617, £T. 42,112, and £T. 1,979 for the three States respectively.

In accordance with article 8 of the Decree of the 28th Muharrem, 1881, Turkey ceded to its creditors these contributive parts. Since that date the reiterated representations of the Ottoman Government, as well as of the Council of Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt, have remained without result. Not one sixpence has been paid on this debt, which represents to-day, with interest at 4 per cent., a sum of £T. 4,865,081. It would seem to be an opportune moment for reminding the Balkan States of this obligation imposed upon them by the international Act above mentioned.

The Bulgarian Government, whilst consenting to a certain extent to indemnify the creditors of the Ottoman Empire who are in possession as proprietors of revenues,

or who hold securities in the conquered territories, claim, on the other hand, in the name of all the Balkan States and as a condition for their consent as above mentioned, the payment by Turkey of a war indemnity fixed by the Bulgarian Government at 1,500,000,000 fr., or £T. 60,000,000. The Bulgarian Government argue that for the last half century the generality of wars have had, as a consequence, the payment of a war indemnity, and they claim that the Ottoman Government, which have provoked and declared war, should bear the expenditure caused by the war to the allied States both now and in the future. The sum claimed is to cover rearmament, pensions to wounded and families of the dead, compensation for agricultural loss, and the re-establishment of the cavalry and of transport animals, the rehabilitation of the conquered countries devastated during the hostilities and impoverished by the emigration of the Moslem inhabitants.

While it is quite true that payments as war indemnity are not unusual in treaties of peace concluded during the last century, nevertheless, as I read the precedents, the conquered have paid an indemnity because the victors agreed to evacuate either the whole or the greater part of the conquered territory. The war indemnity was in fact of the nature of a ransom. If a war indemnity has been exacted by the victors because they held their vanquished enemy at their mercy, such a proceeding has not received the approval of the authorities on international law. To-day the allied States abandon nothing, or scarcely anything, of the territories occupied by their armies. The greater part of Roumelia almost up to the gates of Constantinople will belong to them. The acquisition of a country of more than 140,000 square kilom. would appear to be sufficient remuneration for the war in progress, whichever party may have been to blame, and would appear enough to indemnify the allies for any sacrifices they may have made. If the country has suffered, it would seem unreasonable that Turkey should be called upon to pay the damage. Turkey has lost the territories, the allied States have gained them, and it appears somewhat strange that in addition to this gain the victors should call upon the vanquished and the loser to provide the necessary sums for the development of their acquisition. The Mussulman emigration has been caused by the dangers to which they have been exposed. Turkey will be called upon to provide at the lowest estimate £T. 2,000,000 for the settlement of these emigrants. It would be unreasonable to ask that Turkey should also pay the allies for having driven them forth.

The Bulgarian Government consider that by the loss of the Roumelian provinces and without the payment of a war indemnity the financial situation of Turkey would be considerably improved, since Turkey still possesses important resources, and can assign to the war indemnity its share in the surplus of the ceded revenues, the surplus of revenues assigned to the kilometric guarantees of certain railways and to various loans, as well as certain other revenues, such as the military exemption tax, the war tax, and the property tax. The Bulgarian Government, in calculating for the service of the war indemnity the integral share of the Government in the net receipts of the Public Debt Administration, as well as the total of the surplus of the revenues assigned to the kilometric guarantees of certain railways and of certain loans, seem to have lost sight of other assignments that have been made on these surpluses. For instance, on the Government's share in the surplus of the net receipts of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration there is a first charge of £T. 124,059 for the service of the 4 per cent. Loan of 1904; a second charge of £T. 420,000 for the service of the 1908 4 per cent. Bagdad Railway Loans, Series 2 and 3; a third charge of £T. 300,000 for the 4, 5, and 6 Series Loans of the Bagdad Railway. Further, the working expenses of the said railway, Series 2 and 3, are also guaranteed on the Government's share in this surplus. Lastly, the tobacco tithe revenue, over and above the £T. 230,000 due to the Public Debt Administration, is assigned for the advance of the Imperial Ottoman Bank of the 27th August, 1912, and amounting to £T. 1,250,000.

The charges on the surplus of the revenues assigned for kilometric guarantees of certain railways and to certain loans are as follows:—

1. £T. 25,000 for irrigation works of the plain of Koniah;
2. £T. 40,000 for the 4 per cent. loan of 1908;
3. £T. 114,019 due to Ottoman Public Debt Administration as compensation for the loss of the Eastern Roumelian royalty;
4. £T. 250,000 to the 16th April, 1913, and from that date onwards £T. 500,000 for an advance of the Imperial Ottoman Bank of £T. 250,000, date the 24th June, 1912;

and, again, the surplus of the tithes and sheep tax assigned to the Anatolian Railway Company and to the Bagdad Railway Company Loan, 1st Series, are to be assigned as follows:—

1. To meet the insufficiency of the kilometric guarantees of the Anatolian Railway lines and the annuity of the said Bagdad Railway Loan, Series 1;
2. A sum of 350,000 fr. representing the annuity of an advance of the Anatolian Railway Company for the doubling of the line Haidar-Pasha-Koniah;
3. 350,000 fr. for the establishment of an express service on the Anatolian Railway;
4. Working expenses of the Bagdad Railway Company, Series 2;
5. Working expenses of the Bagdad Railway Company, Series 4, 5, 6;
   (The 3, 4, and 5 charges are not yet required.)
6. The deficit in the share of the Government in the surplus of the net receipts of the ceded revenues assigned for the working expenses of the Bagdad Railway, Series 2 and 3.

When the Bulgarian Government propose to add to the existing ceded revenues of the Debt Administration the military exemption tax, the war tax, and the property tax, they seem to have lost sight of the fact that these revenues are necessary to-day to enable the Turkish Government to carry on the government of the country. Even with these revenues the Turkish budget shows an annual deficit of considerable magnitude.

Even supposing that the Public Debt Administration were willing to assume the collection of these revenues, it would entail a modification of the Decree of Muharrem which could not be carried out without the consent of all the bondholders of Turkey.

The Council of Foreign Bondholders in London has always been averse, and in my opinion with reason, to extending the operations of the Public Debt Council, which was formed for the protection of the creditors of Turkey of 1881. The assignment of fresh revenues entails fresh expenditure and increased friction with the Turkish authorities, and the time and energy of the Public Debt officials is expended on other objects than those for which the Council, of the Debt was called into being, with the result that the interests of the original creditors incur the risk of being neglected.

The Turkish Government, as far as I am aware, would be averse to handing over these revenues to the care of the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt, and, as far as the latter is concerned, to insist on the point would in no wise increase the popularity of this body. The suggestion seems to me so impracticable and undesirable that an examination as to the amount of revenues from these taxes is to-day of no practical value.

It is stated that the loss of the Roumelian provinces without a war indemnity would be a blessing in disguise for the Turkish Government as far as their finances are concerned. The total expenditure in the year 1911-12 in the six provinces of Roumelia by all the Departments of the State, including the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, amounted to £T. 6,280,000, £T. 1,000,000 being expended by the Ministry of War. *Per contra*, the total receipts, including the receipts of the Ottoman Public Debt and the Tobacco Monopoly, were in the same year £T. 6,000,000. With the loss of the territory the Empire will lose its revenues, and will be obliged to continue the payment of an army of functionaries for whom it will be difficult to find posts in Asiatic Turkey. On the other hand, according to the Budget of 1911-12 (1327) the total of the credits of the Ministry of War was £T. 10,750,000. It is almost impossible to determine at this moment whether or not any reduction can be made in this credit apart from the reduction of £T. 1,000,000 spent hitherto in Roumelia, seeing that Turkey also will be under the necessity of renewing its armament, of fortifying its frontiers of Turkey in Europe, and of taking measures to defend its coast-line against neighbours grown far more powerful than hitherto, whose aspirations are of a nature to cause to Turkey legitimate apprehensions.

One may say with justice that after the signature of peace on the terms at present foreshadowed, which deprive Turkey of the bulk of its possessions in Europe, the proportion between its receipts and expenditure will, for a long time at any rate, remain what it has been hitherto.

In 1909-10 the budgetary deficit, taking into consideration the supplementary credits, was £T. 6,300,000 in round figures. In 1910-11 it was £T. 8,660,000, and in 1911-12 it rose to £T. 10,550,000.

Under these circumstances it seems difficult to justify the statement that Turkey can afford to be burdened with a war indemnity. Besides this, as soon as peace is

concluded, Turkey, if it desires to live, will have to make a supreme effort to develop and reform its Asiatic territory. Throughout this wide dominion of more than 2,000,000 sq. kilom. it will be necessary to construct railways, roads, and ports, to develop commerce and agriculture, to take radical and costly measures for the extension of public instruction, to reorganise the administration of justice, to reform the civil administration, and to police the country by the employment of a more numerous and better trained gendarmerie, very likely under foreign officers. For the work of civilisation, which Europe calls upon Turkey to perform and which for its own existence it must take in hand, Turkey will be obliged to increase its expenses very considerably, even were it possible to cut down military expenditure to an irreducible minimum.

To oblige Turkey to pay a war indemnity would be the equivalent to driving it to bankruptcy, or, to say the least of it, to rendering impossible the realisation of reforms which are indispensable if it is to remain an independent State.

Tenth.—The Bulgarian Government, in support of their claims, invoke the interest of their creditors, present or future, who themselves, they say, are the nations of Europe, creditors of Turkey. It is for these latter to decide if it suits them to sacrifice their vested interests in Turkey deprived of large tracts of territory, vanquished in a disastrous war, and menaced with an enormous budgetary deficit, and whose ruin would cause them very serious loss, and to join with the victor to damage Turkey irretrievably in order to come to the assistance of the Balkan States which have entered into the inheritance of vast and fertile territories, the revenues of which must rapidly increase and develop, thanks to the cessation of the troubles and insurrections which have hitherto been a bar to economic progress.

Eleventh.—If it be possible to persuade the allies to desist from a war indemnity and to agree to an equitable contribution to the Ottoman Public Debt it will be essential that to ensure the payment of the same the most precise and categorical stipulations should be inserted in the treaty of peace. Clauses which do not regulate explicitly and at a fixed date the financial obligations of the Balkan States would, as experience has already shown, run the risk of becoming mere paper promises, the execution of which may be indefinitely delayed or permanently eluded. The wiser course would be to fix in the treaty of peace the capital sum to be paid by the Balkan States as well as the date of its payment, and the European Powers might lay down the conditions that until the sum is paid the Ottoman Public Debt Administration would continue to carry on its work in the Roumelian provinces, both as regards the ceded revenues and the special revenues assigned to kilometric guarantees and various loans. Were this system to be adopted the bondholders might consent to a certain sacrifice with regard to the capital sum which the Balkan States would be called upon to provide.

ADAM BLOCK.

Constantinople, April 7, 1913.

Minutes.

Mr. Pember first for his observations.—W. E. D.

The elaborate memorandum by Sir Adam Block, which accompanies these papers, puts forward many important considerations and forcible arguments on the intrinsic merits or demerits of the proposals contained in the *exposé* of the Bulgarian Government.

With these it is not, I conceive, necessary for me to deal, or to do more than offer such observations as have occurred to me upon such points of international law as necessarily suggest themselves upon studying the memorandum.

It will be convenient to take Sir A. Block's numbered headings *seriatim*.

"*First*" (p. 1).

The majority of the text writers do not appear to recognise (as Sir A. Block does) that "it is a principle which has been generally admitted and applied," that when, in consequence of a war, one State cedes a part of its territory to another, the cessionary State takes over a corresponding part of the general debt of the ceding State. *Oppenheim* states (I, p. 131) that no general rule of international law concerning this

point can be said to exist. (*Hall*, pp. 99–104; *Westlake*, I, p. 62, and *Keith*, p. 60; all appear to concur in this view.)

Of course many treatises providing for the cession of territory have also provided for the taking over of part of the general debt of the ceding State (a fact which suggests the conclusion that there is no rule of law to that effect).

The Bulgarians are entirely wrong in suggesting, if they do so suggest, that there is no precedent for this course. But there is no general rule of law, and in the case of the Franco-German War, Germany refused to take over any part of the French National Debt, though she took territory and an indemnity.

The truth is, that when a cession of territory is effected by a treaty of peace, the terms of the cession have to be decided in accordance with what is reasonable and proper in the particular instance. Obviously there will often be strong moral claims for the taking over of a portion of the general debt of the ceding country, when the cession grievously cripples the ability of that country to meet that debt.

Any provincial debt of a ceded province, or any debt charged in its revenues must apparently be taken over. This appears to be a rule of international law (see *Keith*, p. 62; *Oppenheim*, p. 131) laid down by all jurists. And even if it be not a rule of law, expediency will produce the same results.

"*Second*" (p. 2).

If the facts are as they allege, I think there is something to be said for the Bulgarian contention as to loans contracted for putting down insurrections in Macedonia, and for preparations for the present war (see *Westlake*, I, pp. 78–79, and his remarks upon the case of Cuba and the United States of America). In such a case the lenders can hardly expect much consideration from the annexing party.

As to the principles on which the proportion of general debt to be taken over is to be fixed, international law appears to be pretty much at sea. At least four different principles have been suggested, but in most cases it has been fixed arbitrarily (*Keith*, p. 61).

"*Third*" (p. 2).

I agree that the sentence quoted from the Bulgarian *exposé* is obscurely worded, but I think it is only another way of putting their argument that only loans officially secured on the revenues of the ceded territory are, as a matter of fact, bound to be taken over (as to which, see above on "*First*").

"*Fifth*" (p. 2).

This head of the memorandum really raises two questions already dealt with on "*First*" and "*Second*." As to the latter, I agree that it may well be exceedingly difficult, as a matter of evidence, for the Bulgarians to establish that a particular loan was actually expended in paying the cost of putting down insurrection in the Roumelian provinces. I suspect the argument is put forward as being one in respect of which the Bulgarians hope to get some general allowance made in the event of the proportion of Ottoman debt, which the allies are to bear, being fixed upon somewhat arbitrary principles.

"*Sixth*" (p. 3).

Sir A. Block lays down that the Balkan allies should have a share of so much of the general Ottoman debt as has no special security assigned to it, in the proportions which the revenues of the ceded provinces bear to the whole Ottoman revenue. This principle is not, apparently, exactly on all fours with any of those recognised by the jurists as fitting to govern cases of this description (see *Keith*, p. 61), but it seems to be quite as reasonable a principle as any which they suggest.

But, as I have said above, there does not appear to be any recognised principle of international law applicable to this matter.

As to specially-secured debts, it would appear that a proportional part, or the whole thereof, should remain charged on the revenues of the ceded territory, according as they were charged on those revenues alone or jointly with other Ottoman revenues. I do not understand the Bulgarian Government to contest this view. The proportion may fairly be fixed by reference to the amount of the revenues of the ceded provinces, and other revenues charged respectively.

"*Eighth*" (p. 3).

I think the argument on this head is covered by what has been said above on other heads.

"*Ninth*" (p. 4).

I think the considerations suggested under this head should certainly be taken account of in the financial settlement at the conclusion of peace.

Pp. 4, 5.

No principle of international law, I think, governs the question of whether an indemnity can be imposed by a successful belligerent. That law sets no limits to the terms of peace which he may fix. It has nothing to do except to accept the parties as they again present themselves to it in the condition and with the relations which they have determined for themselves in concluding peace (see as to this *Westlake*, II, p. 53). The approval or disapproval of the authorities on international law would not, therefore, appear to count for much in regard to the question of whether, in any given case, an indemnity can properly be demanded. It appears simply to be a question whether the successful belligerent is strong enough to impose an indemnity upon the unsuccessful belligerent, and, if need be, to disregard the pressure exercised by such third parties, if any, as, for whatever reason, may have intervened in the settlement of the terms of peace.

Generally with regard to the whole question, I would suggest that the treaty or treaties which will be entered into after the conclusion of peace will probably take the form of a general settlement of the countries in question, made at the dictation of Europe, with the view of dealing with all the interests concerned in the most equitable and advantageous manner, and not with the bare object of enforcing law.

F. W. P.

Foreign Office, April 20, 1913.

I think that Sir A. Block's memorandum and Mr. Pember's exhaustive and most valuable minute ought to be printed at once, as they must necessarily prove of great use and be constantly referred to when the questions with which they deal come to be discussed more closely by the Powers.

I have, meanwhile, nothing to add to what Mr. Pember has said above, except that I agree with it.

W. E. D.

Foreign Office, May 22, 1913.

This, I think and venture to hope, will no doubt be so if the control of the settlement remains where I believe it now to be.

W. E. D.

Foreign Office, May 22, 1913.

Enclosure 2 in No. 293.

Etude préliminaire comparative sur la Part contributive des États balkaniques dans la Dette extérieure de la Turquie (Emprunts).

Calcul hypothétique basé sur la moyenne des années 1909–10, 1910–11 et 1911–12.

PROPORTION pour cent du Revenu moyen des Territoires cédés par rapport au Revenu global de l'Empire.

Années.	Revenu global de l'Empire.	Revenu des territoires cédés.	Proportion pour cent.
	£T.	£T.	
1909–10	27,385,940	5,106,876	18·87
1910–11	27,529,075	5,199,653	19·66
1911–12	30,649,426	5,971,128	19·49
Total	85,564,441	16,547,457	
Moyenne	28,521,480	5,515,819	19·34

La spécialisation des gages—Revenus concédés ou gérés par la Dette publique ottomane—est également établie sur la moyenne des années 1909–10, 1910–11 et 1911–12.

(A.)—*Part proportionnelle.*

Dette extérieure turque (Emprunts) et Calcul hypothétique de la Part contributive des Etats balkaniques.

Emprunts.	Emprunt initial.	Dates d'émission.	Capital amorti au 14 mars, 1913.	Capital en circulation.	Annuité.	Date d'amortissement.	Établissements prêteurs.	Proportion, 1934 pour cent.	Capitalisation.	
								Annuité.	Années.	Système A.
	£T.		£T.	£T.	£T.			£T.		£T.
Dette convertie unifiée 4 pour Cent, 1903	12,275,772	1re partie—14 sept. 1903 / 2me partie—21 juin 1906	1,329,204	37,946,568	1,887,375	1961	Divers	507,911	(1) 40	10,053,561
Lots turcs	15,632,518	5 jan. 1870	4,497,238	11,135,310	270,000	1974	„			
Amortissement extraordinaire	.	..	..	..	469,000	..	.. .. ..			
Emprunt 4 pour Cent—										
1904	2,750,000	1 sept. 1904	118,272	2,631,728	123,710	14 jan. 1962	Banque Impériale ottomane	23,933	50	514,133
Bagdad 2me Série	4,752,000	2 juin 1905	27,060	4,724,940	194,240	2005	Deutsche Bank	37,566	91	915,621
„ 3me „	5,236,000	2 „ 1908	1,576	5,234,424	214,925	2010	„	41,392	98	1,012,638
„ 4me „	2,376,000	Non encore émis	..	..	(2) 97,120	..	„	..	..	..
„ 5me „	2,376,000				97,120	..	„	..	..	..
„ 6me „	2,376,000				97,120	..	„	..	..	..
Emprunt—										
Osmanlé 4 pour Cent, 1890 ..	4,999,500	18 avril 1890	1,796,300	3,203,200	219,975	14 mars 1931	Banque Impériale ottomane	48,345	19	634,950
Priorité Tombac 4 pour Cent, 1893 ..	1,000,000	8 mai 1893	361,950	638,050	50,000	14 fév. 1934	„ „	9,670	22	139,742
5 pour Cent, 1896	3,272,720	29 avril 1896	386,100	2,886,620	180,000	14 juillet 1946	„ „	34,812	34	640,930
Pêcheries 4 pour Cent, 1903 ..	2,610,000	21 „ 1903	150,741	2,189,259	118,800	1er nov. 1958	Deutsche Bank	22,976	46	479,846
4 pour Cent Bagdad 1re Série ..	2,376,000	5 mars 1903	23,586	2,350,414	97,120	2001	„	18,783	89	455,262
„ Tedjhizat-Askérié, 1905..	2,610,000	1 avril 1905	115,090	2,494,910	118,800	1er sept. 1961	.. .. ..	22,976	49	490,342
„ 1re-1re	5,366,664	25 „ 1905	255,020	5,071,648	238,800	14 juillet 1961	Banque Impériale ottomane	46,184	49	985,634
„ 1908	1,711,124	6 sept. 1908	111,188	4,599,936	212,000	14 jan. 1957	„ „	41,000	45	849,521
Chemin de fer 4 pour Cent, 1894 ..	1,760,000	15 mars 1894	172,810	1,587,190	76,560	1er „ 1958	Banque Paris et Pays-Bas .	14,807	46	309,239
Bavanes 4 pour Cent, 1902 ..	8,660,020	11 oct. 1902	559,702	8,040,318	390,000	14 juillet 1958	Banque Impériale ottomane	75,426	46	1,575,246
4 pour Cent, 1909	7,004,000	8 „ 1909	283,954	6,716,050	350,000	14 déc. 1950	„ „	67,690	38	1,311,010
„ 1911	7,040,000	2 nov. 1910	179,718	6,860,282	352,000	14 jan. 1952	Deutsche Bank	68,077	40	1,317,132
Chemin de fer 4 pour Cent Soma–Panderma	1,712,304	3 déc. 1910	7,326	1,704,978	71,355	3 fév. 1990	Banque Impériale ottomane	13,800	78	328,811
4 pour Cent Hodeida–Sanaa ..	1,000,010	9 mars 1911	..	1,000,010	40,988	9 „ 2000	Bank Salonique	7,927	88	191,893

Avance 4 pour Cent Société Câbles Kavalla	26,175	2 oct. 1901	7,863	18,312	Diverses	Jan. 1932	Postes, Télégr., et Téleph.	..	..	..
Transiranzati a Plaine de Koula 5 pour Cent	8,8,000	23 nov. 1907	125,000	733,000	25,000	Déc. 1947	Deutsche Bank	4,835	35	90,243
	..	..	..	..	..	..	.. .. ..	..	..	..
			13,461,701	112,124,147	6,021,148			1,108,140		22,326,664
Emprunt d'Égypte—										
4 pour Cent, 1885	5,500,000	20 août 1885	1,303,280	4,196,720	181,796	..	.. .. ..	..	..	..
„ 1894	6,918,012	5 mars 1894	995,800	5,982,812	308,685	10 avril 1951	Rothschild, Glyn, Mills ..	..	..	..
3½ pour Cent, 1891	9,933,571	16 mai 1894	1,062,796	7,250,778	362,171	15 oct. 1955	Dent-Palmer	..	..	..
Emprunt municipal	1,100,000	..	..	1,039,056*	60,500	..	.. .. ..	..	..	..

* Capital en circulation au 14 mars, 1912.

(1) Durée approximative—ramenée par suite de l'amortissement extraordinaire.
(2) La proportion pour cent de ces 3 annuités sera donnée ultérieurement.

(B.)—*Spécialisation des Gages.*

Dette extérieure turque (Emprunts) et Calcul hypothétique de la Part contributive des États balkaniques.

Emprunts.	Emprunt initial.	Dates d'émission.	Capital amorti au 14 mars, 1913.	Capital en circulation.	Annuité.	Dates d'amortissement.	Établissements prêteurs.	Annuité.	Capitalisation. Années.	Capitalisation. Système B.
	£ T.		£ T.	£ T.	£ T.			£ T.		£ T.
Dette convertie unifiée 1 pour Cent, 1903	42,275,772	1re partie—14 sept. 1903 / 2me partie—21 juin 1906	4,320,204	37,946,568	1,887,375	1961	Divers	(1)271,364	(2) 40	19,225,988
Lots turcs	15,632,518	5 jan. 1870	4,497,238	11,135,310	270,000	1974	„			..
Amortissement extraordinaire ..	..	..	..	..	469,000	..	.. .. ..			..
Emprunt 4 pour Cent—										
1904	2,750,000	1 sept. 1904	118,272	2,631,728	123,750	14 jan. 1962	Banque Impériale ottomane			..
Bagdad 2e Série	1,752,080	2 juin 1908	27,060	1,724,940	191,240	2006	Deutsche Bank			..
„ 3me „	5,236,000	2 „ 1908	4,576	5,231,424	214,025	2010	„			..
„ 4me „	2,376,000	Non encore émis	..	..	(3) 97,120	..	„			..
„ 5me „	2,376,000				97,120	..	„			..
„ 6me „	2,376,000				97,120	..	„			..
Emprunt—										
Osmanié 4 pour Cent, 1890 ..	4,999,500	18 avril 1890	1,796,300	3,203,200	219,975	14 mars 1951	Banque Impériale ottomane	..	..	..
Privilégié Tombac 4 pour Cent, 1893 ..	1,000,010	8 mai 1893	361,950	638,060	50,000	14 fév. 1934	„ „	..	..	..
5 pour Cent, 1896	3,272,720	29 avril 1896	386,100	2,886,620	180,000	14 juillet 1946	„ „	39,094	34	719,767
Pêcheries 4 pour Cent, 1903 ..	2,640,000	21 „ 1903	150,741	2,489,259	118,800	1er nov. 1958	Deutsche Bank	88,009	46	1,838,037
4 pour Cent Bagdad 1re Série ..	2,376,000	5 mars 1903	25,586	2,350,414	97,120	2001	„	..	..	..
„ Tchitteli-Askerié, 1905..	2,640,000	4 avril 1905	145,000	2,494,910	118,800	1er sept. 1961	„	23,268	19	196,573
„ 1901-1905	5,596,561	25 „ 1905	235,026	5,071,538	238,800	14 juillet 1961	Banque Impériale ottomane	52,361	49	694,964
„ 1908	4,711,121	6 sept. 1908	111,188	4,599,936	212,000	14 jan. 1957	„ „	..	..	..
Chemin de fer 4 pour Cent, 1891 ..	1,760,000	13 mars 1891	172,810	1,587,190	79,200	1er „ 1958	Banque Paris et Pays-Bas ..	..	..	..
Douanes 4 pour Cent, 1902 ..	8,000,020	11 oct. 1902	559,702	8,010,318	330,000	14 juillet 1958	Banque Impériale ottomane	..	..	..
4 pour Cent, 1903	7,000,004	8 „ 1903	283,954	6,716,050	350,000	14 déc. 1950	„ „	..	..	..
„ 1911	7,050,000	9 nov. 1910	179,718	6,860,282	352,000	14 jan. 1952	Deutsche Bank	..	..	..
Chemin de fer 4 pour Cent Soma-Pandermа	1,712,504	3 déc. 1910	7,526	1,704,978	71,355	3 fév. 1930	Banque Impériale ottomane	..	..	..
4 pour Cent Hodeida-Sanaa ..	1,000,010	9 mars 1911	..	1,000,010	40,988	9 „ 2000	Banque Salonique ..	..	..	..
Avance 4 pour Cent Société Câbles Kustendje	26,175	9 oct. 1904	7,863	18,312	Diverses	Jan. 1932	Postes, Télégr. et Téléph.	..	..	..
Frais d'irrigation, Plaine de Konia 5 pour Cent	858,000	23 nov. 1907	125,000	733,000	25,000	Dec. 1947	Deutsche Bank	..	..	..
	..	..	..	..	..	..	.. .. ..	(4) 232,100	40	4,593,902
			13,464,701	112,124,147	6,021,148			1,386,399		27,569,231
Emprunt d'Égypte—										
1 pour Cent 1885	5,500,000	20 août 1855	1,363,280	4,196,720	181,796	..	.. .. ..	..	..	..
„ 1891	6,948,612	5 mars 1891	965,800	5,982,812	308,685	10 avril 1951	Rothschild, Glyn, Mills ..	..	..	..
3½ pour Cent, 1894	9,033,574	16 mai 1894	1,082,796	7,950,778	362,174	15 oct. 1955	Dent-Palmer	..	..	..
Emprunt municipal	1,109,000	..	..	1,090,056*	60,500	..	.. .. ..	..	..	..

* Capital en circulation au 14 mars, 1912.

(1) Revenus y compris monopole des Tabacs—moins sandjak« Tchataldja, Bardanelle« (Marbos).
(2) Durée approximative—ramenée par suite de l'amortissement extraordinaire.
(3) La proportion pour cent de ces trois annuités sera donnée ultérieurement.
(4) Recettes douanes de l'Empire 8 pour cent. £ T. 3,250,820—proportion pour cent du Revenu Roumelie par rapport au Revenu global, soit 19·77 pour cent. Les charges totales gagées sur les Revenus des douanes de l'Empire pour les 8 subits emprunts étant de £ T. 1,171,000, la part qui pourrait être réclamée, à titre de gage spécialisé, serait de £ T. $\frac{1,171,000 \times 19{\cdot}77}{100} = 232,100$.

(C.)—*Spécialisation des Gages des anciens Revenus et Part proportionnelle pour autres Emprunts.*

Dette extérieure turque (Emprunts) et Calcul hypothétique de la Part contributive des Etats balkaniques.

Emprunts.	Emprunt initial.	Dates d'émission.	Capital amorti au 14 mars, 1913.	Capital en circulation.	Annuité.	Date d'amortissement.	Établissement prêteurs.	Annuité.	Capitalisation. Années.	Capitalisation. Système C.
	£ T.		£ T.	£ T.	£ T.			£ T.		£ T.
Dette convertie unifiée 4 pour Cent. 1903	12,275,772	1re partie— 14 sept. 1903 / 2me partie— 21 juin 1906	1,329,201	37,946,568	1,887,375	1961	Divers	(1)971,364	(2) 40	19,225,988
Lots turcs	15,632,518	5 jan. 1870	4,497,238	11,135,310	270,000	1974	„			
Amortissement extraordinaire					469,000					
Emprunt 4 pour Cent—										
1901	2,750,000	4 sept. 1901	118,272	2,631,728	123,750	14 jan. 1962	Banque Impériale ottomane			
Bagdad 2me Série	4,752,000	2 juin 1908	27,060	4,724,940	194,240	2006	Deutsche Bank			
„ 3me „	5,236,000	2 „ 1908	1,576	5,234,424	211,025	2010	„			
„ 4me „	2,376,000	Non encore émis	..	..	(3) 97,120	..	„			
„ 5me „	2,376,000				(3) 97,120	..	„			
„ 6me „	2,376,000				97,120	..	„			
Emprunt—										
Osmanié 4 pour Cent, 1890	4,999,500	18 avril 1890	1,796,300	3,203,200	249,975	14 mars 1931	Banque Impériale ottomane	48,345	19	634,960
Priorité Tombac 4 pour Cent, 1893	1,000,010	8 mai 1893	301,950	698,060	50,000	14 fév. 1934	„ „	9,670	22	139,742
5 pour Cent, 1896	3,272,720	29 avril 1896	386,100	2,886,620	180,000	14 juillet 1946	„ „	34,812	31	640,930
Pêcheries 4 pour Cent, 1903	2,610,000	21 „ 1903	150,741	2,459,259	118,800	1er nov. 1958	Deutsche Bank	22,976	46	479,846
4 pour Cent Bagdad, 1re Série	2,376,000	5 mars 1903	25,586	2,350,414	97,120	2001	„	18,783	89	455,262
„ Tesliizat-Askérié, 1905	2,640,000	4 avril 1905	115,090	2,494,910	118,800	1er sept. 1961	„	22,976	49	490,342
„ 1901–1905	5,306,661	25 „ 1905	235,026	5,071,635	238,800	14 juillet 1961	Banque Impériale ottomane	46,184	49	985,634
„ 1908	1,711,124	6 sept. 1908	111,188	1,599,936	212,000	14 jan. 1957	„ „	41,000	45	849,521
Chemin de fer 1 pour Cent, 1894	1,760,000	13 mars 1894	172,810	1,587,190	76,560	1er „ 1958	Banque Paris et Pays-Bas	14,807	16	309,239
Douanes 4 pour Cent, 1902	8,600,020	11 oct. 1902	559,702	8,040,318	390,000	14 juillet 1958	Banque Impériale ottomane	75,426	46	1,575,246
4 pour Cent, 1909	7,000,004	8 „ 1909	283,954	6,716,050	350,000	14 déc. 1950	„ „	67,630	38	1,311,010
„ 1911	7,010,000	9 nov. 1910	173,718	6,860,282	352,000	14 jan. 1952	Deutsche Bank	68,077	40	1,347,432
Chemin de fer 4 pour Cent Sama-Panderma	1,712,304	3 déc. 1910	7,326	1,704,978	71,355	3 fév. 1930	Banque Impériale ottomane	13,800	78	328,811
4 pour Cent Hodeida-Sanaa	1,000,010	9 mars 1911	..	1,000,010	40,988	9 „ 2000	Banque Salonique	7,927	88	191,893

Avance 4 pour Cent Société Câbles Kustendje	26,175	9 oct. 1901	7,863	18,312	Diverses	Jan.	1932	Postes, Télégr. et Teleph.			..	..
Frais d'irrigation Plaine de Konia 5 pour Cent	858,000	23 nov. 1907	125,000	733,000	25,000	Déc.	1947	Deutsche Bank	4,835	35	90,248	
	..	..	..	..	..	..		..	..	..	..	..
			13,464,704	112,124,147	6,021,148				1,168,672		29,056,029	
Emprunt d'Égypte—												
4 pour Cent 1885	5,500,000	20 août 1855	1,303,280	1,196,720	181,796	..		..	..	..	..	..
„ 1894	6,918,612	5 mars 1894	965,800	5,982,812	308,685	10 avril 1951	Rothschild, Glyn, Mills	..	..	..	..	..
3½ pour Cent, 1894	9,033,574	16 mai 1894	1,082,796	7,950,778	362,174	15 oct. 1955	Dent-Palmer	..	..	..	..	..
Emprunt municipal	1,100,000	..	..	1,090,050*	60,500	..		..	..	..	..	..

* Capital en circulation au 14 mars, 1912.

(1) Revenus y compris monopole des Tabacs—moins sandjaks Tchataldja, Dardanelles (Maidos).
(2) Durée approximative—ramenée par suite de l'amortissement extraordinaire.
(3) La proportion pour cent de ces trois annuités sera donnée ultérieurement.

(D.)—*Spécialisation des Gages pour les Revenus concédés et Gérés et Part proportionnelle pour autres Emprunts.*

DETTE extérieure turque (Emprunts) et Calcul hypothétique de la Part contributive des États balkaniques.

Emprunts.	Emprunt initial.	Dates d'émission.	Capital amorti au 14 mars, 1913.	Capital en circulation.	Annuité.	Date d'amortissement.	Établissements prêteurs.	Annuité.	Capitalisation. Années.	Système D.
	£ T.		£ T.	£ T.	£ T.			£ T.		£ T.
Dette ottomane unifiée 4 pour Cent, 1903	42,275,772	1re partie— 14 sept. 1903 / 2e partie— 21 juin 1906	4,329,204	37,946,568	1,887,375	1961	Divers	(1)971,364	(2) 40	19,225,988
Lots Turcs	15,632,548	5 jan. 1870	4,497,238	11,135,310	270,000	1974	„			
Amortissement extraordinaire ..	..	..	..	..	469,000	..	.. .. ..			
Emprunt 4 pour Cent—										
1901	2,750,000	4 sept. 1904	118,272	2,631,728	123,750	14 jan. 1962	Banque Impériale ottomane	23,933	50	514,133
Bagdad 2e Série	4,752,000	2 juin 1908	27,060	4,724,940	191,210	2006	Deutsche Bank	37,566	91	915,621
„ 3e „	5,226,000	2 „ 1908	4,576	5,221,424	214,025	2010	„	41,392	98	1,012,638
„ 4e „	2,376,000	Non encore émis	..	..	(3) 97,120	..	„	..	..	..
„ 5e „	2,376,000				97,120	..	„	..	..	..
„ 6e „	2,376,000				97,120	..	„	..	..	..
Emprunt—										
Ottoman 4 pour Cent, 1890.. ..	1,999,500	18 avril 1890	1,796,300	3,203,200	243,975	14 mars 1931	Banque Impériale ottomane	18,345	19	634,960
Priorité Tombac 4 pour Cent, 1893 ..	1,000,040	8 mai 1893	301,350	698,690	50,000	14 fév. 1934	„ „	9,670	22	139,742
5 pour Cent, 1896 ..	3,272,720	20 avril 1896	383,100	2,889,620	180,000	14 juillet 1946	„ „	39,694	34	719,767
Pêcheries 4 pour Cent, 1903 ..	2,850,000	21 „ 1903	156,741	2,489,259	118,800	1er nov. 1958	Deutsche Bank	88,009	46	1,838,037
4 pour Cent Bagdad 1re Série ..	2,376,000	5 mars 1903	25,580	2,350,114	97,120	2001	„	18,783	89	455,262
„ Tedjhizat-Askérié, 1905	2,640,000	1 avril 1905	145,090	2,494,910	118,800	1er sept. 1961	„	23,268	49	496,573
„ 1904-1905	5,306,564	25 „ 1905	235,026	5,071,538	238,800	14 juillet 1961	Banque Impériale ottomane	32,561	49	694,961
„ 1908	1,711,124	6 sept. 1908	111,188	4,599,936	212,000	14 jan. 1957	„ „	41,000	15	819,521
Chemins de fer 4 pour Cent, 1891 ..	1,760,000	15 mars 1891	172,810	1,587,190	76,560	1er „ 1958	Banque Paris et Pays-Bas..	11,807	16	309,239
Lignes 4 pour Cent, 1902.. ..	8,800,024	11 oct. 1902	559,702	8,240,322	390,000	14 juillet 1958	Banque Impériale ottomane	75,426	16	1,575,216
4 pour Cent, 1903	7,040,041	8 „ 1903	283,951	6,716,950	350,000	14 déc. 1950	„ „	67,690	38	1,311,010
„ 1911	7,040,060	9 nov. 1910	179,718	6,860,282	352,000	14 jan. 1952	Deutsche Bank	68,077	40	1,317,432
Chemin de fer 4 pour Cent Sama-Pazar	1,712,501	5 déc. 1910	7,326	1,701,978	71,355	5 fév. 1990	Banque Impériale ottomane	13,800	78	328,811
4 pour Cent Hodeida-Sanaa ..	1,060,010	29 mars 1911	..	1,060,010	10,986	9 „ 2000	Banque Salonique ..	7,927	88	191,893

Avances 4 pour Cent Société Câbles Ottomans ..	26,175	9 oct. 1901	7,863	18,312	Diverses	Juin.	1934	Postes, Télégr. et Téléph.	.. .. ..	
Dette flottante 5 pour Cent ..	8,8,000	23 nov. 1907	125,000	733,000	25,000	Déc.	1947	Deutsche Bank	4,835	35	90,243
	..	..	..	..	..	..		.. .. ..	(4) 232,100	40	4,593,902
			13,161,704	112,124,117	6,021,118				1,859,650		37,241,982
Emprunt d'Égypte—										
4 pour Cent, 1885	5,360,000	20 août 1855	1,303,280	1,196,720	181,796	..		.. .. ..	.. ..	.. ..
„ 1891	6,310,612	5 mars 1891	965,830	5,382,812	308,685	10 avril	1951	Rothschild, Glyn, Mills ..	.. ..	.. ..
3½ pour Cent, 1894	9,933,571	16 mai 1894	1,082,796	7,350,778	362,174	15 oct.	1955	Dent-Palmer	.. ..	.. ..
Emprunt municipal	1,000,000	..	..	1,000,000*	60,000	..		.. .. ..	.. ..	.. ..

* Capital en circulation au 14 mars, 1912.

(1) Revenus y compris le monopole des Tabacs—moins sandjaks Tchataldja, Dardanelles (Madère).

(2) Part contributive—ramenée par suite de l'amortissement extraordinaire.

(3) La proportion pour cent de ces trois annuités sera donnée ultérieurement.

(4) Recettes douanières de l'Empire soit pour cent £ T. 3,260,820—proportion pour cent du Revenu Roumélien par rapport au Revenu global, soit 19·77 pour cent. Les charges totales grevant sur les Revenus des douanes de l'Empire pour les susdits emprunts s'élevant à £ T. 1,174,000, la part qui pourrait être réclamée, à titre de gage spécialisé, serait de

$$\frac{£\text{ T. }1{,}174{,}000 \times 19{\cdot}77}{100} = 232{,}100.$$

Récapitulation.

Emprunts.	Nbre d'années.	(A.) Part proportionnelle.		(B.) Spécialisation des Gages.		(C.) Spécialisation des Gages sur anciens Revenus et Part proportionnelle pour autres emprunts.		(D.) Spécialisation des Gages pour les Revenus concédés et gérés et Part proportionnelle pour autres emprunts.		Observations.
		Annuité.	Capitalisation.	Annuité.	Capitalisation.	Annuité.	Capitalisation.	Annuité.	Capitalisation.	
		£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	
Dette convertie unifiée 4 pour Cent, 1903	40	507,941	10,053,561	971,364	19,225,988	971,364	19,225,988	971,364	19,225,988	
Lots turcs										
Amortissement extraordinaire ..										
Emprunt 4 pour Cent—										
1901	50	23,933	514,133	..	..	..	..	23,933	514,133	Annuité prélevée sur excédents anciens revenus.
Bagdad 2me Série	91	37,566	915,621	..	..	..	..	37,566	915,621	" " "
" 3me "	98	41,392	1,012,638	..	..	..	..	41,392	1,012,638	" " "
" 4me "	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
" 5me "	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
" 6me "	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
Emprunt—										
Osmanié 4 pour Cent, 1890 ..	19	48,345	634,960	..	..	48,345	634,960	48,345	634,960	**Annuité prélevée sur dîmes d'Anatolie et £ T. 30,000 sur la douane.**
Priorité Tombac 4 pour Cent, 1893	22	9,670	139,742	..	..	9,670	139,742	9,670	139,742	
5 pour Cent, 1896	31	34,812	640,930	3,094	719,767	31,812	640,930	39,094	719,767	**Annuité prélevée sur dîmes et aghnam d'Anatolie et Roumélie.**
Pêcheries 4 pour Cent, 1903 ..	46	22,976	479,846	88,009	1,838,037	22,976	479,846	88,009	1,838,037	Annuité prélevée sur nouveaux revenus Anatolie et Roumélie et dîmes d'Anatolie.
4 pour Cent, Bagdad, 1er Série ..	89	18,783	455,262	..	..	18,783	455,262	18,783	455,262	Annuité prélevée sur dîmes d'Anatolie.
" Tedjhizat-Askérié, 1905	49	22,976	490,312	23,268	496,573	22,976	490,312	23,268	496,573	**Annuité prélevée sur surtaxes dimières et sur les droits de douane.**
" 1901–5	49	46,184	985,634	32,564	694,964	46,184	985,634	32,564	694,964	Annuité prélevée sur dîmes et surtaxe Anatolie et Roumélie et £ T. 122,000 sur douanes.
" 1908	15	41,000	849,521	..	..	41,000	849,521	41,000	849,521	**Annuité prélevée (£ T. 40,000) sur excédents dîmes Anatolie et Roumélie et £ T. 180,000 sur douanes.**

172

Chemin de fer 4 pour Cent, 1894 ..	16	14,807	309,239	..	..	14,807	309,239	14,807	309,239	Annuité prélevée sur la part revenant au Gouvernement des recettes Chemins de fer orientaux.
Douane 4 pour Cent, 1902 ..	46	75,426	1,575,246	..	..	75,426	1,575,246	75,426	1,575,246	Annuité prélevée sur douanes.
4 pour Cent, 1903	38	67,890	1,311,010	..	..	67,690	1,311,010	67,690	1,311,010	" " dîmes d'Anatolie.
" 1911	10	68,077	1,317,432	..	..	68,077	1,317,432	68,077	1,317,432	Annuité prélevée sur douanes de Constantinople 1re Tranche.
Chemin de fer 4 pour Cent, Sama-Panderma	78	13,800	328,811	..	..	13,800	328,811	13,800	328,811	Annuité prélevée sur recettes du service même.
4 pour Cent Hodeida-Sanaa .	88	7,927	191,893	..	..	7,927	191,893	7,927	191,893	Annuité prélevée sur recettes douanes de Hodeida et Djeblana.
Avance 4 pour Cent Société Câbles Kustendje	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Annuité prélevée sur recettes des Télégraphes.
Frais d'émission Plans de Konia 5 pour Cent	35	1,835	90,243	..	..	1,835	90,243	4,855	90,243	Annuité prélevée sur excédents dîmes et aghnam d'Anatolie et Roumélie.
" " "	10	..	..	232,100	4,593,902	..	..	232,100	4,593,902	
		1,108,410	22,326,061	1,386,399	27,569,231	1,468,672	29,056,099	1,859,650	37,244,982	
Lapsed et Expté—										
4 pour Cent, 1885	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
" 1891	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
5 " 1894	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
Emprunt municipal	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	

173

N.B.—Dans le système B, il y aurait lieu de spécialiser un montant à déterminer provenant des gages sur les excédents des dîmes affectées aux garanties kilométriques des chemins de fer de Roumélie.

1111

Avances contractées par le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman avant la Guerre balkanique.

Diverses avances.	Montant de l'avance.	Dates.	Capital amorti à fin février, 1328.	Capital non amorti.	Pour cent d'intérêts.	Pour cent de Commis.	Date de l'échéance.	Part proportionnelle à 19·34 pour cent.	Gages.
	£ T.		£ T.	£ T.					
Deutsche Bank	2,929,915	29 fév. 1912	41,662	2,888,285	5½	1	1er mars 1913	558,594	Recettes douanes, Constantinople. Avance à valoir sur la deuxième série de l'emprunt 1911.
Banque Nationale de Turquie et Banque de Salonique	1,650,000	1er „ 1912	75,000	1,575,000	5½	¼	28 fév. 1913	304,605	1. Par les recettes "Routes nationales" portant intérêt 4 pour cent. 2. Par le produit de la deuxième série de l'emprunt 1911. 3. Par le produits du 1er emprunt à conclure sauf tout emprunt qui serait spécialement affecté aux travaux publics. 4. Par les revenus des douanes de Salonique, Smyrne, Andrinople, Brousse, Beyrouth, après déduction de £ T. 642,000, annuité déjà gagée.
Banque Impériale Ottomane	1,500,000	19 avril 1912	..	1,500,000	6½	¼	5 avril 1913	290,100	1. Par les recettes "Routes nationales." 2. Par le produit du 1er emprunt à conclure qui serait spécialement affecté aux travaux publics. 2. Sur l'excédent des dîmes et aghnam gérés par la Dette publique ottomane jusqu'à concurrence de £ T. 500,000. 4. Par l'amortissement de l'ancienne avance de £ T. 250,000—si cette avance n'est pas remboursée à l'échéance, il sera émis de nouveaux titres pour un capital majoré des intérêts équivalant au montant en souffrance.
.. ..	1,205,013	11 juin 1912	250,000	1,015,013	7	½	3 .. 1913	202,106	
.. ..	1,250,000	14 août 1912	160,583	1,089,417	7	½	23 août 1913	210,693	1. Recettes "Routes nationales." 2. Par le produit de la seconde série de l'emprunt 1911. 3. Par le produit du 1er emprunt à conclure sauf tout emprunt qui serait affecté aux travaux publics. 4. Ainsi que par l'affectation de £ T. 540,000 provenant de la dîme des tabacs après payement des assignations fixes de £ T. 100,000 et £ T. 130,000 —dans le cas où lesdits revenus n'atteindraient pas le montant de £ T. 540,000, le déficit serait comblé par les premières rentrées des aghnams des vilayets d'Andrinople et Angora—sur les droits de douane 8 pour cent de Bagdad, Alexandrette, Prévésa, Haidar-Pacha, Constantinople pour £ T. 365,000.

à valoir sur l'emprunt, 1912.

174

Banque française	660,000	12 mars 1911	122,406	537,594	5	1	18 déc 1913	103,971	Ces emprunts quoique garantis par les recettes des routes nationales, les titres n'ayant pas été mis en circulation, il a été convenu que les droits de douane de Trébizonde seraient affectés à leur amortissement.
„ „	440,000	4 sept. 1912	18,741	421,259	7	¼	15 oct. 1913	81,171	
Banque Nationale de Turquie	2,051,859	5 juillet 1911	321,662	1,733,197	5	..	1er juillet 1916	335,200	Par le Trésor Impérial pour frais de construction "Dreadnought."
Deutsche Bank	33,000	15 août 1912	..	33,000	5½	..	13 fév. 1913	6,382	Par le Trésor Impérial sur les obligations gagées et transférées du Sultan déchu.
Banque Impériale ottomane ..	300,000	16 „ 1912	..	300,000	6	..	28 „ 1913	58,020	„ „ „
Société Chemin de Fer de Bagdad	30,000	3 juin 1908	166,892	133,108	6	..	..	25,743	Excédent des Revenus concédés.
Administration des Biens des Orphelins	..	..	..	137,420	12·6	..	Versement par versement	26,577	Par le Trésor Impérial (le montant initial n'est pas connu).
Administration des Phares ..	200,000	5 juillet 1907	171,305	128,695	7	..	..	24,890	Sur la part revenant au Gouvernement du produit des droits des phares.
„ „ ..	80,681	5 août 1909	..	80,681	6	..	..	15,601	„ „ „
			1,328,251	11,602,667				2,243,956	

Avances contractées par le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman durant la Guerre balkanique.

175

Régie des Tabacs	200,000	25 oct. 1912	77,263	122,737	6	..	..	..	Part des profits revenant au Trésor sur les recettes de la Régie des Exercices 1328, 1329, et 1330.
Dette publique ottomane ..	300,000	1 jan. 1913	..	300,000	7	..	..	..	Sur le produit du 1er emprunt à conclure, si non sur la surtaxe douanière 3 pour cent l'année 1329 et sur la part revenant au Trésor de l'indemnité Tripolitaine de 50,000,000 de livres.
Banque Nationale de Turquie	33,000	1er déc. 1912	..	33,000	7	..	1er juin 1913	..	Par le Trésor Impérial.
Bons du Trésor	3,000,068	8 nov. 1912	..	3,000,068	6	..	8 nov. 1915	..	Sur l'impôt de guerre.
„ „	5,500,000	18 jan. 1913	..	5,500,000	5	..	30 „ 1917	..	„ „ foncier.
Avance Compte Courant de la Banque Impériale ottomane	1,500,000	..	..	1,500,000	5·5	..	..	..	
„ „	300,000	..	..	300,000	..	..	..	..	Sur les £ T. 500,000 représentant le produit de la vente de la caserne du Taxim.
			77,263	10,755,715					

[16706] No. 294.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 12.)

(No. 60.)

Sir, *Vienna, April 9, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that a meeting was held yesterday in the palace of Count Alfred Harrach, in Vienna, with the object of creating a union for the advancement of Austro-Hungarian economic, literary, scientific, and humanitarian interests in Albania.

The meeting was attended by the former Minister of War, Baron Schönaich, by members of the most influential Austrian, Bohemian, and Hungarian families, officials from various Ministries, representatives of the financial and banking world, and by several Albanians, including Faik Bey Konitza, President of the Albanian Congress recently held at Trieste.

After speeches had been made reviewing the historical ties which bound Albania to Austria and emphasising the obligations of the Dual Monarchy to protect and uphold the interests of the Albanian people, the following resolution was passed amidst loud applause:—

"The meeting held in the Harrach palace regards with admiration and sympathy the heroic defenders of Scutari, who have withstood for many months the overwhelming onslaught of their foe. We offer to them and to the rest of Albania our warmest brotherly sympathy, and express the hope that the righteous cause of Albania will triumph."

The proceedings closed with a speech by Prince Edward Liechtenstein, who stated that a fund was to be raised for the relief of distress in Albania, and that the committee had agents in that country who would see that the money collected was fairly distributed. Faik Bey Konitza thanked the meeting for their benevolent interest in Albania, and added that his countrymen would never forget the help extended to them by Austria-Hungary in their struggle for existence.

I have, &c.

FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[16852] No. 295.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received April 12.)

Sir, *Treasury, April 11, 1913.*

I HAVE laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, Sir L. Mallet's letter of the 8th instant, with regard to the expenses of Sir P. Harvey, Chief Auditor, National Health Insurance Department, while serving as the representative of His Majesty's Government on the International Commission about to meet at Paris to settle the financial questions arising out of the present war.

In reply I am to request you to convey to the Secretary of State their Lordships' sanction for the hire by Sir P. Harvey of a sitting room and for payment of an allowance of 12*s.* 6*d.* a day in respect of a servant.

While my Lords remain of opinion that 1*l.* 10*s.* a night is a sufficient rate of subsistence allowance for members of International Conferences, &c., held at Paris, they are satisfied that the amount of entertainment, which will necessarily be involved during the course of the present commission, will make a considerable addition to the expenses incurred by Sir P. Harvey; and they are accordingly prepared, in the exceptional circumstances, to authorise the grant to him of subsistence allowance at the rate of 2*l.* a night, together with locomotion expenses.

I am, &c.

T. L. HEATH.

[16891] No. 296.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 12.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April 12, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram dated the 11th instant, relative to the Montenegrin blockade.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 296.

Admiralty to Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII."

(Telegraphic.) *Admiralty, April 11, 1913.*

BLOCKADE may be extended to Durazzo when all your colleagues have received similar instructions.

[16773] No. 297.

Formula proposed by M. Pichon as to Indemnity.—(Received at Foreign Office, April 12.)

LE Gouvernement de la république est disposé à examiner si l'attribution d'une compensation pécuniaire aux alliés balkaniques peut se concilier avec les intérêts légitimes de la Turquie et la sauvegarde des garanties octroyées aux porteurs français.

[16770] No. 298.

M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, April 12.)

(Télégraphique.) *Saint-Pétersbourg, le 9 avril, 1913.*

NOUS partageons entièrement les appréhensions de Sir Edward Grey pour le cas de l'entrée des armées bulgares à Constantinople. C'est pour la prévenir que nous pensons reconnaître principe indemnité de guerre, ce qui, du reste, ne saurait préjuger du chiffre de cette indemnité. Or, le Gouvernement bulgare, en se déclarant prêt à ne pas entrer à Constantinople, insiste sur le principe de l'indemnité, qui seul pourrait justifier cette décision aux yeux de l'armée et de l'opinion publique en Bulgarie. C'est là la considération majeure, que nous aimerions à faire admettre à Sir Edward Grey. Veuillez lui reparler en ce sens.

[16684] No. 299.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 12.)

(No. 144.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, April 11, 1913.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has asked me to urge necessity for our doing something to satisfy allies on question of war indemnity, and to say that in his opinion best basis would be proposal which he has already submitted that 3 per cent. customs duties affected to the three vilayets should be assigned to allies for the purpose of raising a loan. He fears that otherwise conclusion of peace will be delayed and that Bulgarians will enter Constantinople.

[16695] No. 300.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 12.)

(No. 134.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, April 11, 1913.*

MEDIATION proposals.

Your telegram No. 90 of 8th April.

All my colleagues except Russian Minister have now received instructions.

I gather proposed *démarche* will strengthen Prime Minister's hands in favour of peace, and also he would be glad to see pressure applied at Athens.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[16897] No. 301.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 12.)

(No. 73.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, April 12, 1913.*

SECRETARY-GENERAL informs me that Italian naval and military staff insist on the danger of the whole of the Corfu channel passing under the control of Greece, as they maintain that, even if adjoining territories were neutralised, the channel provides a base for naval concentration securing the command of narrow entrance to the Adriatic.

[16681] No. 302.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, April 12, 1913.*

SIR R. PAGET'S telegram No. 90 of 11th April: Wounding of British vice-consul at Scutari.

Can you ascertain approximate date of occurrence?

[16684] No. 303.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 322.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 12, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 141 of 11th April.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sir H. Bax-Ironside's No. 134 of 11th April, repeated to you. It is important that *démarche* should be made without delay. It is impossible to get Powers to commit themselves beforehand to principle of indemnity, but formula in *démarche* leaves it open to Bulgaria to raise the question and have it discussed at Paris.

[17314] No. 304.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.**

(No. 58.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Foreign Office, April 12, 1913.*

FOLLOWING is text communicated by Russian Ambassador as definition of Northern Albanian frontier:—

"La frontière du nord de l'Albanie partira de la côte Adriatique à l'embouchure de la Bojana, et suivra le thalweg de ce fleuve jusqu'au village de Koritsa, situé sur la rive droite. De là elle atteint le sommet des montagnes séparant la Bojana du lac de Scutari, en laissant le mont Tarabosch à l'Albanie. Elle traverse le lac près du village Zogaï, qui reste à l'Albanie, jusqu'à la baie de Litcheni-Hoti, d'où elle suit la frontière entre les tribus de Grouda et Hoti, cédées au Monténégro, d'une part, et les tribus de Castrati et Clementi, d'autre part, laissant ces deux tribus à l'Albanie.

* Also to Sir R. Paget (No. 77), Count de Salis (No. 41), and Sir H. Bax-Ironside (No. 93).

"Elle se confond ensuite avec les limites actuelles entre la tribu monténégrine de Koutchi, d'un côté, et la tribu de Clémenti, de l'autre côté, jusqu'au district de Goussigné du Plava: elle laisse ce district au Monténégro, en suivant la chaîne principale et la ligne et partage des eaux entre le Lim, d'un côté, et le Drin, de l'autre.

"Elle quitte cette chaîne pour gagner la crête des collines au sud de la ville de Diakova, qui est laissée hors de l'Albanie. Elle suit le cours du Drin blanc jusqu'à l'ouest de Prizrend et ensuite la frontière entre le district de Prizrend et le district de Liouma, laissant ce dernier à l'Albanie.

"De là elle suit la crête de la montagne Korab, en laissant à l'Albanie le district de Dibra inférieure (Dolna Dibra) et hors de l'Albanie le district de Reka. Quittant cette crête un peu au nord de la ville de Dibra, qui reste hors de l'Albanie, la frontière gagne le Drin noir, qu'elle remonte jusqu'au village de Loukowo, d'où, en laissant Strouga hors de l'Albanie, elle gagne la rive ouest du lac d'Ochrida."

(Repeated to Paris, No. 163; Berlin, No. 162; Rome, No. 138; St. Petersburgh, No. 324; and Vienna, No. 137.)

[17314] No. 305.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.**

(No. 59.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 12, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

Russian text is identical with Austrian text communicated to me on 22nd March, except that in paragraph 4 of former the words "avec le district de Dibra supérieure, Gorna Dibra," have been inserted between words "la ville de Dibra qui" and the verb "reste."

You might point this out to your Austrian and Russian colleagues, and ascertain whether the words in question should be inserted in communication to be made to allies.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 164; Berlin, No. 163; Rome, No. 139; St. Petersburgh, No. 325; and Vienna, No. 138.)

[17318] No. 306.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.†

(No. 162.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 12, 1913.*

THE following proposal was made by the French Ambassador at the meeting with Ambassadors yesterday:—

"Le Gouvernement français proposerait d'examiner s'il ne conviendrait pas de procéder, le moment venu, à l'envoi d'une flotte internationale aux Dardanelles, à Rodosto et à Constantinople. Cette flotte aurait pour mission:

"1. De maintenir l'ordre à Constantinople;

"2. D'empêcher les opérations de guerre dans la presqu'île de Gallipoli, sur la rive septentrionale de la mer de Marmara et sur le Bosphore;

"3. D'assurer la liberté de la navigation dans les Détroits.

Elle ne se retirerait qu'après la conclusion de la paix."

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government are prepared, if all the Powers agree, to co-operate in the international action proposed with the view of securing the objects named.

As, however, it is impossible to say beforehand whether all these objects can be completely achieved without involving the use of more force than the effects an conveniently employ, we think that the action of the fleets must be decided after reference to their respective Governments when they are actually on the spot, and can estimate the circumstance with which they have to deal.

* Also to Sir R. Paget (No. 78), Count de Salis (No. 42), and Sir H. Bax-Ironside (No. 94).

† Also to Sir R. Rodd (No. 146), Sir G. Buchanan (No. 325), Sir F. Cartwright (No. 146), and Sir E. Goschen (No. 164).

Please let me know as soon as possible the decision of Government to which you are accredited, that we may make necessary preparations for sending ships if the others agree.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 179, and Sophia, No. 92, for confidential information only.)

[16904] No. 307.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 135.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, April 13, 1913.*

MEDIATION proposals.

In concert with my colleagues I carried out to-day instructions contained in your telegram No. 90 of 8th April. Prime Minister asked me to thank you, and said he considered this further step as an advance in the direction of peace.

He cannot, however, give official reply without consultation with allies, to whom he must remain loyal.

(Confidential.)

Prime Minister informed me confidentially that the Bulgarian Government were now satisfied with new proposals, and added that he would use all his influence with the generals to keep things quiet at the front.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[16908] No. 308.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 74.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, April 13, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 162 of 12th April to Paris.

Italian Government are prepared to co-operate in proposed international action if all Powers agree, and Minister for Foreign Affairs supports the suggestion for reference to respective Governments before specific action by fleets.

[16909] No. 309.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 75.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, April 13, 1913.*

ALBANIAN southern frontier.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that Austrian General Staff was quite as urgent as the Italian regarding danger for freedom of Adriatic of allowing Greece to acquire whole mainland coast of the Corfu channel, constituting a favourable base for naval concentration. Austria, moreover, insisted on inclusion in Albania of Goritza and other places, which take frontier considerably south of that to which Greece laid claim.

[16910] No. 310.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 76.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, April 13, 1913.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs again spoke to me about extreme importance of settlement of Scutari issue, because in either event, King of Montenegro refusing to abandon Scutari or of fall of dynasty, involving as it would attempting fusion of Montenegro with Servia, Austria would take action.

He felt only hope lay in financial assistance, and Austria would only accept proposal of guaranteed loan if all Great Powers joined guarantee. If one or more refused Austria must refuse, as otherwise she would appear to be yielding to blackmail. Alternative to this guarantee by all the Powers was in his opinion European war.

He also considered that, if agreed on, questions of financial assistance must be handled with tact to save face of the King of Montenegro, who must not be placed in a position of having been bought. Guarantee should not be made public until after King had announced that he was compelled by the action of the Great Powers to resign claims to Scutari. Then Powers should announce that in consequence of their desire to enable Montenegro to recuperate and defend its resources they were prepared to guarantee loan. This was procedure he was advocating through Italian Minister at Cettinjé.

[16913] No. 311.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 64.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, April 13, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 161 of 12th April.

Secretary of State reported French proposals to Emperor yesterday, who is in Homburg, and will let me know decision of Imperial Government as soon as possible. He informs me that German naval force now in Mediterranean is one Dreadnought and three cruisers.

[16914] No. 312.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 65.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, April 13, 1913.*

SCUTARI.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed me to-day that Servian Chargé d'Affaires had stated that his Government had decided to send no more troops, and not to attack except in the case of sortie. He had added that Servian Government would be glad if the Imperial Government would endeavour to get orders sent from Constantinople instructing the commandant to remain passive. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had replied that he would have no objection to taking step desired if the Servian Government would guarantee that message should be allowed to go through the lines.

[16902] No. 313.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 91.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, April 13, 1913.*

BELGRADE Chamber of Commerce has declared in favour of boycott of all Austrian goods. This resolution was probably result of report published by press here two days ago that Austria had threatened to enter sanjak unless the Servian troops were withdrawn from Scutari and that Servian Government had been forced to yield under this threat. As it will gradually transpire that this rumour was incorrect, the boycott is hardly likely to be carried out.

[16903] No. 314.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 92.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, April 13, 1913.*

SERVIAN Government have applied to my German colleague requesting him to arrange for exchange of some 600 Servian prisoners, including four or five officers, for an equivalent number of Servian prisoners captured at Bradina.

This would indicate that Servian Government expect an early conclusion of peace

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[16906] No. 315.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 49.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, April 13, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 47 of 11th April.

No communication received from Russian Government by French Government suggesting extension of blockade to Durazzo, but Austrian Ambassador suggested it this evening to the Political Director on the ground that bacon is being imported there.

Telegraphic instructions are being sent to French commander to join British admiral if the latter has instructions for such extension. French Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks, however, that the necessity of such extension will now no longer exist, for the Servian Minister informed him officially yesterday that the Servians will withdraw from siege of Scutari, and only require a guarantee that the Turks will not fire on the Servian troops when they retire.

[16907] No. 316.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 50.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, April 13, 1913.*

YOUR circular telegram No. 162 of yesterday to Paris.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I have seen this evening, concurs in your views in regard to dispatch of an international fleet to Dardanelles and Rodosto and Constantinople. Proposal has the acquiescence of the Russian Government. Italian Ambassador here is recommending it to the Italian Government. No replies yet received from Berlin or Vienna.

[16965] No. 317.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) *Saloniea, April 13, 1913.*

MY despatch No. 1 of 7th February.

Musselman villagers who have fled from Osmanieh declare that, in spite of official declarations to the contrary, extreme violence is being still employed with a view to compelling them to profess Christianity. In one village alone ten or twelve men have died in consequence of beatings received, and those who came here show obvious signs of ill-usage.

They appeal to protection of England as the only means of preserving their existence.

[17314] No. 318.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.**

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 13, 1913.*

MY circular telegrams of 12th April: Northern Albanian frontier.

Take no action till you hear further from me.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 165; Berlin, No. 164; Rome, No. 140; St. Petersburgh, No. 326; and Vienna, No. 139.)

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* Also to Sir R. Paget (No. 79), Count de Salis (No. 43), and Sir H. Bax-Ironside (No. 95).

[16957] No. 319.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 52 A.)

Sir, *Sophia, March 31, 1913.*

THE military events, culminating in the capture of Adrianople, which took place between the date of my despatch No. 35 of the 12th instant, in which I had the honour to review the occurrences of the previous fortnight, and the 27th instant, are reported in my despatch No. 48 of the latter date. By the fall of the Turkish fortress, the theatre of hostilities is now reduced to the neighbourhood of the Turkish lines at Chatalja and Bulair, from the first of which positions sorties in force are reported by the Bulgarian staff to have been made and repulsed both yesterday and to-day. But, besides such inconclusive engagements, a very important development of the campaign began immediately after the surrender of Adrianople, in the shape of the movement southwards of the greater part of the Bulgarian forces which had been engaged in the siege of that place. Some of these appear to have moved in the direction of Serres, to reinforce the Bulgarian occupation of districts likely to be disputed by the Greeks, but the pick of the army, with all available artillery, are being pressed forward to take part in the great effort by which it is hoped to force the Chatalja lines and effect an entry into Constantinople.

While the operations of war are thus proceeding apace, the negotiations for peace have made but little progress. The extensive conditions which, as foreshadowed in my despatch No. 35, the allies were to make in accepting the proposals of the Powers, caused the reply to those proposals to be considerably delayed, the chief cause of delay being, according to the Bulgarian Prime Minister, the stipulations insisted on by the Greek Government. It was finally presented on the 14th instant, and was in the following terms:—

"Les Etats alliés expriment leurs vifs remerciements aux Grandes Puissances et, déférant à la démarche par laquelle elles ont offert leur médiation, déclarent l'accepter aux conditions suivantes:

"1. Comme base de la négociation pour la délimitation des territoires entre la Turquie et les alliés sera prise une ligne partant d'un point sur la mer de Marmara à l'est de Rodosto rejoignant la mer Noire à proximité du cap Malatra au sud-est de Midia, à l'exclusion de la presqu'île de Gallipoli, qui restera à la Turquie. Tous les territoires à l'ouest de cette ligne frontière sont cédés par la Turquie aux Etats alliés, y compris les places assiégées: Andrinople et Scutari.

"2. La Turquie devra céder les îles de la mer Egée.

"3. Elle devra se désintéresser complètement de l'île de Crète.

"4. La Turquie devra consentir en principe au payement aux alliés d'une indemnité de guerre, dont le montant sera fixé lors de la conclusion définitive de la paix, ainsi qu'au payement d'indemnités particulières pour les dommages dont la cause est antérieure à la guerre. Les Etats alliés devront prendre part aux délibérations relatives aux indemnités.

"5. Les Etats alliés se réservent de régler par le traité définitif de paix le traitement à accorder à leurs sujets et à leur commerce dans l'Empire ottoman, les questions de nationalité contestée aussi bien que les garanties au sujet de privilèges des églises orthodoxes et de droit public de leurs congénères sujets ottomans.

"6. Les opérations de guerre ne seront pas interrompues."

It was in insisting on the admission of the principle of an indemnity—with a view to pressing afterwards for a sum of 40,000,000*l.*—that the allies were most firmly united, and for this admission they endeavoured to enlist the support both of the Austrian and Russian Governments, this being one of the objects of the mission to St. Petersburgh of General Radko Dimitrief, as bearer of an autograph letter from King Ferdinand to the Emperor of Russia.

The meeting of Ambassadors on the 15th passed two resolutions, the first stating that it was for the mediating Powers to formulate the bases of negotiation, and the second laying down those bases; only on the first of these resolutions was I, in the first instance, authorised to act in conjunction with my colleagues. By the 22nd, when they had all been instructed to act on the first resolution, we had all received instructions to act on the second also, and both were communicated on that date by a single [illegible], of which the following is the text:—

"Les Gouvernements des Grandes Puissances prennent acte avec satisfaction de l'acceptation de leur médiation par les Etats alliés et leur font observer qu'avant

l'ouverture d'une discussion sur les conditions de la paix il appartient aux Puissances de formuler leurs vues sur les bases de négociations qui devraient être adoptées.

" Les Grandes Puissances sont d'avis que les bases des négociations doivent être les suivantes : —

" 1. La frontière de l'Empire ottoman en Europe partira d'Énos, suivra le cours de la Maritsa, puis le cours de l'Ergene, et aboutira à Midia. Tous les territoires situés à l'ouest de cette ligne seront cédés par la Turquie aux États alliés, à l'exception de l'Albanie, dont le régime et la délimitation seront fixés par les Puissances.

" 2. La question des îles de la mer Égée sera réglée par les Puissances.

" 3. La Turquie se désintéressera complètement de l'île de Crète.

" 4. Les Puissances ne peuvent se montrer favorables à une demande d'indemnité, mais elles admettront les alliés à prendre part aux discussions de la commission internationale de Paris pour un règlement équitable de leur participation à la dette et aux charges financières des territoires qui leur seront attribués. La Turquie sera invitée à prendre part aux travaux de cette commission.

" Les Grandes Puissances déclarent en même temps que, dès l'acceptation de ces bases, les hostilités devront prendre fin."

The above text of the clause defining the frontier is, as you will note, slightly different from that given in your instructions to me, but it was that on which the French Minister said that his instructions forced him to insist; it was accepted by my other colleagues, and I did not feel justified in further delaying our common action, especially as the French text seemed to be a natural amplification of yours, and it was, after all, a question of " bases " of negotiation only.

It appeared likely at this time that the conditions proposed would be accepted. Such was the opinion expressed to me by my Greek and Servian colleagues here; the Bulgarian forces were known to be suffering severely from the conditions prevailing before Adrianople, and the Prime Minister and other prominent persons in Sophia did not conceal their desire that the war might be brought to an end.

At this moment, however, the military authorities decided that the time had at length come for the great assault at Adrianople, which had been already projected; and General Savof desired that the reply of the allies should be delayed pending the result of this operation. The place was carried, as you are aware, on the morning of the 26th instant, and the Bulgarian Government immediately felt their political, as well as their military, situation to be immensely stronger and more promising. They were now anxious to pursue their military advantage, with a view to a peace on more favourable terms, and more than indifferent, meanwhile, to the delay of the negotiations for mediation. Thus the reply to the Powers has not yet been given, though the Prime Minister stated in reply to the remonstrance which I made by your instruction that this was due to the Greek Government.

At the same time all the troops released from the siege of Adrianople are being pushed southwards, some in the direction of Serres and Drama, to reinforce the occupation of those districts against the Greeks, but the best of all arms, and all available artillery towards Chatalja. There is every sign that the chiefs of the army and the King are bent on making a grand effort to force the Turkish lines, and thus crown the Bulgarian victories by a triumphal entry into Constantinople. How far such an attempt may be likely to succeed I cannot judge, but that it is now intended I have no doubt whatever. Those of my colleagues to whom I have spoken on the question are of a like opinion, and the Russian Minister has drawn the attention of his Government to what he considers a serious danger. He told me, however, that he had renewed the warning which he gave to the Bulgarian Government on this subject in November last, and he expressed no wish that this legation should take any similar action.

With the submission of the Roumano-Bulgarian frontier question to the mediation of the Powers through their Ambassadors at St. Petersburgh, the centre of interest has shifted to that capital, and the efforts of the Bulgarian Government have been directed to gaining the support of the Russian Government for their contentions. General Radko Dimitrief, the most brilliant and popular of Bulgarian soldiers, was dispatched with an autograph letter from King Ferdinand to the Emperor, and shortly afterwards Dr. Danef was also sent on an unofficial mission as adviser to the Bulgarian Minister.

Dr. Danef's mission was strongly discouraged by the Russian Government, and it is perhaps characteristic of the Bulgarian Government that he was, nevertheless, dispatched.

It is probable that an equally important, although unavowed, object of the missions, both of General Dimitrief and of Dr. Danef, was to enlist the favour of the Russian Government on behalf of Bulgaria in the questions raised by Servia respecting the partition of Macedonia.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[16958] No. 320.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 53.)

Sir, *Sophia, April 5, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a memorandum received from His Majesty's consul at Adrianople, containing an account of the circumstances attending the surrender of the town, and of the general conditions which prevailed there during the days immediately following the Bulgarian occupation.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 320.

Memorandum by Consul Samson on situation at Adrianople for period March 26 to 30, 1913.

THE main Bulgarian effort on the 26th was concentrated against Aivas Baba and Ayiyolu forts, the latter of which was captured by the 10th Regiment at about 1 A.M., the work immediately to the south of it falling at about 3 A.M. At 6 A.M. the line Topyolu-Yildiz–Kavkas was still untaken, but by 8 A.M. the whole of the eastern line of defences was in the hands of the Bulgarians. Thirty Bulgarian batteries were employed on this section of the attack, the majority of which were concentrated against the batteries Aivas Baba and Ayiyolu. It was at first understood that a document containing the surrender of the town had been sent by Ismail Pasha, acting under instructions from Shukri Pasha, to the Bulgarian commander who, as it was unsigned, had sent it back for signature. General Ivanof, however, states that this was not the case and that no such document reached him. He awaited Shukri Pasha at Kuru Cheshme fort, expecting him to come there to surrender the town. The latter did not however do so, but was taken prisoner at his headquarters at Haiderlik fort by the squadron of the cavalry of the guard. At 9·45 A.M. the Servian and Bulgarian cavalry reached the centre of the town where shortly after 10 A.M. Ismail Pasha was taken prisoner at the military headquarters offices, which, together with those of the Government, were guarded by cavalry, who began patrolling the streets. The arrival of the Bulgarian troops, which was already described in a previous memorandum, continued throughout the 27th, when a good deal of disorder and lack of discipline prevailed. This, however, was not excessive considering the manner in which the town had been taken, and the fact that it became necessary to bring a large number of the Bulgarian troops into the town in order to secure Turkish fugitives who were hidden in it. The search, which was imperative in order to discover these, afforded opportunity for pillage of which the men employed in this duty freely availed themselves, certain sections of the civil population participating in it. A notice was published during the day forbidding firing in the streets or pillage. Although occasional murders of Moslems took place, these were isolated cases, and there has not been up to the present any sign of a general anti-Turkish movement. There have, however, undoubtedly been cases where prisoners have been killed by the guards in charge of them, and the matter has been brought to the notice of General Ivanof, through the Russian consul. The estimate of the Bulgarian authorities as to the number of prisoners in their hands on the evening of the 26th appears to have been considerably less than the actual figure. By the morning of the 28th it is believed that some 45,000 had actually been captured, who were marched out of the town in different directions.

The King of the Bulgarians arrived in the town in the course of the afternoon and received Shukri Pasha, who tendered him his sword, which the King returned to him. Shukri Pasha was greatly touched at the graciousness of His Majesty, who sent him a

message to ask whether he would care to come and be presented to him, instead of sending for him as a prisoner.

Pillaging continued on the 28th instant, but it was clear that order was being gradually restored, the presence of police in the streets contributing to its maintenance.

A number of Servian troops marched into the town at 10 A.M. some of the Bulgarians leaving in the course of the afternoon, but the majority of the troops in the town are still Bulgarian.

There have been a number of cases of cholera amongst the troops, and especially among the Turkish prisoners who are confined on an island in the Tundja to the north of the town and in an encampment to the south of it. General Ivanof states that the destruction of grain and flour stores by the Turks just before the fall of the town has greatly increased the problem of feeding the prisoners who are being assisted with biscuits from the Bulgarian stores.

The civil population are still suffering from the shortage of breadstuffs, and great difficulty exists in bringing these into the town owing to the Marash bridge having been blown up by the Turks.

It is almost impossible to obtain private transport from Marash (railhead) to the town, nearly all horses and carriages having been commandeered.

The only telegrams accepted, other than military, are those from consular officials and newspaper correspondents.

An incident has occurred in connection with the firing of a revolver by a cavass in the courtyard of the Austrian consulate, and the subsequent surrounding of the building by a guard which refused to allow the consul to leave. The matter is of too complicated a nature to be dealt with in detail here, but the consul has received an expression of regret on behalf of General Ivanof from a staff officer.

Adrianople, April 1, 1913.

[16959] No. 321.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 54.)

Sir, *Sophia, April* 4, 1913.

IN amplification of my telegram No. 122 of to-day, I have the honour to state that on receipt of your telegram No. 88 of yesterday, saying that the French Government had complained that my latest instructions as to the conditions of peace to be proposed to the Bulgarian Government differed from those contained in your telegram No. 86, I was at a loss to conceive how such a misunderstanding could have arisen. I had not communicated the wording of those instructions to any one, but had only informed the German Minister of their sense on 1st April, saying that I waited to hear from him as doyen, that our other colleagues were similarly instructed before we should concert our action.

This morning I called on the French Minister, who told me that it was on the strength of what he had gathered from Herr von Below that he had sent the telegram, rather loosely worded as it seemed to me, which appeared to have given rise to the misunderstanding above referred to. I then communicated to him the exact terms of your telegram No. 86, and informed him of the instructions contained in your No. 88. He replied that he was in entire agreement, and was instructed to act in conjunction with his colleagues. Any misunderstanding therefore which may have existed is now happily removed.

My other colleagues have also, I understand, now received instructions in the same matter, so that I hope that it may now not be long before our joint representation can be made.

I have, &c.

H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[16960] No. 322.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 55.)

Sir, *Sophia, April* 5, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 13 of the 3rd February, containing copy of a *note verbale* addressed to the Bulgarian Government, drawing their attention to the

complaints of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration concerning the action of the Bulgarian authorities in Macedonia, as enumerated in your despatch No. 20 of the 28th January, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the Bulgarian Government's reply to the above note.

Commenting on the replies given to the various points raised, I would venture to observe that—

No. 1 amounts to a simple denial of the alleged robbery, without stating what measures were taken to obtain evidence or the nature of the enquiry held.

No. 2. The admission that the salt at Musselim was taken without the amount being weighed points rather to forcible seizure than to requisitioning, as it is improbable that the Debt officials would have been unwilling to measure out the quantity handed over. It is difficult to see how it will be more feasible to estimate in the future the amount delivered than it was at the time payment was first requested.

No. 3. It would appear that the Bulgarian Government's version of the reasons for which the cereals in depôt at the Protapapas mills were seized would require careful investigation, and it seems desirable that a representative of the Ottoman Public Debt should be permitted to take part in the enquiry which is being held on the subject.

No. 4. As a declaration of intention, the Bulgarian Government's statement as to the orders which have been sent to the local authorities in Macedonia as regards the attitude to be observed towards the Debt officials in the execution of their duties is satisfactory, but it yet remains to be seen what measures are being taken to ensure that these instructions are being carried out. Up to the present, His Majesty's Legation have received no indications that the Bulgarian Customs officials are desisting from the obstructive methods which they have hitherto unfortunately pursued.

I have, &c.

H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 322.

Bulgarian Government to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

M. le Ministre, *Sophia, le 20 mars* (2 *avril*), 1913.

J'AI l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence les explications ci-dessous fournies par le Département des Finances en réponse à la note en date du 22 janvier (4 février) dernier, qui lui a été communiquée en temps voulu :

1. Il n'a pas été commis de vol à l'agence de la Dette publique ottomane a Dédéagatch après le départ des troupes turques, pas plus par des insurgés que par quelqu'un d'autre. Il est vrai que le sceau dont se servait l'agent (le mudir), dans ses fonctions, a disparu, mais c'est à l'hôtel où ce fonctionnaire était logé que la disparition s'est produite, et non pas à l'agence.

2. Il est vrai que les autorités militaires Royales ont réquisitionné du sel dans les agences de la Dette publique ottomane à Enos et ailleurs ; des dispositions ont été prises pour en faire acquitter la valeur à qui de droit. Toutefois, une partie du sel réquisitionné dans les dépôts de la Dette publique, aux salines de Musselim, n'ayant pas été pesée lors de la livraison, il a été impossible de délivrer sur-le-champ les reçus d'usage pour toute la quantité de sel fournie. C'est pourquoi les autorités compétentes ont été invitées à faire constater quelle est la quantité de sel réquisitionné pour laquelle il n'a pas été dressé de reçus ; la valeur en sera remboursée par la suite.

3. Au sujet des céréales provenant des dimes affectées au payement de la garantie kilométrique de la ligne Salonique–Dédéagatch—céréales dont la maison Protopapas et Cie., de Dédéagatch, a pris possession—il vient d'être établi qu'elles avaient été réquisitionnées par les autorités ottomanes, pour les besoins de l'armée, avec l'autorisation de la Direction de la Dette publique ottomane de Constantinople. Or, le Moutessarif de Dédéagatch, au lieu de les verser aux services de l'intendance—ainsi qu'en avait décidé ladite direction et ainsi que le conseil administratif de la même ville avait résolu de faire—avait au contraire essayé de livrer le produit des dimes à la maison Protopapas, en payement de certaine créance contractée par le Gouvernement ottoman. Les armées Royales arrivèrent sur ces entrefaites et c'est alors que la minoterie Protopapas se saisit des céréales en question. Comment elle est parvenue à le faire, on si elle avait droit à cette mainmise, c'est ce que montrera l'enquête qui se poursuit actuellement.

4. En ce qui concerne la perception des revenus affectés en gage à la Dette publique ottomane, les autorités Royales compétentes installées dans les territoires occupés ont reçu l'ordre des instructions leur enjoignant de ne gêner en rien les agents de cette administration dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions. Quant à ceux des revenus qui sont concédés à la Dette publique ottomane et que le Fisc bulgare fait recueillir directement—le droit de timbre notamment—le Ministère Royal des Finances, qui en tient un compte détaillé, se fait un devoir d'assurer intégralement les intérêts de la Dette publique ottomane, en veillant, toutefois, à ce que l'Administration de cette Dette ne profite des revenus recueillis dans les territoires occupés pour renforcer le crédit du Gouvernement turc ou pour augmenter la part qui revient à ce Gouvernement sur les recettes des revenus concédés.

Veuillez, &c.
I. E. GUÉCHOF.

[17050] No. 323.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 66.)
Sir, *Athens, April 7, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a copy of a despatch from the military attaché to His Majesty's legation, reporting on the proposed distribution of the Hellenic forces.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 323.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cunliffe-Owen to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 17.)
Sir, *Athens, April 6, 1913.*

ON enquiry at the office of the general staff yesterday, I was furnished with the following information as to the proposed distribution of the Greek forces for the moment. The information given was not very full and, unless one has been able to obtain verification of any statement by personal observation, it is unwise to accept without reservation even the details vouched for by the general staff. However, I think it may be fairly assumed that the Greek army is practically divided into two groups, located respectively (*a*) at and around Salonica, and (*b*) in Epirus, or perhaps as it may be termed, Epiro-Albanian territory. As both these localities may be regarded as debatable spheres for future settlement, it is significant that they are being occupied with as strong military garrisons as possible, though the assembly of the troops at Salonica is still stated to be as a precautionary measure in the event of their being yet called upon for overcoming the further resistance of the Turks at Bulair or elsewhere.

At Salonica, five divisions will be shortly assembled, viz., the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 6th and 7th. Of these, the 1st, 6th, and 7th are already there, the 4th is on its way from Athens, where it had been brought from Epirus to participate in the funeral ceremonies, and the 2nd is also *en route* from Yanina viâ Prevesa.

In Epirus, the 3rd and 8th divisions are to the north of Yanina; the whereabouts of the 5th is uncertain, but it will probably be disposable with the two named. In addition, two fresh divisions have recently been formed and numbered nine and ten; one of these is likely to be utilised in Epirus and the other may relieve the 5th in Macedonia.

The 9th and 10th divisions are mainly composed of newly-trained men from abroad, with probably some of the 1912 class, and artillery *matériel* provided from captured Turkish guns (mountain or field).

I am informed that the total number of troops raised up to date in Greece for the war amounts to 208,000, but the bulk of the 1912 class has not yet been called upon, nor the 1913 class at all.

I have, &c.
F. CUNLIFFE-OWEN
Military Attaché.

[17051] No. 324.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 70. Confidential.)
Sir, *Athens, April 7, 1913.*

YOUR telegram, No. 51 of the 31st ultimo, instructing me to inform the Greek Government that the Servian and Montenegrin Governments had been notified of the agreement of the Powers about the northern and north-eastern frontiers of Albania, that consequently there is no further occasion for hostilities in Albania, and that Greek ships should not convey further forces to Albania—contained no intimation that it was to be a collective representation, and I therefore acted upon it as soon as I received it, on the 1st instant, by sending a French translation of it in a private note to M. Coromilas, who acknowledged the receipt of it in the same way, and stated that he would come to an understanding with the allied Governments with regard to it.

The German Minister received similar instructions, and acted upon them at about the same time. Our other colleagues received instructions at varying intervals, but no two were identical, some omitting mention of the delimitation of Albania, others making no allusion to the naval demonstration, while most of them contemplated a collective step. Consequently at least until the day before yesterday none of them had taken any step at all.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[17000] No. 325.

Sir R. Paget to Sir E. Grey.—(Received April 11).

(No. 73.)
Sir, *Belgrade, April 7, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a memorandum upon financial conditions in this country at the beginning of the war and at the present moment.

This memorandum is founded upon notes kindly placed at my disposal by the Belgian Minister.

It will be seen that notwithstanding the continuation of hostilities and the complete uncertainty of the political situation, Servia is nevertheless able still to procure funds from abroad, a circumstance which is unfortunate as making the Servian Government less amenable to the wishes of the Great Powers.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET

Enclosure in No. 325.

Memorandum respecting the Financial Conditions of Servia.

IN order to meet military expenditure the sum of 860,000*l.* was specially credited to the Government account under the law passed the 12th July, 1912.

For purposes of mobilisation this sum was subsequently increased (October 16, 1912) to 2,192,900*l.*

The above sum was apportioned from the following sources:—

1. 450,000*l.* representing advances legally due from the National Bank to the State.
2. 640,000*l.* representing the existing surplus from the 1906 and 1909 loans.
3. 450,000*l.* representing special State funds administered by the Crédit foncier ("Otpanva Fondova").
4. 280,000*l.* representing funds lying at the Treasury.
5. 400,000*l.* representing the surplus for the months of October and November lying at the Caisse de l'Administration des Monoples, after securing payment of the January coupon.

Thus at the commencement of the war the net resources of the Servian Treasury amounted approximately to 2,220,000*l.*

At the beginning of October the monetary situation was sound.

The stocks of gold and silver lying at the National Bank amounted to 1,720,000*l.* and 240,000*l.* respectively. Deposits abroad amounted to 880,000*l.* Note circulation was

approximately 3,192,000*l.*, the latter being thus guaranteed to the extent of about 90 per cent.

In the month of December the Minister of Finance was compelled to look round for resources. An advance of 720,000*l.* was obtained through the intermediary of the Crédit foncier. This institution borrowed the above sum from a group of Paris bankers on the security of various funds administered by, and deposited with, it, and which are affected to certain sanitary, educational, and insurance services.

In view, however, of the continuation of hostilities, it became necessary to resort to further financial expedients.

In February, negotiations were opened with the same group of Paris bankers through the intermediary of the Société d'Entreprises de Dragages et de Travaux publics of Paris. In the course of 1912, this company had been authorised by the Servian Government to trace various railway lines of a total length of from 250 to 300 kilom. The company now offered to obtain for the Servian Government a short term loan of 1,200,000*l.* in return for a concession for the construction of the lines. This arrangement is to receive sanction under a bill shortly to be laid before the Skupshtina.

The advance, as in the case of the previous one, is to be at 6 per cent. at par. A higher rate of interest will, however, be received by the lending banks, but, in return for the immediate concession of the lines, the company has agreed to meet the excess of interest over and above the 6 per cent. payable by the Servian Government. The above sum is covered by three-month bills, renewable, but only once so, after the conclusion of peace. At each renewal a commission of 1 per cent. will be charged.

Thus since the commencement of the war the Servian Government have obtained funds totalling approximately 4,140,000*l.*

In spite of the sobriety of the Servian soldier and the large booty obtained in money and provisions of all kinds, it is difficult to believe that the above receipts have sufficed to cover all requirements, especially as the receipts from ordinary revenue have considerably diminished. It seems probable that supplementary sources, of a non-apparent nature, have been tapped. Such sources may have been (*a*) secret advances by the National Bank from its stock of specie which is plentiful; (*b*) the renewal of bills in payment of war material, or (*c*) short-dated loans from the principal Government contractors.

Until, however, Servia has contracted the large loan which will become necessary to cover the expenditure incurred during the war, it will be impossible to estimate its cost with any degree of accuracy.

[16961] No. 326.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 56. Confidential.)

Sir, *Sophia, April 8, 1913.*

WITH reference to the instructions contained in your despatch No. 33 of the 28th February last, and in your telegram No. 79 of the 19th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a memorandum which I presented unofficially on the 5th instant, relating to excesses stated to have been committed by the Bulgarian population of the occupied districts of Thrace and Macedonia, consisting in the forcible conversion of Moslems to Christianity, and other acts of violence.

The memorandum covered certain extracts which have been carefully selected from consular reports from the occupied districts and from Salonica copies of which I have the honour to enclose.

In handing the memorandum to M. Gueschof I drew his Excellency's serious attention to the fact that this was the second memorandum which I had been compelled to present to him on the same subject.

I reminded him of the deplorable impression which will be produced throughout Europe when it becomes known that such outrages as those referred to have occurred, and that such conversions have taken, and are taking place, and I urged his Excellency to have immediate steps taken to stop the commission of such acts, and the punishment of the guilty parties.

M. Gueschof made no attempt to deny that such misdeeds had been committed, or that wholesale forcible conversions of Moslems to Christianity had taken place. He expressed his great personal regret that such acts could be ascribed to Bulgarians; that he had done, and would continue to do, his utmost to prevent the commission of such

crimes, but that, at the present time, Bulgaria was in the hands of the military authorities, and that the civil authorities had but little power.

I said that, as a proof of his good intentions, he was surely powerful enough to insist on Tchernopeief and Tchakof, who, it was well known, were chiefly responsible for the outrages at Cavalla, and whose misdeeds were public property, being brought to trial.

His Excellency replied that the latter had already been placed in the hands of the military authorities, that the former had powerful friends, but that he would continue to insist on his being tried.

The Prime Minister concluded by stating that if an amelioration did not take place in the situation described, and if the chief offenders were not condemned, he would resign. M. Gueschof evidently felt his position in the matter very keenly.

I would venture to suggest that other Great Powers, who have information of a similar description, should also interest themselves in this question.

Similar action on their part to that taken by His Majesty's Government would undoubtedly have a good effect.

I have, &c.

H. G. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 326.

Memorandum communicated to M. Gueschof.

BY instruction of His Majesty's Government the attention of the Royal Bulgarian Government was drawn, in a memorandum of the 1st (14th) February, to excesses stated to have been committed by the Bulgarian population of the occupied districts of Thrace and Macedonia, countenanced, if not abetted, by the Bulgarian civil and military authorities, and consisting in the forcible conversion of Moslems to Christianity and other acts of violence.

Since the above date confirmatory reports have been received from informants in whom His Majesty's Government have the fullest confidence, the substantial accuracy of which it is unfortunately impossible to doubt. The extracts from these reports annexed to the present memorandum will show the Royal Bulgarian Government how deplorable have been the excesses committed, and how detrimental they are likely to prove to the best interests of Bulgaria. It is indeed to be feared that when they become known to the public, as in course of time they inevitably must, they will produce the most unfortunate and disagreeable impression in the very quarters in which opinion has always been most favourably disposed towards this country, and will go far to alienate sympathy from all those who may be held, rightly or wrongly, to be responsible for them.

The Bulgarian Government should therefore be the first to deplore such acts committed within their jurisdiction or by the abuse of their authority, and His Majesty's Government cannot doubt that now that they are more fully informed they will take prompt measures to prevent their recurrence and to obtain the punishment of the guilty parties.

It is in this expectation that His Majesty's Government feel it to be their duty to make the present unofficial communication, which they are confident will be received by the Royal Bulgarian Government in the same friendly spirit by which it is inspired.

British Legation, Sophia, April 5, 1913.

Enclosure 2 in No. 326.

Extracts from Reports received by His Majesty's Government.

I FEEL that no further time should be lost in submitting to you my conviction that a peculiarly cynical and cruel persecution is now being carried on under the cloak of religion with the purpose of forcing the entire Pomak population in the occupied districts to become Bulgarian.

I have already explained how the bulk of the able-bodied male population of the Pomak villages has been deported to Philippopolis and other places in Bulgaria since the occupation, with the result that there are now, for the most part, only old men, women, and children left. It is on these that the brunt of the persecution has fallen and is falling. Meanwhile, their relatives in prison here are being subjected to similar pressure.

Last week I had occasion to visit the "Vacaro" tobacco factory for the purpose of distributing gifts of clothing, &c., to some 983 Pomaks who are detained there. During my visit a pencilled petition was slipped into my cavass's hand, stating that the wives and families of the twenty-nine signatories had been forcibly converted to Christianity, and begging me to save them (the writers) from the fate with which they themselves were now being threatened. Of the 983 men, I was informed by the physician in charge that 203 were seriously ill, most of them with with typhoid, and all are in a deplorable state of neglect and misery. Pressure is being put on those who are still in health to become "Christians." It is said that some have accepted and been released. Those who refuse these terms will presumably be kept in durance to "take their chance" in their present insanitary surroundings.

The foregoing tallies in substance with accounts which reach me by more or less direct channels from Salonica, Cavalla, Nevrokop, and other places. It suffices, I venture to think, to dispose once for all of the pretension that these "conversions" are voluntary. The Pomaks were, indeed, Christians at periods varying in remoteness from possibly 100 to 400 years ago, but it cannot be too emphatically stated that at the present day they are fanatical Moslems. It is in this that the cruelty and cynical blasphemy of these forced conversions for a political motive lie. Detailed information of them has probably not yet reached the Mohammedan world at large, but the outcry in England over the Armenian conversions to Islam at Biredjik in 1896 is not forgotten, and it will be seen that the principle involved is the same. At Biredjik it was a question of a handful of Armenians, here it is a population of at least 100,000 whose fate is at stake. With all respect I venture to submit that, for the credit of civilisation and for the good name of Christianity in the East, means must be found quickly to put an end to these outrages.

Decent Bulgarians profess to regard these forced conversions as the work solely of an ignorant and bigoted clergy, and they refuse to believe that the Bulgarian Government can be aware of what is going on. But the persecution is on too large a scale, too general, and too uniform in method to admit the hypothesis that the Bulgarian Government has not connived.

List of villages from which complaints have been received :—

Dere-Dere (district).	Ourlou (250 houses).
Aher-Gelebe (district).	Mustafchouva (300 houses).
Yasouren (400 houses).	Ouzoun Dere (500 houses).
Shahin (330 houses).	Eliastche (200 houses).
Elmali (200 houses).	Dovien (200 houses).
Sinikova (250 houses).	Kohsanler (30 houses).
Soujak (60 houses).	

The above are all in the recently occupied provinces, most of them being in the Gumuljina district. The persecution is now being extended to Pomaks inhabiting villages within the Bulgarian frontier.

Michaelkovo is a Pomak village which has suffered greatly. It consisted before the war of 110 houses, and appears to have been very prosperous. The village is now little more than a heap of ruins. Out of 110 houses only 10 were left. One hundred and sixteen men, which (in a village of 110 families, means practically all the males between the ages of 20 and 50), were sent under arrest to Philippopolis. Early in January some 600 women and children were crowded together in ten houses and two granaries. As many as nineteen were living and sleeping in a single room, and from fifty to sixty in a five-roomed house.

At Dovlen out of 250 houses only 27 are standing, the rest having been burnt to the ground. In these 27 houses 900 persons were living, their supplies were running short, and I was assured that half of them were without means of subsistence. All the foregoing particulars were given to me openly in the presence of the Bulgarian officials on the spot, and they are not likely to be exaggerated.

Pallas: This place is now a wretched scene of desolation. It is, however, conceivable that the destruction of Pallas may have been a necessity, as this is the first and only point after crossing the Turco-Bulgarian frontier at which I heard of fighting having taken place.

At Elmali and Shahin the inhabitants complained of the endeavours of the Bulgarian priests and komitajis to force them to accept Christianity.

At Xanthi, since the beginning of the war, there has been a great influx of destitute peasants, not only from the neighbouring villages but from places such as Tumrush, five or even six days distant. A large section of the population are in the most painful straits. It must be noted with regret that the Bulgarian authorities have already raised subscriptions in Xanthi for their own Red Cross Society, and for other purposes of little interest or benefit to the inhabitants, but they have done nothing to relieve their misery. On the contrary, they have indirectly helped to increase it. Greek merchants, who in the ordinary course of their business would have imported flour, sugar, salt, petroleum, and other necessaries into the town, were again and again prohibited from doing so, in order that a few favoured Bulgarians, profiting by a monopoly of transport, might sell at famine prices. It must be added that until now Xanthi has been particularly unfortunate in the type of civilian officials, who have been sent there from Sophia, and the administration appeared to be rife with abuses. Whether by accident or from motives of political expediency, it would seem that the Central Government have given opportunity to a crowd of disreputable adventurers to take up temporary appointments in the occupied provinces, and exploit the country to their heart's content. There was no general massacre by Bulgarians at Xanthi, but a very large number of isolated acts of violence and murder for the purposes of robbery. The principal mosque in the town has been converted into a Bulgarian church, and the mufti has been forced to sign a deed of gift conveying another mosque and the cemetery in which it stands to the conquerors, a proceeding which it must be hoped, for the credit of Bulgaria, may not be allowed to stand. Much private property has been seized by the Bulgarian bishop and other civilians under the ægis of the occupying forces.

While at Xanthi many Pomak villagers came to me and begged my intervention to protect them from the violent measures which their conquerors were adopting to force them into Christianity.

The village of Yasouren in particular was surrounded by a cordon, while priests and komitajis with threats and blows endeavoured to force the people to renounce their religion.

On arrival at Serres I went first to the principal hotel, intending to put up there, but found it full of komitajis. Several of these were pointed out to me by name, amongst them Tchernopoief, the author of the Cavalla murders. At that time Serres was swarming with these criminals. Not only was the hotel full of them, but one came across them everywhere, even in the Government and the ante-room of General Volkof. They were constantly to be seen *tête-à-tête* with Bulgarian officers, and whether from force of circumstances or policy, it was obvious that the Bulgarian Government had not yet seen fit to dissociate itself from them. An American tobacco merchant informed me that one of these ruffians had boasted to him of having murdered 700 Turks with his own hands.

Serres, like almost every considerable town in this part of Macedonia, sent emissaries to surrender to the Bulgarians some hours before the latter reached the town. Now the massacre of more than 400 unarmed Mahommedans was subsequently permitted in front of the Government buildings and almost in the presence of the officer in command, has yet to be satisfactorily explained. The victims were for the most part

villagers who had taken refuge in the town. Part of the Moslem quarter was pillaged and burnt, and a very large number of houses were looted. The principal mosque was converted into a Bulgarian church, others were razed to the ground. When I visited Serres more than two months after, many Moslems were still afraid to come out of their houses. I believe that some of those I saw—chiefly ex-Turkish officials—were not far from starving in their homes.

The Serres district is notoriously one of the richest in European Turkey, and it is deplorable that a district which seems to have offered no resistance to the invading forces should have suffered so abominably. Here were some of the finest farms in Turkey, but it seems doubtful whether any are now standing. From one alone (at Kavakli) 1,436 head of cattle were driven off and damage done (including pillage of cereals and stock) to the extent of £T. 2,000. Many villages were burnt, and the number of those ruthlessly pillaged cannot at present be even guessed at. At the Moslem village of Tchoban Kuiu, from Serres, out of 215 men only 11 are believed to have escaped. All the women are said to have been violated. While at Serres I visited the Medressé, Osman Hodja, where I found eighty-four of the Tchakova survivors. Of these only three were men, the rest women and children. They were crowded together in nine or ten little cells, and absolutely destitute. It will be interesting to know what the Bulgarian Government is to do with these unhappy homeless and utterly helpless victims, if indeed they survive the winter.

At Demir-Hissar, situated on the [illegible] line, and into Bulgarian territory, while another [illegible] Petritch, is a Pomak community. Several hundreds have been [illegible] to their villages, but naked everywhere one of the most [illegible] of the [illegible] which has been done to [illegible] and armed [illegible].

At Gumuldjina I found over 3,000 destitute Moslem refugees from the villages, mostly Pomaks. Here again I was repeatedly approached by Pomaks imploring British intervention to save them from Bulgarian religious persecution. I called the attention of General Petroff to the matter, and also that of the prefect, both of whom protested with obvious untruth that no forced conversions were taking place.

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At Dedeagatch conditions were exceptionally painful. A port easily accessible from all parts of the interior, it became early in the war the refuge of an exceptionally large number of Turkish officials and their families, who, no doubt, hoped to escape to Constantinople or Asiatic Turkey, but who had not, at that date (end of January), been permitted to leave. In my previous despatch I was careful not to hazard a guess at the number of Turks massacred by the Bulgarians at their first entry into Dedeagatch. I have now good (foreign) authority for saying that it was approximately 300. One sees no fezzes in Dedeagatch, the Bulgarians having forced the inhabitants to exchange their proper headgear for a black cloth cap. I do not know that this is in accordance with the official order, but on both occasions of my visiting this town I saw nothing else.

In the districts dealt with in the foregoing report, the invading forces met with very little opposition on the part of the Turkish troops and none whatever on the part of the population, but they seem to have acted as though engaged in the suppression of a bloody and obstinate rebellion rather than in the occupation of an unresisting province. I refer to [illegible] to the [illegible] destruction of villages, of which I have cited only a few instances. There can [illegible] to justification for the burning of [illegible] villages both in the [illegible] of the invaders. In the case of [illegible] Mr. Calloway and Dr. [illegible] officers and soldiers have admitted to me privately that [illegible] when they took possession. I am [illegible] in the next [illegible] the cases that here and there there were [illegible] but I can only say I have found no such [illegible] on the [illegible] who took part in the advance. On the contrary, I [illegible] the Bulgarians for the [illegible] with which the [illegible] Christian villages in the country

where they (the Pomaks) are accused of cruelties. Pallas is the only place at which I heard of an encounter with Turkish troops, and nowhere did I hear of resistance offered by the population.

Serres, Cavalla, and Xantri sent out emissaries to meet the Bulgarian general and formally surrendered to him long before troops (regular or irregular), reached these towns. Yet at Serres 400 persons were massacred, at Cavalla 200 were methodically tortured to death, on successive days, and at Xanthi there were numerous murders and "disappearances" and innumerable isolated acts of violence. At Dedeagatch some 300 persons were massacred and the Moslem quarter looted. Everyone hears of outrages on women and children. In the country villages and farms were devastated, cereals pillaged, cattle driven off, and peasants murdered. I have no experience on which to base an estimate, but I have heard an American, judging from the results of the American Civil War, say that the Serres district will hardly recover from the events of the past five months in less than a generation—and this though there has been, properly speaking, no fighting.

The Cavalla atrocities were the work of the komitajis, and perhaps some day it will be explained why General Kovachef allowed these criminals a clear week's freedom of action in a defenceless town which was formally surrendered to him. Two months after the Cavalla murders, Tchernopeief and companions were living in great style at Serres, on terms of seeming equality with the civil and military authorities. In these circumstances, and until the Bulgarian Government takes steps to prevent it, the impression will continue to prevail that an understanding did exist between it and the komitajis, giving the latter *carte blanche* during a certain period to make what they could out of the inhabitants of the occupied provinces in payment of services rendered to the regular troops. At all events, at present there seems no other way to account for the systematic intimidation and robbery of non-combatants, with imprisonment, violence, and murder, which were permitted to continue unchecked by the Bulgarian military authorities for a given time in various localities.

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Within a few weeks of the occupation large numbers of Pomaks were arrested all over the country (in many of the villages practically the whole male population between the ages of 20 and 50) and deported as prisoners to Bulgaria, where they are still detained. Meanwhile, missionary priests, accompanied by soldiers or komitajis, have been passing from village to village and forcing the remaining inhabitants to renounce Mahommedanism and declare themselves Bulgarians and Christians. Similar pressure is being put upon those who are under arrest in Bulgaria, many hundreds of whom must have perished of disease and neglect. In defence of their policy the Bulgarians urge that the Pomaks were at one time Bulgarians and Christians. This is true, but it is not by a very long way within living memory, and the fact remains that to-day that they are fanatical Moslems.

I have the honour to report that this morning a native of Beden, a village of some 250 houses in the Ruptchos district, came to see me, and narrated that he had escaped at the risk of his life to inform the foreign consulates here of the attempts that are being made in that region to compel the Mussulman population to embrace Christianity.

According to his story, on Monday, the 27th January, some eighty or ninety inhabitants of his village were rounded up and driven to the small town of Shireen Lake, on the Bulgarian side of the frontier, and there forcibly baptised. After three days they were taken back to Devlen, the chief town in their circumscription, and made to figure as voluntary converts for the encouragement of the rest, being compelled by threats of actual violence to sign a written declaration that they had themselves petitioned for admission into the Christian Church.

Similar proceedings, he declared, had taken place at Breza, Nikalkova, Tchurukova, Laskova, and Seltche, and were taking place in all the twenty-six villages of that district, in all of which the mosques were closed, the women compelled to cast aside their veils, and the moukhtars and imams removed and kept under surveillance at

Devlen. All this was done, he assured us, by gendarmes and reservists under the personal direction of the military commandant and civil Governor of Devlen, who declared that, by order of the Bulgarian Government, there should be no more Mussulmans on Bulgarian soil.

I am satisfied that the crimes committed by the Macedonian komitajis are, as a general rule (though there are a few honourable exceptions), connived at if not openly approved by the constituted authorities; and there seems to be only too good grounds for the belief that the Bulgarian Government have become in a manner subservient to the Macedonian committees.

Towards the latter end of January the inhabitants of Kruphik, Osenovo, Izekovo, and Simitli (and probably other villages as to which there is no direct news) received invitations to return to the faith of their (remote) ancestors.

These suggestions having remained without effect, three or four of the most prominent men were successively murdered, to intimidate the rest. The inhabitants of each village were then rounded up in the open and harangued by the priests and komitajis in the presence of an armed band, after which all those who were persuaded of the superior advantages of Christianity were invited to step forward. No one daring to refuse, each received a new name from the priest, who made the mark of the Cross on his forehead, and the ceremony was then concluded.

My informant believed that complaints in regard to the somewhat drastic measures adopted by the modern apostles of Christianity to undermine the religious convictions of the Pomak villagers must already have reached Sophia, since he had heard that about a week ago the Bishop of Dubnitza had visited Djuman accompanied by a Greek doctor, and it was understood that part of their mission was to search for and exhume the corpses of the murdered men.

[17802] No. 327.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 14.)

(No. 77.)

Sir, *Belgrade, April* 8, 1913.

IN an article in the "Samouprava" animadverting with much bitterness upon the representations of the Powers in regard to Scutari there is also a passage dealing with the special religious guarantees which it is proposed should be afforded to the Turco-Albanian population outside the limits of Albania. Stress is laid on the fact that religious liberty is secured under Servian just as much as under English law, and the article concludes as follows:—

"In the course of the war, Servia, on her own initiative, opened negotiations with the Holy See for the execution of a Concordat with a view to assure the religious freedom of her Catholic subjects and regulate their religious services in the same manner as in other countries."

I took an opportunity to-day of enquiring of M. Stefanovitch whether the negotiations had, in fact led to any result. He replied, that so far, nothing definite had been arranged, but that, owing to the increased number of Catholics who had now come under Servian rule, the Government would doubtless consider it necessary to proceed further in the matter.

I have not thought it necessary to summarise the expressions of the Servian press on the subject of the present situation, as they consist almost solely of abuse of the Powers, and are in reality of little political interest.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[17004] No. 328.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 14.)

(No. 77.)

Sir, *Belgrade, April* 8, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copies of despatches Nos. 21 and 22 of the 24th ultimo and 1st instant respectively, which have been addressed to me by His

Majesty's vice-consul at Uskub, upon the conditions and local military opinion in his consular district.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure 1 in No. 328.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 21.)

Sir, *Uskub, March* 24, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to continue herewith my series of reports on conditions in the south of this province, the last of which was my No. 19 of the 12th instant.

I am told that the Servian persecution of Bulgars is for the moment slackening. This is ascribed to the representations of General Paprikof, who visited Uskub recently. My informant, however, was not reassured by the greater toleration now shown by the Serbs, and quoted "*timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.*"

In my despatch No. 13, Confidential, of the 20th February, I expressed doubts as to how far the mass of the Bulgar peasantry would resist the Serbising tendency of the new Government. I am too recent an arrival in this part of the world to express with any confidence an opinion as to how far these people have a real national attachment to Bulgaria (the original attraction of the Exarchate was not, I believe, that it was Bulgar, but simply that it was Slav), but I have taken several opportunities to elicit opinions on the subject, and have sometimes argued the case for denationalisation in order to get the arguments on the other side. My informants have all expressed their opinion that Bulgar propaganda had taken too deep root to be eradicated without considerable difficulty. The last of them, Mr. Charles Hadkinson, who has for some years past had a farm at Krivolak, in the extreme south of the province, is as positive as the others and much less likely to be biassed. He points out that the peasantry of those parts had taken an active part in Bulgar propaganda, having formed part of the "militia" of the bands.

He tells me that even now, after time for mature reflection, they accept the enhanced price of living, and consider it a cheap price to pay for the departure of the Turks, but that they continue to hope for autonomy under European control.

Two rumours which have been current here may not be without interest. The non-official account of the assassination of His Majesty the King of Greece stated that the murderer was a Bulgar, and there have been rumours of an encounter between Servian and Bulgarian troops at Ishtib, similar to the incident at Nigrita. These were circulated with a wealth of detail, asserting that the mayor, or, according to another account, the prefect, had been killed. I have not, however, been able to get confirmation of this rumour from a trustworthy source, and quote it merely as showing that the local populace was prepared to believe it.

The Servian soldiery here is, I believe, heartily sick of the war. The men want to get back to their village, and tend to grumble against the Government for having fought for a country which, they say, is much poorer than their own. I have little doubt, too, that they are somewhat disgusted to find that the Bulgars they have "liberated" do not look on their Servian emancipators with the same enthusiasm as they manifested in the early days of the occupation.

I have, &c.
W. D. PECKHAM.

Enclosure 2 in No. 328.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 22.)

Sir, *Uskub, April* 1, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that while dining at the officers' mess here last night I was enabled to get some impression of local military opinion.

I saw no sign of readiness to fall in with the wishes of the Powers and abandon the siege of Scutari. On the contrary, the impression appeared to be that the Powers could be flouted with impunity. "When we have Scutari the *fait accompli* will be the only thing that will have any importance." I also heard the opinion expressed that it would be impossible to create an Albanian State, and that the Albanians would be much better

off under Servian rule. This, I presume, means that the military are most unwilling to disgorge any of their conquests. (It may also be interesting to note that the newspaper boys here have recently been selling a "Map of New Servia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria, from authentic sources." While this shows some uncertainty about eastern frontiers, the western are clear. The southern Montenegrin frontier runs from Dyakova to Alessio, and the southern Servian from the south of Lake Ochrida along the Shkumbi, including Elbassan; to the south of this "Albania" is marked.)

I noticed a tendency to confuse "the Powers" with "Austria," and to imagine that the creation of Albania was a purely Austrian scheme. The news that a British squadron had left Corfu northward bound had just arrived, and was interpreted as an anti-Austrian move. "They are going to save us from Austrian interference." (Later I retailed this piece of news to an Albanian, who at once expressed his gratitude to Great Britain for intervening on behalf of Albania. I pointed out that the Servians put a different interpretation on the move.)

Confidence in the immediate break up of Austria was great. An artillery colonel, who sat next to me, assured me that he would be "commandant de place" at Vienna before he died. I remarked that I had once thought that the Balkan war was the beginning of the end for Austria, but was not so sure now. "But Austria is much weaker than Turkey was. Austria had to proclaim a state of siege in Croatia a year ago, which was more than Turkey ever had to do. For years Austria managed to exploit the difference of religion between us and the Croats to keep us apart; now they are with us, heart and soul. Even the Slovenes have come in, whom we never hoped to win over. The Croat troops shout 'Long live King Peter, King of Croatia,' and the officers pretend not to hear because they cannot put a whole regiment into prison. Austrian artillery is infinitely worse than ours, and you cannot sight their guns properly after ten shots have been fired. The moral of their army is bad."

The feelings expressed were not merely pan-Serb but pan-Slav, for I heard a good deal about Bohemian nationalism, and the disappearance of German among the educated classes in Bohemia.

"By the time we attack Austria Roumania will be our ally, to gain the Rouman population of Transylvania in the partition."

I did not hear much about military feeling towards Bulgaria, but in speaking of languages one of the Serbs explained to me that Bulgarian was a corrupt Slavonic patois ("the suffixed article is a proof of how those Mongols spoiled a Slav language"), which had no business to be a literary language at all. They all seemed convinced that Makedo-Slav was a patois of Servian; personally, I am convinced that it is nearer related to Bulgar; but on this, as on other matters, I abstained as far as possible from expressing opinions, particularly such as might be offensive to Servian Chauvinism.

I have, &c.
W. D. PECKHAM.

[16931] No. 329.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 288.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 8, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 187 of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter received from Sir Adam Block, president of the Council of Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt, appealing for the withdrawal of the prohibition of the despatch of silkworm eggs by post which has been imposed by the Bulgarian Government.

A copy of the enclosed communication has been sent to His Majesty's Minister in Sophia.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 329.

Sir A. Block to Sir G. Lowther.

Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane,
M. l'Ambassadeur, *Constantinople, le 5 avril, 1913.*

LA gestion des revenus concédés aux porteurs étrangers de fonds ottomans ayant été, à maintes reprises, entravée dans les régions occupées par les armées balkaniques, notre Conseil, prenant en considération que la Dette publique ottomane est une institution d'ordre international, a toujours recouru, en ces circonstances, à la haute intervention des représentants des Grandes Puissances, lesquels ont bien voulu lui prêter une aide efficace.

J'ai de nouveau recours à votre entremise auprès du Gouvernement de Sophia la levée de l'interdiction dont est frappé par les fonctionnaires Bulgares l'expédition, par la poste, des [illegible] de vers à soie. La maintien de cette mesure prohibitive causerait un grand préjudice aux intérêts de la Dette ottomane, et notamment de la région de Gumuldjina, où se trouvent nombreuses [illegible] ayant aux chemins de fer, celle-ci [illegible] par les autres ports ottomans.

L'intérêt [illegible] de la Dette publique [illegible] de la Turquie [illegible] sérieux [illegible] par la guerre, [illegible] que [illegible] à la sécurité et à la vente en [illegible] de vers à soie.

Je vous prierais donc [illegible] de vouloir bien appuyer [illegible] auprès du Gouvernement Royal bulgare auprès pour [illegible] des intérêts [illegible] des porteurs de la Dette publique [illegible] ainsi [illegible] bienveillante garde.

Veuillez, &c.
Le Président du Conseil,
ADAM BLOCK.

16933. No. 330.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 290.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 9, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 252 of the 30th March last, I have the honour to transmit herewith a further report which I have received from the acting vice-consul at the Dardanelles on the unrest prevailing in the outlying parts of his district.

At the same time, I take the opportunity of forwarding copies of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna, reporting the distribution of arms by the authorities to many Mahommedans and Jewish Ottoman subjects in the coast districts in that neighbourhood. With regard to this proceeding, I may mention that rumours have reached this embassy to the effect that the same Austrian unofficial agencies which are supposed to have had a hand in the *coup d'Etat* of the 23rd January last have sent emissaries to stir up trouble in Western Asia Minor. Whatever may be the truth of this report, it is a curious fact that persistent rumours have been in circulation here during the past few days as to serious trouble having occurred at Smyrna. The rumours which were current in a vague form before the 4th April, the date of Mr. Consul-General Barnham's despatch, have now materialised in a sensational and circumstantial account of a serious riot, and the hanging of the Metropolitan.

I have received no news of any disturbance at Smyrna from His Majesty's consul-general, nor has the American warship now stationed there, which is in wireless communication with His Majesty's ship "Zealandia," given any indication of anything exceptional having occurred. It is, therefore, somewhat strange that a member of the Austrian Embassy should have gone out of his way to inform one of my staff that he had seen the text of a wireless message communicated from Smyrna to the German warship "Geier" here, in which the report of the serious disturbances at Smyrna, including that of the hanging of the Metropolitan, was confirmed.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 330.

Acting Vice-Consul Harris to Consul-General Eyres.

(No. 59.)

Sir, *Dardanelles, April 2, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that on Monday, the 31st ultimo, I was returning from the Calverts' farm, accompanied by my cavass, and met on the road the Arab cavalry regiment from Diarbekir, reported in my No. 57 of the 31st March. As is the custom of Turkish troops on the march, they were straggling along the road in groups of twenty and thirty. On passing one of these groups an Arab soldier shook his sword at me in a very threatening manner. I thought it best not to expostulate with him on the spot, so rode on and met the officers of the regiment half a-mile further on. I told them what had happened, and a binbashi returned with me and beat the offender on the head with his riding whip. I have since been told that he was bastinadoed on arrival at their camping place.

Mr. Calvert tells me the people in his district are getting out of hand; it is openly said that, should Constantinople fall into the enemy's hands, the Holy banner will be raised in Asia Minor and extermination of all Christians will be the order of the day.

I have lent Mr. Calvert a consular flag, but the gendarme on his farm says, "in case of trouble it would not be worth 5 paras; you should put up the Turkish flag, for, after all, this is Turkish 'toprak.'"

It is perhaps unwise for the Calverts to remain in such an exposed position, but they do not want to move, as the farm requires supervision. I have therefore written to Fauri Pasha, the commander-in-chief in this district, impressing on him the necessity of giving special orders that the Calverts should not be molested in any way.

Personally, I do not believe in the likelihood of any disturbances, but have brought the foregoing to your notice to show that there is a certain amount of unrest in the outlying districts.

I have, &c.
M. G. HARRIS.

Enclosure 2 in No. 330.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 22.)

Sir, *Smyrna, April 4, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that arms have recently been distributed to a considerable number of the Mahommedan and Jewish subjects of the Porte in such districts as Tourbali, Sokia, Menemen, Phokia, and Magnesia, all of which are in comparative proximity to the sea.

This information is obtained from various private sources up-country, and has further been confidentially confirmed by the Metropolitan of the Orthodox community here.

My informants stated that arms were distributed to most Moslem and Jewish males, whether in the small townships or in the villages, and with the Martinis 100 rounds of ammunition were given out; the rifles and ammunition are kept in their houses by those who have received them.

As the past history of what has at times happened in Turkey when arms have been distributed to the Moslem section of the population justified the alarm and anxiety shown by the Christian population in those parts, I asked the Governor-General with what intention this one-sided distribution had been made.

His reply was that "the military authorities had received instructions at the beginning of the war to enrol volunteers for active service; that these instructions were remembered again when the recent rumour of attack by the Greek fleet was impending, and that, consequently, volunteers in all coast districts were now being drilled; their rifles were kept in the depôts, and no Greeks were enrolled, as none came forward; further, no ammunition had been distributed."

The Metropolitan's and my own information contradicts the above and concurs in the facts that the arms are taken home, that Greeks who asked for arms received no reply, and that ammunition also has been distributed.

The Metropolitan of Ephesus called on the vali on the 2nd and laid the same facts before him.

I pointed out to the vali the great unwisdom of leaving arms in the hands of villagers, and urged him to see the danger he laid himself open to if he armed other than properly enrolled soldiers.

I have, &c.
(For the Consul-General),
C. E. HEATHCOTE-SMITH.

[17005] No. 331.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 78.)

Sir, *Belgrade, April 9, 1913.*

THE friction in the relations between Bulgaria and Servia upon which I had the honour to report in my despatches Nos. 51 and 55 of the 10th and 14th ultimo has been considerably intensified by circumstances in connection with the fall of Adrianople. For, whereas the Bulgarians' accounts of the capture of the fortress represent the part played by the Servian forces as having been in the nature merely of a feint ("rôle démonstratif"), Servian accounts maintain that the Servian troops bore some of the hardest of the fighting, that they were the first to break through the line of defences, and that it was to the Servians that Shukri Pasha surrendered. A heated press controversy has arisen from which it is very difficult to distinguish the true facts, but, with such a theme as this constantly before the public, bad feeling between the two nations is growing apace.

Referring to the differences over the delimitation of Bulgarian and Servian possessions in Macedonia, my Bulgarian colleague recently told me that the position now taken up by Servia regarding Prilep, Veles, and Monastir was largely due to encouragement from Russia. The Bulgarian Government had already received indications as to what the attitude of Russia would be should the dispute be submitted to arbitration. Russia was not favourably disposed towards Bulgaria, as the latter was not sufficiently amenable to Russian orders, and might possibly some time interfere with Russian designs on Constantinople, whilst Servia was nothing more than a Russian province. It was therefore Russia's policy to weaken Bulgaria—this was also apparent from the fact of Russia favouring the cession of Silistria to Roumania—and to strengthen Servia. The press campaign in Belgrade against himself (see my despatch No. 51) had been fostered by M. de Hartwig. The latter had undoubtedly promised the Servians more territory than he had any right to do, and was enraged that he (M. Toshef) should have stated that the Servians must abide by their word. The result of this policy would of course be that Bulgaria would look elsewhere for friends.

I may mention that M. Toshef, whom during last summer I used to see frequently, has since the commencement of the war in October kept rather aloof. He has, however, quite lately resumed his visits to me, and has appeared anxious to impress me with the fact that, whilst Bulgaria has been willing to accept the terms for peace laid down by the Powers, difficulties and delays have been caused by the other allies, especially by Servia, and that the Bulgarian Government have had a difficult task to cause the latter to preserve any moderation whatever. With this object he read me the drafts respectively of the Bulgarian and Servian replies to the Powers as reported in my telegram No. 79 of the 3rd instant. As for his personal feelings, M. Toshef cannot find words adequate to express his contempt for the Servians.

M. d'Ugron informs me his experience with regard to M. Toshef's visits has been exactly similar to mine.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[16962] No. 332.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 57.)

Sir, *Sophia, April 9, 1913.*

THE Bulgarian Minister of Finance called on me on the 5th instant and spoke at some length on the question of a war indemnity.

The Prime Minister had already advised me of M. Teodorof's visit. His Excellency assured me that the only two Governments which continued to regard the

question from an unfavourable point of view in so far as the allies were concerned were those of Germany and Great Britain. He made an appeal to me to use any influence that I might possess to persuade His Majesty's Government to admit, at any rate, the principle of an indemnity. I informed M. Teodorof that I had nothing to add to the statements previously made by me to the Prime Minister, as reported to you in my telegram No. 20 of the 20th January, which were to the effect that the whole financial question would be duly considered by a technical commission at Paris. His Excellency stated that he was telegraphing an *aide-mémoire* to the Bulgarian Minister in London, who would receive instructions to discuss the matter directly with the Foreign Office.

Copy of this document is enclosed herewith.[4]

It will be within your recollection that the Bulgarian Minister of Finance has already made it public that the French Government is favourably disposed towards the allies on the indemnity question, but that this statement proved to be inaccurate.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[16983] No. 333.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 58.)

Sir, *Sophia, April 10, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that since the date of my despatch No. 50 of the 28th ultimo, little of interest has occurred in the Bulgarian Sobranjé, although it has been continuously in session. This is partly accounted for by the fact that the majority of its members have been spending some days on a parliamentary excursion to visit the recently-captured fortress of Adrianople. The necessary three-twelfths of the budget have nevertheless been voted for April, May, and June, and an appanage of 240,000 fr. a-year has been voted for the Crown Prince.

The opening of the session last year having been put off from the 15th October till the 1st December, its close has accordingly been deferred this year from the 15th March until the 1st May.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[16964] No. 334.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 59.)

Sir, *Sophia, April 10, 1913.*

SINCE the writing of my despatch No. 52A of the 31st ultimo no engagements between the Bulgarian and Turkish forces have been reported. Time will show whether this is a suspense by tacit agreement preliminary to the formal cessation of hostilities, as is suggested by the leading Government paper here, or whether the inactivity on the Bulgarian side is only a lull before the final storm. It is certain that the movement of reinforcements towards the Turkish lines continues, and all reports tend to show that the Bulgarian army is clamouring for the attack. The leading military authorities are no doubt also anxious to attempt a feat of arms which would enable them to exact the Midia Rodosto frontier line which they desire. The Sophia Cabinet, on the other hand, are more alive to the sacrifices which the continuance of the war does and will entail on the country, and are ready to conclude peace on the terms now offered. The opinion of the King—and this it is which is sure to prevail—can only be inferred. It is significant, however, that His Majesty went to the trouble of paying an ostentatious visit to Rodosto a few days ago, where he is officially reported to have been received with enthusiasm by the population.

On the 5th instant the collective *démarche* was made in pursuance of the instructions to me contained in your telegram No. 86 of the 31st March, to inform the Bulgarian Government that the Powers considered that hostilities should cease on condition of the acceptance of the direct Enos–Midia line, and the reference of all financial questions to the Paris Commission. In replying to me the Prime Minister

[4] Memorandum from Bulgarian Minister of Finance to Bulgarian Minister in London, April 24, 1913.

said that he was most desirous of a cessation of hostilities, but he was not clear how it could be effected without giving offence to the Greek Government, who had resented the conclusion of the first armistice, and would certainly take umbrage if a second one were now agreed to while their claim to the Ægean islands had not been met. According to this account it will be pressure at Athens, rather than at Sophia, which will be required in order to secure a satisfactory reply.

The reply of the allies to the collective *démarche* of the 22nd ultimo was delivered the same day (5th April), and was as follows:

"Les États alliés expriment leur reconnaissance aux Grandes Puissances pour leurs efforts à amener la conclusion de la paix, et, désirant sincèrement les faciliter dans leur tâche, acceptent leurs conditions pour la médiation sous les réserves suivantes:

"1. Lors de la fixation définitive de la frontière en Thrace, la ligne indiquée dans les conditions formulées par les Puissances sera prise comme base et non comme ligne définitive.

"2. Les îles de la mer Égée seront cédées par la Turquie aux alliés.

"3. Les alliés estiment qu'ils doivent connaître au préalable les frontières projetées de l'Albanie, espérant qu'elles seront conformes à celles qu'ils ont proposées à Londres.

"4. La demande d'une indemnité de guerre doit être acceptée en principe, en laissant le soin d'en fixer le montant à la commission qui étudiera les questions financières, commission dans laquelle les alliés seront représentés.

"5. Les alliés acceptent que les opérations de guerre cessent dès que les conditions ci-dessus exposées auront été favorablement accueillies et admises."

Your telegram No. 90 of yesterday contained the reply to be given on behalf of the Powers to the above communication, but at the time of writing only my German and Austrian colleagues have received similar instructions, so that it may be a few days before our collective action can be taken.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[16938] No. 335.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 295.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April 10, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica, reporting the reopening of the Servian consulate-general at that place.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 335.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 25.)

Sir, *Salonica, March 28, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Servian consulate-general in this town, which had remained closed since the declaration of war on the 17th October last, has been officially reopened. M. Simitch, who was formally attached to the post as vice-consul, and subsequently employed as secretary to the Servian Legation in Constantinople, having assumed the functions of acting consul-general.

This action on the part of the Servian Government, in disregard of the fact that Salonica is technically still part of the dominions of a Power with which it is at war, is significant in view of the relations existing between the allied States. M. Jivoin Balougtchitch, the actual titulaire of the post, has paid frequent visits to Salonica since the date of the Greek occupation, acting as intermediary between his own Government and the Hellenic authorities in occupation for the settlement of various questions that have from time to time arisen between them, but in the almost entire absence of the Servian colony there did not appear to be any necessity for the reopening of the consular office, and the fact that this has now been done is regarded as intended by the Serbs as a public intimation that they recognise the permanent character of the

existing administration in Salonica, and the deduction is not unnaturally drawn that Servia and Greece have come to a mutual understanding to support their respective claims to the Turkish inheritance against the exaggerated pretensions of their common ally.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[16939] No. 336.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 296.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 10, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica, reporting further on the relations between the allies in his district.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 336.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 26.)
Sir, *Salonica, April 1, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 21 of the 20th ultimo concerning the relations between the allied States, I have the honour to report that the Greek garrison of this place has since that date been further strengthened by the return of practically the entire 6th division, under Colonel Miliotis Comnenos, from Epirus. The 4th division, which left Janniua on the 17th March, is now, I believe, at Athens, but is expected to come on here after the King's funeral. The Bulgarians likewise continue to talk of their intention to bring at least a division into Salonica; but I am confidentially informed that a couple of regiments of Greek infantry are being posted so as to command all the principal approaches to the town, and that orders have been given to them to oppose, if necessary by force, the entrance of any fresh Bulgarian troops.

At Cavalla, Mr. Morgan informs me that the Bulgarian garrison is being raised to 6,000 men, and that guns are being placed in position, not only to defend the entrance to the town, but also to command the place itself, the population of which, of course, is largely Greek. Guns are likewise being mounted to protect the approaches to the town of Serres from the west, whilst the Greeks on their side are fortifying themselves in and around Nigrita.

The mixed commission, appointed to investigate the origin of, and establish the responsibility for, the sanguinary encounter which occurred at the latter placet owards the beginning of last month, has not yet been able to proceed to the spot. I believe, however, that four of its members left here for that locality yesterday, viz., for the Greeks, Lieutenant-Colonel Koutzis and Captain Makkas, and for the Bulgarians, Colonel Tchilinghirof and Captain Petrof. The more important commission, the task of which is understood to be the delimitation of the respective spheres of occupation, and which is composed of General Hessaptchief, his Excellency M. Sarafof with Captain Koundorof on the one side, and Major Vlachopoulos, M. Dimaras, and Captain Mazaraki on the other, is to follow in a few days.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[17040] No. 337.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 117.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, April 10, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 106 of the 1st April, I have the honour to enclose the protocols drawn up by the French Ambassador of the last two meetings of the Ambassadors on the Bulgaro-Roumanian frontier dispute.

I have little to add to what I have already reported by telegraph with regard to the first of these sittings. In putting forward my proposal respecting the strategical

advantages to be accorded to Roumania I argued that if it was true, as asserted in the Roumanian case, that the Bulgarians cherished aggressive designs against the Dobroudja, I could imagine nothing so calculated to fix their attention on the Bulgaria *irredenta* in the north as to add unduly to its dimensions. The intervention of the French Ambassador, who suggested that Silistria might possibly be ceded if Roumania would renounce all her other territorial claims, changed the course of the discussion, which subsequently centred round the questions of the two triangles and the few kilometres of coast-line to the south of Mangalia which Bulgaria had at first offered to cede to Roumania.

At the third meeting, which took place on the 7th of this month, the German Ambassador yielded on the question of the two triangles, but insisted that Roumania must be given a few kilometres of coast to enable her to construct a naval port at Mangalia. He suggested that Bulgaria might be induced to do so either by the promise of a larger money indemnity or of the construction of a bridge over the Danube at Sistovo. The Austrian Ambassador also laid great stress on the necessity of finding some compensation that would reconcile Bulgaria to the loss of the territory which she was to cede to Roumania.

Count Thurn reverted once more to his proposal that Bulgaria should be assured of the possession of Salonica, and, failing to obtain our consent to such an arrangement, suggested that she might be given an accession of territory by drawing the future Turco-Bulgarian frontier line from some point on the Gulf of Saros instead of from Enos.

M. Sazonof, M. Delcassé, and I declared that we could under no circumstances consent to the cession of anything in addition to Silistria, and that Count Thurn's compensation proposals would only lead to further complications and might probably delay the conclusion of peace.

After sitting for over two hours the meeting adjourned, in order to enable the Austrian and German Ambassadors to consult their respective Governments.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 337.

Protocol of Second Meeting, held April 4, 1913.

L'AMBASSADEUR d'Italie constate que tout le monde veut accorder à la Roumanie des garanties d'ordre stratégique. En mettant à part Silistrie, dont la Roumanie fera son principal point d'appui, la région qu'elle demande pour compléter ces garanties est pauvre et n'a presque pas d'habitants; elle est sans valeur pour la Bulgarie, qui peut la céder sans dommages sérieux pour elle.

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre est toujours d'avis qu'il convient de donner à la Roumanie un avantage d'ordre stratégique. Il comprend très bien l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche disant, dans la première séance, que la situation de Silistrie ville serait intenable si le Medjidié Tabia était donné aux Roumains. Qu'on oblige donc la Bulgarie à démanteler le Medjidié Tabia, à céder à la Roumanie une petite portion de territoire à l'est de Silistrie, pour élever un fort qui servira à défendre le futur pont; à prendre l'engagement de n'élever aucune fortification le long de la frontière, de Silistrie à la mer Noire. Et si cela ne suffit pas, qu'on abandonne à la Roumanie les deux triangles.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne fait remarquer que, pour que la Roumanie puisse protéger efficacement le pont à construire près de Silistrie, il lui faut les hauteurs environnantes et, par conséquent, la ville.

L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche dit en substance :—

"Nous sommes d'accord pour chercher une solution que les deux parties puis-ent accepter. Laissons de côté les raisons de droit, et considérons surtout les raisons d'opportunité. D'après ce principe, prononçons nous sur les revendications roumaines, en commençant par la plus importante. Nous finirons par la question des compensations à accorder à la Bulgarie, compensations que nous mesurerons aux concessions que la Bulgarie devra consentir."

"La précédente séance nous a tous éclairés," dit à son tour l'Ambassadeur de France. "De l'examen auquel nous nous sommes livrés il résulte que Silistrie con time la partie essentielle, et, si l'on voulait parler par chiffres, les trois quarts des revendications roumaines. Mais à la vivacité du désir des Roumains d'acquérir Silistrie, je juge aussi du regret que les Bulgares auront à la perdre.

"Cependant, tout bien pesé, tenant compte notamment de l'attitude des Roumains au début de la guerre, de la nécessité d'une solution qui en assurant à la Roumanie l'avant-garde auquel on nous affirme qu'elle tient par dessus tout, ne blesse pas profondément l'âme bulgare et fasse obstacle à la consolidation des rapports amicaux des deux nations, je veux bien, pour ma part, admettre en principe l'attribution de Silistrie à la Roumanie. Mais qu'il soit bien entendu que disparaissent en même temps toutes les autres revendications de la Roumanie, et que le Gouvernement de Bucarest dédommagera ceux des habitants bulgares de Silistrie qui voudraient quitter la ville devenue roumaine. D'ailleurs, il va de soi que nous enregistrerons l'engagement offert par la Bulgarie de n'élever aucune fortification le long de la frontière, de Silistrie à la mer Noire."

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères déclare qu'il lui répugne fortement d'enlever Silistrie à la Bulgarie, qu'il s'y résigne toutefois pour rendre plus étroits les rapports d'amitié entre Bulgares et Roumains, et pour accroître et fortifier les éléments de paix dans les Balkans. Mais son adhésion définitive est expressément subordonnée à l'abandon de toutes les autres revendications roumaines portant sur les deux triangles et sur la mer Noire, et au payement d'une indemnité aux Bulgares qui préféreraient ne plus habiter Silistrie.

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, pour les mêmes considérations élevées, consent à l'attribution de Silistrie à la Roumanie. Mais, déclare-t-il, qu'il ne soit plus question ni des deux triangles, ni de prolonger la frontière roumaine sur la mer Noire. Et qu'un dédommagement soit assuré aux Bulgares qui voudraient plus rester à Silistrie.

Finalement l'Ambassadeur de France soulève la proposition suivante, que les Ambassadeurs soumettront à leurs Gouvernements :—

"Les représentants de la Russie, de l'Angleterre et de la France accepteraient en principe la cession de Silistrie à la Roumanie à condition : (1) que tendant toutes les autres revendications territoriales de la Roumanie ; (2) que le Gouvernement roumain dédommage les habitants bulgares de Silistrie qui voudraient quitter cette ville et la partie de son territoire qui passerait à la Roumanie. Il est entendu que, pour donner à la Roumanie tous les apaisements au point de vue stratégique, la Bulgarie prendra l'engagement de n'élever aucune fortification le long de la frontière actuelle de Silistrie à la mer Noire."

La prochaine séance est fixée au lundi, 25 mars (7 avril), à 5 heures.

Enclosure 2 in No. 337.

Protocol of Third Meeting, held April 7, 1913.

L'AMBASSADEUR d'Allemagne reconnaît que la proposition faite par les représentants de la Russie, de l'Angleterre et de la France, inspirée d'un désir manifeste de conciliation, a grandement facilité l'entente. "Nous sommes très près du but où nous tendons."

Silistrie étant d'un intérêt capital pour la Roumanie, l'attribution de cette ville aux Roumains leur donne en effet une large satisfaction.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne est cependant d'avis que pour assurer à la Roumanie toute la sécurité stratégique qu'elle réclame, on pourrait chercher à lui accorder une autre légère rectification de frontière. Il croit qu'on devrait reculer de quelques kilomètres, au sud, la frontière actuelle de la Roumanie sur la mer Noire.

Mais il trouve équitable de procurer à la Bulgarie une compensation.

Sans faire aucune proposition ferme, le Comte de Pourtalès estime que cette compensation pourrait consister, soit dans une indemnité plus large que celle qui est envisagée dans la proposition des représentants de la Russie, de l'Angleterre et de la France, soit dans l'établissement d'un pont à Sistovo, qui raccorderait, au grand avantage de la Bulgarie, les réseaux bulgares et roumains, et à l'établissement duquel la Roumanie jusqu'à ce jour ne s'était pas prêtée.

M. Sazonof déclare savoir que la Bulgarie répugne absolument à céder du territoire contre de l'argent. Elle repousse même l'idée d'un pareil marché.

D'autre part, M. Sazonof estime qu'il n'est pas juste, enlevant Silistrie à la Bulgarie, de lui prendre un autre morceau de territoire. "Je suis sûr," dit-il, "que la Roumanie, qui n'est pas certaine de voir accueillir sa revendication essentielle, et qui, d'après mes informations, ne serait pas éloignée de la réduire, nous sera profondément reconnaissante de l'en avoir libérée."

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre déclare qu'il est allé jusqu'à la limite extrême des concessions permises. Sa conscience est tranquille avec ses instructions, et il s'en tient strictement à la proposition faite dans la précédente séance.

L'Ambassadeur d'Italie croit, comme le Comte de Pourtalès, que l'assentiment de la Roumanie à l'établissement d'un pont sur le Danube à Sistovo, serait pour la Bulgarie une satisfaction substantielle qui la pourrait disposer à consentir à une rectification de la frontière sur la mer Noire.

M. Sazonof répond qu'il sait pertinemment que la Bulgarie ne cédera rien autre que Silistrie. Quant au pont à Sistovo, jamais ! Politique bulgare ne lui en a été parlé. C'est une question nouvelle, étrangère, un différend dont nous sommes saisis. Ne l'y mêlons pas.

L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche rappelle le projet de déclaration de la conférence, arrivé à une solution qui contente les deux parties. Or, il est d'avis que la simple cession de Silistrie laisse à la Roumanie un désir inassouvi. Quant à la Bulgarie, elle refusera à une compensation territoriale adéquate. Il risque ici un autre point. En y ajoutant l'établissement du pont à Sistovo, la Bulgarie aura tout lieu de se louer. Voilà, à son avis, la solution, envisagée par la proposition à soumettre à nos Gouvernements, qui donnera à la Roumanie.

"C'est la preuve qu'elle est bonne," ajoute l'Ambassadeur de France. "Elle ne satisfait pas toutes les deux parties à la fois, mais elle est juste à l'égard de leurs prétentions respectives. N'oublions pas cependant que la Roumanie ne sacrifie que des revendications, et que la Bulgarie abandonne un territoire que l'Europe lui a reconnu par le Traité de Berlin. Mais plus le temps s'écoule, plus il me semble que nous avons la raison qui la rendra à une concession aussi importante. Il est à peine déjà d'entrevoir le moment où cette question ne s'imposera plus à elle. C'est donc maintenant sur les autres, prétentions de la Roumanie, compromettre la solution à laquelle on n'a pas cessé de nous affirmer qu'elle tient par dessus tout ? L'intérêt de deux pays est de mettre résolument leur compte dans la proposition que nous avons tous voté à l'instant, pour me permettre d'insister d'y tenir."

Les Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne, d'Autriche-Hongrie et d'Italie vont demander à leurs Gouvernements s'ils acceptent définitivement la combinaison basée sur la proposition qui leur a été télégraphiée le 7 avril.

La prochaine séance est fixée au mercredi, 27 mars (9 avril), à 3 heures.

[17041] No. 338.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 119.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, April 11, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith translation of the official communiqué issued to the press to-day by the Russian Government in regard to their policy during the Balkan crisis.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 338.

Official Communiqué issued to the Russian Press on April 11.

(Translation.)

SINCE the beginning of the crisis in the Balkan Peninsula, Russian public opinion has followed the course of events with natural interest and sympathy for the States akin to us in faith. In the appreciation of events this opinion listened to the voice of its heart. Thus frequent reproaches have been levelled against Russian diplomacy, as our public opinion founded its judgment on fragmentary and incomplete news which had got into the press. On the other hand, the Government frequently found itself in a difficult position, since it was not able to allay the misunderstanding without damaging the interests which it was protecting; for the time was not come for making public the complete data which could shed light on the firm and clear recognition of the historic tasks and interests of Russia which has invariably been the guide of the Government in its foreign policy, and from which it will not depart. The Government, however, considers it its duty to give, so far as possible, some explanations

of the recent and more acute questions. To secure for the conquerors, as far as possible, the results of their victories, such has been the chief aim pursued by the Russian Government from the moment the success of the allies became known. In other words, it was necessary, above all, to create conditions under which it would be possible to localise the Balkan war. After difficult and complicated negotiations this task was achieved. It is only thanks to the non-interference of the other Powers that the Balkan States could secure without obstacles that success which seemed to themselves scarcely probable before the outbreak of war. One must take into account all the complications of the international situation and the antagonism of conflicting interests to appreciate at their full value the significance and extent of the services rendered by Russia in this respect to the Balkan States.

The localisation of the war could only be secured by the observance of the following conditions:—

1. Renunciation by the Great Powers of any special territorial or other advantages which they might gain through the war;
2. Renunciation on their part from undertaking any separate action.

Out of these two conditions of a negative character resulted the recognition of the following positive principle: the revision of the conditions created by the war and their co-ordination with those interests of the Great Powers which the latter cannot give up can only be a matter for the entire European concert, whose decisions would be adopted not by separate Powers but by all Europe. On the other hand, the restriction of separate action could only be attained by a united recognition that the decisions come to by all Europe have an obligatory force. It assumed that the authoritative character of such decisions would be sufficient in the sense that the Balkan States would accept them, seeing that every non-recognition of this authority would naturally lead to its confirmation by force. It could hardly be expected that the Conference would draw any other conclusion, as the decisions of Great Powers cannot be treated like resolutions adopted at public meetings. Under such conditions and with these objects the Conference of Ambassadors assembled in London. Agreement to participate therein undoubtedly depended on self-sacrifice on the part of those Powers which were given the opportunity and possibility of imposing their particular views and interests, but which refrained from doing so for the sake of a higher purpose, the maintenance of peace, and in consequence of the sympathy which the Balkan States had won in the public opinion of all Europe. The London Conference has now carried out one of the most difficult tasks which have fallen to its lot, and which consists in defining the northern and north-eastern frontiers of Albania.

In this question there was a collision of two opposing interests: one taking the side of Montenegro and Servia, who were naturally striving to extend the limits of their territorial acquisitions, and who found in Russia a protector of their interests, and on the other side the Albanian interests supported by Austria and Italy. The support given by those Powers to the formation of an independent Albanian province could seem unexpected or unfounded only to people who are little acquainted with the general international situation and the line of policy pursued by these Powers during the last quarter of a century. The maintenance of the *status quo* on the coast of the Adriatic Sea is for Austria and Italy so vital a question that no doubt could arise as to the importance which they would attach to it. On the other hand, the maintenance of this *status quo* evoked support for another principle closely bound up with it—that of a future Albanian province which would be able to exist by itself. Hence arose the endeavours of these two Powers to obtain the greatest possible extension of the land frontiers of Albania that would contain a population of one Albanian nationality. The rights of the conquerors came into conflict with the above-mentioned interests, and Austria and Italy put forward in their turn the question of the racial unity of Albania.

Montenegro and Servia get many towns and districts in whose populations there are not a few pure-blooded Albanians. The Great Powers can hardly be blamed for not allowing this dispute to blaze up into an acute conflict. After long and stubborn negotiations a compromise was reached. As always happens, this was the result of mutual concession. After securing in the interests of the Slavs the towns of Prisrend, Ipek, Djakova, and Dibra, Russia held it to be necessary to agree to the inclusion of the town of Scutari in Albania.

This compromise was made for the sake of ensuring peace, the disturbance of which on account of the above question was clearly not justifiable in the eyes of Russia and of Europe. Not many of the people who have been demanding these last few days

a solution of the Scutari question by drastic action on the part of the Government have any clear idea what is the significance of this town and the strife that has arisen regarding it. In reality, Scutari is a purely Albanian town, and the residence of a Catholic archbishop with Catholic institutions. More than a year ago, when the events which have now developed were not foreshadowed, the Russian vice-consul at Scutari, Miller, who is now doing his duty in a self-sacrificing manner in the besieged town, informed the Imperial Ministry that, in his opinion, the desire of Montenegro to conquer this territory, inhabited by an entirely Albanian and Catholic population, should not be supported by us. For Montenegro plays, in spite of her small population, wrote Mr. Miller, a very important rôle among the Balkan States. This importance is entirely due to its fighting strength and to the national unity and moral characteristics of the Montenegrin people. The assimilation of people of foreign race and religion would exceed the power of Montenegro. In 35 years the Montenegrins have not been able to assimilate the few thousand Catholic and Mahommedan Albanians who went over into their territory after the war of 1877–1878. The Mahommedan population of Dulcigno, for example, have continued up to quite recent years to migrate to Scutari. Also, in the spheres of trade and industry the Montenegrins are behind their new subjects, such as the Albanians of Podgoritza.

Thus, even if in its struggle towards the south, Montenegro should succeed in annexing a part of the sanjak of Scutari, this would not only bring no great advantage, but even be a real weakness for her, seeing that thereby hundreds of thousands of men alien to the Montenegrins in faith, blood, and language, would be mingled with them, people who would never imbibe Montenegrin ideals, traditions, or spirit. Even if a considerable number of these new subjects were not soon to turn against the Montenegrins, Montenegro would lose her identity and be transformed into a Montenegrin Albania.

In the opinion of our representative, the uniting of a large number of Catholic Albanians to Montenegro would only give them the opportunity of establishing connections beyond the frontier whereby foreign influence could gain an entry. If, moreover, it was imperatively necessary to avoid a general European conflict, it is clear why the Imperial Government did not consider the possession of Scutari to be a vital question for Montenegro. Reference must also be made to the attitude which King Nicolas has adopted in this question, and also to his demeanour towards Russia since the beginning of the crisis. Above all, the King did not respect the obligation that he undertook to inform Russia of his intended declaration of war beforehand, and to obtain Russia's consent. In spite of that, His Imperial Majesty has graciously rendered magnanimous help to the Montenegrin wounded. When the Scutari question was decided at the London Conference the Imperial Government considered it its duty to acquaint the Montenegrin Government thereof, and to point out the fruitlessness of further sacrifices and bloodshed in the siege of a town which was finally assigned to Albania. A personal and friendly warning was sent to the King, and he was reminded of the heavy responsibility which he would assume by further stubbornness and fruitless sacrifice. Urgent advice was then given to him to avoid the reproach of pursuing personal aims which exposed the Montenegrin people to useless bloodshed. All these warnings were without effect. The King of Montenegro evidently acts on the assumption that he can involve Russia and the Great Powers in an European war.

Since the Imperial Government recognised the decision that Scutari should be allocated to Albania she could not protest against the measures to be taken when King Nicolas refused to submit to this decision of the Great Powers. The measures are at present the blockade of the Montenegrin and part of the Albanian coasts. The Imperial Government has not lost the hope that the Montenegrin Government will desist in time from its stubbornness, and will find a solution worthy of it by obeying the will of Europe, which is supported by a strong naval force. In this case the Government of King Nicolas will not have to repent, for Europe will find means for alleviating the lot of the Montenegrin people which has been burdened by the heavy losses before Scutari. In judging the attitude taken by the Imperial Government in this question, one must not be guided only by the feeling of natural sympathy for the glorious Montenegrin people whose entire past finds an echo in Russian hearts. The Government must not forget. The Government cannot forget, in the first place, its responsibility towards the Russian people. It must weigh its decisions with due right, that no drop of Russian blood should be shed except when the interests of the Fatherland demand it.

Russia is a great Slav Orthodox Empire, and has never spared herself in this character in the help she has given to and the sacrifices she has made for her brothers.

Yet the relations of Russia to States kindred to her in faith and race cannot be based on any duty of Russia always, and on all occasions, to fulfil their wishes and claims. Our younger brothers have also duties of which our press has not always understood how to remind them. They have to receive with respect the counsels of Russia of which Russia does not abuse, and to bear in mind that if we rejoice over their successes, these successes could not have been achieved without the help of Russia, who called them to life and shares their sorrows and joys. Especially is it their duty to show a spirit of mutual conciliation, without which neither the power nor the might of these peoples can be strengthened. This is the attitude of Russia towards the Slav and Orthodox peoples. It does not entail a hostile attitude towards other States and peoples. Differences of race are not the same as race antagonisms, and the cause of peace will hardly gain by one race being set against another. Conscious of her right and of her strength, Russia has no need to resort to agitation and threats, as that is no evidence of the strength of a nation.

[17006] No. 339.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 79.)
Sir, *Belgrade, April 11, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Skupshtina was opened on the 3rd instant.

All reference to the political situation or to outstanding questions has hitherto been avoided, and I understand that this will continue to be the case until peace is signed. M. Pasitch confined himself in his opening speech to giving expression to the deep gratitude of the Servian Government and of the country towards the army which had avenged Kossovo, secured territorial acquisitions for Servia, and shed glory on Servian arms, not only in the Balkans but throughout the world.

Further developments in the Skupshtina will form the subject of later despatches.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[16988] No. 340.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 14.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, April 12, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram dated to-day from the vice-admiral commanding 3rd squadron.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 340.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April 12, 1913.*

HAVE experienced no trouble with ships since first day of blockade, as it seems to be generally known.

Am awaiting concurrence of French Government before extending blockade to Durazzo Bay.

By 8 A.M. to-day all steamers left San Giovanni di Medua, some proceeding to Durazzo in tow. Servian troops to the number of about 700 left San Giovanni di Medua this morning and proceeded along the shore southwards, apparently to Durazzo.

With reference to your telegram No. 326 I have made necessary arrangements as to Bari wireless station.

[16967] No. 341.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.

(No. 147.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, April 13, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 323 of 12th April.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he had no objections, and acquiesced in your views. He does not, however, wish proposal acted upon unless there is imminent danger of a Bulgarian occupation of Constantinople. I remarked that if we waited until this was an accomplished fact we might arrive too late, and suggested that the fleet might perhaps assemble at Besika Bay so as to be in readiness if wanted. His Excellency said that Besika Bay was so much nearer to Constantinople than Sevastopol that Russian fleet would only arrive after the others. He presumed that His Majesty's Government would send ships from Malta, and he thought that we ought to make all necessary preparations so as to be able to dispatch ships at a moment's notice.

I could not get his Excellency, who was pressed for time, to be more precise. While quite agreeing in principle, he does not want international fleet to go to Constantinople unless Bulgarians really occupy that town, and he is evidently anxious that Russian fleet should not arrive on the spot after the others.

16920 No. 342.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 148.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, April 13, 1913.*

I HAVE acted on your telegram No. 322 of 12th April.

Minister for Foreign Affairs explained that delay had arisen owing to desire of Russian Government to modify formula with regard to indemnity. He thought Powers were making great mistake in not recognising principle of indemnity. It was only chance of keeping Bulgarians quiet, and would not have engaged them to agree to anything beyond mere nominal sum. Their refusal might have serious consequences. As, however, Powers would not follow his advice, he would instruct Russian Minister to act with his colleagues.

[16921] No. 343.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, April 13, 1913.*

FRENCH Minister for Foreign Affairs told me this evening that negotiations are being carried on under the auspices of Russia between the Bulgarians and Turks at outposts of the Chatalja lines for the cessation of hostilities.

[16919] No. 344.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, April 14, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 60 of 13th April.

It is proposed to communicate to Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon reply conveyed in your telegram No. 55 of 8th April, reserving definition of Albanian frontier for future communication.

Presume no objection.

[16985] No. 345.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 53.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, April 14, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 60 of 13th April: Albania.

I had already ascertained that the Austrian Minister's text was identical with that in your telegram No. 58 of 12th April, except that in the last sentence the word "west" is omitted after the word "shore."

The Russian Minister has not yet received definition of frontier.

[17197] No. 346.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 54.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, April 14, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 52 of 14th April: Albanian frontier.

Communication made as proposed.

Usual answer returned.

[17199] No. 347.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 93.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, April 14, 1913.*

MEDIATION.

Your telegram No. 74 of 8th April.

The reply of the Powers on the four points was presented to the Servian Government by my colleagues and myself collectively this morning.

The Prime Minister is absent at Uskub till to-morrow.

[17191] No. 348.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 66.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, April 14, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 64 of 13th April.

I have just received a message from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stating that, if all the Powers agree, Germany will take part in the naval demonstration at Constantinople with ships she has now in the Mediterranean. The Secretary of State hopes, however, that the demonstration will not be necessary, as it seems probable that peace preliminaries may be signed very soon. He shares very strongly your doubts as to the possibility of carrying out the second point of the French proposals.

If the demonstration does take place, he is anxious that the Ottoman Government should be formally informed that it is undertaken in a Turcophil spirit, as the Turks are so used to hostile naval demonstrations that they would probably take the demonstration as aimed against them.

[17196] No. 349.

Sir C. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 150.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, April 14, 1913.*

I HAD audience of Emperor this morning, which I will report fully by messenger.

I spoke to His Majesty as instructed in your private telegram of 12th April. His Majesty expressed himself as in entire agreement with what you had said with regard to Anglo-Russian relations, and added that he greatly appreciated loyal support which you had given his Government throughout crisis. He recognised that Balkan

settlement was a most favourable one for Slavs, and said he had no intention of embarking on war with Austria and Germany on account of a town like Scutari.

On His Majesty referring to situation at Constantinople, I asked whether he would do nothing to stop a Bulgarian occupation. Emperor replied that Powers ought to accept principle of war indemnity. He used language almost identical with that held to me by Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in my telegram No. 148 of 13th April, but added that it was probably now too late. On my enquiring what Bulgarians hoped to gain by a temporary occupation, His Majesty said that their original intention had been to offer Constantinople to Russia as a token of their gratitude, but that they had been told that Russia would not accept it. I suggested that they might make their withdrawal conditional on receiving an assurance from Powers that Salonica should become Bulgarian. His Majesty replied that this would be very unjust to Greece, who had better claims.

[17187] No. 350.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, April 14, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 136 of 12th April.

I communicated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning the contents of above-mentioned telegram. He has sent instructions to Count Mensdorff to see you on the subject.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, without pronouncing himself definitely, showed himself in the language he used to me as unfavourable to the French proposals to send an international fleet to Constantinople. He said that he had no information leading him to believe that Bulgaria meditated an advance towards Constantinople or the Sea of Marmara. She knew that such an advance would be useless to her, as she was aware that Russia was strongly opposed to her remaining there. On the contrary, his Excellency had reason to believe that Bulgaria was the most desirous of the allies for peace, and that all the difficulties in the way of arrival at conclusion of peace were raised by the three other allies. These were carrying on the war for the purposes of aggrandisement and against the express wishes of the Great Powers, and, in the opinion of the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, if pressure was to be brought to bear it should not be on Bulgaria but on her allies. That was the equitable way of looking at the present situation.

[17200] No. 351.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 61.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, April 14, 1913.*

MONTENEGRO.

Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that in his opinion it was unfortunate that the proposal to offer 20,000,000 fr. to Montenegro should have been made public before Montenegro had yielded to the pressure brought to bear on her by the Powers in the question of Scutari. The King could have yielded to the pressure of Europe and survived it, but it was difficult for him to remain under the slur of having yielded to bribery. Minister for Foreign Affairs told me he thought money would probably have to be found for Montenegro at the end of war, otherwise the country would be bankrupt. He thought this question might be left to the financial commission in Paris. He foresaw that it would be very difficult to persuade public in this country to accept the burden of a portion of this loan to Montenegro.

[17186] No. 352.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 136.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, April 14, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 13th April and your telegram No. 95 of 13th April.

Albanian frontier was not communicated.

[17194] No. 353.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 137. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, April 14, 1913.*

THE Bulgarian Government have communicated to military headquarters the *démarche* reported in my telegram No. 135 of 13th April, and have expressed the hope that every endeavour will be made to keep things quiet at the front. I hear from a reliable source that the communication has not been received in good part, and I would venture to submit that the action referred to in Paris telegram No. 162 of 12th April is urgently desirable. The mere knowledge that the international fleet was being collected would have excellent effects, and would improve the situation by strengthening the hands of the Government as against the military.

[17198] No. 354.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 138.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, April 14, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 137 of 14th April.

Bulgarian Government have dispatched M. Danef to prevail on generals to cease hostilities and establish a neutral zone.

[16965] No. 355.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 99.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, April 14, 1913*

MR. LAMBS telegram No. 26 of 13th April: Excesses committed upon Moslems.

You should bring contents of this telegram unofficially to the knowledge of the Bulgarian Government.

[17184] No. 356.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 180.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, April 14, 1913.*

THE Servian Chargé d'Affaires has announced that his Government have ordered the suspension of the attack on Scutari by Servian troops, which they have begun to recall. They consequently ask that the Ottoman Government may be requested to send orders to Governor of Scutari forbidding sorties or attacks on the besieging troops.

You may act accordingly when your colleagues are similarly instructed.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 166; Vienna, No. 141; St. Petersburgh, No. 329; Paris, No. 168; Rome, No. 142; Cettinjé, No. 45; and Belgrade, No. 81.)

[16919] No. 357.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 61.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 14, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 52 of 14th April.

No objection.

[17314] No. 358.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.**

(No. 62.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Foreign Office, April 14, 1913.*

MY circular telegram of yesterday.

Following is revised identic text communicated by Russian and Austrian Ambassadors here as to north and north-east frontier of Albania:—

"La frontière de l'Albanie partira de la côte Adriatique à l'embouchure de la Boïana; elle suivra le thalweg de ce fleuve jusqu'au village de Koritsa, situé sur la rive droite. De là elle atteint le sommet des montagnes séparant la Boïana du lac de Scutari, en laissant le Taraboche à l'Albanie. Elle traverse le lac près du village Zogaï, qui reste à l'Albanie, jusqu'à la baie de Licheny Hotit, d'où elle suit la frontière entre les tribus de Grouda et Hoti, cédées au Monténégro, d'une part, et les tribus de Castrati et Clémenti, d'autre part, laissant ces deux tribus à l'Albanie.

"Elle se confond ensuite avec les limites actuelles entre la tribu monténégrine de Koutchi, d'un côté, et la tribu de Clémenti, de l'autre côté, jusqu'au territoire de Goussigné et Plava; elle laisse ces villes avec leurs dépendances au Monténégro, en suivant la chaine principale et la ligne du partage des eaux entre le Lim, d'un côté, et le Drin, de l'autre. Elle quitte cette chaine pour gagner la crête des collines au sud de la ville de Dinkova, qui est laissée hors de l'Albanie, et continue sur cette jusqu'au Drin blanc.

"Elle suit le cours de ce fleuve jusqu'à l'ouest de Prizrend, et ensuite la ligne frontière entre le district de Prizrend et le district de Liouma, laissant ce dernier à l'Albanie.

"De là elle suit la crête de la montagne Korab, en laissant à l'Albanie le district de la Basse-Dibra et hors de l'Albanie le district de Réka. Quittant cette crête un peu au nord de la ville de Dibra, qui reste hors de l'Albanie, la frontière gagne le Drin noir, qu'elle remonte jusqu'au village de Loukovo, d'où, en se dirigeant par les crêtes principales séparant le bassin du Drin de celui du Chkoumbi et en laissant Strouga hors de l'Albanie, elle gagne la rive du lac d'Ochrida dans les environs du village Lin."

You may communicate it to Government to which you are accredited as soon as your colleagues are similarly instructed.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 166; Rome, No. 141; Berlin, No. 165; Vienna, No. 140; and St. Petersburgh, No. 327, for information only.)

[15614] No. 359.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 81.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 14, 1913.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copy of a notice† left with me on the 3rd instant by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador relative to the misunderstanding which arose respecting the wording of the communication made to the Servian Government by the representatives of the Powers at Belgrade on the subject of the protection of minorities in the territories annexed by Servia.

* Also to Sir H. Bax-Ironside (No. 96), Sir R. Paget (No. 80), and Count de Salis (No. 44).
† No. 62.

Sir A. Nicolson enquired of the Russian Ambassador on the 3rd instant by my instructions what reply his Government proposed to make to the Austro-Hungarian notice.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[15440] No. 360.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.[*]

(No. 247.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 14, 1913.*

AT the reunion which took place on the 4th instant, I communicated to the Ambassadors the following declaration, defining the attitude of His Majesty's Government as regards the measures to be taken for the settlement of the Albanian frontier difficulty, with special reference to the question of Scutari:—

The attitude of His Majesty's Government is that they abide by the agreement come to about the Albanian frontier. His Majesty's Government are prepared to take part in a naval demonstration of an international character, but should that prove impossible, they cannot oppose any steps taken by any other power that may be reasonably required to make the agreement effective.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[16395] No. 361.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 253.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 14, 1913.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 183 of the 9th instant relative to the forthcoming international commission in Paris to deal with financial questions arising out of the present war.

Your Excellency should inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that the date proposed for the first meeting of the commission, viz., the 19th instant, is agreeable to His Majesty's Government.

Sir P. Harvey will arrive in Paris on Wednesday next, the 16th instant, and will call on your Excellency, and I have to request you to be good enough to assist him in the discharge of his duties by every means in your power.

With reference to my telegram No. 161 of the 11th instant, relative to the appointment of the Councillor of His Majesty's Embassy as a further delegate to represent His Majesty's Government on the commission, I have to inform your Excellency that that officer should be regarded as on a footing of absolute equality with Sir P. Harvey.

The two delegates will correspond with me through your Excellency, and you will doubtless be able to lend them the clerical assistance of a junior member of your staff if they should stand in need of it.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[16438] No. 362.

Sir Edward Grey to Count Mensdorff.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, April 14, 1913.*

HIS Majesty's Government have not failed, in fulfilment of the promise conveyed to your Excellency in my note of the 14th ultimo, to give careful consideration to the note dated the 6th February last which I had the honour to receive from your Excellency, forwarding a draft of certain provisions intended to safeguard the shipping

[*] Also to Sir E. Goschen (No. 125), Sir F. Cartwright (No. 82), Sir G. Buchanan (No. 154) and Sir R. Rodd (No. 105).

and commerce of European Powers in the ports and territorial waters of the several Balkan States, which provisions the Austro-Hungarian Government desire to include in the international arrangements to be drawn up by the conference of Ambassadors.

As your Excellency is doubtless aware, His Majesty's Government have already treaties of commerce with Bulgaria, Greece, and Servia, and, in accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law, the rights they already enjoy under those treaties will be equally valid in any new territories which may, at the termination of the war, be annexed to either Bulgaria, Greece, or Servia. From the point of view of British interests alone, therefore, His Majesty's Government do not see advantage in putting forward to the allies proposals of the nature suggested in your Excellency's note above referred to, but they would be prepared to submit the matter to further consideration if all the Great Powers are in agreement as to the propriety of such stipulations.

In the meantime I have the honour to offer the following observations on the text of the articles suggested by your Excellency's Government:

As Turkey will presumably, at the termination of the war, still remain in possession of Constantinople and the surrounding territory, the wording of the first paragraph of the French text might conceivably be interpreted as permitting the free passage of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus by the ships of war of all nations, a meaning which I presume that the Austro-Hungarian Government has no intention of attaching to it.

Moreover, the use of the phrase "de tous les États de la presqu'île balcanique" would involve the bestowal on the European Powers of rights on the coasts and in the ports of Turkey also, *i.e.*, of a State not a party to the arrangement.

If negotiations are undertaken with the Balkan States and a disposition on their part should become manifest to restrict existing coasting trade to domestic ships it might be desirable to urge the allies in a friendly way to refrain from any attempt to declare trade between their existing ports and ports in newly acquired territories to be coasting trade to the consequent exclusion of foreign shipping. If, as His Majesty's Government have no reason to anticipate, any attempt should be made to declare trade between the ports of the different allied States to be coasting trade, such a proposal would of course meet with serious objection.

As regards the third and last paragraph of article 2, beginning "Les bâtiments étrangers" and ending "sous leur pavillon national," I have the honour to observe that so far as His Majesty's Government are aware this provision does not correspond to any present treaty obligation of Turkey, and is, as they believe, in contravention of the rules laid down for themselves by almost all the Great Powers. This provision, therefore, might well be considered by the countries concerned as a serious derogation from their rights as Sovereign States.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

[16771] No. 363.

Sir Edward Grey to Tewfik Pasha.

HIS Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has had the honour to read the telegram addressed by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Turkish Ambassador, the text of which was communicated to Sir A. Nicolson by his Highness on the 10th instant, relative to the eventual fate of the Ægean Islands.

Sir Edward Grey has the honour to inform Tewfik Pasha, in reply, that the Representatives of the Powers at the capitals of the allied Balkan States have, by instructions, informed the Governments to which they are accredited that, the future of these islands having been reserved for settlement by the Powers, the proposal of the allied Governments on this point can only be accepted with the reserve of the decisions which may be reached with regard to some of these islands.

Sir E. Grey has the honour to observe that till this declaration has been accepted by the allies the discussion of the question can serve no useful purpose.

Foreign Office, April 14, 1913.

[15935] No. 364.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 14, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter from Sir P. Harvey, British Delegate to the International Commission about to assemble in Paris to settle the financial questions arising out of the present war, asking authority to propose an amendment to the formula accepted by the Ambassadors' conference here.*

I am to ask whether the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury see any objection to this proposal.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[15616] No. 365.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 14, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copies of two communications made by the Bulgarian Minister at this Court,† setting forth the arguments advanced by the Bulgarian Government in favour of the payment of a war indemnity by Turkey to the Allied Balkan States.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey would be glad to receive the observations of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury on these two papers, and I am to add that it is not clear to him whether the *exposé* alluded to in the latter communication is that herewith enclosed (which does not appear to touch on the question of an eventual further increase of the Turkish customs duties), or some other document of which this Office has no cognisance.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[17294] No. 366.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir L. Mallet.—(Received April 15.)

My dear Mallet, *Sophia, April* 10, 1913.

THE enclosed is from Young, our vice-consul at Philippopoli, and contains an interesting account of his second visit to Adrianople since its surrender, and of the state of things there.

He gives a sad description of the wretched plight of the unfortunate Turkish prisoners of war, and all the reports which I have received from Adrianople are to the same effect.

Yours sincerely,
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 366.

Vice-Consul Young to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

Dear Sir Henry, *Philippopoli, April* 4, 1913.

I THINK you may be interested to hear something of my second visit to Adrianople since its fall. On the first occasion, as you are aware, I arrived on the afternoon of the 27th (the day after the surrender), and left twenty-four hours later, *i.e.*, before the arrival of the newspaper men, and, in fact, of any other European. The King did, indeed, enter the city in the course of that day for the purpose of receiving (and returning) Shukri Pasha's sword, but the statement in the press that he

* No. 167. † Nos. 89 and 189.

was received with great enthusiasm is inaccurate. The entry and departure were quite private, and passed almost unnoticed by the population.

The purpose of my second visit was to ensure the arrival at the earliest possible moment of supplies for the British hospital. Thanks to the promptness with which your request to the Minister of Railways was attended to, a 16-ton truck was put at my disposal on Monday afternoon, and it was just possible to load it with some 16,400 kilog. of flour, beans, potatoes, sugar, salt, coffee, oranges, lemons, soap, &c., and have it tacked on to the passenger train which left at 6.30 P.M. It arrived at Mustapha Pasha the following morning, where forty-three ox-carts were secured, and the goods transferred and started for Adrianople in the course of the afternoon. They reached the consulate at Adrianople thirty-six hours later, *i.e.*, early morning of Thursday, the 3rd, and. were, I am told, the first non-military supplies to enter the city.

Major Samson is sending a memorandum with this on the state of affairs. The King, whose movements were kept as secret as possible, seems to have taken up his quarters in a Royal train on the Adrianople side of the damaged bridge, so that he is now quite close to the town. On Wednesday morning, the 2nd, traffic was stopped everywhere, and the main streets kept for the King to drive to and from the Greek church, where he attended a Requiem for the King of Greece. We saw him well, both coming and going. This was the first occasion on which His Majesty entered the town with any sort of ceremony. He is expected to make an official entry in state within the next few days.

On Wednesday afternoon we visited the Aivas Baba and other forts on the N. and N.E. faces of the defences and met the King, who, with General Ivanof and a following of about fifty officers, was going over the battle-field. The wire entanglements, with the exception of one or two comparatively small gaps, were still almost intact, and it seems to be a mystery how the Bulgars got through in any force under fire. I gather, but am not quite sure of this, that Samson's theory is that the Turks were so thoroughly demoralised by artillery fire that by the time that the Bulgars reached the wire there was practically none left to oppose them. But in any case it still remains to explain where the Bulgar casualties, which General Ivanof told me he estimated at 6,000, occurred. The Bulgar artillery fire must have been marvellous; not only is the ground literally ploughed all round, but numberless shells fell actually in the trenches and batteries. However, no doubt you will have an interesting report of it all from Major Samson in due course.

It is believed that practically all the Turkish forces have now surrendered. They are concentrated for the most part in two concentration camps, which between them must contain at least 30,000 men. They are penned in the open, like sheep, with no sort of shelter or protection from the weather. Many of them have no coats, and the suffering must be appalling in the rain and cold winds which have lately prevailed. No doubt it was impossible for the military authorities to find accommodation for so large a number of prisoners all at once, but it is to be hoped they will devote their attention to the matter with as little delay as possible. Cholera has already broken out and, given these conditions, is almost sure to spread. The obvious course would seem to be to find a more suitable locality than at present, and give the men the means of constructing dug-outs and shelters for themselves. I had a wire from the Foreign Office this morning, mentioning that the editor of an Indian newspaper, the "Comrade," has offered 2,000*l.* for the benefit of Moslem war-sufferers in Adrianople, which should do something, if not much, to alleviate the sufferings of these unhappy prisoners.

On the road from Adrianople to Mustapha Pasha yesterday I attended a consecration service for the site of the monument to be erected to the Servians who have fallen around Adrianople, and made the acquaintance of the Servian general commanding the right (Papas Tepe) division. I gathered from him that the Servian casualties during the siege had not exceeded 200 killed and 500 wounded altogether

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[17496] No. 367.

Note communicated by Admiral Sir H. Jackson, April 15, 1913.

THE channel between Corfu and the sea possesses great strategic value for a fleet watching the exit from the Adriatic, as it gives good shelter for all classes of vessels.

The exits are narrow, and can be barred to vessels from either shore. The area

outside the 3-mile limit from either shore is small, and the water too deep to be a safe anchorage.

If the dividing line between the new Greece and the new Albania joins the sea opposite Corfu, such as the line of the River Kalamas, the Grecian waters off Corfu and the best anchorage would be dominated by the Albanian coast as they are at present by the Turkish coast, and it seems reasonable that the dividing line between the two countries should reach the sea clear of Corfu and to the northward of the island, say, at Cape Kiephali.

War Staff, April 14, 1913.

[17293] No. 368.

Note communicated by Count Benckendorff, April 15, 1913.

(Confidentielle.)

LE Ministre de Russie à Cettigné informe qu'un personnage de l'entourage du Roi Nicolas est venu lui dire que le Roi cherche une issue à la situation au moyen de compensations. Le Monténégro renoncerait à Scutari moyennant l'acquisition de tout le cours de la Boiana, de tout le littoral septentrional du lac, et la libération de toute partie de la dette turque dont il pourrait être chargé.

Pour le cas où ces acquisitions territoriales se trouveraient irréalisables, il nous semblerait très désirable qu'en dehors de l'emprunt de 30,000,000 de couronnes, qui ne pourrait servir qu'à couvrir les dépenses pressantes, le Monténégro ne soit pas chargé d'une partie de la dette turque.

Le Gouvernement Impérial aimerait à connaître à ce sujet l'opinion de Sir E. Grey.

Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres,
le 15 *avril*, 1913.

[17320] No. 369.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 15.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April* 15, 1913.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 14th instant, relative to Montenegrin affairs.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 369.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April* 14, 1913.

YOUR No. 327.

French commander has not yet received authority from his Government.

[17263] No. 370.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 15.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April* 15, 1913.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegrams dated the 14th instant, relative to Montenegrin affairs.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAME GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 370.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

(Telegraphic.) *Admiralty, April* 14, 1913.

VICE-ADMIRAL 3rd Squadron should be informed as follows:—

"Servian Government wish instructions to be given to the Turkish commandant not to molest or fire upon their troops who have been ordered not to take part in further warlike operations before Scutari. Servians have arranged for the withdrawal of their troops to commence.

"According to Austrian Ambassador, Turkish Government have agreed to give commandant instructions accordingly, and Austrian admiral has been instructed by his Government to confer with his colleagues as to the possibility of opening communications in the sense desired between the International Fleet and Turkish commandant. If your colleagues are authorised to do so you should discuss the question with them, and report immediately what arrangements can be made to send the message.

"Before taking action in the matter, submit any suggested proposals for consideration and approval."

Enclosure 2 in No. 370.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April* 14, 1913.

REPORT as follows received from Rear-Admiral 3rd Battle Squadron, Smyrna:—

"Reports of disturbances at Smyrna sent by Reuter to different London newspapers on 7th April are absolutely without foundation.

"On 5th April a Greek torpedo boat came to Vourlah, Asia Minor, opened fire on Turkish troops, and withdrew after slightly wounding three.

"Some days later the same vessel repeated performance off mainland near Mitylene, but apparently did no damage."

[17343] No. 371.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 91.)

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, April* 14, 1913.

I LEARN that King of Montenegro has informed Servian Government he will not desist from siege of Scutari; but they are nevertheless determined to withdraw their troops, and have telegraphed Greek Government requesting them to supply transports for their conveyance.

Servian Government, however, informed German Minister yesterday that it was important to warn commander of Scutari garrison not to make a sortie, as it would render Servian position still more difficult. Seeing that King of Montenegro would refuse to convey any such warning to Turkish commander, Servian Government suggest that Porte should request German Government to cause message to be transmitted via Belgrade through the commanding officer of the Servian forces.

17344 No. 372.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 57.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, April* 14, 1913.

SCUTARI.

According to reports received here this morning, Servian troops are already beginning to withdraw.

A Council was held at the Palace last night to discuss situation created by action

of Servia, and the Russian official statement of 10th April. Nothing definite seems to be known with regard to result, except that a communiqué was issued to the press this evening, stating that Montenegro will not yield, but will persist in the struggle.

If Servians really withdraw at an early date, it seems to me Montenegrins alone will have greatest difficulty in surrounding town, though King may continue to keep them in their present positions either from fear of withdrawing them now or with a view to increasing claims to compensation.

[17384] No. 373.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 56. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, April 15, 1913.*

THE Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs is grateful for the tone and substance of the reply of the Powers, which he admits goes far to meet the views of the allies. He will do what he can to obtain favourable answer, but he fears that, although the Bulgarian Government are peaceably inclined, the army may not obey their orders.

He points out that the conclusion of peace will change the situation to the disadvantage of Greece by converting the Great Powers from mediators into parties directly concerned in the question of Epirus and the islands, and he therefore appeals the Triple *Entente*, and especially to you, for support in those questions.

A memorandum on the subject of indemnity is being prepared.

[17301] No. 374.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 192.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, April 15, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 180 of yesterday.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday that instructions had been sent to the Governor of Scutari to desist from attacking Servian troops.

[17342] No. 375.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 193.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, April 15, 1913.*

IN a leading article to-day the "Tanin" strongly criticises the change of front of the Powers in agreeing to fresh alteration of the frontier line accepted by Turkey, and reopening the indemnity question in Paris. It says that if the allies want an indemnity they must break Turkey's last line of defence, and the Porte cannot sign peace or cease hostilities until assured that all demands for an indemnity will remain unsatisfied.

(Sent to Sophia, Belgrade, and Athens.)

[17387] No. 376.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 194.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, April 15, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 182 of 15th April.

On initiative of Russian Ambassador, conversations have for the last two or three days been taking place on the lines, and a verbal understanding was reached yesterday for a cessation of hostilities to last for ten days, which period can be renewed if peace negotiations are progressing. Understanding, however, remains to be completed by the laying down of a neutral zone, both at Chatalja and at Bulair, news of demarcation of which is still awaited here.

Matter has been kept entirely secret between Grand Vizier and Russian Ambassador, and latter has now telegraphed to Sophia to obtain necessary permission for the cessation of hostilities to be made public.

[17390] No. 377.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 139. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, April 15, 1913*

OWING to fears entertained of the exaggerated territorial pretensions of Bulgaria in the direction both of Monastir and Salonica, I learn on good authority that the Greek and Servian Governments are contemplating a more formal agreement than the *entente* reported in my telegram No. 62 of the 10th October last, and that negotiations are proceeding at Athens for the settlement of the frontier between the future Greek and Servian possessions in Macedonia, and for a secret defensive treaty between the two countries. The definition of the boundary in the neighbourhood of Lake Presba has presented some difficulty, which is, however, unlikely to prove serious.

[17391] No. 378.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 140.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, April 15, 1913.*

MACEDONIAN excesses.

My despatch No. 56.

Prime Minister is anxious that certain passages asserting complicity of Bulgarian Government be omitted from extracts and others toned down. He states he will have to lay memorandum before the King.

Passages he wishes particularly eliminated are :—

1. Page 3, last sentence.
2. Page 7, sentences "whether" to "content" and "[group undecypherable]" to "forces."
3. Page 8, words "and whether" to "from them."
4. Page 14, sentences from "in these circumstances" to "localities."
5. Page 17, sentence "I am satisfied" to "committee's."
6. Page 18, last paragraph.

He says Bishop referred to does not exist.

His Excellency again spoke in the sense reported in my despatch above mentioned, and declared that after the war the sternest measures would be taken to punish all offenders.

It would be very helpful if other Powers, especially France and Germany, could be induced to take similar action to that of His Majesty's Government. They have necessary information in their hands.

[17392] No. 379.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 141.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, April 15, 1913.*

PARIS Financial Commission.

It has been decided that Minister of Finance with his staff, together with Bulgarian representative in Paris, shall represent this country.

[17389] No. 380.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 152.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, April 15, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 146 of 11th April : Bulgaria and Roumania.

After a long discussion, in which Ambassadors of the Triple Alliance argued in favour of rectification of frontier in the neighbourhood of two triangles, while we

declined to consent to any territorial cession in addition to Silistria, meeting was adjourned until 17th April, so as to enable them to receive final instructions.

We then discussed a formula drawn up by the French Ambassador embodying our eventual decision. At the request of Austrian Ambassador, his Excellency agreed to add a sentence flattering to Bulgarian *amour-propre*.

[16921] No. 381.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.[5]

(No. 182.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 15, 1913.*

WE have been informed that an armistice has been concluded between Turkey and Bulgaria. Have you any information on the subject?

[17425] No. 382.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 10. Commercial.)
Sir, *Salonica, April 9, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 6, Commercial, of the 11th ultimo, on the subject of the proposed railway line from Ghida to the present Greek frontier at Papapoulia, I have the honour to report that, according to a statement which appears in a local newspaper to-day, the group controlling the Salonica-Monastir railway proposes to compete with the Batignolles Company for the privilege of constructing this branch.

A translation of the paragraph in question is enclosed.

The same paper states that the Greek Government is studying fresh plans for the proposed central railway station for Salonica, the official laying of the first stone of which by Djavid Bey, then Turkish Minister of Public Works, was reported in my despatch to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, No. 52, of the 11th April, 1912.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure in No. 382.

Extract from the "Independant" of April 9, 1913.

(Translation.)

THE GHIDA-PAPAPOULIA RAILWAY.

MR. HAFFNER, inspector of permanent ways of the third inspectorate of the Oriental railways, representing the group of the Salonica Monastir Railway and the Deutsche Bank, has solicited the authority of the Greek Government to study the proposed Ghida Papapoulia branch, with a view to putting in a tender for its construction. The Government, indeed, has already notified its assent, and its representatives in the different towns and villages situated on or near the proposed line have been instructed to afford every possible assistance to Mr. Haffner and his staff. Mr. Haffner will set to work at once with the assistance of fifteen other engineers, and hopes to be in a position to put in a definite tender within a couple of months. The Government will then have to choose between this tender, the project elaborated by the Greek Ministry of Public Works, and that of the Batignolles Company.

The line, upon which work can be begun simultaneously at four different points, can probably be constructed in twelve months.

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[5] Also to Sir H. Rumbold (No. 190).

[17413] No. 383.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 15.)
Sir, *Cettinjé, April 10, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 55 and 56 of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the note which, on receipt of Vice-Admiral Burney's telegram of to-day's date, I have addressed to the Montenegrin Government respecting the blockade of the coast.

A copy of Vice-Admiral Burney's telegram is enclosed for convenience of reference.[6] I have informed him that the desired action has been taken.

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

Enclosure in No. 383.

Count de Salis to M. Vukotitch.

M. le Ministre, *Cettigné, le 10 avril, 1913.*

LE vice-amiral britannique, commandant par ancienneté l'escadre internationale dans les eaux monténégrines, a reçu avec regret la réponse que votre Excellence a bien voulu lui adresser en date du 6 avril.

Par suite du refus du Gouvernement Royal de se conformer aux désirs des Puissances, l'escadre internationale a établi, à partir de 8 heures ce matin, le 10 avril, 1913, un blocus étroit de la côte s'étendant d'Antivari jusqu'à l'embouchure du Drin. A partir de ce temps, l'entrée des ports de cette côte sera défendue aux bateaux. Aux bateaux se trouvant déjà dans ces ports sera accordé un délai de quarante-huit heures à partir du temps susmentionné, c'est-a-dire il leur sera permis de quitter les eaux bloquées jusqu'à 8 heures du matin du 12 avril, 1913.

Je saisis, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

[17400] No. 384.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 300.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 12, 1913.*

IN my despatch No. 228 of the 22nd March last I reported the promulgation of a provisional law on the separation of provincial from Imperial finance in this country. I have now the honour to report that the "Official Gazette" of the 28th March published the text of a further provisional law on the whole subject of provincial administration, promulgated on the 26th March. The new law is divided into two main parts. The first deals with the general administration of the vilayets, a subject which was not touched by the law of the 6th April, 1912, to which reference was made in my despatch No. 228. The second, dealing with the special administration of the vilayets, is on the same general lines as the law of April 1912, but it modifies that measure in some important particulars. The new law, as a whole, replaces the old laws of 1864 and 1871 (see Young's "Corps de Droit ottoman," vol. i, pp. 36 and 47), which it expressly abrogates. Except for a temporary retention of the old provisions concerning the elective members of Administrative Councils, this abrogation is unaccompanied by any reserve, although, as a matter of fact, the new law does not deal specifically with various administrative details mentioned in the older enactments.

The observations made in the last paragraph of my despatch No. 228 apply with equal force to the law now under consideration. It is a measure which, in the more stable conditions of any western country, would mark an epoch of the first importance in the history of its administration. In this country, where far-reaching paper reforms have been so numerous, it is necessary to suspend judgment in the real value of such a measure from the administrative point of view. It is, nevertheless, worthy of attention as an indication of the doctrines which dominate the minds of statesmen and publicists at the present time, and still more, perhaps, as a move in the political game. I propose, therefore, to forward in due course a translation of the law, which is now

[6] Admiralty telegram, April 19, 1913.

being published in instalments in a local newspaper. In the meanwhile I submit the following survey of its main contents:—

The law begins with a brief preface, which says, "According to article 108 of the Constitution the system of the administration of the vilayet is founded on the rules of the distribution of powers and the division of duties. Every official is charged with the execution of his duty within the sphere of competency conferred on him by law and is responsible for all acts pertaining to his official functions." This text is doubtless intended to emphasise the Committee's claim to be no less convinced of the necessity of decentralisation than its political opponents. The law goes on to re-enact the old division of the Empire into vilayets, vilayets into sanjaks, sanjaks into kazas, and kazas into nahiés or communes. The various administrative organs differ but little in form from those contemplated by the laws of 1864 and 1871. In function, however, they differ very considerably, and a new attitude towards all the problems involved is indicated by some general differences, notably, the omission of any reference to religious distinctions in the portions of the new law dealing with elective bodies.

So far as the principle of the devolution of Imperial authority is concerned, the essential administrative unit is the vilayet. The Governor-General, or Vali, becomes a veritable Viceroy, wielding very extensive powers, and ruling with the aid of an elective General Council, which presents many of the features of a provincial Parliament. It is noteworthy that, while the Governors of sanjaks and the sub-Governors of kazas are described as being "the heads of and responsible for" their respective administrations, the Vali is described as "the head of and competent authority in" his. Whether this wording be intended to indicate his dependence on the General Council or to evade a statement as to how far or to whom he is responsible, the fact remains that the law goes on to endow him with wide specific powers. He appoints and can dismiss, of his own authority, many of the provincial officials, and must be consulted as to the appointment of most of the higher administrative officials, whose nomination is reserved to the Central Government. He can demand the dismissal of the latter, and, if the Ministry concerned is not satisfied with his reasons, the difference is referred to the Council of State. He can call for enquiry into the conduct of judicial officers with whom he is dissatisfied, and is entitled to receive a copy of the résumé of such enquiry when it is sent to the Ministry of Justice or the Sheikh-ul-Islam. He is the representative in his province of each of the Imperial Ministers, and is the sole channel for the communication of laws and regulations to all provincial authorities. The enumeration of his duties brings him into relations with every conceivable interest of the provincial population, and includes, very significantly, that of seeing that "justice is dispensed with as great rapidity and ease as possible, consistent with respect for the independence of Tribunals." In discharge of this duty he is empowered to call the attention of the judicial authorities to cases of delay and to ask in writing for explanations. In the maintenance of public order he has complete authority over the police and gendarmerie; he can call in the assistance of the military and naval forces of the Empire, even from outside his vilayet, in case of need, and the military authorities are bound to comply with his demands for such assistance. When apprehensive of popular commotion, he can proclaim the state of siege by his own authority, if it be not possible to get that of the Central Government within twenty-four hours. His obligations are equally extensive, but less specific, except for one or two like that requiring him to make an annual tour of from two to four months in his province. The powers and duties of Governors of sanjaks and sub-Governors of kazas are, for their own districts, similar to those of the Valis, but are, in various respects, more limited in degree.

There is in each vilayet an Administrative Council (to be distinguished from the General Council), which discharges in relation to the Provincial Government much the same functions as the Council of State in relation to the Central Government. It consists of a number of the higher provincial officials, together with the spiritual heads of the various religious communities (whose inclusion has attracted some attention), and a small number of elected members. Like the Council of State in Constantinople, it exercises judicial powers in connection with official offences. Its other functions include the putting up to tender of Government contracts, elaborating the conventions relative to them, &c. Its decisions are subject to revision by the Council of State, and it has itself power to examine, in second instance, the decisions of similar Administrative Councils established in the subordinate divisions of the vilayet. All Administrative Councils are bound to give copies of their decisions, without fee, to interested parties. On the other hand, they are invested with a power, which seems singularly

susceptible of abuse, of imposing a fine of £ T. 1 to £ T. 5 on any person opposing the execution of any decision taken under the law by themselves, the General Council, or heads of administrative departments, and these fines are summarily enforceable without further trial and without the possibility of appeal.

Some accounts of the law of April 1912 on the special administration of the vilayet law has already been given in my despatch No. 228. The most striking modification effected by the present measure is the greater extension of powers in regard to public works given by the article enumerating the "local services pertaining to the vilayet," *i.e.*, to the "moral person" constituted, according to the definition contained in the law, by the ensemble of the province. Thus the Provincial Government is now empowered to contract the reclaiming of lakes and marshes, the construction of canals within certain limits, the installation of lighting and tramway systems under concessions granted for any period up to forty years, and such like, without reference to the Central Government. The portion of the law dealing with the provincial budget differs only in some slight particulars from that of the 6th April, 1912. It contemplates an ordinary and extraordinary budget for each year. The former bears all charges connected with the special services of the province, salaries of special provincial officials, charges on property belonging to the Provincial Government, &c. The latter bears all charges for non-recurring expenditure, new buildings, and the like. The articles enumerating the revenues of the vilayet not only include certain existing revenues which are now placed at the disposal of the Provincial Government, but give it the power of imposing supplementary taxes within limits partly indicated in the present law and partly to be indicated by future enactments. They also empower it to raise loans for extraordinary expenditure. This privilege is unfettered so long as the amount of the loan does not exceed one-third of the ordinary annual revenue of the province. If it exceed that amount, but not one year's annual revenue, it must be sanctioned by Imperial decree, while, if it exceeds one year's revenue, an Act of the Imperial Parliament is required.

In all matters connected with the special administration of the vilayet, the Vali is the chief executive authority. In matters of provincial finance, however, and in most of the important matters outside the ordinary administrative routine, the binding decision is that of the General Council of the vilayet. This body consists of paid members from each kaza, elected by a joint college composed of the secondary electors, chosen for the purpose, of the last Parliamentary elections and the Municipal Council of the "chef-lieu" of the kaza. In the present law it is now further specifically stated that the secondary electors shall continue to exercise this function until they are succeeded by new secondary electors in connection with a new Parliamentary election. A significant effect of this provision is that, until Parliament is next convoked, the election of members of the provincial General Councils will be largely in the hands of the instruments whom the Committee used to pack Parliament at the General Election held in the spring of last year.

Candidates for the General Council must be residents in the Ottoman Empire; otherwise, the qualification for membership is the same as for Parliament. Soldiers on active service, senators and deputies, judges and officials, and tax-farmers and contractors for public services in the vilayet are excluded. The life of the Council is four years. Many of the articles dealing with the General Council betray an unmistakeable anxiety to avoid undue self-assertion by the provinces. The Vali is *ex officio* president. The ordinary session of forty-five days per year can only be prolonged by the Vali, and under no circumstances for more than fifteen days. Extraordinary sessions can only be held with the sanction of the Central Government, and only for the consideration of specific business to be stated beforehand. All discussion or formulation of views on political subjects is strictly forbidden. The Vali has power to suspend the sittings for a week in case of need, and may provoke a dissolution of the Council by Imperial decree based upon a decision of the Council of Ministers. He has power to disperse meetings held at times or places other than those provided for under the law. Only a summary account of the proceedings need be published in the official journal of the province. Finally, the Council is deprived of the power of coercion by refusing supply, for an article on the budget declares that: "The General Council of the vilayet is obliged to include, without fail, in the budget the regular expenditure of the vilayet as stated. In the contrary event, expenditure not so included in the budget shall be added to it by the Ministry of the Interior on its own initiative upon a report furnished by the Vali."

The General Council is represented in the entourage of the Vali by a permanent committee of four members chosen each year. This body examines the budget before

it is submitted to the General Council, revises the monthly accounts of the province, and exercises various other functions enumerated in the law.

A new feature in the present law is the provision for inter-provincial committees of the General Councils of adjoining provinces to consider matters of common interest. The Central Government must be approached before such committees can be appointed.

In conclusion, I may quote the following article from the earlier part of the law as indicating a tendency to take into account the practical conditions of the Empire:—

"Special regulations, adapted to their idiosyncracies, local requirements, and social needs, will be drawn up in connection with the mode of settlement and administration of the nomad tribes within the Ottoman dominions."

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[17401] No. 385.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 301.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 12, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel G. E. Tyrrell, military attaché to this embassy, regarding the disposition of the Turkish forces in Western Anatolia.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 385.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 20.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 10, 1913.*

WITH reference to the formation of an army corps in Western Anatolia, I have the honour to state that, as far as my information goes, the actual position in the neighbourhood of Smyrna is as follows:—

At Aivali and Dikilli, three battalions of Sivas redifs and four battalions of mustahfiz.

At Jimovassi, six battalions Sivas redif division, with detachments watching the approaches from Scalanuova and Sivri Hissar.

Two or three battalions at Kilizman.

A nizam battalion at Vourla, and another about 10 miles west of that place on the Cheshme road.

Along the south shore of the gulf, to the west of Smyrna, are some field and mountain guns and four quick-firing guns taken out of the gunboat "Muin-i-Zafer." Also at least one searchlight. The 14th mountain artillery battalion.

At Manissa are two depôt battalions, where recruits and reservists receive a short training before being sent to units.

The commander is Ferik Ismail Fazil Pasha, with headquarters in Smyrna.

Orders have now been given to complete the 42nd nizam division. This division, which was the Turkish garrison of Tripoli in Africa, was brought over to Syria in December and January last, and has since been collected at various centres along the line of the Anatolian Railway, with headquarters at Afium Kara Hissar. As far as arrival reports and railway returns enable one to judge, the strength of the division was about 3,000, to which may be added some 1,600 prisoners returned from Sicily, who were distributed among its battalions. The division still retains its paper organisation of thirteen battalions, and is still commanded by Mir Alai Neshad Bey, who was the commander of the Turco-Arab forces during the Italian war. A regiment of cavalry and one mountain and three field batteries are also included among the troops which arrived from Tripoli, and these also may be counted as available in Western Anatolia, though they are probably no longer under the orders of the commander of the 42nd division.

Orders have also been given to raise fourteen new battalions of mustahfiz, to provide non-commissioned officers for which 1,270 men have been taken from the local gendarmerie. Some of the officers for these battalions will doubtless be provided from the cadres of the Anatolian redif battalions which have lately been repatriated from the Yemen and disbanded.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL,
Military Attaché.

[17403] No. 386.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 303.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 12, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 191 of the 8th March, 1913, on the subject of the mission to England to plead the cause of autonomy for Salonica and its Macedonian hinterland, I have the honour to transmit herewith a leading article of to-day's date from the "Jeune Turc" which reflects the views of the Salonican Jews.*

As will be seen, it advocates the internationalisation of Salonica as "the only logical solution of the problem," a result to be obtained by antagonising Greek and Bulgarian on the subject.

As far as can be gleaned, the Jews of Salonica would like to see the town of Salonica internationalised under Austrian ægis, but would prefer that it should go to the Bulgarians rather than the Greeks, whose rule they are anxious at all costs to escape, mainly on account of the probable successful rivalry of the Greeks owing to their commercial and financial aptitudes.

I am, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[17404] No. 387.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 304.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April, 12, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 249 of 30th March I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica, transmitting a petition from the inhabitants of Ruptchos and Nevrokop, complaining of the barbarities alleged to have been committed by the Bulgarians in those districts.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 387.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 28.)
Sir, *Salonica, April 7, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 22 of the 22nd ultimo, and to previous correspondence on the same subject, I have the honour to enclose herewith translation of a petition which has been presented to some of the foreign consuls in Salonica in the name of the Mussulman population of the kazas of Ruptchos and Nevrokop, complaining of the barbarities committed to their detriment by the Bulgarians in occupation of those districts.

Though I have no means of controlling in detail the statements contained in this document, I have little doubt that they are in the main true.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

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* Not printed

Enclosure 2 in No. 387.

Petition presented to the Foreign Consulates in Salonica on behalf of the Mussulman Population of Ruptchos and Nevrokop.

(Translation.)

THE prayer of your petitioners showeth:

The Following are the barbarities committed by Ferdinand the Bulgarian in the kazas of Nevrokop and Ruptchos:—

1. Wherever the soldiers passed they beat the people without reason and with such severity that many persons died in consequence of the blows received. They violated the young women and girls, even little children of nine years old not being spared.

2. In every village they took by force from fifty to a hundred liras, together with all the best of the cattle, quantities of grain, clothing, and household objects.

3. In every village 5, 10, 50, or 100 people were killed, according to its size.

4. Apart from these and other acts of barbarity, the whole of the Ruptchos kaza has been turned upside down and a large portion of the population, both male and female, is at the present moment wandering in the snow upon the mountains. As for the Nevrokop kaza, out of about ninety Mussulman villages, fifty have similarly been destroyed, Ablanitza, Valkosel, Tohovishta, Zhizhovo, Srtchen, Barshten, (or Barutin), Burundjik, Potchan, and Nesova having been burned. Of these nine villages, the adult male inhabitants of four, namely, Srtchen, Zhizhovo, Valkosel, and Ablanitza, were sprinkled with petroleum and burned in the mosques. What became of the women and children is unknown.

Besides these nine villages, Lozna and Sirobal (Ziropolje (?)) were also burned and their inhabitants massacred, for the purpose of dividing up their lands (among the neighbouring Christian villages). Their survivers are at present wandering, without food or protection, in the snows upon the mountain-side, and it is even not known whether they are alive or not, it being rigorously forbidden to them to go and take refuge in the neighbouring villages.

The condition of the Mussulman population of twenty-eight other villages is entirely unknown, for they are completely blockaded on both sides.

April 23 (5), 1913.

Note.—The first nine villages mentioned are upland hamlets lying in the mountains westward of the Mesta Kara-Sou. The other two lie in the Mesta Valley. The greater agricultural value of the land in the valley probably accounts for the distinction drawn in the petition.

[17516] No. 388.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 16.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April* 16, 1913.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegrams dated the 15th* and 16th instant relative to Montenegrin affairs.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 388.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April* 16, 1913.

AT conference held to-night Austrian admiral said he considered that some communication had already reached the Turkish commandant at Scutari. I propose first, subject to approval, to telegraph viâ San Giovanni di Medua to the

* See also No. 390.

Servian general and ascertain whether commandant received and understood the communication.

If it was not received, I shall enquire whether he can send the message to Scutari from the Servian lines under a flag of truce.

If this cannot be done, I propose to send a British officer with Austrian interpreter by road with escort of Servians from San Giovanni di Medua to Scutari to pass through Servian lines and communicate with commandant at Scutari under British flag and flag of truce.

As the river is in flood and as it passes the Montenegrin frontier and positions held by the Montenegrins, it is thought that it would be undesirable to open communications with Scutari by river.

Conference considered that if the Servians retreated from Scutari as proposed, blockade should not be extended to Durazzo.

[17411] No. 389.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 142.)

(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, April* 15, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 100 of 15th April.

No armistice has been concluded, but simple suspension of hostilities has just been arranged to-day for the purpose of burying the dead. The Prime Minister confirmed the above, but says that it is confidential. The Bulgarian Government will continue to use every effort to prevent recommencement of hostilities.

The Prime Minister tells me that no armistice can be concluded without the consent of the allies.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[17446] No. 390.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, April 16.)

(Telegraphic.) *April* 15, 1913.

YOUR No. 131.

As my colleagues are unable to leave their ships owing to violence of south-westerly gale, which is now moderating, I cannot hold conference at present, but will do so as soon as possible.

French Government have instructed their captain to follow out my instructions as to the blockade, but any extension would affect Servians rather than Montenegrins, and I do not, therefore, propose to extend it pending further orders from Admiralty.

I would propose that the Governments of Servia and Greece should be informed through the diplomatic channel that we will permit empty transports to pass the blockade and embark Servian troops at San Giovanni di Medua.

The Austrian Admiral has received information to the effect that the Grand Vizier sent instructions through the German Ambassador to the Turkish commander at Scutari that his troops were not to impede the withdrawal of the Servians.

[17548] No. 391.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, April 16.)

(Telegraphic.) *April* 16, 1913.

THIS morning I telephoned to the Servian general in command before Scutari and the British military attaché with the Servian army there.

They inform me that Servian troops, with exception of one small battery, which is about 2,200 yards from the town, have all been withdrawn from siege of Scutari, and they are now 9 miles from Scutari. The small battery can easily be withdrawn behind the hills after dark without interference, and this will be done to-night.

Servian general now considers it unnecessary to communicate with commandant at Scutari, as all Servian troops will by to-night be outside the zone of fire.

Servians have not yet been informed from headquarters where the transports for the embarkation of their troops will be sent. It is expected that this will be done at San Giovanni di Medua.

[17421] No. 392.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 58.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, April 16, 1913.*

THE King told the Italian Minister yesterday that he would not accept financial compensations for abandonment of his claims to Scutari.

[17544] No. 393.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 59.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, April 16, 1913.*

YOUR telegrams, circular, of 8th and 14th April: Mediation.

A collective representation in the sense of your instructions was made this morning.

[17541] No. 394.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 95.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, April 16, 1913.*

THE Servian Government intend not only to withdraw their troops from Scutari, but also from Alessio and Durazzo, as soon as transports are available.

[17391] No. 395.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 101.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, April 16, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 140 of 15th April.

You may agree to the omissions specified in points 1 to 6 in your telegram. I do not think any other omissions or modifications should be made. As to the co-operation of France and Germany, you might inform your French and German colleagues of the steps you have taken, and ask if they would not obtain authority from their Governments to take similar action on the information which they have in their hands.

[16181] No. 396.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon.

HIS MAJESTY'S Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the French Ambassador, and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of his Excellency's communication of the 5th instant relative to the future status of Ottoman Jews residing in territory which will be annexed to the Balkan States on the conclusion of peace.

Sir E. Grey begs leave to inform M. Cambon, in reply, that this question was lately raised by the Italian Ambassador at this Court. The Marquis Imperiali was informed that Sir E. Grey would be glad to see this question put on a satisfactory

footing after being raised at the proper time, and that His Majesty's Government would willingly co-operate in its settlement after the preliminaries of peace were arranged. It could, however, hardly be mixed up with the question of mediation between Turkey and the allies at this moment.

Foreign Office, April 16, 1913.

[14817] No. 397.

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 16, 1913.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 31st ultimo on the subject of the conditions for safeguarding foreign trade to be proposed to the Balkan States as a preliminary to the recognition of their acquisitions of territory on the partition of the European dominions of Turkey.

The stipulation contained in article 1 (3) is equivalent to a demand that the allies shall not increase any of the customs duties for fifteen years. This provision would be of the greatest advantage to those Powers, particularly Austria-Hungary, who pursue a highly protectionist policy, for they could then impose for that period all manner of restrictions upon Servia and her friends with complete immunity from fiscal retaliation, and while the conquering States would be thus hampered in their endeavours to restore their finances, which have been gravely impaired by the war and in the discharge of their other obligations, such as sharing the burden of the Ottoman Debt, it is in contemplation to permit the conquered State (Turkey) to increase her customs duties.

Sir E. Grey, therefore, hesitates to join in placing such an impediment upon the free action of the allies, not merely in the enjoyment of the fruits of their victories, but also in enlarging their means of revenue for the government of their original territories.

A further difficulty is that there seems no reason in equity or policy why restrictions should be put upon the Balkan States in respect of their annexations and not upon Italy in respect of Tripoli.

I am further to observe that the application of paragraph 4 of article 1 of the draft formula enclosed in your letter under reply would, as it appears to him, give rise to difficulties from the practical point of view. Sir E. Grey appreciates the advantages which would be gained by allowing foreign trade time to accommodate itself to the new conditions, but in the meantime it is at least probable that the annexed territories would be the main channels of importation across the present limits of the allied States, and the arrangement suggested in the paragraph in question would, therefore, necessitate a large staff of customs officials on the old as well as on the new frontiers.

Sir E. Grey would be glad to know whether these considerations in any way modify their views with regard to their proposals.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[17567] No. 398.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 16.)
Sir, *Cettinjé, April 10, 1913.*

IN my despatch No. 10 of the 16th March, I forwarded to you the text of the collective representation of the 13th March and of the reply returned to it the same day on the subject of the withdrawal of the civil population of Scutari. Further steps were taken by the Austro-Hungarian Legation on the 21st and 24th March respectively; on the latter occasion it was urged that there should be a cessation of all firing against either the town or fortifications of Scutari till the civil population had left. It was added that if a negative answer were returned, resort would be had to coercive steps, and efficacious measures would be adopted to prevent excesses on the part of the Montenegrin troops in case the town were taken; Montenegro would be held responsible for the lives of the inhabitants.

In a note addressed to me on the 24th March, the Montenegrin Government protested against the Austro-Hungarian communication, adding that, on humanitarian grounds and in acceptance of the unanimous advice of the Powers, they were taking

the necessary steps in conjunction with the military commandant of Scutari to facilitate the departure of the civil population of the town. The Montenegrin emissary, who was accordingly despatched to Scutari, was not accompanied by any independent authority, and there may be ground for suspecting that the offer which he was charged to make was coupled with conditions which rendered it inacceptable. In any case, Essad Pacha, according to a note received from the Montenegrin Government and dated the 26th March, declined, in the absence of orders from Constantinople, to agree to the proposed arrangement, whatever it may have been. A fresh proposal was put forward in the name of the Powers on the 30th March, when the Montenegrin Government were requested to transmit a cypher message from the Grand Vizier, Mahmoud Shefket, to Essad Pasha, authorising the departure of the civil population. The Montenegrin Government refused to give their consent, but stated that they were prepared to submit to the commander-in-chief of the army a communication *en clair* signed by the Turkish Government. A message of this nature, telegraphed from Constantinople, was tendered to the Montenegrin Government on the 6th April; it was accompanied by a letter from the German Minister to Essad Pacha, asking for a direct reply as to whether he intended to avail himself of the Grand Vizier's authorisation, and, if so, what steps he proposed in order to give effect to it. These words were inserted in order to forestall any attempt of the Montenegrin military authorities to attach objectionable conditions to the proposal as presented to Essad. On the 8th April the papers were returned to the German Minister with the explanation that the military authorities, for reasons connected with the military operations in progress, objected to forward them.

It may be remarked that the commander-in-chief of the army is the King, who was, moreover, in Cettinjé when the reply of the Montenegrin Government suggesting the transmission of a message *en clair* was given to the representatives of the Powers.

I enclose herewith copies of the correspondence referred to in this despatch.

I have, &c.

A. DE SALIS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 398.

M. Vukotitch to Count de Salis.

M. le Ministre, *Cettigné, le 11 (24) mars*, 1913.

J'AI l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que la Légation Impériale et Royale d'Autriche-Hongrie vient de nous adresser une note verbale de la teneur suivante:

"Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne peut pas se contenter de la réponse donnée au sujet du bombardement de Scutari et de la sortie de la population civile; il doit, au contraire, absolument insister à ce que jusqu'à l'accomplissement de la sortie de la population civile, non seulement le bombardement de la ville, mais aussi celui de Scutari en général cesse, comme il n'est pas possible de constater les points sur lesquels le feu d'artillerie est dirigé, et que, d'après les expériences faites et les récentes remarques de Sa Majesté le Roi à propos d'une attaque d'artillerie, le danger subsiste pour la ville et la population.

"Je suis chargé de demander une réponse claire et décisive si le Monténégro veut se rendre ou non à notre susdite demande.

"Je suis chargé, en outre, de déclarer que, si la réponse était négative ou qu'acceptation de notre demande n'était pas suivie en temps utile de son exécution, la monarchie se verrait, à son regret, forcée d'employer des moyens coercitifs.

"De plus, j'ai l'ordre de ne laisser aucun doute à Sa Majesté le Roi et au Gouvernement Royal que nous avons envisagé des moyens très efficaces pour le cas où l'entrée [illegible] rendue possible par une [illegible] volontaire [illegible] Scutari [illegible] accompagnée d'excès quelconques contre la population pour la [illegible] laquelle nous serions obligés de rendre le Monténégro responsable."

Le Gouvernement Royal considère cette déclaration comme une violation de la neutralité, qui a, cependant, été proclamée par les Grandes Puissances, ainsi que par le Gouvernement austro-hongrois lui-même, dès le début des hostilités.

[illegible] M. le Ministre, de vous informer que le Gouvernement Royal, vu le caractère de la note, n'a pas cru pouvoir entrer avec le Gouvernement austro-hongrois dans le fond même du débat, d'autant moins que cette question, [illegible] les rapports militaires entre le Monténégro, ses alliés et la Turquie, ne saurait être l'objet d'une démarche quelconque d'une Puissance neutre.

J'ai l'honneur, par conséquent, de vous prier, M. le Ministre, de porter ce qui précède à la connaissance de votre Gouvernement et de vous prier en même temps de l'informer que le Gouvernement Royal, par des considérations humanitaires et pour adhérer au conseil unanime des Grandes Puissances, vient d'entreprendre auprès du commandant militaire de Scutari les démarches nécessaires pour faciliter l'évacuation de la population civile de la ville de Scutari.

Veuillez, &c.

DUCHAN VUKOTITCH

Enclosure 2 in No. 398.

M. Vukotitch to Count de Salis.

M. le Ministre, *Cettigné, le 13 (26) mars*, 1913.

EN me référant à ma note en date du 11, mois courant, j'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance, avec prière d'en informer votre Gouvernement, que M. Pierre Plamenatz, ancien Chargé d'Affaires à Constantinople, a été en parlementaire hier à Scutari pour faire savoir par lettre à son Excellence Essad Pacha que Sa Majesté le Roi avait pris la décision de donner son consentement à ce que la ville assiégée de Scutari soit évacuée par la population non combattante ainsi que par les consuls étrangers et leurs ressortissants.

Le commandant de Scutari, en accusant réception par écrit de cette communication et en répondant par lettre à Son Altesse Royale le Prince Héritier, commandant en chef de l'armée monténégrine, y a déclaré ne pouvoir pas profiter de cette autorisation bienveillante, n'ayant pas des ordres de son Gouvernement pour pouvoir le faire.

Veuillez, &c.

DUCHAN VUKOTITCH

Enclosure in 3 No. 398.

Note communicated by the Montenegrin Government, April 1, 1913.

LE Gouvernement Royal regrette de n'être pas en mesure d'accéder au désir exprimé par les Grandes Puissances concernant la demande relative à une évacuation des non-combattants de la ville de Scutari, le haut commandement de l'armée refusant la transmission d'une dépêche chiffrée au commandant de Scutari.

Le Gouvernement Royal se déclare, toutefois, prêt de soumettre à l'appréciation du commandant en chef de l'armée une communication écrite en clair [illegible] du Gouvernement ottoman concernant la susdite évacuation.

Enclosure 4 in No. 398.

M. Vukotitch to M. von Eckhardt.

M. le Ministre, *Cettigné, le 26 mars (8 avril)*, 1913.

EN réponse à la note de votre Excellence du 6, mois courant, j'ai l'honneur de vous informer que le Gouvernement Royal n'est pas en état de donner suite à la transmission de la dépêche du Grand Vizier au commandant de Scutari, les autorités militaires compétentes ayant donné un avis négatif pour des raisons concernant les opérations en cours.

En conséquence de ce qui précède, j'empresse de vous restituer le pli qui était destiné au commandant de Scutari.

Veuillez, &c.

DUCHAN VUKOTITCH

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* NOTE.—The statement that the Crown Prince is commander-in-chief of the army would not appear to be accurate. The King assumed the chief command at the end of November last.—J. DE S.

[17929] No. 399.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 71.)

Sir, *Athens, April 9, 1913.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 26 of the 12th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith a despatch from the British delegate on the International Financial Commission respecting the probable effects of the acquisition of new territory on the revenues assigned to the service of the Greek debt, and the suggestion to abolish the system of plus-values in this connection.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 399.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.

(No. 3. Confidential.)

Sir, *April 8, 1913.*

SIR FRANCIS ELLIOT has communicated to me your despatch No. 26 of the 12th ultimo, forwarding the observations of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury on the points raised in my despatch No. 11 of the 15th November last, as to the effect of new acquisitions of territory on the revenues now assigned to the service of the Greek debt.

I have reason to believe that the Government intend, for the present at least, to leave prices of the articles of monopoly, and possibly also stamp dues, in the former Turkish provinces at the lower level prevailing under Turkish administration. The danger, therefore, foreseen in my despatch, and also in the letter of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, that steps may be taken to increase the sale of such articles outside the present limits of the kingdom, all the profits on which would go to the Government, at the expense of revenue derived from the same sources now encashed by the Commission—the profits on which, according to existing arrangements, are shared with the bondholders—is a real one.

The risk is all the greater, inasmuch as by the new law for the administration of the occupied territories the products of such territories can be imported free of duty into Greece. It is true that the importation of articles of monopoly is forbidden, but it can hardly be expected that special vigilance will be exercised to prevent either the importation into Greece proper of the produce of the occupied territory, such as salt, which will be sold by the Government, or even of articles, such as petroleum and matches, which have already paid the Turkish duty to the Greek Government on importation into occupied territories. To prevent such a trade it would be necessary not only to establish a severe control on all ships arriving from Macedonia, Epirus, or the islands, but also special vigilance on the existing land frontiers. It cannot be considered likely that the Government will take such precautions, and the special circumstances of the case make it possible that this form of contraband trade may even be connived at.

Recent experience which the International Financial Commission have had of the methods of the Government in regard to the strike of miners at Naxos still further justifies the fear that the interests of the bondholders will not be considered in dealing with the revenue from stamps and the sale of tobacco and articles of monopoly in the new territory.

With regard to the suggestion of the Treasury that the list of monopolies might be recast, and, in the event of the Commission being charged with the payment of an annuity on account of the share of the Ottoman debt assumed by Greece, that it should also undertake the encashment of these revenues in the annexed territory, I fear that the Greek Government will certainly oppose any extension of the present functions of the International Financial Commission.

The simplest solution of the difficulties which will arise, and also probably the most advantageous to the bondholders, would rather, I think, be the abolition of the plus-values and the payment of interest at a fixed rate acceptable to the bondholders.

I have already, on more than one occasion, referred to the advantages of such a change. It would free the hands of the Government in dealing with the assigned revenues. At present the Commission can hardly assent to any modifications, otherwise desirable, in the laws relating to stamps, or the monopolies which would

have the effect of diminishing revenue even to an inconsiderable extent. For example, certain anomalies exist in the stamp laws which might with advantage be removed. With this object, the Government have even proposed amendments to which, while admitting that they were desirable, we have been unable to assent because they entailed the possibility of a trifling loss to the bondholders. To quote a concrete case: On all foreign cheques up to 1,000 fr. negotiated in the country, the stamp duty is now 50 leptas, which is obviously excessive in the case of cheques for very small amounts. We were unable to agree to a proposed reduction to 10 leptas for cheques of less value than 100 fr., because it would involve a loss of a few thousand francs in the revenue subjected to the plus-values arrangement. Similarly with the petroleum monopoly. The high price and existing conditions of sale now act as an effective check on consumption. It is probable that lower prices would, by encouraging consumption, not only benefit consumers, but might even increase revenue. Unless, however, the minimum were lowered, in excess of which profits are shared between the Government and the bondholders, the Commission could with difficulty give its assent to a reduction of prices, which might, perhaps, entail a loss to the bondholders. These and other difficulties, with the resulting danger of friction between the Government and the Commission, would be avoided by an abandonment of the plus-values system.

On the other hand, taking the point of view of the bondholders, the profits accruing to them from the plus-values are small and uncertain; how small and uncertain they are will be seen from the table annexed to my despatch No. 1 of the 14th February. The total surplus up to now has never exceeded 5,620,328 drachmas, and has frequently, as last year, fallen considerably below this sum. The bondholders' share is 60 per cent. after deduction of 18 per cent. for expenses. Of this 60 per cent., half is applied to increasing the interest and half to increasing redemption. It follows that, in order to provide payment of an additional ½ per cent. interest, requiring approximately 2,500,000 fr., it will be necessary for the plus-values to increase by, roughly, 10,000,000 fr. Such a result, even in the most favourable circumstances, is impossible for many years.

Since profits on exchange can go no higher, though they may fall, nothing further can be hoped from this source.

There remains only the interest on the bonds redeemed, which is a constantly increasing amount. This increase, however, though sure, is small, and can hardly exceed 100,000 fr. in one year, a figure, in fact, never yet reached. From this source alone it would take, allowing for the reduction of the number of bonds in circulation, nearly twenty years to give the amount necessary for a distribution of an additional ½ per cent.

Under the law authorising the Government to come to an agreement with the International Financial Commission for the conversion of the old debt, or the payment of a fixed rate of interest and redemption, the maximum sum to be applied may not exceed the amount actually applied in any one year under existing conditions. The largest sum so applied was last year, and amounted to—

	Fr. c.
Interest	11,490,895 00
Redemption	3,698,927 50
Total	15,189,822 50

By a redistribution of this sum, reducing the amount applied to redemption and increasing that applied to interest, it would be possible to pay a fixed rate as follows:—

	Per Cent.
Group I—	
1887 4 per cent. monopoly, 73 per cent. of original interest or ..	2·92
1893 5 „ funding, 62 „ „ „ ..	3·10
1881 5 per cent., 62 per cent. of original interest or	3·10
Group II—	
1884 5 per cent., 62 per cent. of original interest or	3·10
1890 5 „ 62 „ „ „ „	3·10
Group III—	
1889 4 per cent. Rentes, 62 per cent. of original interest or	2·48

The total sum required for payment at these rates on the bonds in circulation on the 1st January, 1913, would be 14,119,000 fr., leaving a balance of more than 1,000,000 fr. available, in accordance with the Law of the 19th March, 1910, for purposes of redemption.

The highest distributions yet paid are as follows:—

1887 4 per cent.	: 61 per cent. of the original interest, or 2·44 per cent (payable in 1913).						
1883 5	,,	: 50	,,	,,	,,	2·50	,,	,,
1881 5	,,	: 50	,,	,,	,,	2·50	,,	(paid in 1912).
1884 5	,,	: 50	,,	,,	,,	2·50	,,	,,
1890 5	,,	: 50	,,	,,	,,	2·50	,,	,,
1889 4	,,	: 50	,,	,,	,,	2	,,	,,

The payment of interest at a fixed rate might, of course, be effected without any capital conversion and consolidation, but market and other considerations would, perhaps, make the latter scheme preferable. Capitalised at 4 per cent. the interest mentioned above (14,119,000 fr.) represents a sum of 353,000,000 fr. The outstanding nominal capital of the six loans being, on the 1st January, 1913, 489,781,500 fr., this would effect a reduction in the nominal capital of the debt of approximately 136,000,000 fr.

The Greek Government have already been approached by at least one group of bankers offering to carry through a scheme of conversion, in which it may be assumed the interests of the banks would be more considered than those of either the Government or of the bondholders.

In consequence of the recent shrinkage of receipts from the assigned revenues, due principally to the war and to the continued strike of miners at Naxos, it is already practically certain that next year's distribution of interest will be even smaller than that distributed this year, and this may be the cause that no proposals on the subject of the conversion, which, apparently, would be advantageous both to the Government and the bondholders, have yet been made to the Commission here.

In the circumstances, I would suggest for consideration that the Commission which is to sit in Paris to deal with financial questions arising out of the war might take the initiative in the matter.

If it could be carried out, it would, I think, facilitate arrangements for entrusting the Commission here with the duty of encashing any revenues in the former Turkish provinces, assigned as security for payment of the annuity, due on account of the share of the Ottoman Debt to be assumed by Greece.

The margin of the revenues already assigned over all existing charges paid by the Commission has amounted to the following sums in the last five years:—

	Drachmas.
1908	21,982,170
1909	22,598,212
1910	24,497,486
1911	27,419,093
1912	23,795,480

At first sight this surplus would appear to be ample to guarantee payment of any annuity due on account of the Greek share of the Ottoman Debt. The surplus is, however, already charged with the service of the national defence loan, of two Thessalian agricultural loans, and of the 1911 loan, requiring, in round figures, 7,500,000 fr. It will also be charged with the service of the loans rendered necessary by the war, the amount of which it is impossible yet to estimate, but which is likely to be so considerable that the assignment of additional revenue is a question which will have to be considered.

I have, &c.
H. D. BEAUMONT.

[17549] No. 400.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 17.)

(No. 72.)

Sir, *Athens, April* 11, 1913.

THE deliberations of the Conference of Ambassadors have had but an indifferent interest for the Greek Government until the meeting of the 28th March, when the southern frontiers of Albania began to be discussed. The proceedings of that meeting were immediately reported by M. Skouloudis and excited the liveliest apprehension in the minds of the Greek Government. They feared that the Conference might be disposed to defer to the superior knowledge of the localities said to have been claimed by the Marquis Imperiali for the Marquis of Sa Giuliano on the strength of a visit paid

there by him as a tourist some years ago. With regard to the disturbance of the balance of power which the Italian Government said would arise out of the possession by Greece of both sides of the Corfu Channel, which would enable her to convert Corfu into a strong naval base, they said the idea was fantastic; however much the frontiers of Greece were extended, she could never compete with Italy as a naval power, and she had not the slightest desire to do so.

It then occurred to me to suggest, as a purely personal idea, that the Italian objection might be met by an undertaking on the part of the Greek Government not to fortify the coast of Epirus if they were allowed to keep it. I mentioned the idea to my Italian colleague, who had told me that the objections of his Government were based entirely on the advice of their naval and military advisers, and were not due to political motives, and he was struck by it and himself suggested it to M. Coromilas. To both of us the Minister's answer, afterwards confirmed to me by M. Venizelos, was that the Greek Government would most readily acquiesce.

I regretted afterwards to learn, from your telegram No. 54 of the 7th instant, that you disapproved of my having raised the point, even as an entirely personal suggestion, for reasons of which I entirely recognise the force. It was not, however, until afterwards that I received a copy of your despatch to Sir F. Bertie No. 223 of the 20th March, which showed that you had contemplated another solution of the question, namely neutralising the strategic value of the Corfu Channel as far as Italy was concerned by freeing Greece from her obligation of neutrality about Corfu.

Upon this I take leave to express the decided opinion that this is an obligation of which Greece had rather not be relieved. She has no aggressive intentions against Italy and (apart from the anxieties of the present moment, to which I shall refer later), no apprehensions of aggression on the part of Italy. She would therefore prefer not to be exposed to the temptation of incurring heavy expenditure in fortifications. The same applies to the Ægean Islands. M. Venizelos has told me in the most positive manner that there exists no Asia Minor question for Greece; that he wishes to live on the best of terms with Turkey, and that he has not the slightest desire to create a naval or military station in any of the islands. It appears to me that he might be grateful for a treaty obligation depriving him of the right to do so, as a protection against pressure from his military advisers.

Turning now to the question of the land frontier between Greece and Albania; both M. Venizelos and M. Coromilas have represented very earnestly that the position of Greece is not like that of Montenegro. Montenegro is holding out for the possession of a town which she has not captured, and of which the inhabitants are not of her race. Greece claims to retain what she has acquired by right of conquest; her troops have not crossed the line of frontier she aspires to, although the people beyond it are clamouring for deliverance; within it all sorts and conditions of men are protesting against their being handed over to the Albanians and petitioning to be allowed to remain under the Greek flag. The inhabitants of the district of Khimara, for instance, have enjoyed privileges from time immemorial even under the Turkish Government; how would it be possible to condemn them to servitude under a Mussulman Albanian Government after having tasted complete liberation?

The Ministers fear that you, Sir, and the Ambassadors, engaged in remodelling the map of Europe at a round table, with principal consideration for the supposed interests of certain of the Great Powers, do not sufficiently take into account not only the interest but the moral obligations of the small Powers who have carried to a successful issue the war of liberation which has been the dream of centuries. The creation of an independent Albania is bad enough; that, however, has been decided, and is past discussion, but to take Greek populations and forcibly include them within it would be to lead to certain trouble. They would rise in insurrection immediately and the Greek Government could not desert them. Then what would happen? Would the Italian Government send troops to impose its will by force? I have, of course been unable to answer that question, but I have pointed out that Greece is much more exposed than Montenegro to pressure from the sea.

The Ministers admit that if united Europe, or Italy alone, resorts to force, Greece must give way, but they declare that in no case will they be parties to the surrender of any Greek populations already liberated. Another Government may perhaps be found to sign away their freedom, but certainly not the present one, and they doubt if the King himself would consent to it, or if he did whether, with all the prestige which now surrounds him, he would not be shaken on his throne.

They do not understand how Europe, which professes to be guided by the principle of nationalities, can contemplate such a colossal breach of that principle as the severance

from Greece of the purely Greek populations of the islands, and of the largely preponderant Greek populations of Epirus. In the latter case they urge the adoption of a plebiscite, subject to whatever control the Powers may think necessary to ensure its being carried out with impartiality.

The press is as firm as the Government upon the impossibility of giving way, and is unanimous. There was some foolish writing about a boycott of Italian goods when the Italian attitude with regard to Epirus first became known, but the idea was not generally taken up, and appears to have been dropped. Indeed the papers in general try to distinguish between the Government and the people of Italy, and maintain that the policy of the former towards Greece is thoroughly distasteful to the latter.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[17621] No. 401.

Imperial Ottoman Bank to Foreign Office.—(Received April 17.)

Sir, 26, *Throgmorton Street, London, April* 16, 1913.

WE see that two British delegates have been appointed to the Financial Commission in Paris.

It is not within our knowledge what the precise functions of this conference may be, but we think it our duty to point out that there are British holders of bonds and bills other than those with which the Council of Foreign Bondholders is closely connected.

May we assume that these interests will be duly considered by the British representatives at the conference?

I am, &c.
[Signature illegible], *Secretary.*

[17595] No. 402.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 143.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, April* 16, 1913.

MY telegram No. 142 of 15th April.

Prime Minister states cessation of hostilities has been arranged for ten days.

There is no doubt that considerable amount of fighting has been proceeding at Chatalja since the fall of Adrianople, as foreshadowed in my telegram No. 120 of 2nd April.

Three thousand two hundred wounded arrived here between 9th April and 14th April, and many others were dispatched northward. This would tend to show that Turkish army has well held its own. Prime Minister did not deny there had been fighting, but all mention of it has been suppressed. He is hopeful of armistice being concluded. He had just received a telegram from Athens, which he considered fairly satisfactory, but he hopes that pressure will be placed during interval on allies, adn especially on Greece, to agree to mediation proposals.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[17596] No. 403.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 144.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, April* 16, 1913.

PRIME Minister is anxious respecting relations between allies, especially between Greece and Bulgaria. He states tension now existing between troops in the neighbourhood of Salonica is dangerous. He believes that all questions outstanding between Bulgaria and Servia will be eventually arranged through Russian intervention.

[17728] No. 404.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 153.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, April* 17, 1913.

MY immediately preceding telegram of 15th April.

We to-day agreed unanimously to decision to the following effect:—

1. Silistria to be ceded to Roumania. Frontier to start from a point on Danube at about 3 kilom. west from periphery of the town and to cut Shumla and Varna roads, also at 3 kilom. distant from periphery of town, and proceed direct to the present frontier.

A Bulgaro-Roumanian Commission to fix within three months *tracé* of the frontier.

2. Roumania to indemnify inhabitants who decide to migrate. A Bulgaro-Roumanian Commission to fix amount of such indemnities.

3. Bulgaria to erect no fortifications along the frontier, and to dismantle those already existing. A Mixed Commission to determine within six months extent of zone which must be left unfortified.

4. Autonomy to be accorded to Koutzo-Vlach schools and churches in future Bulgarian possessions.

As the above met with the approval of M. Sazonof, I accepted it in accordance with instructions conveyed to me in your telegram No. 360 of 5th April. Austrian Ambassador said he must forward text by post to his Government, in case they should wish to introduce any verbal alterations.

I am forwarding text by messenger to-day, so that there will still be time for you to telegraph any modifications should you desire to do so.

It was agreed that M. Sazonof should communicate our decision when signed to Roumanian and Bulgarian Governments, but that it was not to be made public without the consent of these Governments till conclusion of peace.

[17725] No. 405.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 198.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, April* 17, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 171 of 8th April.

My Russian and Austrian colleagues have received no instructions to communicate four points of basis for mediation, and so no official communication has been made. German Ambassador has communicated terms unofficially.

[17726] No. 406.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 199.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Constantinople, April* 17, 1913.

OTTOMAN official agency to-night announces that suspension of hostilities between Ottoman and Bulgarian armies has been arranged verbally on the following conditions:—

1. Hostilities at Chatalja and Buhair are suspended till 23rd April.

2. This suspension may be prolonged by agreement if peace negotiations are not meanwhile concluded.

3. Neutral zone to be fixed by joint commission.

4. Forty-eight hours' notice to be given in case of resumption of hostilities, to be calculated from 8 o'clock of the evening of the day on which such notice is given.

5. During the suspension the Turkish fleet will not oppose the revictualling of the Bulgarian army with food and provisions between the Gulf of Saros and the Black Sea.

[17579] No. 407.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, April 17, 1913.*

BELGRADE telegram No. 90 of 11th April.

The sons of the vice-consul at Scutari tell me that, according to accounts given by refugees, their father was wounded by the explosion of a shell on 12th March.

In accordance with instructions in your telegram No. 38 of 10th April, I have made a representation to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. I do not think that the shell can have been fired by the Servians.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

[17705] No. 408.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 57.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, April 17, 1913.*

TURKISH troops having occupied Valona, and hoisted the Turkish flag, the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests that, with a view to avoiding disagreeable consequences, it might be best for the Greeks and Servians to combine to capture them, retiring afterwards to their present positions.

[17716] No. 409.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 58
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Athens, April 17, 1913.*

NORTH and north-east frontier of Albania.

Communication made to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in terms of your telegram No. 62 of 14th April.

[17729] No. 410.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 96.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, April 17, 1913.*

UNDER-SECRETARY of State for Foreign Affairs has asked me to repeat request already made to you by Servian Chargé d'Affaires that orders should be sent to British admiral to allow transports for bringing away Servian troops to pass blockade.

He says that Greeks refuse to allow transports to start until they have the certainty that they will not be stopped.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs explained that the reason for anxiety is lest their troops, although withdrawn as far as possible from Scutari, should nevertheless still become involved in hostilities through a possible sortie of the Turkish garrison. I am, however, inclined to think that Servian impatience to re-embark troops for [? group omitted] is perhaps connected with increasing tension in relations with Bulgaria.

[17730] No. 411.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 97.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, April 17, 1913.*

SERVIAN and Bulgarian relations.

Servian semi-official organ, in its issue yesterday, for the first time had an article directly asserting that Servia has on various grounds a right to expect a revision of territorial settlement in Macedonia concluded between Bulgaria and Servia before the war.

Tension between the two countries is becoming decidedly marked.

[18048] No. 412.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.**

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 17, 1913.*

SERVIAN Chargé d'Affaires requests that no opposition should be made to the embarkation and departure of Servian troops from San Giovanni di Medua and Durazzo. Servian Government also hope that no difficulty will be made about allowing Greek transports to go to San Giovanni and to Durazzo to pick up Servian troops.

Instructions are being sent to admiral to act in this sense provided that all his colleagues are similarly instructed.

You should inform Government to which you are accredited.

[15146] No. 413.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 260.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 17, 1913.*

IT will be within your Excellency's recollection that in my despatch No. 587 of the 5th December last I submitted for the consideration of the French Government a proposal that, in view of the changed situation produced by the results of the present war, the Greek Government should be held responsible for the payment of the indemnity due to M. Zaimis so soon as the annexation of Crete shall have been definitely accomplished and confirmed by treaty.

The French Government concurred in this proposal, the Russian Government dissented from it, and the Italian Government do not appear to have expressed an opinion on it. It would therefore seem preferable no longer to press it.

It remains, however, necessary to find some solution of the question of the source from which the sum necessary to meet this claim is to be drawn, and His Majesty's consul-general at Canea has put forward, in a despatch copy of which is enclosed,† the suggestion that a part of the sum produced by the 3 per cent. surtax which is now lying at the disposal of the protecting Powers should be employed for this purpose.

Mr. Wratislaw further proposes that the indemnity for the family of the murdered Mussulman rural guard should be drawn from the same source.

I have to request your Excellency to submit these suggestions to the Government to which you are accredited, and to ask for an expression of their opinion on them, adding, as regards the second point, that the consular representatives of the protecting Powers at Canea might be instructed to agree as to the amount of the indemnity to be paid.

With reference to the last paragraph of Mr. Wratislaw's despatch, your Excellency should enquire of the French Government whether, in their view, the question of the repayment of the advance of 4,000,000 fr. made to Prince George of Greece when High Commissioner by the protecting Powers is one which can properly be considered as arising out of the present war and thus discussed and settled by the commission about to assemble in Paris.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[17062] No. 414.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 261.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 17, 1913.*

M. CAMBON mentioned on the 9th April to Sir A. Nicolson that he was sure that it would be impossible for French and Italian views as to a frontier line in South Albania to be reconciled, and he seemed to doubt if Italy would consent to the question being referred to an international commission. He considered, moreover, that it was most desirable that the Réunion should not come to any decision as to a frontier line which would be rejected by Greece, as it was self-evident that it would be impossible to secure unanimity for the exercise of any pressure on Greece to accept a line distasteful to her. Furthermore, a naval blockade would be inefficacious, as the whole coast-line

* Also to Sir R. Paget (No. 83). † No. 58.

of Greece would not be blockaded. The Powers, therefore, must not place themselves in a ridiculous dilemma, and he thought that France, Russia, Great Britain, and Germany should adopt the attitude of asserting that it was of no avail to lay down a line unacceptable to Greece, and to ask Austria-Hungary and Italy to propose one which would have a probability of meeting with Greek acceptance.

Sir A. Nicolson told M. Cambon that he thought I was quite aware that no frontier line could be imposed on Greece, and that action which might be efficacious as regards Montenegro was not applicable to Greece.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[17882] No. 415.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 263.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 17, 1913.*

A MEETING of the Ambassadors was held to-day. The Prime Minister, in the absence of Sir E. Grey, presided, and Lord Morley and Sir A. Nicolson were present.

Sir A. Nicolson informed the meeting that the Montenegrin delegate had called upon him on the 15th instant, and had stated that he was instructed by his Government to acquaint His Majesty's Government that Montenegro was firmly determined to continue military operations before Scutari; that the territorial compensations which she understood it was contemplated to accord to her were quite inadequate; that she declined to accept any financial aid or monetary compensation from the Powers; and that, if any naval or military detachments were landed by the Powers, Montenegro would regard them as enemies, and act accordingly.

The Ambassadors took note of this declaration, but doubts were expressed by some if this attitude of Montenegro would be seriously maintained by her, and it was considered possible that she would yet be inclined to accept the decision of the Powers, provided some financial assistance were granted to her in a form which would not be inconsistent with her dignity and self-respect.

The French, Italian, and Russian Ambassadors strongly urged that a loan to Montenegro of about 1,200,000*l.* should be guaranteed in equal shares by all the Powers, as it was possible that by this means she might be induced to desist from further hostilities, and, furthermore, that a situation which might possibly lead to serious and embarrassing complications would be greatly eased. The Austro-Hungarian and German Ambassadors stated that they had no instructions, but thought it probable that their Governments would acquiesce in participating in the guarantee of a loan if all the other Powers were in agreement on the subject.

The Prime Minister observed that Montenegro apparently was not in a position to offer any securities either for payment of interest or of sinking fund, and that therefore the loan was in reality in the nature of a gift. He explained to the meeting that it would be necessary for His Majesty's Government to obtain parliamentary sanction to a British guarantee, and that it was quite likely that a proposition for that purpose would meet with certain criticism and opposition. Nevertheless, if all the Powers were of opinion that in the interests of peace it was desirable to proffer financial aid to Montenegro, His Majesty's Government would not wish to be alone in declining to assent in principle to the proposal, subject of course to the assent of Parliament.

The following resolution was accordingly adopted by the meeting:—

"La proposition des Gouvernements italien and français, appuyée par l'Ambassadeur de Russie, relative à l'aide financier à donner au Monténégro ayant été examinée, les Ambassadeurs pensent qu'il convient de proposer à leurs Gouvernements de faciliter au Gouvernement monténégrin la conclusion d'un emprunt d'environ 1,200,000*l.* pour régulariser sa situation financière et lui permettre de satisfaire aux charges résultant de la guerre.

"Vu l'unanimité des Ambassadeurs, le Premier Ministre déclare qu'il ne peut opposer d'objections au principe de la proposition et qu'il la soumettra, le cas échéant, à l'assentiment du Parlement si toutes les Puissances y donnent leur adhésion."

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

* Also to Sir E. Goschen, No. 132; Sir G. Buchanan, No. 162; Sir F. Cartwright, No. 84; and Sir R. Rodd No. 110.

[15146] No. 416.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.**

(No. 159.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 17, 1913.*

IT will be within your Excellency's recollection that in my despatch No. 102 of the 5th December last I submitted for the consideration of the Russian Government a proposal that, in view of the changed situation produced by the results of the present war, the Greek Government should be held responsible for the payment of the indemnity due to M. Zaïmis so soon as the annexation of Crete shall have been definitely accomplished and confirmed by treaty.

The French Government concurred in this proposal, the Russian Government dissented from it, and the Italian Government do not appear to have expressed an opinion on it. It would therefore seem preferable no longer to press it.

It remains, however, necessary to find some solution of the question of the source from which the sum necessary to meet this claim is to be drawn, and His Majesty's consul-general at Canea has put forward, in a despatch copy of which is enclosed,† the suggestion that a part of the sum produced by the 3 per cent. surtax which is now lying at the disposal of the protecting Powers should be employed for this purpose.

Mr. Wratislaw further proposes that the indemnity for the family of the murdered Mussulman rural guard should be drawn from the same source.

I have to request your Excellency to submit these suggestions to the Government to which you are accredited, and to ask for an expression of their opinion on them, adding, as regards the second point, that the consular representatives of the protecting Powers at Canea might be instructed to agree as to the amount of the indemnity to be paid.

With reference to the last paragraph of Mr. Wratislaw's despatch, your Excellency should inform the Russian Government that I have instructed His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris to enquire of the French Government whether, in their view, the question of the repayment of the advance of 4,000,000 fr. made to Prince George of Greece when High Commissioner by the protecting Powers is one which can properly be considered as arising out of the present war, and thus discussed and settled by the commission about to assemble in that capital.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[15146] No. 417.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 17, 1913.*

WITH reference to the letter from this Office of 21st August, 1911, relative to the advance of 4,000,000 fr. made by the four protecting Powers of Crete to Prince George of Greece when High Commissioner of the island in 1901, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that he has received a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Canea, observing that in any eventual settlement of Cretan affairs the solution of this question should be taken into consideration.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey has accordingly addressed a despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, instructing his Excellency to enquire of the French Government whether, in their view, the question of the repayment of the advance of 4,000,000 fr. made to Prince George of Greece when High Commissioner by the protecting Powers is one which can properly be considered as arising out of the present war, and thus discussed and settled by the commission about to assemble in that capital.

I am to ask at the same time that the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury will favour Sir E. Grey with any observations which they may have to offer on the subject.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

* Also to Sir R. Rodd (No. 108), *mutatis mutandis.* † No. 58.

[17793] No. 418.

Council of Foreign Bondholders to Foreign Office.—(Received April 18.)

Sir, 17, *Moorgate Street, London, April 17, 1913.*

THE Council of Foreign Bondholders learns that a conference will shortly take place in Paris to settle the amount to be paid by the Balkan States to the holders of Turkish bonds in compensation for the loss of revenue in the conquered territories. The Council considers it of great importance that the bondholders should have their own representatives present at the conference, and begs that His Majesty's Government will take steps to ensure that an official invitation shall be sent to the Council of Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt to nominate and send delegates to the meeting.

I have, &c.
JAMES P. COOPER, *Secretary.*

[17850] No. 419.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 18.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, April 18, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs copy of telegrams dated the 17th instant, relative to Montengrin affairs.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 419.

Admiralty to Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII."

(Telegraphic.) *Admiralty, April 17, 1913.*

PROVIDED your colleagues have received similar instructions, Greek transports *en route* for Durazzo and San Giovanni di Medua should be allowed to pass blockade and embark Servian troops. The embarkation and departure of Servian troops from this port should not be interfered with.

Servian Government made request to this effect in London. Greek Government has been informed.

Enclosure 2 in No. 419.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April 17, 1913.*

AUSTRIAN Admiral has just stated to me that he has proposed to his Government that certain towns should be occupied, &c.

I have withheld my consent to these proposals in which I do not concur.

Enclosure 3 in No. 419.

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April 17, 1913.*

TELEGRAM received from Vice-Admiral, H.M.S. "King Edward VII," as follows:—

"This morning the British military attaché came on board H.M.S 'King Edward VII' with Servian general's orderly officer, who came to see me. Servian troops to the number of 13,000 are at Barluce, 9 miles from Scutari. This includes the whole of the army which was recently investing Scutari. A rear-guard is protecting the army in case of a sortie from Scutari.

"The Servian general expects transports to arrive at San Giovanni in three days and is awaiting their arrival.

"He has requested that the Turkish Government should give an assurance that they will not attack the transports between San Giovanni di Medua and Salonica. Failing that he asks that a convoy shall be provided. He has also requested that help may be given him in embarking his troops, and if their departure will thereby be hastened I propose to afford him such assistance as may seem desirable. Permission given for hospital ship for reception of sick and wounded to anchor off San Giovanni di Medua."

[17783] No. 420.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 18.)

(No. 61.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, April 17, 1913.*

ALTHOUGH usual language is still being held here that there will be no surrender to the Powers and no acceptance of anything in the form of a pecuniary indemnity, I think there are signs that the King sees that the time is coming when he must modify his attitude. He knows that alone he has no reasonable chance of taking or of keeping Scutari and is not ill-pleased at departure of Servians, which he will exploit to the utmost with a view to damaging them.

Generals have been summoned to Cettinjé to-night. Perhaps for a little longer there may be usual declarations of defiance; otherwise next step will be proposals for impossible modifications of the frontier as established. The longer the King can prolong present situation the better pleased he will be.

[17768] No. 421.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 18.)

(No. 98.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, April 18, 1913.*

ALBANIAN frontier.

A communication was made yesterday to the Servian Government by my colleagues and myself in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 80 of 14th April.

[17883] No. 422.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 18.)

(No. 99.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, April 18, 1913.*

SERVIA and Bulgaria.

My telegram No. 97 of 17th April.

In a recent speech in the Skupshtina, the Minister of Finance, in applying for a credit of 60,000,000 fr., stated that 30,000,000 fr. would be required for the upkeep of the army until its demobilisation, that is to say, until the delimitation of the new territories had been finally settled.

I hear that the Bulgarian Government have asked for an explanation.

[17881] No. 423.

Sir H. Baz-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 18.)

(No. 145.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, April 18, 1913.*

ALBANIA.

In concert with my colleagues, I have to-day carried out instructions contained in your telegram No. 96 of 14th April.

[17865] No. 424.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 18.)

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Canea, Crete, April 18, 1913.*

IN yesterday's "Official Gazette" was published a circular of the Governor-General to the Customs authorities, stating that, by order of the Greek Minister of Finance, all products of Greece and of the countries occupied by Greek troops are to be henceforward admitted in Crete free of customs duties.

As the Governor-General is acting under direct instructions from the Greek Government, any protest which it may be desirable to make against this premature preferential treatment of Greek goods should be made at Athens.

(Sent to Athens.)

[17446] No. 425.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.**

(No. 61.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 18, 1913.*

MONTENEGRIN blockade.

Empty transports proceeding to San Giovanni di Medua will be allowed to pass blockade.

You should inform Government to which you are accredited.

[17865] No. 426.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 66.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, April 18, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day: Preferential treatment of Greek goods in Crete.

You may act accordingly as soon as your colleagues receive similar instructions.

[17865] No. 427.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.†

(No. 176.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, April 18, 1913.*

MR. WRATISLAW'S telegram No. 9 of 18th April: Preferential treatment of Greek goods in Crete.

Inform Government to which you are accredited, and ask them to instruct their representative at Athens to join His Majesty's Government in protesting against measure reported, which infringes rights of foreign Powers.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 65.)

[17882] No. 428.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 47. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 18, 1913.*

AMBASSADORS here have recommended to their respective Governments that the Powers should guarantee the raising of a loan to the Montenegrin Government of about 1,200,000*l.* in order to regularise the financial situation of the latter, and to meet the losses consequent on the war.

* Also to Sir R. Paget (No. 84).

† Also to Sir E. Goschen (No. 173), Sir F. Cartwright (No. 146), Sir G. Buchanan (No. 343), and Sir R. Rodd (No. 147).

You should, when all your colleagues are similarly instructed, make a communication in the above sense to the Montenegrin Government in the form and manner which you and your colleagues consider to be the most suitable.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 171; Paris, No. 174; Constantinople, No. 187; Rome, No. 145; St. Petersburgh, No. 338; and Vienna, No. 144, for information only.)

[17605] No. 429.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 109.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 18, 1913.*

THE Italian Ambassador read to Sir A. Nicolson on the 10th April a long telegram from Marquis di San Giuliano. The following was the gist of it:—

The Austrian Ambassador at Rome spoke to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs in regard to the likelihood of the Montenegrin dynasty being upset and Montenegro uniting herself to Servia. The Austrian Minister at Cettinjé considered that there was a real danger that this would occur, and Count Berchtold shared these apprehensions. Austria was therefore ready to join in some financial (not territorial) compensations being offered to Montenegro to avert the above eventuality, and that some international subsidy should be accorded to Montenegro on the ground that she should receive some financial aid to re-establish her finances and assist her towards developing her resources. Count Berchtold thought that Italy might take the initiative in making this proposal to the Powers, who should all participate in the subsidy.

Marquis di San Giuliano observed that for a long time past he had been urging on Vienna the necessity of a money compensation, and that he was ready to join with some other Power in making the proposal, but he did not wish to do so alone. He thought that the financial assistance might take the form of a loan guaranteed by all the Powers, or any other form which might be considered desirable. Marquis di San Giuliano was of opinion that no time should be lost in coming to a decision, as the danger to the dynasty is great.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[17988] No. 430.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 80.)
Sir, *Belgrade, April 12, 1913.*

AS reported in my telegram No. 88 of the 10th instant, a sudden and complete change has taken place in the attitude of the Servian Government with regard to Scutari, and orders have been sent to the commander of the Servian forces to withdraw his troops from all further operations in that neighbourhood.

In informing me of this fact M. Pasitch offered no real explanation; he merely muttered a few words about the futility of defying the Powers, strong representations from Russia, and that this would make an end of the treaty with Montenegro. I thought it would be more tactful not to press for any more definite statement.

Various theories are current here to account for this *volte-face*, but I am personally inclined to believe that M. Pasitch has all along been very lukewarm about supporting Montenegro, and has been anxious to find a loophole to escape from an embarrassing position and to conform to the wishes of the Powers so long as means could be found to save his face. The protestations concerning the impossibility of abandoning an ally and that it would be incompatible with Servian honour to desert Montenegro thus appear to have been mere fireworks for the benefit of public opinion here and at Cettinjé. The Secretary-General, M. Stefanovitch, evidently knew what he was saying when he made the statements both to my colleagues and myself that as soon as the Powers specified the frontiers of Albania the Servian troops would be withdrawn. M. Pasitch, in fact, acknowledged to me that he had some time ago declared to the Montenegrin Government that he could not support them against any

decision of the Powers, but he had thought it inexpedient to make the declaration public.

The means adopted by M. Pasitch to exonerate himself *vis-à-vis* of public opinion for his present action is peculiar, and is illustrative of Servian mentality and methods.

Three days ago a certain M. Taburno, a close friend of M. Pasitch, on entering the most frequented café in Belgrade proclaimed the news—of course, at M. Pasitch's instigation—that the Austro-Hungarian Government had intimated at St. Petersburgh that unless the Servian troops were withdrawn from Scutari an Austrian force would enter the sankjak of Novibazar. The following morning this news was published in the "Politica," which, if not a semi-official paper, is at least known to be closely connected with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It was stated, in addition, that the news had been communicated by the Russian Minister, who had called at the Ministry late at night and had urgently counselled the withdrawal of the Servian forces.

It is true that the report—which was, of course, false from beginning to end—was later denied, but the denial will probably carry little weight, and M. Pasitch has meanwhile secured two objects, namely, that of preparing the public mind for retirement from Scutari, and throwing the odium for the Servian Government being compelled to this step upon Austria-Hungary.

It is unlikely that M. Pasitch allows himself to be troubled by any considerations regarding the effect which the withdrawal of the Servian forces may have upon the future relations of the Servian and Montenegrin Governments. His aim has throughout merely been to impress upon the Serb world that Servia was prepared to stand by Montenegro and fight for the cause of the Serbs until the overwhelming weight of circumstances made this no longer possible. In this aim he has probably succeeded. He is by no means concerned for the safety of the present Montenegrin dynasty; on the contrary, if the truth were known, he is probably working to bring about its fall with a view to the ultimate fusion of Montenegro with Servia, a policy in which he will receive every support from M. de Hartwig, who sees in it both a check to Austria and a consolidation of Russian influence in the Balkans.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[17989] No. 431.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 81.)

Sir, *Belgrade, April 12, 1913.*

I MENTIONED in my despatch No. 78 of the 9th instant that my Bulgarian colleague had lately resumed his visits to me, which he had more or less interrupted since last autumn.

M. Toshef came to see me again yesterday.

After some general conversation he opened the subject of Serbo-Bulgarian relations, and said the Servians were revealing a capacity for falsehood which astounded even himself. The Minister for War had actually announced in the Skupshtina that Shukri Pasha had surrendered to the Servians, though he must have been well aware this was not a fact. Shukri Pasha had in fact made a declaration before the Russian Minister in Sophia stating that he had surrendered to a Bulgarian officer, and it would be interesting to see what would be the Servian explanation, though in reality it was altogether indifferent to whom Shukri Pasha had surrendered, as it was a matter of pure chance.

M. Toshef then asked me whether any representations had been made to the Servian Government concerning outrages committed during the war. I replied I had presented a memorandum and spoken unofficially on one or two occasions, but that the Servian Government stoutly denied any knowledge of the outrages, and it was difficult to get satisfactory evidence. M. Toshef sneered at the idea of the Servian denial. He said Servian troops, not komitajis, but regular troops, had made away with thousands of Albanians, and I gathered from various remarks he made that the Bulgarian Government were somewhat upset that under the circumstances they should have been the recipients of more frequent remonstrances concerning outrages than the Servian Government. M. Toshef said the Servians did not know what "conscience"

meant; they would not only murder Albanians, but they murdered Bulgarians, and they were endeavouring now wherever they found Bulgarian functionaries to replace them by their own. He had repeatedly spoken to M. Pashitch on the subject, but without effect, and now that a considerable number of Bulgarian troops had been set free by the fall of Adrianople his Government proposed to send a superior force of their troops into those districts of Macedonia which they claimed as their territory, and where Servian troops were now in occupation.

I observed that the alliance was not likely to last long at that rate.

M. Toshef replied that the alliance—to which he alluded with the greatest contempt—was quite ephemeral, and he never thought it would be anything else.

As I had a few days previously received Sir H. Bax-Ironside's despatch No. 32, Secret, of the 10th March in the Confidential Print [12216], Section 12, enclosing copy of M. Pashitch's letter to M. Spalaikovitch concerning the Servian demands on Bulgaria, I asked M. Toshef whether the Servian Government had yet definitely approached the Bulgarian Government regarding a new delimitation in Macedonia.

M. Toshef replied in the affirmative, and he gave me the following version of what had taken place:—

Some time ago the Bulgarian Government made a request to the Servian Government for troops and artillery for the siege of Adrianople. The troops, according to the military convention, the Servians were obliged to furnish, if possible to do so, but the artillery, being new guns just received, the Bulgarian Government offered to pay for. An offer to the latter effect was twice made by M. Toshef to M. Pashitch, who, however, stated that the Servian Government could not accept payment. On M. Gueshof insisting upon a pecuniary settlement, a letter (Enclosure in Sir H. Bax-Ironside's despatch above referred to) was addressed by M. Pashitch to the Servian Minister in Sophia setting forth the Servian claims to a revision of the delimitation in Macedonia, and instructing him to read the same to M. Gueshof and to leave a copy with him. This letter was at once communicated by his Government to M. Toshef, who was ordered to proceed to Sophia. Before doing so, M. Toshef called upon M. de Hartwig, showed him M. Pashitch's letter, and enquired of him how, in view of the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement, the Prime Minister now came to make further demands upon Bulgaria. M. de Hartwig professed complete ignorance of the letter, but, on reading it, appeared to favour the Servian view.

On his arrival in Sophia, M. Toshef, in consultation with M. Gueshof, drew up the Bulgarian reply, which relied entirely upon the terms of the agreement concluded before the war, and, I gather, constituted a categorical and somewhat abrupt rejection of the Servian case. When he returned again to Belgrade, before delivering this document to M. Pashitch, he showed it to M. de Hartwig. The latter appeared somewhat upset, and asked whether it was necessary to deliver it at all, suggested the whole subject had best be allowed to drop for the present, and that in any case the form of the reply should be toned down. M. Toshef said he would be willing to let the subject drop if the Servian Government would withdraw their letter. This M. de Hartwig did not think would be possible, and M. Toshef therefore presented the reply (which was in the form of a letter from M. Gueshof to M. Toshef) to M. Pashitch.

The Prime Minister did not appear to relish its contents any more than M. de Hartwig had done, but as he likewise stated that it would be impossible to withdraw the original letter to M. Spalaikovitch, the controversy could not be suppressed.

A telegram from Sophia, dated the 11th instant, reports a declaration made by M. Danef before the deputies of the Progressist party to the effect that the Bulgarian Government, in their differences with their Greek and Servian allies, will not be satisfied with less than that to which they are entitled, and that they will insist on a strict interpretation of their treaty with Servia.

M. Toshef called my attention to the fact that M. Spalaikovitch had again visited Belgrade, and that probably, therefore, something further was brewing.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[17942] No. 432.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 94.)
Sir, *Rome, April 15, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that it is growing evident that there will be strong opposition on the part of Italy to the ambitions of Greece in Epirus, not less than to her acquisition of the Ægean islands. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has endeavoured to impress upon me that so far as Epirus is concerned it is a mistake to suppose that the opposition comes only from Italy. The Austrian General Staff is as strongly convinced as the Italian that the Otranto channel into the Adriatic could be menaced by a Greek naval concentration in the Corfu channel if Greece were enabled to establish herself on the whole of the Epirote coast running parallel to the island, while on the mainland Austria went even farther than Italy might be disposed to go in insisting that Coritza and other places must be included in Albania with a frontier which would entail the withdrawal of the Greeks from a considerable territory which they have actually occupied. The public opinion of the country is being educated to a spirit of opposition to the claims of Greece by quotations from the German and Austrian press, representing the danger to the free navigation of the Ægean which the possession of the Sporades, as well as the Cyclades, by the Hellenic Kingdom would entail, and the presumed French support of Greece is also turned to account at a moment when France is far from popular in this country. Hitherto between Greek and Albanian there has been little indication of the antagonism which exists between Albanian and Slav, and it would not only be regrettable that it should be artificially fostered, but to do so would seem to indicate a lack of foresight on the part of Italy. Her present cordiality of co-operation with Austria-Hungary is not likely to endure, and it would rather seem to be the interest of Italy to encourage the reinforcement of Greece as a counterpoise to the growing ascendancy of the Slav on the opposite shore of the Adriatic.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[17985] No. 433.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 197.)
Sir, *Paris, April 18, 1913.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 253 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the British delegates to the forthcoming International Commission to deal with financial questions arising out of the Balkan War, respecting the postponement of the first meeting of the Commission.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 433.

Delegates to International Financial Commission to Sir Edward Grey.

Sir, *Paris, April 17, 1913.*

WE have the honour to report that M. Gout, one of the French delegates to the forthcoming International Commission to deal with financial questions in the Balkans, informed us this afternoon that the first meeting of the Commission, originally fixed for the 19th instant, has been indefinitely postponed. M. Gout stated that the reasons for this postponement, which he hoped would not be of long duration, were that the Italian Government had not yet appointed their delegates, and that the French Government wished to have further information in regard to the views of the Powers respecting the payment by Turkey of an indemnity to the Balkan States before the question was examined by the International Commission.

In the meantime we have arranged to have some preliminary informal discussions with the French delegates, whom we shall meet for the first time next Monday.

We have, &c.
LANCELOT D. CARNEGIE.
H. P. HARVEY.

[17890] No. 434.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 19.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, April 18, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams dated the 18th instant, relative to Montenegrin affairs.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 434.

Admiralty to Vice-Admiral commanding 3rd Squadron.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Admiralty, April 18, 1913.*

YOU may agree to extension of blockade referred to in your telegram No. 43, provided instructions have been given to your colleagues to extend it. His Majesty's Government, however, considers extension now unnecessary.

Enclosure 2 in No. 434.

Vice-Admiral commanding 3rd Squadron to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April 18, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 37 and 38, request reply may be given whether blockade is to be extended to Durazzo Bay or not.

[18176] No. 435.

Telegrams communicated by Admiralty, April 19, 1913.

(1.)

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April 19, 1913.*

FOLLOWING telegram received from Vice-Admiral, 3rd Squadron :—

"Five batteries of artillery have reached San Giovanni di Medua, and infantry to number of 5,000 close to town; 8,000 infantry and some batteries have been left about 9 miles from Scutari as rearguard. Transports left the Piræus to-day, and are expected here on the 22nd instant.

"The Servian general arrived to-day, and I saw him this afternoon, at his request. I agreed to lend the steamboats of the ships which are here to aid in work of embarking troops.

"He is anxious to receive a reply regarding the safe conduct of the transports on their way to Salonica mentioned in my telegram No. 41."

(2.)

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April* 17, 1913.

PARAPHRASE already sent, as No. 313 from Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, of 17th April.

[18117] No. 436.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 100.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, April* 19, 1913.

I HEAR that there is considerable military activity between Uskub and Ghevgheli, and that Servian forces appear to be concentrating along Vardar. Sixth regiment is at Ghevgheli and one at Kumanovo.

Following from vice-consul at Monastir to-day, No. 10 :— (End of R.)

"Commandant and staff of the 1st Morava Division and fourteenth regiment, and a battery of field guns, have arrived here from Central Albania.

"Eighteenth regiment left Monastir for Kudistrivo to-day, and the seventh regiment and the commandant of the 1st Danubian Division are about to leave for the same destination [group undecypherable]."

(R.) Bulgarian Government are protesting energetically to Servian Government concerning ill-treatment of the Bulgar population at various places, especially Egri-Palanka.

[18110] No. 437.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 101.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, April* 19, 1913.

SERVIA and Bulgaria.

My telegram No. 99 of 18th April.

The Prime Minister explained to Bulgarian Minister that the statement of the Minister of Finance had been made without his previous knowledge. He had spoken to him about it, saying that it was regrettable that he should allude to anything connected with foreign politics.

[18120] No. 438.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 62.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, April* 19, 1913.

OWING to declaration recently made by Servian Prime Minister that it was not expedient to publish the Bulgaro-Servian Treaty for the moment, I understand that Bulgarian representative here has applied to his Government for permission to publish the full text in Vienna so as to put an end to misrepresentations circulated by Servian agencies in regard to this treaty.

[18118] No. 439.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 146.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, April* 19, 1913.

MEDIATION proposals.

My telegram No. 135 of 13th April.

Answer of allies may be expected very shortly.

I gather that Greek Government make reservations respecting the southern frontier of Albania and the islands, as also do the Bulgarian Government respecting details of frontier.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[18113] No. 440.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 155.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, April* 19, 1913.

YOUR circular telegram of 18th April : Greek goods in Crete.

Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he had no objection to course suggested, and would instruct Russian Minister at Athens accordingly, provided that the other Powers sent similar instructions to their representatives.

[14817] No. 441.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.**

(No. 161.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 19, 1913.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copy of a memorandum communicated to this Office by the Councillor of the German Embassy,† relative to the protection of the commercial interests of foreign Powers in the territory to be annexed by the allied Balkan States as the result of the present war.

Your Excellency should enquire of the Government to which you are accredited whether they have received a similar communication from the German Government, and if so, what reply they propose to return to it.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[18119] No. 442.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 147. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, April* 20, 1913.

MEDIATION proposals.

My immediately preceding telegram of 19th April.

Prime Minister has called and read to me reply which allies last night agreed to. This morning, however, both Greek and Servian Governments have made further reservations respecting north and south frontiers of Albania. Servia eventually accepted Greek reservations, while Greece refuses to accept Servian reservations. Bulgaria is now merely acting as an intermediary.

Reply is, however, quite favourable as far as Bulgaria and Turkey are concerned.

A Reuter telegram dated 19th April is to the effect that it is believed that the Powers themselves will eventually draw up conditions of peace in conformity with lines already indicated. They will then in their capacity as mediators present them to belligerents. Prime Minister thinks that this would be now the best course. He is anxious to be helped out of the present situation.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

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* Also to Paris, No. 262.

† Part V. No. 353.

[18176] No. 443.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 190.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 20, 1913.*

THE Servian troops before Scutari are being withdrawn to Salonica by sea, and Servian general has asked for an assurance from the Turkish Government that the transports will not be attacked by Turkish vessels on their way from San Giovanni di Medua to Salonica. The transports arrive at the former place to-morrow. Please ascertain at once from the Turkish Government if they will give such an assurance, and in order to save time telegraph their reply direct to the Commander-in-chief, Malta, for the information of the Vice-Admiral, 3rd Squadron.

[18253] No. 444.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 17.)
Sir, *Cettinjé, April 11, 1913.*

IN my telegram No. 29 of the 24th March last I reported to you that, according to information received by the Austrian authorities, a Franciscan monk, Luigi Palic, had been arrested by the Montenegrin authorities at Ipek and taken to Djakova, where he was murdered. In bringing these circumstances to the notice of the Montenegrin Government the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires was instructed to state that, in view of the information received respecting the proceedings of the troops in the districts in question, his Government had decided on the journey to Djakova of the Archbishop of Prisrend, accompanied by the vice-consul at Prisrend as representative of the Monarchy.

The Montenegrin Government replied at length that Father Palic had been arrested with some fifty-five others on an accusation of rebellion against the Montenegrin authorities, and was shot down, in accordance with the Montenegrin military code, for attempting to escape from the soldiers who were escorting him to Ipek. They refused to accept the Austrian proposal for an enquiry, on the ground that the territory in question was in the occupation of their armies, and that, in the exercise of the full civil and military power to which they were consequently entitled, they had put into force there all the laws of the Montenegrin State. Moreover, it was by application of its legislation that a State affirmed its sovereignty, whether the latter were based on the right of occupation or derived from a treaty or some other legal source.

As regards the question of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, they considered that the Archbishop of Antivari, as the chief Catholic authority in Montenegro, was entitled to deal with the matter, though for certain reasons they had admitted an enquiry on the part of the Archbishop of Prisrend. They could not, however, allow the Austrian consul to accompany him.

The claims put forward by the Montenegrin Government with regard to the exercise of sovereignty without reference to existing rights would appear to be wider than those maintained by European Powers, such as the United Kingdom and France, which have occupied portions of the Ottoman Empire. Nor would it, presumably, be easy to find the support of precedent for the contention that, by the fact of mere military occupation by the Montenegrin troops, the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Prisrend had been *ipso facto* transferred to the Archbishop of Antivari. The Austrian Government must have felt that their position was sufficiently strong to allow them to dispense with a discussion in detail on the subject. The Montenegrin note was returned with an intimation that the explanations respecting the murder were insufficient; with a protest that the Austrian right of protection over the Albanian Catholics had been violated. At the same time the Montenegrin Government were informed that the Archbishop of Prisrend, accompanied by the consul, would enquire into the circumstances in which a number of Catholics had been taken on the 15th March by a Montenegrin military escort to the Orthodox church at Djakova, as well as into other forced conversions for which the Montenegrin Government would be held responsible.

It was ultimately arranged that a mixed enquiry should take place into all the questions at issue, the Austrian Government refusing to accept the proposal that a

representative of some other Power should also take part in it, but offering to agree to the presence at it of any properly authorised person.

I enclose herewith copies of the correspondence referred to in this despatch.*

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

[18161] No. 445.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 121. Confidential.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, April 14, 1913.*

I HAD the honour of being received this morning by the Emperor in an audience which lasted an hour.

After expressing the great pleasure with which he looked forward to meeting the King, whom he had not seen since His Majesty's accession, at the royal wedding at Berlin, His Majesty proceeded to speak of the international situation. Many things, His Majesty said, had happened since the audience which he had given me in February of last year, when he had spoken of possible complications in the Balkans, and of the danger of Russian sympathy for the Balkan Slavs forcing his hand should Servia or Bulgaria become engaged in war with Turkey. Fortunately for the peace of Europe the Balkan States had been victorious, as had it been otherwise, and had they met with serious reverses, he would have been obliged to intervene, even at the risk of provoking an European war. As things had turned out, it had not been so difficult to control Russian public opinion. The recent demonstrations and the Pan-Slavist agitation did not represent the real views of the Russian people, and were rather of a fictitious growth. They were, indeed, being engineered for the purpose of embarrassing the Government and encompassing its fall. The majority of Russians did not want war so long as their own interests were not attacked. They had rejoiced over the victories of the Balkan allies; but the magnitude of those victories proved that the latter stood in no need of Russia's protection or intervention. There had no doubt been moments when the international horizon had looked very black, and the discussions which had taken place with regard to Djakova and Scutari had caused him great anxiety. Austria had, after much haggling, been obliged to yield about the former place, and Russia intended to abide by the arrangement which had been come to with regard to the latter. Unlike some of his subjects, who imagined that Russia had only Austria to deal with, he was from the first fully aware that Germany would make common cause with Austria, and he had no intention of embarking on a war with those two Empires about a wretched Albanian town like Scutari. Russia had naturally had to support the claims and the interests of the Balkan Slavs, and he feared that her insistence must sometimes have caused you considerable embarrassment.

I replied that His Majesty's Government had never wished to see the Balkan States deprived of the fruits of their victories, and had consequently given their support to the Russian Government, who were so much more directly interested than themselves. While doing so, you had at the same time laboured incessantly to preserve European peace, and as His Majesty had also on more than one occasion subordinated the claims of Servia and Montenegro to the attainment of that end, the two Governments had been able to work loyally together throughout the crisis. You had, I added, charged me to say that the communiqué recently published by the Russian Government had been received with the greatest satisfaction in England, and had done more than anything else to secure peace between the great Powers. It had, moreover, convinced His Majesty's Government that the part which England and Russia have taken in the difficult negotiations which have been proceeding for months past, must confirm and strengthen the friendly feelings existing between the two countries.

The Emperor said that he entirely shared this view, and that he was happy to think that the crisis should have served to bring the two Governments into closer contact. He greatly appreciated the loyal support which you had given to him, as well as your untiring efforts in the cause of peace.

I then repeated to the Emperor what you had instructed me to say with regard to the immense gains which were about to accrue to the Balkan Slavs, whose aspirations could not be prejudiced by the frontiers now assigned to Albania. Had such a

* Not printed.

settlement, I added, been suggested to Russia a year ago, it would have been accepted with enthusiasm. The creation of an autonomous Albania, on which Austria had insisted, was but a poor set-off against the vast political advantages which Russia would derive from the new order of things in the Balkans. To this His Majesty cordially assented.

The Emperor next spoke of the proposed despatch of an international fleet to Constantinople, and enquired what I thought of the situation there. I replied that I had not received any very recent information myself, but that the Italian Ambassador had told me yesterday that his news was very bad. I did not, however, know whether the Marquis Carlotti was referring to the internal situation or to the danger of a Bulgarian occupation of Constantinople. I was personally afraid that such an occupation was imminent, and I ventured to ask whether His Majesty could not do anything to prevent it. The Emperor replied that in his opinion the only thing for the Powers to do was to admit the principle of a war indemnity. Such a course would not commit them seriously, and they might eventually fix the indemnity at a merely nominal amount. It would, however, satisfy the Bulgarians, and greatly facilitate the conclusion of peace. I explained the difficulty of getting all the Powers to consent to this, and His Majesty said that he feared that in any case it was now too late. While apparently looking on it as almost inevitable, the Emperor seemed fully to realise the serious consequences that might result from a Bulgarian occupation of the capital, more especially as regarded its effect on the Sultan's subjects in Asiatic Turkey. He had, he said, heard from the Russian Minister at Sophia that an attack would probably be made on the Chatalja lines in the course of the present week, and he did not believe that the Turkish army was capable of offering any serious resistance. In reply to a question which I had addressed to him, the Emperor said that the original idea of the Bulgarians had been to offer Constantinople to Russia as a token of their gratitude for their liberation from the Turkish yoke. They had been told that she would not accept it, and had been strongly urged to refrain from occupying it. What conditions they would attach to their eventual withdrawal he did not know, but if, as I had suggested, they were to insist on receiving Salonica in exchange, it would be very unfair on the Greeks, who had a better and prior claim to the latter town. The Austrian Ambassador, he had heard, had proposed that Salonica should be given to Bulgaria to compensate her for the loss of Silistria; but this proposal had no doubt been prompted by the desire of sowing the seeds of discord between Greece and Bulgaria, as well as by the hope of proving to the latter that Austria and not Russia was her friend. He had tried to impress on Dr. Danef, in a conversation which he had recently had with him, that a real friend is one who tells the truth even though the truth be not palatable, and that if Bulgaria quarrelled with her allies over the spoils she would revert to the position of a small and unimportant State, whereas in union with them she would be a factor with which even the great Powers would have to reckon. He trusted that the Balkan States would not be so mad as to fight among themselves; but if they did, the only course for the Powers to pursue would be to keep the ring and let them fight it out.

As the conversation then turned on the German Army Bill and the counter measures being taken by France to meet the new military situation, I asked the Emperor whether he thought that the financial strain thus imposed on the two countries would be so severe that one or the other of them might lose patience and precipitate a war, and whether, if this danger really existed, it would be possible for the Powers to do anything to avert it. The Emperor replied that in 1899 he had taken the initiative in convoking the Peace Conference at The Hague, but his action had been misrepresented as aiming at a general disarmament. He was not, therefore, tempted to repeat the experiment, and would abstain from putting forward any proposals on the present occasion. He quite understood the reasons which had prompted the proposed increase of the German army; but the German Government must be aware that they were but setting an example which other States would be bound to follow. They would probably have no difficulty in finding the men, but whether the country would for long be able to bear the increased taxation was another question. Russia, on the other hand, had unlimited resources to draw on, both as regards men and money; and just as His Majesty's Government had fixed the relative strength of the British and German fleets at sixteen to ten, so he was determined to maintain the same ratio between the Russian and German armies. It was impossible to foresee what would happen, but it was very necessary to prepare beforehand to meet the danger should it arise.

The Emperor spoke of Austria without any bitterness, but as a source of weakness to Germany and as a danger to peace, owing to the fact that Germany was bound to support her in her Balkan policy. His Majesty apparently believes that the disintegration of the Austrian Empire is merely a question of time. He spoke of the day when we should see a kingdom of Hungary and a kingdom of Bohemia, while the southern Slavs might be absorbed by Servia, the Roumanians of Transylvania by Roumania, and the German provinces incorporated in the German Empire. The fact that Germany would then have no Austria to entangle her in a war about the Balkans would, His Majesty said, make for peace. I confess that I was unable to follow the Emperor's train of thought, or to understand how he arrived at this conclusion. I therefore contented myself with remarking that such a change in the map of Europe was not likely to be effected without a general war.

As the Emperor in the course of our conversation referred to our relations with Germany, I remarked that while His Majesty's Government were determined to maintain their understanding with Russia intact, they were at the same time anxious to cultivate good and friendly relations with Germany. His Majesty replied that this was exactly Russia's position. If, as he hoped, he was able to attend the Royal wedding at Berlin, he would no doubt, as on former occasions, be plied with questions and proposals by the Emperor William. He would in such case listen patiently while the Emperor talked, and be careful not to commit himself, as he always found that this was the safest course to pursue.

Before taking leave of the Emperor I expressed the hope that the two Governments would co-operate together in Persia as cordially as they had in the Balkans, and would both give their support to the present Persian Government. His Majesty replied that he was sure they would do so, adding with a smile that he must confess that he had forgotten all about Persia of late.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[18237] No. 446.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 74.)

Sir, *Athens, April 14, 1913.*

IN company with my five colleagues, I called upon M. Coromilas to-day and read and handed to him the enclosed paper, containing the rejoinder of the Great Powers to the four points raised in the reply of the Balkan allies to the proposals of mediation. Three verbal alterations were made in the text transmitted to me in your telegram No. 55 of the 8th instant, in accordance with that received by the majority of my colleagues, the only important one being the insertion of the words "et du sud" after "celle du sud-est" in the reply on the third point.

The statement of the delimitation of the northern and north-eastern frontiers of Albania was reserved, not only on account of the instructions contained in your telegram No. 60 of yesterday, but because the Russian Minister had not yet received the statement. We told M. Coromilas that we would communicate it to him later.

His Excellency thanked us for the tone and substance of the communication, and said he hoped to reply to it shortly after consulting the other allies.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 446.

Note communicated to M. Coromilas.

LES Puissances, prenant acte avec satisfaction des dispositions des alliés pour la cessation des hostilités, répondent de la façon suivante sur les quatre points formulés dans la note des alliés:—

1. Le premier point ne soulève pas d'objection.

2. Sur le second point, les Puissances font observer que le sort des îles de la mer Egée ayant été réservé à l'appréciation des Puissances, ce point ne peut être admis que sous réserve des décisions à prendre au sujet de certaines de ces îles.

3. Sur le troisième point, les Puissances déclarent qu'elles sont prêtes à faire

connaître dès maintenant aux alliés la délimitation nord et nord-est de l'Albanie et que celle du sud-est et du sud leur sera communiqué aussitôt qu'elle aura été établie.

4. Sur le quatrième point, la solution de toutes les questions d'ordre financier ayant été réservée à la commission technique de Paris, à laquelle prendront part les délégués des belligérants, les Puissances estiment qu'il n'y a pas lieu de s'expliquer quant à présent sur le principe de l'indemnité.

[18238] No. 447.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 75.)
Sir, *Athens, April 14, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 25 of the 4th February, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the reply which I have this day received from the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs to the note which I addressed to him by your instructions on the subject of the interference complained of by the officials of the Ottoman Public Debt in the territories occupied by the Greek forces.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 447.

M. Coromilas to Sir F. Elliot.

M. le Ministre, *Athènes, le 28 mars (10 avril), 1913.*

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la note que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser le 22 janvier (4 février), année courante, au sujet du fonctionnement des services de l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane dans les provinces occupées par l'armée hellénique.

Le Ministère Royal des Finances, auquel je me suis empressé de communiquer les griefs formulés par ladite administration, fournit, à ce sujet, les explications qui suivent :

1. Les droits prélevés sur les alcools importés de l'étranger furent doublés durant la guerre italo-turque et le revenu de cette surélévation ne fut pas concédé à la Dette publique. Celle-ci n'a, en conséquence, droit qu'à la moitié de la taxe actuellement perçue. De même, le revenu de la surtaxe douanière de 3 pour cent est, d'après la convention y relative, réparti entre l'Administration de la Dette publique et le Gouvernement ottoman. La part revenant à ce dernier est de 75 pour cent sur les recettes nettes.

Étant donné que le Gouvernement hellénique a le droit de percevoir toutes sommes revenant au Gouvernement ottoman, auquel il se trouve être substitué, en vertu des lois de la guerre, il a été jugé rationnel que la perception des droits et de la surtaxe en question fût effectuée par les autorités compétentes helléniques, à la charge par elles de tenir un compte séparé des recettes et d'en verser ultérieurement aux caisses de l'Administration de la Dette publique la part qui reviendrait à cette dernière, d'après les proportions ci-dessus. L'agence de l'administration à Salonique en fut, d'ailleurs, avertie à temps par l'autorité civile hellénique.

2. L'impôt de guerre frappant la consommation du sel est également perçu par l'Administration de la Dette publique pour le compte du Trésor ottoman ; aussi est-ce avec raison que l'Administration hellénique a demandé que le produit lui en fût remis par les agences de la Dette publique dans les provinces ottomanes occupées par l'armée hellénique.

3. La loi ottomane sur le timbre est généralement appliquée dans les provinces occupées. Il n'est fait usage de timbres du royaume que pour remplacer les timbres ottomans autres que ceux dont le revenu est concédé à la Dette publique.

4. Les employés de l'agence de la Dette publique ottomane à Chio, qui ont été constitués prisonniers de guerre, avaient pris les armes contre l'armée hellénique. Leur arrestation fut opérée sur le champ ennemi.

Le Ministère des Finances fait observer à cette occasion que, dès les premiers jours de l'occupation des provinces ottomanes par l'armée Royale, l'Administration hellénique a accordé l'assistance nécessaire aux employés de la Dette publique, en vue

d'assurer le fonctionnement régulier de ses services, et qu'elle a eu recours à toutes les mesures possibles pour parer aux difficultés inhérentes aux circonstances.

Je dois ajouter que les deux ponts à bascule destinés aux salines de Valona et débarqués à Corfou sont à la disposition de l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane.

Veuillez, &c.
L. S. COROMILAS.

[18162] No. 448.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 122.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, April 16, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 117 of the 10th instant, I have the honour to enclose the protocol of a fourth meeting of the Ambassadors on the Bulgaro-Roumanian frontier dispute.

The two chief points discussed were the questions as to whether Bulgaria was to be called on to cede a few kilometres of coast to the south of Mangalia, and as to whether it was possible to find some compensation elsewhere to reconcile Bulgaria to the sacrifices which she would have to make.

The German Ambassador had at the previous sitting suggested that Bulgaria might cede a few kilometres of coast in return for an undertaking on Roumania's part to construct a bridge over the Danube at Sistovo. This would, he declared, be a most advantageous arrangement for Bulgaria. When, therefore, Count Pourtalès once more insisted at the fourth sitting on the cession of a small portion of the coast, I said that I must decline to be a party to any arrangement that would impose any fresh sacrifice on Bulgaria. I would not, however, raise the slightest objection were M. Sazonof, in communicating to the Bulgarian Government our decision respecting the cession of Silistria, to inform them that the Roumanian Government were prepared to construct a bridge at Sistovo in exchange for a few kilometres of the coast. If such an arrangement offered all the advantages which Count Pourtalès ascribed to it, the Bulgarian Government would no doubt gladly accept it ; but I could not consent to its forming part of our decision, as otherwise it would look as if we were imposing it on Bulgaria. M. Sazonof at once said that he would be quite ready to act as I had suggested, but, as Count Pourtalès did not press him to do so, the matter was allowed to drop.

The Austrian Ambassador, who has throughout insisted on our compensating Bulgaria for whatever cession of territory she may be called on to make, suggested that Thasos and Samothrace might be eventually assigned to her. The Minister for Foreign Affairs reminded him that Bulgaria was already assured of the eventual possession of Thasos, while the French Ambassador pointed out that we had no mandate to dispose of Samothrace any more than of Salonica.

I might mention here that in consequence of articles which have recently appeared in the press giving alleged accounts of the negotiations which have been taking place at the Ambassadors' Conference here on this question, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has published a communiqué in the "Official Messenger" of to-day's date to the effect that, as all the participants in the Conference unanimously undertook to communicate nothing to the press except by general understanding, all the reports on the proceedings which have appeared have no foundation on facts, and can only be ascribed to an attempt to place the negotiations in a tendencious light. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs declares that in the above question Russia has from the beginning considered it primarily her duty not to support the aims of one or other of the disputing parties, but to attempt their reconciliation. Thanks to this principle, the Russian Government has succeeded in averting the danger of a crisis in the relations between these two neighbouring countries of kindred faith. The recognition of this conciliatory and unprejudiced attitude on the part of Russia induced both parties to choose St. Petersburgh as the seat of the conference. Without anticipating the decision of the Conference, the Ministry, which is in constant receipt of the views of both parties, can announce in advance that Russia will only consent to sign a decision which is known to be acceptable to both parties.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 448.

Protocol of Fourth Meeting of Conference, held in St. Petersburgh April 11, 1913.

L'AMBASSADEUR d'Allemagne exprime le regret que la conférence n'ait pas jugé possible d'accorder à la Roumanie une nouvelle rectification de frontière. Aussi ne peut-il encore donner son assentiment à la proposition faite le 4 avril. Il insiste pour que la conférence examine de nouveau la question. La seule possession de Silistrie n'apporte pas à la Roumanie tous les apaisements stratégiques qu'elle réclame. Mangalia ne peut être sérieusement fortifié que si l'on recule de quelques kilomètres la frontière vers le sud. Il ne s'agit en somme pour la Bulgarie que d'un sacrifice minime.

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre dit :—

"C'est à contre-cœur, pour faciliter l'accord et permettre à la conférence d'aboutir, que j'ai cédé sur Silistrie. Mais je ne puis absolument pas consentir à ce que l'on impose un nouveau sacrifice à la Bulgarie. Ce ne serait pas servir la cause de la paix—bien au contraire. Quant au pont à établir à Sistovo, que la Bulgarie, si elle y trouve un avantage, entre en négociation avec la Roumanie. Mais laissons cette question en dehors de la discussion actuelle."

M. Sazonof déclare impossible de modifier la proposition du 4 avril, surtout après l'émotion profonde qu'a produit à Sophia la nouvelle que Silistrie serait attribuée à la Roumanie. Le sort des bonnes relations entre Roumains et Bulgares dans l'avenir, veut que nous n'allions pas plus loin.

L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche dit que, pas plus que l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, il ne peut encore aujourd'hui donner son assentiment à la proposition du 4 avril. Il juge nécessaire, pour contenter la Roumanie, d'obtenir un petit bout de côte sur la mer Noire. A cause de la pauvreté du terrain, cela ne coûterait rien à la Bulgarie ; mais la Roumanie trouverait l'avantage d'assurer sérieusement la défense de Mangalia.

Le Comte Thurn reconnaît que la Bulgarie a droit à une compensation territoriale. Pour empêcher qu'on ne la prenne à l'ouest, on a dit : c'est le terrain des alliés ; pour empêcher qu'on la cherche à l'est, on a dit : c'est trop près de Constantinople. Le Comte Thurn la trouve ailleurs, et il propose Samothrace. Cette île est en face de la côte qui va devenir bulgare, et M. Daneff l'a demandée.

L'Ambassadeur d'Italie pense aussi qu'il convient de satisfaire la Roumanie en étendant quelque peu, au delà de Mangalia, sa frontière sur la mer Noire. Ce point de la côte n'a pas de valeur pour la Bulgarie, à qui on peut offrir Samothrace en dédommagement.

L'Ambassadeur de France estime que, pas plus que de Salonique, la conférence ne peut disposer de Samothrace. Elle ne saurait davantage oublier que Samothrace est occupée par la Grèce. Quel est l'objet de sa mission ? La Roumanie trouvant que sa frontière méridionale n'est pas sûre, a demandé à la Bulgarie de consentir à une rectification. Et elle lui a fait connaître ses désirs. Sans admettre que la Roumanie ait aucun droit à rien revendiquer, la Bulgarie, pour maintenir et resserrer ses bons rapports avec ses voisins, a proposé successivement une série de concessions. L'accord direct n'a pu se faire ; la conférence est chargée de se prononcer. Notre rôle est donc d'examiner les demandes des Roumains, les offres des Bulgares, et de rendre une décision inspirée à la fois par l'équité et, comme l'a dit M. Sazonof, par le souci de ne pas compromettre, dans l'avenir, les relations amicales entre les deux pays. En attribuant à la Roumanie Silistrie, sur quoi dès la première heure elle a concentré, pour ainsi dire, tout son effort, nous avons atteint la limite extrême, au delà de laquelle le but que nous voulons atteindre serait certainement manqué. Je ne saurais franchir cette limite.

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères est d'avis que l'Ambassadeur de France a judicieusement circonscrit le champ de l'examen auquel doit se livrer la conférence. Le sort de Samothrace, pas plus que celui de Salonique, ne peut se régler ici. Et nous ne pouvons discuter à Saint-Pétersbourg ce qui a été fait ou ce qui peut se faire à Londres.

L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche dit qu'il se croit obligé de référer une dernière fois à son Gouvernement.

Sur une question du Comte Pourtalès, il est entendu que, dans la décision à rendre, on tiendra compte de l'engagement du Gouvernement bulgare d'accorder l'autonomie scolaire et l'autonomie ecclésiastique aux Koutzo-Valaques.

Sur le désir de l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche, il est également entendu que la conférence exprimerait sa satisfaction de ce que les représentants des Puissances à Londres aient admis, conformément à la demande des alliés, que la ligne Enos-Midia sera considérée simplement comme base de négociation.

La prochaine réunion aura lieu le mardi, 2 (15) avril, à 11 heures.

[18166] No. 449.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 127.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, April 16, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 16th instant I have the honour to enclose copy of the protocol of the fifth meeting of the Conference of the Ambassadors that was held yesterday at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The German Ambassador commenced by saying that public opinion in Roumania would be by no means satisfied with the cession of Silistria alone, that the position of the Ministry would be shaken, and that, therefore, if we would not consent to a cession of any territory on the coast we must, at any rate, concede a rectification of frontier near the two triangles. Count Pourtalès was strongly supported by the Austrian and Italian Ambassadors who discussed the question at considerable length.

On M. Sazonof calling on me to express my views I said that I had no instructions to support either one or the other of the two litigants, but rather to arrive at a decision founded on the principles of equity and justice. No such principles had been advanced in justification of the cession of Silistria. The Austrian Ambassador had always supported Roumania's claims by arguments of what he called "opportunité," and we had been told that if we did not satisfy Roumania's claim King Charles's position would be compromised. I had the greatest respect and admiration for His Majesty and had no desire to add to his difficulties. It was, however, impossible to prop up His Majesty's throne with jewels taken from the Bulgarian crown, and I had already, by consenting to the cession of Silistria, gone as far as I could in this direction. A great deal had been said about finding compensation for Bulgaria elsewhere, and I fully admitted that it was hardly fair that Bulgaria alone of the Allies, who had all equally profited by Roumania's neutrality, should be called on to pay her "petite note." As, however, we had no mandate to dispose of any of the territory that belonged to Turkey before the war there was no material compensation that we could give Bulgaria, and unless the cession of Silistria was accepted in full settlement of all Roumania's claims, it would be impossible to explain it satisfactorily to either Russian or Bulgarian public opinion. I could not, therefore, consent to any further rectification of frontier, and, were the conference to break down, the responsibility would not rest with those who had made, by far, the greater concession.

The French Ambassador and M. Sazonof also spoke strongly in the same sense, and, after some further discussion, the Austrian Ambassador said that he must refer the matter once more to his Government.

The rest of the sitting was occupied with a discussion of the text of a formula, drafted by the French Ambassador, embodying our decision.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 449.

Protocol of Fifth Meeting, held April 15, 1913.

L'AMBASSADEUR d'Allemagne ne saurait dissimuler qu'à son avis la seule cession de Silistrie ne sera pas bien accueillie en Roumanie. La déception qu'on y éprouverait peut rendre critique la situation d'un Gouvernement qui a donné des gages de son attachement à la paix. Et ce sur quoi aurait compté un esprit modéré !

C'est pourquoi l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne estime qu'un effort nouveau devrait être tenté pour accorder à la Roumanie les deux triangles, à défaut d'un point sur la mer Noire, qui serait préférable.

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre dit qu'à force de penser à la Roumanie on risque de perdre de vue la Bulgarie. Nous demandons aux Bulgares de céder Silistrie, qu'en

droit strict ils pourraient vouloir garder. N'oublions pas non plus que tous les États balkaniques ont profité également de la neutralité roumaine; pourtant ce sont les Bulgares seuls qui la paient. Il est prudent, autant que juste, de ne pas exiger d'eux davantage.

L'Ambassadeur d'Italie partage l'opinion de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne. Il fait remarquer que, des 140 kilom. sur lesquel s'étend la frontière roumano-bulgare de la Dobroudja, la plus grande partie comprend une région déserte, stérile, inutilisable. Seule la très faible portion de territoire qui constitue les deux triangles peut se prêter à des opérations de guerre. Puisque nous voulons assurer à la Roumanie des garanties stratégiques, ne lui refusons pas sur ce point l'apaisement qu'elle désire. Il ne s'agit en somme que d'un territoire minime.

L'Ambassadeur de France dit que peu importe l'étendue du territoire. Ce qu'il faut mesurer, c'est l'effet moral d'une cession, si minime soit-elle, venant s'ajouter à la cession de Silistrie. "Il sera désastreux en Bulgarie. On y aura l'impression que nous avons pris en considération que les intérêts roumains et les revendications roumaines. Et les rapports des deux pays ne tarderont pas à s'en ressentir.

Et c'est là, dit le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, ce que nous avons pour mission et pour but d'empêcher. Plus je réfléchis, plus je suis convaincu qu'aller plus loin dans la voie des concessions à exiger de la Bulgarie, serait créer une situation pleine de périls. Nous assurons à la Roumanie, par l'attribution de Silistrie, une position très forte, à l'extrémité d'une frontière non défendue du côté de la Bulgarie. Elle ne peut qu'être satisfaite, et je sais qu'elle sera très satisfaite de cet avantage, qui est énorme.

L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche déclare que, s'il a eu souci de soutenir les justes revendications de la Roumanie, il a voulu, d'autre part, procurer à la Bulgarie de légitimes compensations. Il a d'abord proposé de lui attribuer Salonique, puis Samothrace. Sa proposition n'ayant pas été accueillie, et devant la nécessité d'en finir, il n'insiste plus pour un nouvel avantage territorial. Mais il désire que, dans la rédaction de la décision, la conférence exprime le gré que les Puissances doivent savoir au Roi Ferdinand et à son Gouvernement du sacrifice qu'on leur demande de consentir.

Finalement, l'Ambassadeur de France est chargé de rédiger un projet de décision sur les bases suivantes :—

1. Attribution à la Roumanie de Silistrie avec un territoire d'un rayon de 3 kilom., à partir de la périphérie de la ville.

2. Indemnité à ceux des sujets bulgares qui ne voudraient plus habiter Silistrie ou la partie de son territoire devenue roumaine.

3. Engagement à prendre par la Bulgarie de ne pas élever de fortifications le long de la frontière de la Dobroudja.

4. Autonomie des écoles et des églises des Koutzo-Valaques fixés dans les futures possessions bulgares.

La prochaine séance est fixée au jeudi, 4 (17) avril.

[18134] No. 450.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 21.)

(No. 311.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April* 17, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of two despatches (Mr. Lamb's No. 29, and Vice-Consul Morgan's No. 12) containing interesting information regarding the relations between the allied forces in the occupied districts of Salonica and Cavalla.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 450.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 29.)

Sir, *Salonica, April* 10, 1913.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 26 of the 1st instant concerning the mutual relations between the allied States, I have the honour to report that the Greek

4th division, under the command of Colonel Moschopoulos, arrived here from Athens on the 6th. I understand that its strength has been reduced to about 9,000 men, but its arrival brings the Greek force in the vilayet of Salonica up to something over 40,000. It is understood that this force will shortly be further strengthened by the arrival of Colonel Calaris' division (the 2nd) which suffered so severely in the recent campaign in Epirus that it is said not to number more than 7,000 bayonets, and one other, which may be either the 3rd or the 8th. At present the 1st division is being quartered in and around Harsanksui to the north-west of the town along the Langhaza road, whilst the 4th is distributed between Kapoudjilar and Kirstchkeui on the south and east, thus covering the only possible approaches to the town from the land side. The 7th division is mainly distributed amongst the Greek villages in the southern portions of the Serres Sanjak.

The Bulgarians on their part appear to have brought into this district the whole of their 8th division, the three brigades of which, numbering some 35,000 men, are centred on Doiran, Serres, and Drasa respectively. At Cavalla Mr. Morgan reports that there are already some 10,000 Bulgarian troops abundantly supplied with artillery. Fresh troops are being daily pushed westward as fast as they can be brought up from Dedeagatch and Adrianople. A few days ago a detachment of Bulgarian cavalry reached Ishtib, which had hitherto been garrisoned only by Serbs.

The mixed commission, mentioned in the last paragraph of my despatch above-quoted, did not then proceed to Nigrita, as I had been given to understand, but to Subotsko (Karadjabad), in which district a somewhat similar conflict had taken place between the Bulgars and the Greeks in connection with the Bulgarian village of Poshar. It has now returned from there, but the result of its labours has not been made known.

The main commission does not appear to have yet effected anything. General Hessaptchief appears to have objected to the inclusion amongst its members of Major Vlachopoulos, chief of the staff of Prince Nicolas, as Military Governor of Salonica, with whom he declared that it was impossible for him to negotiate. This officer has, therefore, been replaced. General Hessaptchief then left Salonica himself for the purpose of accompanying the Bulgarian Crown Prince, who passed through this town on the 6th instant on his return from assisting at King George's funeral in Athens. It is understood that the commission will commence its deliberations on his return: but in the meantime all interest in the matter or expectation of any practical result from it appears to have died away.

In this connection I annex a translation of a paragraph which appeared in yesterday's number of the Bulgarian paper "Pravo," and which is interesting as an indication of the views entertained in respect to it on at least one side of the fence.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 2 in No. 450.

Extract from the "Pravo" (Bulgarian) of the 9th April.

(Translation.)

THE "Temps" of the 5th instant, received here to-day, contains the following telegram from Athens :—

"The commission of enquiry into the incident at Nigrita, where an encounter occurred between Greek and Bulgarian detachments, which was also entrusted with the task of delimitating the districts to be occupied respectively by the Greek and Bulgarian troops, has terminated its labours. It has decided in favour of the Greeks in the sense that the line of the Bulgarian occupation is drawn to the east of Serres and of the Gulf of Orfano.

"According to the most positive information derived from an authoritative Bulgarian source, the statements contained in the above telegram are absolutely false. We are in a position to assert that the commission of enquiry into the Subotsko and Nigrita incidents will occupy itself exclusively with these incidents. It is only the day before yesterday that it concluded the first portion of its task at Subotsko, and it will proceed to Nigrita for a similar purpose in two or three days. This commission will not occupy itself with any temporary delimitation of the localities to be occupied

respectively by the two allies, and consequently it is not possible that it should have come to a decision in favour of either the one or the other of the two parties.

"The question of the priority of occupation of various localities will occupy the attention of a special commission, which will only enter upon its duties in the course of the next few days."

Enclosure 3 in No. 450.

Acting Vice-Consul Morgan to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 12.) *Cavalla, April 8, 1913.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that on the fall of Adrianople, the 8th division of the Bulgarian army was at once entrained for the Drama and Serres district. The three brigades composing the division are stationed; one at Doiran, one at Serres, and one divided between Drama and Cavalla. The whole division numbers some 35,000 men.

The number of troops in Cavalla and district is about 10,000, of whom 2,000 are at Pravishta, 3,000 are Macedonian recruits, who are being trained here, and 5,000 form the newly-arrived 30th regiment of the 8th division.

The despatch of such a large number of troops to these parts is undoubtedly due to Greco-Bulgarian differences. It was decided on after the fighting at Nigrita, and as a counterbalance to the penetration of Greek troops into the district west of Pravishta and the Drama plain.

The differences between Greeks and Bulgarians, which are still far from being settled, seem due as much to old antipathy as to the still existing Bulgarian desire for the possession of Salonica, and the equally strong Greek desire for the Serres–Drama–Cavalla region.

I have, &c.
JAMES MORGAN.

[18167] No. 451.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 128.) *St. Petersburgh, April 17, 1913.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 127 of the 16th instant, I have the honour to report that the sixth meeting of the Ambassadors was held this afternoon at the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Austrian, German, and Italian Ambassadors having announced that their Governments would not press for the cession of any territory in addition to Silistria, the French Ambassador read to us the corrected text of the formula which we had discussed at our last meeting, and we unanimously accepted it as our final decision. The Austrian Ambassador, however, said that he would prefer to submit it to his Government before attaching his signature, in case that they should wish to introduce any verbal alterations.

I have the honour to enclose the text.

We are not likely to meet again before Wednesday next, the 10th (23rd) instant, so that, should there be any modifications which you may wish to introduce into it, I would ask you to telegraph them to me at once.

It was agreed that the Minister for Foreign Affairs should communicate our decision when signed to the Roumanian and Bulgarian Governments, but that it should not be made public without the consent of those Governments till after the conclusion of peace.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 451.

Corrected Text of Formula.

LA conférence des Ambassadeurs réunie à Saint-Pétersbourg, sous la présidence du Ministre Impérial des Affaires Étrangères, pour se prononcer sur le différend qui s'est élevé entre les Gouvernements bulgare et roumain au sujet de la frontière méridionale de la Dobroudja;

Après avoir examiné les revendications formulées par le Roumanie et les concessions offertes par la Bulgarie,

Décide:

1. La ville de Silistrie doit être attribuée à la Roumanie.

La nouvelle frontière roumano-bulgare partira d'un point sur le Danube à 3 kilom. environ à l'ouest de la périphérie de Silistrie, coupera la route de Shoumla, puis la route de Varna également à 3 kilom. environ de la périphérie de la ville et gagnera directement la frontière actuelle.

Une commission mixte bulgaro-roumaine fixera sur les lieux dans un délai de trois mois à dater de la présente décision le tracé de la frontière.

Au besoin, elle pourra s'adjoindre des experts à nommer par les Puissances médiatrices.

2. Le Gouvernement roumain donnera une indemnité à ceux des sujets bulgares habitant Silistrie ou le territoire englobé dans la nouvelle frontière, qui auront fait connaître dans un délai de six mois à dater de la présente décision leur désir de quitter la ville ou le territoire ci-dessus délimité.

Une commission mixte bulgaro-roumaine, après avoir constaté le dommage, fixera le montant de l'indemnité.

Au besoin, elle pourra s'adjoindre des experts à nommer par les Puissances médiatrices.

3. Conformément à l'engagement qu'elle s'est déclarée prête à prendre, la Bulgarie n'élèvera aucune fortification le long de la frontière actuelle du Danube à la mer Noire.

Une commission mixte déterminera dans un délai de six mois à dater de la présente décision la zone à l'intérieur de laquelle la Bulgarie, s'interdit de construire des ouvrages fortifiés et s'oblige à démanteler ceux de ces ouvrages qui pourraient s'y trouver.

Au besoin, elle pourra s'adjoindre des experts à nommer par les Puissances médiatrices

4. La conférence enregistre la déclaration faite à Londres par le délégué de la Bulgarie et consignée dans le protocole du 16 (29) janvier, aux termes de laquelle "la Bulgarie consente à donner l'autonomie aux écoles et aux églises des Koutzo Valaques se trouvant dans les futures possessions bulgares en tant que ces écoles seront fréquentées par les enfants koutzo-valaques et à permettre la création d'un épiscopat pour ces mêmes Koutzo-Valaques avec la faculté pour le Gouvernement roumain de subventionner, sous la surveillance du Gouvernement bulgare, lesdites institutions culturelles."

Avant de se séparer la conférence a à cœur de constater que les dispositions connues de la Bulgarie à consentir des sacrifices au maintien et au resserrement de ses liens d'amitié avec la Roumanie ont singulièrement facilité sa tâche.

Elle exprime la conviction que la cession de Silistrie à la Roumanie ne saurait manquer de produire le résultat unanimement recherché.

Sa Majesté le Roi Ferdinand et son Gouvernement méritent que les Puissances leur en sachent gré.

[18245] No. 452.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 95.) *Rome, April 18, 1913.*

Sir,

IT is announced in this morning's papers that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs has appointed the following gentlemen to act as the Italian representatives at the Conference to be held in Paris to settle the financial questions arising out of the redistribution of territory in the Balkan Peninsula:—

Commendatore Ernesto Koch, Minister Plenipotentiary of the Italian Foreign Office;

Commendatore Tito Canovai, Chief Secretary of the Banca d'Italia; and

Commendatore Carlo Conti Rossini, of the Ministry of the Treasury.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[18255] No. 453.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 82.)

Sir, *Belgrade, April 18, 1913.*

THE article in the semi-official "Samouprava," translation of which I have the honour to enclose herewith,* is of special interest in that it indicates for the first time the grounds upon which Servia bases her claim for a revision of the territorial settlement in Macedonia concluded between Bulgaria and Servia before the war. The principal argument adduced is that treaties are only binding so long as the conditions under which they are entered into remain unchanged. In the present instance it is argued that the conditions of the *ante bellum* territorial settlement have, owing to subsequent events, been modified wholly to the advantage of Bulgaria, and greatly so owing to assistance voluntarily tendered by Servia during the course of the war. The article concludes by saying that the present situation calls for the conclusion of a fresh treaty.

I understand that, under the delimitation arrangements made prior to the war, besides the spheres allotted as indisputably Bulgarian and Servian, there remained certain doubtful districts, such as Kumanovo, Uskub, Dibra, Struga, and which, in case of disagreement subsequent to the war, were to be reserved for the arbitration of the Czar of Russia. The districts to which Servia is, however, now laying claim fall within the Bulgarian sphere as defined under the treaty. The grounds urged in defence of these claims by Servia are that compensation is due for services rendered to Bulgaria during the war over and above those originally stipulated for, and that without those services Bulgaria could not have achieved her successes.

Bulgaria's argument, on the other hand, is that, according to the spirit of the treaty, Servia was bound unconditionally to fulfil all those duties towards Bulgaria for which she now claims compensation. But this notwithstanding, in order to mark her appreciation of Servian assistance, she has been willing to forgo all claim to the doubtful districts mentioned above, and asserts that this constitutes ample compensation, if, indeed, compensation be due. In view of the fact that Servia apparently shows no intention of evacuating the districts occupied by her, the situation is becoming decidedly disquieting.

An impression exists that Servia and Greece are retarding peace negotiations with a view to exhausting Bulgaria, and that the Bulgarian Government have replied to this move by concluding an armistice.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[18175] No. 454.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 21.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April 19, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram dated to-day, from the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 454.

Vice-Admiral Commanding 3rd Squadron to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April 19, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 330.

Instructions to Austrian admiral were to extend blockade to Durazzo at once. Decided at conference to-day, against wishes of Austrian admiral, not to extend blockade at present, but Italian, French, and German captains to obtain instructions from their Governments in the meantime. Cause of Austrian attitude appears to be desire to affront Servia and force her to abandon vicinity of Durazzo, utilising international squadron for purpose. About 8,000 Servians are based north of the River

* Not printed.

Skumbi, faced by some 12,000 Turks to the south of the river. Extension of blockade would cut off Servian supplies, which they obtain by sea from Austrian ports to Durazzo. Want of supplies might force Servians to evacuate a position in the face of the Turkish forces, and would render their situation an awkward one.

[18394] No. 455.

Count Benckendorff to Sir A. Nicolson.—(Received April 21.)

Russian Embassy, London,
My dear Nicolson, *April 20, 1913.*

I HAVE just received the following telegram :—

"A la demande du Gouvernement serbe, le bateau à vapeur le 'Saint-Pétersbourg,' de la flotte volontaire russe, se rend sur la côte albanaise pour embarquer et débarquer à Salonique les blessés et malades serbes.

"Veuillez en informer le Gouvernement britannique, en ajoutant la prière que l'amiral anglais en soit prévenu et muni des instructions nécessaires pour que le 'Saint-Pétersbourg' puisse accomplir sa tâche. Il battra pavillon de la Croix-Rouge. Il quittera Odessa le 8 (21) avril."

Yours very sincerely,
BENCKENDORFF.

[18557] No. 456.

Memorandum communicated by M. de Fleuriau, April 21, 1913.

DANS sa note du 7 courant, le Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères avait bien voulu exposer à l'Ambassadeur de France le point de vue auquel se place le Gouvernement britannique dans la question de la contribution des États balkaniques à la dette publique ottomane; il lui indiquait en même temps qu'il serait disposé à renoncer à l'amendement proposé par lui le 20 février dernier, s'il lui était démontré que cet amendement est inutile et que le système de la proportionnalité assure aux porteurs de fonds ottomans une garantie aussi complète que celle résultant nécessairement de l'application du système de la spécialisation des gages. Sir Edward Grey exprimait en conséquence le désir de recevoir communication des chiffres sur lesquels les spécialistes français avaient basé leur opinion.

Afin de répondre à ce désir, l'Ambassadeur de France transmet ci-joint au Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères: (1) un tableau de la dette ottomane consolidée sur lequel est basé le système français de la proportionnalité; et (2) un dossier composé d'un tableau et de deux notes, présenté par les intéressés allemands et exposant l'application du système de la spécialisation.

Le tableau de la dette ottomane consolidée (annexe (A)), qui sert de point de départ au système de la proportionnalité, devrait être complété par la justification d'un coefficient de répartition basé sur la comparaison des recettes des territoires cédés aux recettes générales de l'Empire pour une période de trois années. Les seuls résultats connus étaient ceux de l'exercice 1325 (1909-10), et la proportion applicable aux provinces européennes à l'exclusion de Constantinople, comme à l'exclusion des îles de l'Archipel, a été ainsi évaluée provisoirement à 21·38 pour cent. Dans une étude que vient de publier l'Administration de la Dette ottomane, et où se trouvent comparés les différends modes de calculs proposés, le revenu moyen des territoires cédés, établi sur la moyenne des années 1909-10, 1910-11, 1911-12, est évalué à 19·34 pour cent par rapport au revenu global de l'Empire, mais les éléments sur lesquels est basé ce calcul ne sont point donnés. Il semble cependant que, *grosso modo*, la proportion de 20 pour cent rende pour l'instant un compte suffisamment exact de l'application du système préconisé par la commission française. L'application de ce taux à l'ensemble de la dette répartissable, consolidée et non consolidée, fixerait à £T. 23,655,902, soit environ 544,000,000 de francs, la contribution en capital nominal des États balkaniques.

Les résultats auxquels aboutirait le système de la spécialisation des gages sont indiqués en leur détail dans un tableau préparé par le syndicat des porteurs allemands (annexe (B)). Les Allemands arrivaient d'après ce calcul à une annuité de £T. 1,242,614, qui leur paraissait sensiblement égale à celle que donnerait d'après eux l'application du système de la proportionnalité, et c'est cette considération qui décida le Gouvernement allemand à se rallier au système français.

La spécialisation des gages a fait l'objet d'autres calculs: l'Administration de la

Dette publique a dégagé d'après ce système un chiffre de £T. 1,286,399, mais les Russes croient pouvoir ramener l'annuité à £T. 811,000 par une élimination rigoureuse des excédents, et les chiffres invoqués par eux sont indiqués à l'encre rouge* en marge du tableau annexe (B).

En présence de résultats aussi divergents, la préoccupation du Gouvernement britannique de ne renoncer qu'à bon escient à invoquer l'existence de gages réels au bénéfice des porteurs est trop légitime pour que le Gouvernement français insiste en vue d'obtenir une adhésion pure et simple au système de la proportionnalité. La commission internationale, qui va se réunir à Paris, aura pour tâche de vérifier les différends calculs et de se rendre compte de l'application exacte des divers systèmes. M. Pichon ne verrait donc aucun inconvénient, si le Gouvernement britannique le jugeait utile, à ce que la commission soit saisie de l'amendement anglais du 20 février dernier en même temps que lui sera soumis le projet d'article français déjà communiqué aux Puissances.

M. Cambon saisit, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 21 avril, 1913.

Annexe (A.)

Commission financière : Tableau de la Dette ottomane.

Calcul français.

TABLEAU 1.—DETTE consolidée.

(Situation au 1er (14) septembre, 1912.)

Désignation des emprunts.	Taux d'intérêt.	Dates d'émission.	Capital nominal en circulation.	Totaux.	Annuité (intérêt et amortissement ordinaire).
			£T.	£T.	£T.
Emprunts régis par le Décret de Moharrem—					
Dette unifiée		1903	38,196,334		1,887,375
Lots turcs..		1870	11,252,292		270,000
				49,448,626	
Emprunts dont le service est assuré par la Dette publique ottomane—					
Osmanié	4	1890	3,203,200		249,975
1896	5	..	2,886,220		180,000
1903, Port-de-Fer	4	..	2,189,256		118,800
1904	..	..	2,643,696		123,750
1901–5	..	..	5,071,638		238,800
Tedjhizat Askérié	1905	..	2,193,910		118,800
1908	..	..	1,612,106		212,000
Bagdad première série	1907	..	2,350,111		97,120
„ deuxième série	1908	..	4,734,496		194,240
„ troisième série	?	..	mémoire		mémoire
				30,490,306	
Autres emprunts—					
Priorité Tombac	4	1893	709,050		56,000
Chemins de Fer orientaux		1894	1,595,592		76,560
Douanes		1902	8,075,210		390,000
1903		..	6,771,504		350,000
1909		1909	1,000,010		40,987
Hodeidah-Sanaa		1910	1,708,872		71,354
Sanaa-Panderma		1911	6,910,442		352,000
				26,771,690	
Montant répartissable				106,710,622	5,021,761
Amortissement extraordinaire Lots turcs et Dette unifiée (1911–2)				..	492,305
					5,514,066
Sont exclus de ce calcul :					
Emprunts garantis par le tribut d'Égypte—					
Emprunt garanti		1855	4,196,720		
Defence loan		1891	6,048,812		
Tribut d'Égypte		1894	8,030,088		
Emprunt municipal		1909	1,026,976		

* Printed in italics.

TABLEAU 2.—DETTE non consolidée.

(Situation au 31 décembre, 1912.

Preneurs.	Dates.	Montant du solde dû.	Totaux.
		£T.	
Bons du Trésor—			
Banque nationale de Turquie ..	juillet 1911	1,753,198	
„ „ ..	février 1912	1,050,000	
Banque ottomane	mai 1912	1,500,000	
„	juin 1912	1,250,000	
„	août 1912	1,250,000	
Banque française pour le Commerce et l'Industrie	octobre 1912	440,000	
			7,863,198
Avances—			
Administration des Phares ..	août 1901	mémoire	
Câbles de Constantza	septembre 1901	mémoire	
Administrateur des Phares ..	1907	mémoire	
Société des Chemins de Fer d'Anatolie	1907	mémoire	
Société du Bagdad	1908	133,107	
Deutsche Bank	1911	2,912,589	
Banque française pour le Commerce et l'Industrie	1911	660,000	
Régie des Tabacs	mai 1912	mémoire	
Caisse des Orphelins		mémoire	
Société du Tunnel		mémoire	
			3,705,696
Montant répartissable		..	11,568,894

Sont exclus de ce calcul—

1. Les bons du Trésor émis pendant la guerre.

2. Les avances suivantes :—

Preneurs.	Dates.	Montant du solde dû.	
		£T.	
Banque Impériale ottomane ..	conversion février, 1912	1,500,000	compte courant statutaire.
Deutsche Bank	juillet 1912	300,000	avances sur titres.
Banque agricole	..	33,000	ditto.
„	novembre 1912	300,000	avances faites durant la guerre.
„	décembre 1912	50,000	ditto.
Dette publique ottomane	„	300,000	ditto.

3. La dette flottante proprement dite : £T. 19,148,442.

Annexe (B).

Conséquences financières d'un Détachement des Vilayets d'Europe excepte celui de Constantinople, en cas de Substitution des États conquérants au Gouvernement Impérial ottoman.

Charges à assumer par les États conquérants sur la base des Encaissements effectifs respectivement des Parts proportionnelles encaissées dans les Vilayets à céder sur les Affectations spéciales des différents Emprunts.

Note.—Le présent Tableau ne comprend pas les charges à assumer par les États conquérants à l'égard des avances temporaires et des sociétés des chemin de fer.

Calcul russe. £ T.		Calcul allemand. Rente. £ T.	£ T.
	1. **Revenus concédés par le Décret de Mouharrem—**		
	(*a.*) Anciens revenus, dont les 25 pour cent affectés à la Dette unifiée et aux Lots turcs (sans limite), et les 75 pour cent affectés aux emprunts 1904 et Bagdad Séries II à VI, ainsi qu'aux frais d'exploitation Boulgourlou–Bagdad (sans avoir atteint jusqu'ici le montant requis)—		
438,606	(i.) Cinq revenus encaissements effectifs en 1327 dans les vilayets à céder	438,606	
112,000	(ii.) Monopole des tabacs (*idem*)	188,205	
	(iii.) Assignations fixes—	£ T.	
	(*a.*) Dîmes des tabacs (en remplacement du tribut de Bulgarie)	100,000	
	(*b.*) „ (en remplacement des excédents de Chypre)	130,000	
		230,000	
	dont à la charge des États conquérants la quote correspondant à la part des vilayets à céder		
140,000	dans le produit de la dîme des tabacs en 1327, soit £ T. $\frac{288,579}{476,274} = 60{\cdot}59$ pour cent ..	139,357	
	(*c.*) Excédents des dîmes, &c. (en remplacement de la redevance de Roumélie orientale)—		
43,727	£ T. 114,020 dont à la charge des États conquérants la quote correspondant à la part des vilayets à céder dans les excédents des dîmes en 1326, soit 38·35 pour cent	43,727	
8,190	(*d.*) Traites de douanes (pour les droits de Tumbeki)—		
	£ T. 50,000 dont à la charge des États conquérants la quote correspondant à la part des vilayets à céder dans le produit des douanes en 1327, abstraction faite des affectations spéciales, soit 16·38 pour cent	8,190	
742,527			818,085
La déduction de la surtaxe douanière qui arrive à expiration en 1914, la déduction des 25 pour cent affectés à l'amortissement extraordinaire et la déduction de la part de 75 pour cent non affectés réduisent la contribution de l'Europe sur ce premier chef à £ T. 602,000			

(*b.*) Surtaxe douanière de 3 pour cent, dont les 25 pour cent affectés à la Dette unifiée et aux Lots turcs—
Produit total en 1327 dans les vilayets à céder : £ T. 190,499, dont à la charge des États conquérants, 25 pour cent 49,875

2. Dîmes et revenus divers gérés par l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane. (L'emprunt Osmanié de 1898 pour l'annuité duquel £ T. 80,000 ont été affectées comme gage supplémentaire sur les douanes générales, n'a pas été mis en compte, l'Administration de la Dette publique n'encaissant plus le gage supplémentaire par suite de l'abondance des autres affections)—

42,000	(*a.*) Emprunt 1896. Assignation fixe sur les Aghnams de Salonique. (L'annuité n'exigeant que £ T. 180,000, tandis que les affectations sont de £ T. 200,000, on pourrait consentir à une réduction de 10 pour cent à £ T. 36,000)			40,000
	(*b.*) Emprunt 1901–5—	£ T.	£ T.	
	(*a.*) Annuité	238,000		
	Dont à couvrir par douanes	122,000		
			116,000	
	(*b.*) Produit total en 1326 des autres affectations		170,669	
	(*c.*) Dont part provenant des vilayets à céder		33,049	
	La rente à assumer par les États conquérants s'élève donc à : $\frac{(a)\,(c)}{(b)}$ = £ T. $\frac{116,000 \times 33,049}{170,669}$ =		22,462	
	Plus la quote dans £ T. 122,000 correspondant à la part des directions de douanes de Salonique et Archipel dans le produit des douanes affectées spécialement au présent emprunt, soit $\frac{14755}{42{\cdot}24}$		43,179	
20,000				65,641
	(*c.*) Emprunt 1905 (Tedjhizat-Askériè)—	£ T.	£ T.	
	(*a.*) Annuité	118,800		
	Dont à couvrir par douanes perçues pour le Tedjhizat-Askériè	30,000		
			88,800	
	(*b.*) Produit total en 1326 des autres affectations		101,071	
	(*c.*) Dont part provenant des vilayets à céder		21,771	
20,000	La rente à assumer par les États conquérants s'élève donc à : $\frac{(a)\,(c)}{(b)}$ = £ T. $\frac{88,800 \times 21,771}{101,071}$ =		18,576	
	Plus la quote dans £ T. 300,000 correspondant à la part des vilayets à céder dans le produit des douanes en 1327, soit 17·33 pour cent		5,199	
	(*d.*) Emprunt 1903 (Pêcheries)—			23,775
	(*a.*) Annuité	118,800		
	(*b.*) Produit total en 1326 des affectations	235,400		
	(*c.*) Dont part provenant des vilayets à céder	86,882		
20,732	La rente à assumer par les États conquérants s'élève donc à : $\frac{(a)\,(c)}{(b)}$ = £ T. $\frac{118,800 \times 86,882}{235,400}$ =			20,732
7,000 *				
600,878	Rente totale à verser à l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane			1,068,108

(Il faudrait compter aussi les dépenses de l'Administration dans les vilayets à céder, qui seraient en 1327 de £ T. 70,374 et la moyenne de 5 années 1323 – 1327 de £ T. 73,145, on pourrait consentir à une réduction de la rente équivalent aux dépenses économisées à l'avenir.)

* *Déduction des frais de perception*

Calcul russe.		Calcul allemand.	
£ T.		Rente.	
		£ T.	£ T.
	3. Revenus sans intervention de l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane—		
	(a.) Emprunt Douane 1902—	£ T.	
	(a.) Annuité	390,000	
	(b.) Part des directions des douanes de Salonique et Andrinople dans le produit des douanes affectées spécialement au présent emprunt : 1425		138,033
138,033	1424		
	La rente à assumer par les États en quotité sévère donc à—	£ T.	£ T.
	(b.) Emprunt 1908—		212,000
	(a.) Annuité	50,000	
	(b.) Dont à couvrir par douanes générales	130,000	
	(c.) Dont à couvrir par douanes spéciales	180,000	
	(d.) Solde à couvrir par les excédents des dîmes	32,000	
	La rente à assumer par les États conquérants se compose donc comme suit—		
	(b.) Part des vilayets à céder dans le produit libre des douanes générales en 1327 : 1638 pour cent.		
	1638	8,190	
	£ T. 50,000 × 100		
	(c.) Parts des directions des douanes de Salonique et Andrinople dans le produit en 1327 des douanes spéciales : 1425	46,011	
	1425 £ T. 130,000 × 1224		
	(d.) Parts des vilayets à céder dans les excédents des dîmes en 1326 : 3835 pour cent.		
	3835	12,272	
	£ T. 32,000 × 100		
	(e.) Emprunt 1894 (Chemins ottomans)—	£ T.	
	Annuité	76,560	
66,473			66,473
			pro-memorii
871,000	Rente totale à verser pour les emprunts (non compris celui de 1894)		1,242,614

Charges à assumer par les États conquérants sur la base des encaissements effectifs respectivement des parts proportionnelles encaissées dans les vilayets à céder sur les affectations spéciales des différents emprunts.

Bases de Calcul.

1. Sur les revenus revendiqués dans leur ensemble par les emprunts auxquels ils ont été assignés, soit que leur produit total est, sans limite, destiné au service des emprunts respectifs, ou que leur produit actuel est inférieur à la somme affectée, il a été mis en compte :

Le montant effectivement encaissé dans les vilayets à céder.

2. Sur les revenus dont le produit dépasse les exigibilités des emprunts auxquels ils ont été affectés, laissant ainsi un excédent au profit du Gouvernement ottoman, il a été mis en compte :

La part correspondant à la proportion $\frac{(a)\ (c)}{(b)}$;

(a) représentant l'annuité de l'emprunt respectif, (b) représentant le produit total des revenus affectés ; (c) représentant la part du produit total encaissé dans les vilayets à céder.

3. Sur les revenus des affectations composées dont les unes produisent des recettes variables et les autres ont été assignées en sommes fixes (comme, par exemple, l'affectation de £ T. 40,000 sur les aghnams de Salonique pour l'emprunt 1896 et l'affectation de £ T. 122,000 sur les douanes pour l'emprunt 1901-05), il a été mis en compte :

(a.) Si l'affectation fixe est déterminée séparément pour les vilayets à céder (comme pour l'emprunt 1896) :

Le montant de l'affectation fixe.

(b.) Si l'affectation fixe est déterminée généralement :

La quote correspondant à la part des vilayets à céder dans le produit total des revenus affectés en partie.

(c.) Pour les affectations d'un rendement variable :

La part correspondant à la proportion mentionnée ci-haut $\frac{(a)\ (c)}{(b)}$.

(a) représentant l'annuité de l'emprunt respectif, déduction faite des affectations fixes ; (b) représentant le produit total des affectations variables ; (c) représentant la part encaissée sur le produit total des affectations variables dans les vilayets à céder.

4. Le calcul est, en outre, basé :

(a.) Pour les dîmes et revenus divers gérés par l'Administration de la Dette publique : sur les recettes de l'exercice 1326, respectivement de la moyenne des années 1323 à 1326.

(b.) Pour les autre revenus : sur les recettes, constatées ou évaluées, de l'exercice 1327, respectivement de la moyenne des années 1323 à 1327.

Berlin, le 14 décembre, 1912.

Annexe (C).

(Traduction.)

Principes pour l'établissement des contributions des États balkaniques au service de la dette publique ottomane et pour la répartition de ces contributions entre les différents emprunts (sur la base des garanties spéciales affectées à chaque emprunt).

On sait que les gages spéciaux affectés au service des différents emprunts turcs et des différentes garanties kilométriques ne sont pas intégralement absorbés par ces services, mais laissent des excédents qui reviennent au Trésor turc. En conséquence, une demande tendant à ce que les États balkaniques versent à la Dette publique, en

vue du service de la dette ottomane, la totalité du montant des recettes affectées à des emprunts, &c., en tant qu'elles proviennent des territoires à céder, se heurtera à une opposition justifiée des États balkaniques, qui ne seront pas disposés à verser en plus du montant effectivement nécessaire pour les différents services garantis, une contribution aux recettes libres du Trésor ottoman.

Il y aurait donc lieu de distinguer, à ce point de vue, entre :

1. Les recettes qui sont intégralement et effectivement absorbées pour le service des emprunts, &c., auxquels elles sont affectées.

2. Les recettes qui ne sont qu'en partie effectivement nécessaires au service des emprunts, &c., auxquels elles sont affectées, et qui ont jusqu'ici fourni à l'État turc un excédent au delà des montants nécessaires pour la garantie.

1. La première catégorie comprend les "anciens revenus" de la Dette publique ottomane.

Le produit de ces revenus sert, en premier lieu, comme on sait, au service de l'intérêt et de l'amortissement normal de la Dette unifiée et des Lots. Vingt-cinq pour cent des excédents doivent servir à l'amortissement extraordinaire de la Dette unifiée et des Lots. Les 75 pour cent restant représentent la part du Gouvernement; mais cette part du Gouvernement aussi n'est pas libre, mais est affectée, en premier lieu, à l'emprunt de 1901 (Unifiée II, émis en France), et en second lieu aux emprunts Bagdad, deuxième à sixième séries, et à la garantie des frais d'exploitation du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad pour la ligne Bourgourlou-Bagdad. Étant donné que l'excédent le plus élevé accusé jusqu'à présent ne suffit même pas à assurer le service des emprunts Bagdad, séries deuxième et troisième, et la garantie des frais d'exploitation de Bourgourlou à Hellf, le montant total de la part revenant au Gouvernement est effectivement absorbé par les affectations consenties à des tiers.

Les États balkaniques doivent donc compenser la totalité de la diminution des anciens revenus provenant de la cession de la plus grande partie de la Turquie d'Europe; sinon, les créanciers de la Turquie subiraient un dommage et il serait porté atteinte à leurs droits de garantie. Il y aurait donc lieu d'établir à combien s'élève le montant des anciens revenus provenant des territoires à céder (y compris les recettes du monopole des tabacs). Ce montant devrait être imposé pour sa totalité aux États balkaniques à titre de contribution au service des différents emprunts participant aux anciens revenus.

Suivant mon opinion, ce montant ne doit pas être établi sur la base de la moyenne des cinq dernières années. Les anciens revenus ont accusé un accroissement très considérable et ininterrompu depuis l'année 1907 S et, en admettant un développement tant soit peu normal, on aurait pu s'attendre à de nouvelles plus-values sur ces revenus. Si, au moment de la cession d'une grande partie du territoire européen de la Turquie, les créanciers de la Turquie doivent renoncer aux perspectives favorables d'un développement futur, ils peuvent au moins exiger comme contributions minima le montant encaissé effectivement du chef des anciens revenus dans les territoires à céder pendant la dernière année financière ayant précédé la guerre des Balkans.

2. Suivant les stipulations du Décret de Moharrem, 25 pour cent du produit de la surtaxe douanière de 3 pour cent doivent également être affectés à l'amortissement extraordinaire des Lots et de la Dette unifiée. Par contre, la part de 75 pour cent revenant au Gouvernement, à valoir sur la surtaxe douanière de 3 pour cent, est libre. Il y aurait donc lieu d'imposer aux États balkaniques une contribution s'élevant à 25 pour cent des recettes produites par la surtaxe douanière de 3 pour cent dans les vilayets européens, à l'exception de Constantinople, pendant la dernière année financière; le droit sur les 75 pour cent restant passerait, par contre, avec les territoires cédés, de la Turquie aux États balkaniques.

3. Pour les autres recettes affectées à titre de garanties spéciales, leur produit dépasse, pour des sommes plus ou moins considérables, le montant nécessaire aux services des garanties. Pour ces recettes, il ne suffit donc pas d'établir simplement quelle est la part des recettes affectées qui provient des territoires européens à céder. Il y a lieu d'établir en plus pour quelle part des recettes provenant jusqu'ici des territoires à céder et affectées à des emprunts turcs, &c., les États balkaniques auront à fournir une compensation.

La solution suivante me semble indiquée :—

Il sera établi pour chaque emprunt séparément la proportion moyenne pour laquelle, pendant les trois à cinq dernières années, les recettes produites par la Turquie d'Europe et d'Asie et affectées à chaque emprunt ont été effectivement

appliquées au service de l'emprunt. Il sera ensuite établi à combien s'élèvent, en moyenne, pendant les trois à cinq dernières années, les recettes des vilayets à céder, affectées en garantie. C'est à ce montant qu'on applique la proportion établie entre les recettes totales et les sommes payées effectivement à titre de garantie. Le montant résultant de ce calcul doit être imposé aux États balkaniques comme contribution annuelle.

Voici, comme exemple, ce mode de calcul appliqué à l'emprunt pêcheries :

(1.) Le produit total des recettes affectées à l'emprunt pêcheries s'est élevé, pour l'année financière 1326, à £T. 253,100.

(2.) Le service de l'emprunt exige une annuité de £T. 118,800, ce qui représente 4688 pour cent du produit total des recettes affectées.

(3.) Dans le produit total des recettes affectées, les quatre vilayets européens, Constantinople non compris, participent pour £T. 86,882.

(4.) Il y aurait lieu d'imposer aux États balkaniques, à titre de contribution, 4688 pour cent (proportion établie au chiffre 2) sur ces £T. 86,882, soit £T. 40,750.

4. Lorsque les excédents des recettes affectées au service d'un emprunt, ou de leur côté, affectées à d'autres garanties spéciales, il y aurait lieu de procéder d'une façon analogue pour établir le montant à imposer aux États balkaniques comme contribution.

Le cas le plus important est l'assignation de £T. 114,000 sur les excédents des "revenus divers" donnée à la Dette publique comme compensation pour le tribut de la Roumélie orientale.

Sous la dénomination de "revenus divers," l'on comprend l'excédent total des gages spéciaux, dont l'encaissement est confié à la Dette publique, au delà des sommes nécessaires au service des emprunts et garanties spéciales.

Pour ce cas, il y aurait donc lieu d'établir la part de ces excédents provenant des vilayets européens à céder. Dans ce calcul, il faut tenir compte du fait que les dîmes affectées au chemin de fer d'Anatolie sont également affectées au chemin de fer de Bagdad, et cela pour un montant absorbant la totalité de leurs excédents. Dans ce calcul des excédents disponibles pour les £T. 114,000, il y aurait donc lieu de déduire les excédents des garanties du chemin de fer d'Anatolie. La proportion des excédents des revenus divers produits par la Turquie d'Europe par rapport aux excédents des revenus divers devrait être appliquée au montant £T. 114,000 affecté à la dette, et le montant qui en résulterait devrait être pris en charge par les États balkaniques comme contribution dans les revenus généraux de la Dette publique.

Annexe (D).

Calcul allemand dans le Système de la Proportionnalité.

CONSÉQUENCES financières d'un détachement des vilayets d'Europe, excepté celui de Constantinople, en cas de substitution des États conquérants au Gouvernement ottoman.

CHARGES à assumer par les États conquérants sur la base des parts des vilayets à céder dans les recettes générales de l'Empire.

NOTA.—La part des vilayets à céder dans les recettes générales de l'Empire a été, en 1325 (1909–10), de: 18·27 pour cent des recettes totales; 21·26 pour cent des recettes totales, déduction faite des recettes non répartissables de l'Administration centrale.

Des comptes analogues n'existant ni pour les exercices précédents, ni pour 1326 ou 1327, la proportion constatée pour 1325 est la seule base de calcul possible.

Situation approximative à fin Novembre 1912 de la Dette publique ottomane.	Part de la Dette publique ottomane à assumer par les États conquérants sur la base—	
	De 18·27 pour cent.	De 21·26 pour cent.
	£ T.	£ T.
1. Emprunts émis ..	129,046,800	23,741,300	27,626,700
2. Avances* ..	9,382,300	1,695,900	1,973,400
	139,229,100	25,437,200	29,600,100

* Les calculs ci-dessus ne tiennent pas compte—
1. De l'avance statutaire de la Banque Impériale ottomane de £ T. 1,500,000.
2. Des avances consenties par des tiers pour la construction de routes.
3. Des petites avances sur gages données en nantissement.

[18272] No. 457.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 21.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April 21, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram, dated the 20th April, relative to Montenegrin affairs.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 457.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Admiralty, April 20, 1913.*

REFERRING to your telegram No. 322, directions have been given to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to ascertain at once whether Turkish Government will give assurance that no attack will be made on transports with Servian troops while on their way to Salonica. You should inform vice-admiral, 3rd squadron, of reply, which will be telegraphed to you direct.

[18513] No. 458.

Programme of the Paris Financial Commission.—(Communicated by M. Cambon, April 21.)

DÉTERMINER la part de la dette ottomane qui doit incomber aux États balkaniques, en raison de leurs acquisitions territoriales.

2. Fixer les garanties et toutes autres dispositions d'ordre financier, nécessaires au strict accomplissement des obligations qui seront ainsi assumées par les États balkaniques.

3. Fixer les conditions auxquelles les États balkaniques seront subrogés dans les droits et charges de l'Empire ottoman, à l'égard des particuliers ou des sociétés concessionnaires d'entreprises ou bénéficiaires de contrats dans les territoires cédés.

4. Examiner les réclamations que les États belligérants croiraient devoir produire, à titre de compensation pécuniaire, du fait des opérations de guerre.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 21 avril, 1913.

[18177] No. 459.

Vice-Admiral commanding 3rd Squadron to Admiralty.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, April 21.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *April 20, 1913.*

I WAS informed this morning by Servian general that his Government has ordered the embarkation of all the Servian troops in Albania. Embarkation can now take place in vicinity of Durazzo without interference, as the Turks in the neighbourhood have been forced well to the southward of the River Skumbi. About 17,000 or 18,000 would embark at San Giovanni di Medua, the rest, about 7,000, at Durazzo. When siege of Scutari is raised there will be no proper constituted authority in Albania left to maintain order, and Servian general fears there may be massacre of Albanians of opposed Christian and Mussulman faiths.

[18128] No. 460.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 62.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, April 20, 1913.*

YOUR telegram, Very Confidential, of 18th April: Guaranteed loan.

Last word on the subject here was a violent article in the inspired paper (which should reach you in a couple of days in my despatch No. 20) declaring the idea to be an insult, which neither the King nor Montenegro will ever accept. Of course you will understand that when the right moment comes (it does not seem to have quite come yet) the King will take the money. At present he feels he risks nothing by keeping up the comedy of defiance for a little longer.

I would venture to suggest that there may be no need to couple the offer of a loan with any direct condition with regard to Scutari. This might facilitate matters. In other respects the result will be exactly the same.

It is given out day after day that general assault will be made to-morrow. I think there is little probability that anything of the kind will occur, but a good deal of shell-firing into the town is going on in the vain hope perhaps that an unexpected surrender might take place.

[18415] No. 461.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 59.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Athens, April 21, 1913.*

FOLLOWING has just been read by Foreign Minister to six representatives:—

"Les États alliés se font un devoir d'adresser aux Grandes Puissances leurs vifs remercîments pour la communication qu'elles leur ont faite et d'après laquelle:

"1. La ligne Énos-Midia sera prise comme base de négociations et non comme ligne définitive.

"2. La cession des îles de la mer Égée par la Turquie est admise sous réserve de décisions à prendre au sujet de certaines d'entre elles.

"3. Les Grandes Puissances sont prêtes à faire connaître dès à présent la délimitation projetée nord et nord-est de l'Albanie, et feront connaître celle du sud-est et du sud dès qu'elle aura été établie.

"4. La solution de toutes les questions financières ayant été réservée à la commission technique de Paris, à laquelle prendront part les délégués des belligérants, les Puissances estiment qu'il n'y a pas lieu de s'expliquer quant à présent sur le principe de l'indemnité.

"Les États alliés constatent que les conditions ci-dessus, auxquelles les Puissances consentent d'intervenir comme médiatrices en vue de la conclusion de la paix avec la Turquie, diffèrent un peu de celles qu'ils ont formulées dans leur réponse du 5 avril. Cependant, dans leur sincère désir de faciliter et de faire aboutir la médiation offerte, les États alliés, en priant de nouveau les Grandes Puissances de vouloir bien admettre le principe de l'indemnité de guerre, déclarent qu'ils acceptent cette médiation, se réservant dans le cours des négociations de débattre avec les Grandes Puissances les questions se rapportant aux îles et à la fixation définitive des frontières de la Thrace et de toute l'Albanie."

[18389] No. 462.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 118. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, April 21, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 147 of 20th April.

Up to late last night the Prime Minister had failed to bring the Greek and Servian Governments into line. He is still continuing his efforts.

Meanwhile he would be grateful for some authoritative statement, or even action, emanating from the Powers.

Generals have been instructed to endeavour to arrange prolongation of suspension of hostilities until signature of preliminary treaty.

I believe the Bulgarian Government to be acting sincerely in this matter.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[18411] No. 463.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 149.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, April 21, 1913.*

MEDIATION proposal.

Following is text of reply of allies:—

"Les États alliés se font un devoir d'adresser aux Grandes Puissances leurs vifs remercîments pour la communication qu'elles leur ont faite et d'après laquelle:

"1. La ligne Énos-Midia sera prise comme base de négociations et non comme ligne définitive.

"2. La cession des îles de la mer Égée par la Turquie est admise sous la réserve de décisions à prendre au sujet de certaines d'entre elles.

"3. Les Grandes Puissances sont prêtes à faire connaître dès à présent la délimitation projetée nord et nord-est de l'Albanie, et feront connaître celle du sud et du sud-est dès qu'elle aura été établie.

"4. La solution de toutes les questions financières ayant été réservée à la commission technique de Paris, à laquelle prendront part les délégués des belligérants, les Puissances estiment qu'il n'y a pas lieu de s'expliquer quant à présent sur le principe de l'indemnité.

"Les États alliés constatent que les conditions ci-dessus, auxquelles les Puissances consentent d'intervenir comme médiatrices en vue de la conclusion de la paix avec la Turquie, diffèrent un peu de celles qu'ils ont formulées dans leur réponse du 5 avril. Cependant, dans leur sincère désir de faciliter et de faire aboutir la médiation offerte, les États alliés, en priant de nouveau les Grandes Puissances de vouloir bien admettre le principe de l'indemnité de guerre, déclarent qu'ils acceptent cette médiation, se réservant dans le cours des négociations de débattre avec les Grandes Puissances les questions se rapportant aux îles et à la fixation définitive des frontières de la Thrace et de toute l'Albanie."

[18271] No. 461.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 201.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Constantinople, April 21, 1913.*

MY despatch No. 246.

Vice-consul, Rhodes, telegraphs military occupation of Castelorizo by Greeks 18th April.

[18408] No. 465.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 202.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, April 21, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 190 of 20th April: Safe conduct for Servian troops.

I have informed the commander-in-chief at Malta that assurance has been given.

[18409] No. 466.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 103.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, April 21, 1913.*

MEDIATION of Powers: Reply of allies.

I have received a memorandum which, after expressing sincere thanks for communication of the Powers and reciting four points set forth therein, states as follows:—

"Les États alliés constatent que les conditions ci-dessus, auxquelles les Puissances consentent d'intervenir comme médiatrices en vue de la conclusion de la paix avec la Turquie, diffèrent un peu de celles qu'ils ont formulées dans leur réponse du 5 avril. Cependant, dans leur sincère désir de faciliter et de faire aboutir la médiation offerte, les États alliés, en priant de nouveau les Grandes Puissances de vouloir bien admettre le principe de l'indemnité de guerre, déclarent qu'ils acceptent cette médiation, se réservant dans le cours des négociations de débattre avec les Grandes Puissances les questions se rapportant aux îles et à la fixation définitive des frontières de la Thrace et de toute l'Albanie."

[18400] No. 467.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 67.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, April 21, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 173 of 18th April: Crete.

German representative at Athens is being instructed to join British colleague in making representations.

[18481] No. 468.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 27.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Salonica, April 21, 1913.*

GREEK second division now completely disembarked. First and remainder of the seventh are moving out to-day into the disputed territory north and east of Salonica.

[18631] No. 469.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 48.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, April 21, 1913.*

FOLLOWING resolution was taken at the meeting of Ambassadors to-day:—(End of R.)

"La réunion pense que les déclarations des représentants des Puissances au Roi Nicolas et à son Gouvernement ne peuvent avoir d'effet que si l'accord est établi sur la question du concours financier des Puissances et s'il peut être offert au Gouvernement monténégrin dès à présent.

"Quant aux mesures qui pourraient être annoncées à Cettigné et qui, dans la pensée du Roi, semblent devoir être formulées dans des termes tels que sa responsabilité vis-à-vis de son peuple soit complètement dégagée, elles pourraient consister dans la remise aux Puissances par la Sublime Porte de la ville de Scutari. Cette manière de procéder exige le consentement du Gouvernement ottoman, à qui il convient de le demander confidentiellement. Mais au préalable il importe d'obtenir l'engagement formel du Roi Nicolas et de son Gouvernement que les pavillons des Puissances seront respectés.

"Sur ce dernier point les représentants des Puissances à Cettigné pourraient s'entendre pour charger l'un d'eux d'en parler confidentiellement au Roi Nicolas et de s'assurer que la remise de la ville aux Puissances lui suffirait pour justifier vis-à-vis du peuple monténégrin la levée du siège."

(R.) When your colleagues have received necessary instructions, you may act in the sense of the above resolution.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 175; Paris, No. 177; Rome, No. 149; St. Petersburgh No. 350; and Vienna, No. 148.)

[18631] No. 470.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.**

(No. 176.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 21, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 21st April is for your information only.

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* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 178), Sir R. Rodd (No. 150), Sir G. Buchanan (No. 351) and Sir F Cartwright (No. 149).

[14962] No. 471.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 264.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 21, 1913.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople,† relative to a request made to the Powers by the Sublime Porte that steps may be taken to secure the restitution of Ottoman fiscal stamps seized by the Greek and Bulgarian authorities in the territories occupied by their troops.

It appears to me that these stamps, which can in no case be regarded as belonging to the Ottoman Bank with which they were deposited, are as much the property of the Turkish Government as any other token money in paper, and that, as such, they come within the category of articles, the property of the enemy State, which a belligerent is entitled to appropriate in territory occupied by him.

It is not, moreover, clear to me how the Greek and Bulgarian authorities could encash the value of these stamps in other parts of the Turkish Empire which, according to the contention of the Porte, must be the object of the seizure, nor even were this possible, what ground for intervention the Powers would have in the matter were that seizure good.

I should, however, be glad to learn the views of the Government to which your Excellency is accredited, and you should accordingly ask them to favour His Majesty's Government with an expression of their opinion on the subject.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[18631] No. 472.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.‡

(No. 267.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 21, 1913.*

AT the meeting of Ambassadors held to-day, it was ascertained that all the Powers had in principle agreed to the offer of financial assistance to be made to the Montenegrin Government, though the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had not himself received any specific instructions on the point. It was considered desirable that the offer should be made to the Montenegrin Government, but, as it appeared likely that King Nicholas would have some difficulty in justifying the acceptance of financial aid if it implied the raising of the siege of Scutari, a proposal was accepted by the Ambassadors that he should be sounded confidentially as to whether he would fall in with the suggestion that Turkey should be asked if she would consent to surrender Scutari to the Powers. Before approaching the Ottoman Government confidentially on the subject, it was considered desirable to obtain a formal engagement from King Nicholas and his Government that the flags of the Powers, if hoisted over the town, would be respected, and that he would be able to justify to his people the raising of the siege if the Ottoman Government placed the town in the hands of the Powers. A resolution was accordingly passed by the meeting of the Ambassadors in the above sense, and you will have received its text by telegraph.

An enquiry was made at the meeting as to whether some further measures than a blockade might not be necessary; but the proposal to land detachments from the international fleet did not meet with unanimous acceptance, and it was consequently withdrawn. A suggestion was made that the retirement of the Servian troops might have so eased the close investment of the town as to permit the international fleet taking some measures to revictual the besieged place. This suggestion was withdrawn when it was pointed out that the international fleet could not, without committing a belligerent act, assist in provisioning a beleagured town.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Also to Sir E. Goschen (No. 133), Sir F. Cartwright (No. 85), Sir G. Buchanan (No. 163), and Sir R. Rodd (No. 111).
† Sir G. Lowther (No. 248), April 1913.
‡ Also to Sir E. Goschen (No. 138), Sir F. Cartwright (No. 87), Sir G. Buchanan (No. 164), and Sir R. Rodd (No. 116).

[16960] No. 473.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 115.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 21, 1913.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 53 of the 22nd January last, relative to interference by the authorities of the allied Balkan States in the occupied districts with the business of the officials of the Ottoman Public Debt, I transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Sophia,* forwarding copy of the reply of the Bulgarian Government to the note of protest which, under my instructions, he addressed to them on the subject.

I have to request your Excellency to communicate this paper to the British commissioner on the Debt, with a request for his observations on the explanations of their action offered by the Bulgarian Government, which appear to me to be far from satisfactory.

Your Excellency should also ask Sir A. Block for an expression of his opinion on Sir H. Bax-Ironside's suggestion that it would be desirable that a representative of the Debt administration should take part in the enquiry which is being held by the Bulgarian Government into the case of the seizure of cereals deposited at the Protopappas mills.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[17621] No. 474.

Foreign Office to Imperial Ottoman Bank.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 21, 1913.

IN reply to the question contained in your letter of the 16th instant, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that you are right in assuming that the British delegates at the forthcoming Financial Commission in Paris will duly take into consideration the interests of British holders of bonds and bills other than those with whom the Council of Foreign Bondholders is closely connected.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[18428] No. 475.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 76.)

Sir, *Athens, April* 15, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 65 of the 31st March, I have the honour to state that a few days ago rumours were current in the Athens press of a descent of Turks upon the island of Castellorizo, accompanied by massacres and outrages. I asked M. Coromilas yesterday if he had any confirmation of this.

He said that for a long time past the islanders of Castellorizo had been praying the Greek Government to occupy and annex the island. The Government had repeatedly replied that it was impossible, owing to its remote situation, which would make it necessary permanently to detach a ship or more to protect it. They begged the people to keep quiet, and not to embarrass the Government by untimely movements. Nevertheless a party of about thirty Castellorizkots, Cretans, and other hotheads, succeeded in chartering a vessel and leaving the Piræus unknown to the authorities; they landed at Castellorizo, hoisted the Greek flag, and are said to have imprisoned the Turkish authorities. When the Government heard of it they sent another vessel to bring them back, and once more to urge the islanders to keep quiet. They had no official knowledge of the descent of the Turks, but they had sent a destroyer to report, and to give protection if necessary.

The inhabitants numbered about 10,000, and were well-to-do, owning 150 vessels, largely employed in the carrying trade between Egypt and the coast of Asia Minor. I said I understood that many of them held properties on the mainland, and that it seemed the

* No. 322.

height of folly to risk losing all the advantages of their close connection with Turkey. I added that from information I had received it appeared that the annexationist movement was organised by people of low class, and that the better sort were not concerned in it (see Sir A. Biliotti's despatch enclosed in Sir G. Lowther's despatch No. 246 of the 28th March).

M. Coromilas replied that feelings of patriotism were sometimes stronger than regard for material interests, and that the members of the deputation which waited upon the Greek Government to petition for annexation were most respectable persons. He said that the question would arise again when the fate of the islands in Italian occupation came to be decided, for Castellorizo had always been regarded as one of the "Twelve Islands."

This evening's paper states that the report of massacres having taken place was not true.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[18429] No. 476.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 77. Confidential.)

Sir, *Athens, April* 15, 1913.

WHEN the meeting of the six representatives with M. Coromilas was over yesterday, his Excellency detained me and asked me if I had reason to suppose that you objected to the neutralisation of the Corfu channel. That had now become an Italian proposal. The Marquis of San Giuliano had mentioned it to the Greek Chargé d'Affaires, but on the latter replying that his Government would accept it with alacrity, he added that it was not a proposal but a suggestion he was making, which he thought offered the materials for a compromise on the question of Epirus. But the Greek Government did not know your views on the subject, and they were particularly anxious not to do anything in opposition to them. They looked for support to the Powers of the Triple *Entente*, and they hoped that those Powers would take into consideration the value that the friendship of the Balkan allies might have for them.

I replied that I had written you a long despatch, which should reach you to-morrow, explaining the views of the Greek Government with regard to Epirus and the islands, but without saying anything of their leanings towards the Triple *Entente*. I could not tell him anything of your views as to the neutralisation of the channel, but I would enquire if he wished. He said he would see M. Venizelos and speak to me again.

M. Coromilas came to the legation later and said that on consideration M. Venizelos would not trouble you further with the question of the Corfu channel at present. He then went on to speak of the reply which the representatives had communicated to him, and said that the Greek Government appreciated very much the changes which had been made to meet the views of the allies, especially as regards the islands and the indemnity. I said I hoped we might receive an early and a favourable reply, as there were now no questions outstanding between the allies and Turkey, and no reason, therefore, why peace should not be declared between them. He said that was the case as regards the Governments, but he was afraid that the Bulgarian army might get out of hand and insist upon forcing the lines of Chatalja. In Albania there were still in existence the armies of Ali Riza and Djavid Pashas. The former had gone to Vallona, where, owing to their demoralised and disorganised condition, they were a source of danger. The Greek Government were receiving petitions from as far inland as Berat that they should send troops there, while from the territories in Greek occupation the populations, including even the Mussulmans, were imploring that they should not be handed over to the Albanians.

The conclusion of peace with Turkey on the proposed conditions would materially alter the situation as regards Epirus and the islands, as the Great Powers would be converted from mediators into parties directly concerned, and, having lost the means of direct pressure, the Greek Government would be forced to rely upon the friendly influence of the Triple *Entente* for a favourable solution, especially of the question of the islands in Italian occupation.

With regard to the question of a war indemnity and of the participation of the allies in the Ottoman Debt, M. Coromilas said he had figures to prove that the administration of Macedonia and Thrace had hitherto been a dead loss to the Turkish Government of 20,000,000 fr. a year, and that a proportional loss might be assumed for Albania and Epirus. The amputation of those provinces was therefore a positive gain for Turkey from a financial point of view. He maintained that the revenues of Constantinople would not suffer from it. He argued, therefore, that the Turkish Empire would be perfectly capable of paying an indemnity and still of developingthe resources of its diminished dominions even without the increased customs' du ies it was asking for, provided it did not waste money on Dreadnoughts or such useless expenses. Memoranda were being prepared on this subject, which he hoped would be printed and ready for distribution in a few days.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[18454] No. 477.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 22.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, April 21, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram dated the 21st April, from the vice-admiral commanding the Third Squadron.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 477.

Vice-Admiral commanding the Third Squadron to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April, 21, 1913.*

FRENCH cruiser "Edgar-Quinet" sails this afternoon, having been relieved by the "Ernest-Renan." Two transports arrived to embark Servian troops. They will leave, when full, as soon as Turkish Government have given assurance of safe-conduct.

[18486] No. 478.

Council of Foreign Bondholders to Foreign Office.—(Received April 22.)

Sir, 17, *Moorgate Street, London, April 21, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose copy of a communication we are sending to-day to the various syndicates representing the holders of Turkish Government bonds.

I have, &c.
JAMES P. COOPER, *Secretary.*

Enclosure in No. 478.

Council of Foreign Bondholders to Syndicates of Turkish Government Bonds.

Dear Sir, *London, April 21, 1913.*

WITH reference to the conference which is to take place in Paris for the discussion and settlement of Turkish and Balkan finances we are of opinion:—

1. That, at any rate in so far as the bondholders secured by the Decree of Mouharrem and the decret-annex are concerned, the Balkan allies must assume and become responsible for the payment of the equivalent of the sum collected on account of the bondholders in the territories acquired by the said allies.

2. That the said sum shall, if possible, be capitalised.

We consider it most important that representatives of the debt council should attend the conference officially, and we especially desire to point out that no change can be made in the status of the debt without the consent of the bondholders.

If, as we hope, you are in accord with these views, you might think it desirable to communicate with your Government with regard thereto.

I am, &c.
JAMES P. COOPER, *Secretary.*

[18456] No. 479.

Vice-Admiral Commanding Third Squadron to Admiralty.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, April 22.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *April 21, 1913.*

"EDGAR QUINET" left at 7.30 P.M. for Bizerta. Three transports have arrived to-day and have begun to embark wagons and guns. Steamboats have been lent from ships present, as owing to lighters and tugs promised by Greeks not having arrived, there are very few appliances available.

Chief staff officer to general will visit Durazzo to-morrow to supervise arrangements for troops embarking.

[18458] No. 480.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, April 22.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *April 21, 1913.*

SENIOR naval officer, Salonica, reports arrival of twelve Greek transports there with Greek troops.

[18566] No. 481.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, April 22, 1913.*

AUSTRIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to me very seriously to-day on the subject of Scutari. He said that the present state of this question was worse than ever. The blockade was producing no effect. It was all very well as the first step in a plan for coercing Montenegro into obeying the will of the Powers, but now that this first step had failed the second must be taken, and, in his opinion, this should be disembarkation of an international force, which might remain under the protection of the guns of the fleet, at Antivari and Dulcigno. Italy and Germany had given their consent to this: France conditionally on England's taking part. His Excellency said that there seemed to be hesitation on the part of England, which he regretted but could not explain. Things could not be allowed to remain as they were at present. His information went to show that Scutari could not hold out much longer, and, if it fell, European situation would be greatly aggravated. Austria could not admit that Scutari should remain in the hands of Montenegrins, and if they took it they would have to be driven out. How this was to be done was the problem. He said that his sincere desire was to work in this question in concert with the other Powers, but if the latter had no suggestions to make, he intimated that Austria might be driven to act alone or in concert with Italy to enforce decision of Europe in regard to Albanian frontier. Italy, he declared, had so far acted in perfect accord with Austria in this matter. Austria must defend her vital interests, and Scutari was one of these; another would be incorporation of Montenegro in Servia. This she could not allow.

On my asking him approximate number of troops he would deem it necessary to send to hold Scutari, he replied about 40,000, as Austria could not risk a misadventure. I think he would like an international contingent landed on Montenegrin soil to show the flags of the Powers, and that latter, without giving formal mandate to Austria and Italy, should at least allow them to turn Montenegrins out of Scutari should the town fall.

Minister for Foreign Affairs had no objections to raise to idea of applying to

Turkey to surrender Scutari to the Powers, but he thought it was of no practical value to apply to the King of Montenegro for a guarantee not to fire on the foreign detachments as proposed in Ambassadors' conference on Monday. Situation in Montenegro was just now abnormal, and the King's authority greatly impaired.

As to making financial proposals to Montenegro, Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks such a plan useless in present circumstances, as until the siege of Scutari ceases offer will not be accepted.

His Excellency's impression was that Russia would not be opposed to Austrian action so long as this were not carried out against Servia, Russia being very anxious for prompt termination of Scutari siege.

[18559] No. 482.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 104.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, April 22, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 94 of 14th April.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informs me that, notwithstanding King Nicholas's refusal of permission, a Servian emissary has succeeded in entering Scutari and communicating to the commandant that Servian troops are withdrawing, and that during this operation the garrison should not undertake any offensive operations.

The Montenegrins are much incensed, as they maintain that the commandant was to the point of surrender, but changed his mind on receiving the Servian message.

[18558] No. 483.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 105.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, April 22, 1913.*

MINISTRY of Foreign Affairs has received a report that, on learning that Servian troops were about to evacuate Albania, Mahommedans attacked the Christians, and serious disorders took place at Tirana, on the bank of the Devoli River.

A deputation from Lyushi has approached the Servian authorities, requesting that Servian troops may remain to maintain order until some other authority is properly established.

[18560] No. 484.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 106.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, April 22, 1913.*

FOLLOWING is repetition of telegram No. 11 from Monastir to-day:—

"Seventh regiment and two batteries field guns have left Monastir for Kuprulu."

(R.) Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs explained movements of troops as purely precautionary, and that they are necessitated by the fact that the Bulgarians appear to be disposing their forces for possible offensive movement.

[18564] No. 485.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 150.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, April 22, 1913.*

TENSION between Bulgaria and Servia over partition of conquered territory is becoming serious.

Any untoward incident after the conclusion of preliminary arrangements with Turkey might make situation acute.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

[18410] No. 486.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, April 22, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 59.

Montenegrin Government have returned reply, which, after recapitulating proposals of Powers on the four points, runs as follows:—

"Les Etats alliés constatent que les conditions ci-dessus, auxquelles les Puissances consentent d'intervenir comme médiatrices en vue de la conclusion de la paix avec la Turquie, diffèrent un peu de celles qu'ils ont formulées dans leur réponse du 5 avril. Cependant, dans leur sincère désir de faciliter et de faire aboutir la médiation offerte, les Etats alliés, en remerciant de nouveau les Puissances de vouloir bien admettre le principe de l'indemnité de guerre, déclarent qu'ils acceptent cette médiation, en se réservant dans le cours des négociations de débattre avec les Puissances les questions se rapportant aux îles et à la fixation définitive des frontières de la Thrace et de toute l'Albanie."

[18548] No. 487.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 78.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, April 22, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 147 of 18th April: Crete.

Italian Government have instructed their representative at Athens to take similar action if all the Powers agree to do so, but are anxious to avoid any independent action, as they have other issues with the Greek Government.

[18167] No. 488.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir C. Buchanan.

(No. 352.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, April 22, 1913.*

YOUR despatch No. 128 of 17th April: Bulgaro-Roumanian mediation.

I approve your attitude throughout the meetings, and have no modifications to suggest in the text of the decision of the conference, if it satisfies the Russian Government.

[16318] No. 489.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 265.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 22, 1913.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copy of a note from the Turkish Ambassador at this Court, requesting that His Majesty's Government will give their support to a proposal that the Ottoman Public Debt Administration should be represented at the forthcoming International Financial Commission in Paris.†

I do not feel disposed to accede to this request. The Ottoman Public Debt has, I consider, no interests apart from the collective interests of the bondholders, the protection of which will be one of the duties of the delegates by whom the various Powers concerned will be represented on the commission, and who, it may be noted, are in several cases themselves commissioners of their respective Governments on the Debt Administration. The presence of special representatives of the Debt would therefore appear superfluous.

I am further of opinion that the Debt Administration, not being a sovereign State, cannot properly be admitted to representation on an international commission.

Your Excellency should ask the Government to which you are accredited what

* Also to Sir E. Goschen (No. 129), Sir F. Cartwright (No. 98), and Sir R. Rodd (No. 211).
† No. 214.

attitude they propose to adopt with regard to the request of the Sublime Porte, and should inform them that I propose to reply to it in accordance with the views set forth above.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[18615] No. 490.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 11. Commercial.)

Sir, *Salonica, April 16, 1913.*

ACCORDING to an official statement reproduced in the local press to-day, goods can now be imported into Greece from any portion of the Ottoman territories at present in the occupation of the Greek troops without payment of duty, with the exception of the following articles:—

1. Alcoholic beverages (including beer) and hops.
2. Gunpowder and other explosive substances.
3. Tobacco and cigarettes.
4. Ready-made clothing.
5. Forest produce.
6. Flour and farinaceous foods.
7. Medicines and pharmaceutical products.

The articles specified above will continue to pay duty at the same rates as before.

Goods intended for importation into Greece free of duty must be accompanied by a certificate of origin issued by the local municipal authorities at the port of shipment.

The following articles can be imported into the territories occupied by the Greek troops without payment of duty:—

1. Raw cotton for the use of spinning factories.
2. Raw wool and woollen yarn.
3. Bark and other similar products for the use of tanneries.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[18606] No. 491.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 19.)

Sir, *Cettinjé, April 17, 1913.*

WITH reference to your instructions in connection with the report that the British vice-consul had been wounded by the explosion of a shell thrown into the consulate at Scutari, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the representation which I made on the 12th instant to the Montenegrin Government. I have not so far received any formal reply from them.

A note received from M. Summa's eldest son, who is at present at Podgoritza, states that, according to the account given by the refugees from Scutari, the incident occurred at 1 o'clock on the afternoon of the 12th March last. He adds, on the same authority, that houses in the adjoining streets were also destroyed, apparently by shells from guns of large calibre.

In view of the fact that the Servians had no such guns in position on the date in question and that their mountain guns were, as far as I know, being employed in the attack of the position of Brditza at some distance from the town, there would seem to be little doubt that the shells were fired by the Montenegrins.

I have, &c.
J DE SALIS.

Enclosure in No. 491.

Aide-mémoire communicated to Montenegrin Government.

DE sources vraisemblables Sir Edward Grey vient d'apprendre que le vice consul britannique à Scutari aurait été blessé par un obus lancé dans le consulat.

Il est à remarquer que le consulat se trouve au milieu du quartier chrétien de la ville, loin de tout établissement militaire.

Dans le cas où cette triste nouvelle se confirme Sir Edward Grey aura à s'aviser des démarches qu'il conviendra au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique de prendre en soumettant à la publicité les représentations qu'il s'est déjà trouvé dans le cas d'adresser au Gouvernement Royal monténégrin et les rapports qui les ont motivés.

[18588] No. 492.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 325.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April 19, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 295 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica reporting on the alleged withdrawal of Servian troops from Ghevgheli and Demir Kapu.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 492.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 31.)

Sir, *Salonica, April 12, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 25 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I understand that the Serbs have agreed to evacuate Ghevgheli, which they have hitherto occupied conjointly with the Bulgars and the Greeks, and to withdraw their troops as far north as Demir Kapu, which will henceforward become the frontier station between themselves and the Greeks. Two regiments of Evzones and two batteries of Greek artillery have left Salonica for the purpose of occupying the district thus evacuated.

I am informed that Ghevgheli, where there are considerable barracks, is intended to become the depôt of one of the two new divisions (the Xth) which the Greeks propose to form in the conquered territories.

A copy of this despatch is being sent directly to His Britannic Majesty's legations at Athens and Belgrade.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

P.S.—From later information it appears that the troops despatched from here have not at present proceeded further than Ghumendje, the actual frontier station.
H. H. L.

[18589] No. 493.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 326.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April 19, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 249 of the 30th of last month I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica reporting further on the alleged forcible conversions of Mussulmans in that district.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 493.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 32.)

Sir, *Salonica, April 12, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 22 of the 22nd ultimo and to other correspondence on the subject of the forced conversion of Mussulman villages to Christianity in the districts occupied by Bulgars in Macedonia, I have the honour to report that eight inhabitants of Tchervnik, or Tchervnikli, a village of some 300 houses situated in the mountains about 5 miles north of Pehtchevo, came to the consulate this morning to complain of the continuance of the violence of all descriptions to which they are still exposed with a view to obliging them to confess themselves Christians.

According to my informants' story it must have been about the middle of February that this particular village was first "converted." In the early morning it was surrounded by 400 or 500 armed men, half of whom remained posted at the various exits while the rest entered the village and obliged all the male inhabitants, from the age of 7 upwards, to assemble in the school-house. They were there harangued by a Bulgarian schoolmaster from Pehtchevo, originally a native of Stroumnitza, who told them that it was the will of King Ferdinand that there should be no differences of religion in his dominions, and that therefore they must all be christened and become "Bulgarians." The villagers said that they were willing to accept Bulgarian rule and to comply with all legitimate orders that might be communicated to them by the constituted authorities, but that they could not abandon their religion. The propagandists, soon tiring of argument, singled out a young man and asked him if he were prepared to adopt Christianity. On his refusing he was first severely beaten with sticks and the butts of rifles in the presence of the rest, and finally led away between guards with fixed bayonets. The same process was then repeated with another and yet another until ten or twelve had been removed. The remainder, having little doubt that nothing short of summary execution awaited the obstinate, eventually consented to be christened.

They subsequently, however, complained to the authorities in Pehtchevo of the treatment to which they had been submitted, and about three weeks afterwards the "Natchalnik" of Pehtchevo, who is described as being a native of Radovishta and brother to the "Despot Vekili," or Suffragan Bishop of Osmanich, came to their village and told them that there had been misunderstandings, but that in future every man would be free to profess the religion that he chose. The villagers were encouraged by this to ask that the Government might grant them some assistance to rebuild their mosque, which had been destroyed, and would take steps to send them a hodja to replace their former one, who had been amongst the 700 Turks "executed" in Stroumnitza, as reported in my despatch No. 174 of the 11th December. To these requests, however, they received only evasive replies.

A week after this visit of the "Natchalnik" a certain Pop Gheorghi, the priest of the neighbouring village of Ismojnir, or Smojmirovo, came from Pehtchevo and announced that he had been appointed to take charge of the ecclesiastical affairs of the village. The villagers were again collected at the school, and those who protested that they were Mussulmans were taken outside and again subjected to severe ill-treatment at the hands of the armed Bulgars who had accompanied the priest. Towards evening the latter withdrew, but only to return again at intervals of a few days and repeat the same performance. Finally, on Thursday, the 3rd instant, he reappeared in the village early in the morning and announced his intention of taking up his residence there. The villagers, relying on the official declarations of the "Natchalnik," refused to accept him, and sent him back to Pehtchevo under a strong escort, fearing that if any harm befell him on the way the Bulgars would seize the pretext for destroying their village altogether. Later in the day the priest returned, and was again re-escorted to Pehtchevo. This time the villagers who escorted him back were threatened by the gendarmes and by the Bulgarian inhabitants of Pehtchevo with extermination if they persisted in their refusal to become "Bulgarian." Shortly after sunset Pop Gheorghi appeared again for the third time in the village. Thereon my informants, feeling that all resistance was hopeless, decided to flee from the village and endeavour to reach Salonica for the purpose of bringing their situation to the knowledge of the foreign consuls.

Like the Ruptchos villagers, whose visit to me I reported in my despatch No. 10 of the 7th February last, these people declared that they raised no objection to their passing under Bulgarian dominion. They did not even complain of the plundering of their houses,

the confiscation of all their live stock, or the physical violence to which they themselves had been submitted. All these things they regarded as the natural, if not inevitable, consequences of the conquest of their country, which had been ordained by God. All they demanded was that they should be allowed to practise without interference the religion of their fathers, and that their lives and the honour of their women should be respected, and for this they appealed to the protection of England, as the Power under whose rule the largest remaining Mussulman population enjoyed religious and political liberty.

In answer to my questions my visitors declared that previous to the war they had lived in perfect unity with their Christian neighbours, and had consequently nothing on their consciences, as had many of their co-religionists in the districts of Kotchana, Radovishta, and Ishtib. Their kaza contained forty-two Christian and only fourteen Mussulman villages, and the former had had nothing to complain of at the hands of the latter. Neither, so far as they knew, had they themselves much to complain of as regarded the inhabitants of the neighbouring Christian villages. The persecutions of which they had been the victims were mainly the work of the Bulgarian inhabitants of the town of Pehtchevo, instigated and led by outsiders. Amongst those of the ringleaders whom they had able personally to identify, they mentioned the following persons:—

The son of a certain Gholo, whom they understood to have been appointed mayor of Pehtchevo;
The son of Pop Arso, of Pehtchevo;
Davidko, son of Ghogo, of Pehtchevo;
Yano, son of Sino, of Pehtchevo;
Lesso, son of Yovan, of Pehtchevo;
Gligor, son of Vesenko, of Pehtchevo;
Dimitreki, kmat or mayor of Duboshtitza, in the kaza of Djounaa-i-bala;
Pop Natcho and Yaniel Ilef, of Pantcharevo.

They declared that, though nobody had been killed outright during the conversion operations in their village, ten or twelve had subsequently succumbed to the results the beatings received. They themselves had all undergone the violence complained of, and two, whom I personally interviewed, showed unmistakable signs of ill-usage. Another point of which they complained was that the girls of their village were compelled to marry Christians. They cited five such cases by name, though it transpired that in three of them the bridegrooms were young men of the same village who had been forcibly converted. The religious ceremony was performed by Pop Gavril, the priest of the neighbouring Bulgar village of Pantcharevo.

In addition to the districts mentioned in my previous reports on this subject, information of a similar nature has reached me from Razlog and Kilkish, leaving absolutely no doubt that these barbarities, which have now been carried on over a period of four months, are the result of a deliberate and systematic policy.

A copy of this despatch is being sent direct to His Britannic Majesty's Legation in Sophia.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[18575] No. 194.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 202.)

Sir, *Paris, April 22, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, with reference to my despatch No. 197 of the 17th April, a despatch from the British delegates to the International Commission to deal with the financial questions arising out of the Balkan war.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 494.

British Financial Delegates to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 2.)

Sir, *Paris, April 22, 1913.*

WE have the honour to report that we had yesterday a conversation with the delegates of the French Government on the International Commission to deal with the financial questions arising out of the Balkan war.

The discussion was mainly directed to the elucidation of the figures which are to serve as a basis of discussion for the apportionment of the Turkish Debt.

It was made clear that no useful progress can be made until materials are available for the detailed consideration of the figures which have been supplied from various quarters representing the total revenues of the Turkish Empire, the portion of these revenues drawn from the Roumelian provinces, and the receipts of the Council of the Ottoman Debt from the same territories. Detailed information is also required concerning the conditions governing the various Turkish loans.

On the other hand it was agreed that it would greatly expedite the work of the International Commission if a preliminary discussion of the numerous points involved could take place before the formal meetings of the commission begin.

As it is understood that Sir Richard Crawford, the Financial Adviser to the Ottoman Government, will shortly be in Paris, it was decided that informal meetings with delegates of other Powers should, if possible, be arranged at which he should be present, when the points in question would be elucidated.

The chief German delegate, whom he saw subsequently, has expressed his entire concurrence in the proposed procedure.

One point which may prove of considerable importance was brought out by the discussion, namely, that it is not only the amount of the Turkish Debt to be taken over by the allies, which will be affected according as one or another basis of apportionment is adopted; the underlying principle may also affect the mode of employment of any capital sums by the payment of which the allies may discharge their obligations. For it seems to be a logical consequence of adopting the principle of the "Spécialisation des gages" that the capital payments resulting from that principle should be assigned to paying off in various proportions those loans, and those only, which are guaranteed on revenues of the European provinces.

This result does not appear acceptable to the French delegation, who seem to think that other categories of the Turkish Debt should also participate in the process of reduction which the payment of a capital sum by the Balkan States would render possible.

We have, &c.
LANCELOT D. CARNEGIE.
H. P. HARVEY.

[18576] No. 495.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 203.)

Sir, *Paris, April 22, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a note from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, in reply to the enquiry which I addressed to his Excellency in accordance with the instructions contained in your despatch No. 229 of the 4th instant as to the views of the French Government and the action to be taken for the protection of the interests of the French holders of the Treasury bills issued on the 14th February, 1912, by the National Bank of Turkey and the Bank of Salonica.

M. Pichon states that he has instructed the French representatives at Sophia and Athens to discuss the matter with the Bulgarian and Greek Governments respectively, and he thinks that it would be desirable that similar instructions be sent to His Majesty's representatives in those capitals.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 495.

M. Pichon to Sir F. Bertie.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Paris, le 21 avril, 1913.*

PAR une note en date du 9 de ce mois, votre Excellence a bien voulu me demander quelle attitude le Gouvernement de la république entendait adopter pour la sauvegarde des intérêts des porteurs français de bons ottomans souscrits le 14 février, 1912, par la Banque nationale de Turquie et la Banque de Salonique. Aux termes du contrat, les revenus des douanes de Salonique et d'Andrinople ont été assignés au payement de ces bons.

Tout en tenant compte du fait que l'avance représentée par ces bons est au nombre de celles qui très probablement seront admises à figurer proportionnellement dans la part de la dette ottomane qui devra être mise à la charge des États alliés, concessionnaires de portions du territoire ottoman, le Gouvernement de la république a cru néanmoins qu'il serait utile de signaler aux États alliés, dont les forces occupent Salonique et Andrinople, l'affectation consentie par la Sublime Porte en faveur des créanciers étrangers sur les revenus douaniers perçus dans ces deux villes.

En conséquence, le 8 avril, j'ai transmis aux Ministres de France à Sophia et à Athènes le mémoire que m'avaient remis les porteurs français de ces bons, et j'ai invité les représentants de la république à entretenir les Gouvernements bulgare et hellénique de cette question. Je ne verrais donc que des avantages à ce que le représentant du Gouvernement Royal, dont les nationaux détiennent la plus grande part de ces bons, soit également invité à appeler l'attention des Gouvernements à Sophia et à Athènes sur la situation des porteurs de ces titres ottomans.

Agréez, &c.
(Pour le Ministre),
PALÉOLOGUE.

[18642] No. 496.

M. Cambon to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

L'AMBASSADEUR de France est chargé de proposer au Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Étrangères la date du 15 mai pour la réunion à Paris de la commission internationale chargée de rechercher les solutions des problèmes financiers posés par la guerre des Balkans.

Il est également chargé de proposer que le délégué diplomatique de chaque État et le premier adjoint technique—soit deux personnes par délégation—prennent seuls séance à la commission; les autres adjoints techniques siégeraient dans les sous-commissions et pourraient, selon la nature des questions à l'ordre du jour, remplacer dans la commission le premier adjoint technique.

M. Paul Cambon serait heureux de connaître le plus tôt possible la réponse de Sir Edward Grey à ces deux propositions.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 22 avril, 1913.

[18571] No. 497.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 23.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April 22, 1913.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 21st instant, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram dated the 22nd instant which has been sent to the Vice-Admiral, H.M.S. "King Edward VII."

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 497.

Admiralty to Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII."

(Telegraphic.) *April* 22, 1913.

VOLUNTEER steamer "St. Petersburgh" (Russian), flying Red Cross, left Odessa the 21st April to take on board and convey to Salonica Servian sick and wounded from Albania. Give every assistance.

[18645] No. 498.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received April 23.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Board of Trade, April* 22, 1913.

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 16th April on the subject of the proposals put forward by this Department for safeguarding the position of foreign trade with the Balkan States on the conclusion of the present war.

In reply I am to say that, as will be seen from their letter of the 31st March and its enclosure, it was not the intention of the Board to suggest in article 1 (3) of their draft formula that there should be no increase of customs duties in the existing territories of Bulgaria and Servia for fifteen years The whole of the proposed stipulations were confined to the newly-annexed territories. The Board, however, appreciate the force of the considerations urged in your letter under reply, and they do not desire to press the matter further.

As regards article 1 (4) of their formula, the Board recognise that this proposal—which was designed to afford time for trade to accommodate itself to new circumstances—would necessitate special customs arrangements on the part of the States acquiring new territory. This, however, should not be a matter of great difficulty as a purely temporary arrangement, particularly as the States are at present under obligation to maintain a separate customs régime in their existing territories and the occupied territories respectively. The Board think, therefore, that article 1 (4) of their formula might reasonably be proposed by the Powers to the allied States.

I am, &c.

GEO. J. STANLEY.

[19005] No. 499.

Note communicated by Count Mensdorff, April 23, 1913.

LA proposition présentée au nom du Gouvernement austro-hongrois à la réunion du 15 mars relativement aux droits découlant des Capitulations turques dans les territoires annexés par les alliés a été opposée par le Gouvernement russe invoquant la doctrine du droit international qu'en cas de cession d'une portion de territoire d'un État à un autre État la portion annexée cesse d'être soumise aux traités conclus par le cédant et subit l'application des conventions diplomatiques qui lient l'État annexant (voir Bonfils, "Manuel de Droit international public," p. 114, No. 219).

Il est vrai que la doctrine pose en théorie cette règle ; néanmoins, en pratique une précision s'impose. Le caractère de cette règle n'est nullement impératif et elle est seulement appliquée si, à l'occasion de l'annexion d'un territoire la question du maintien des conventions antérieures à l'annexion n'a pas été réglée par une stipulation spéciale (par exemple, un traité de paix), ou si ladite annexion a reçu une reconnaissance expresse sans réserve ou une reconnaissance tacite.

S'il revient aux Puissances de formuler elles-mêmes les conditions d'une paix préliminaire entre la Turquie et les alliés la règle invoquée par le Gouvernement russe ne saurait les empêcher de poser la demande que l'abolition ou la restriction des Capitulations dans les territoires turcs annexés par les alliés ne pourra être effectuée qu'après avoir obtenu de la Puissance intéressée une renonciation expresse.

Il existe du reste des exemples qui prouvent que la doctrine du droit international sur laquelle la Russie s'appuie, n'a pas toujours été observée dans toute sa vigueur. Pour n'en citer qu'un : le Japon, ayant annexé la Corée après une guerre victorieuse, abolit formellement tout traité de commerce existant entre la Corée et les Puissances

étrangères mais concéda en même temps que le système douanier basé sur lesdits traités soit maintenu sans aucun changement pour la durée de dix ans. Par ce fait le commerce étranger est traité encore maintenant en Corée sur un pied de parfaite égalité avec le commerce japonais.

Ambassade d'Autriche-Hongrie, Londres,
le 23 avril, 1913.

[18920] No. 500.

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff.—(Communicated by Austrian Ambassador, April 23, 1913.)

(Translation.)

THE eventuality foreseen by us, namely, the fall of Scutari, has now become an accomplished fact.

That this should have been carried through by Montenegro in spite of the categorical declarations made by the representatives of the Great Powers at Cettinjé, and regardless of the international fleet assembled in Montenegrin waters, makes manifest to the whole world the unprecedented defiance on the part of Montenegro of the will of Europe. The prestige of the Powers concerned seems to be damaged thereby to such an extent that we anticipate that none of them will quietly accept such an affront, and for our part at any rate we are determined not to leave it without redress.

It has consequently become an unavoidable necessity for the Great Powers, without any delay, to take energetic action in order fully to rehabilitate their greatly wounded dignity, and now at length to put into execution the decisions at which they have arrived.

We are entitled, therefore, to expect that the Powers will at once come to a definite resolution respecting the measures of coercion to be adopted by them, and we propose that these might take the form of an occupation of Montenegrin ports by international detachments or a bombardment of those ports. Should the Powers not be able to make up their minds to this, the moral obligation will be incumbent upon us to take steps to carry out the will of the Powers, as laid down in international agreements, and to compel the evacuation of Scutari.

Your Excellency should lay the above at once before the British Government and add that we are at the same time approaching the other Cabinets in the same sense and urgently requesting them to send the necessary instructions to their Ambassadors in London, so that a resolution dealing with the matter may be drawn up by the Ambassadors' conference as soon as possible. In view of the urgency of the situation, your Excellency should take note that, if all the representatives should not be instructed in time for to-morrow's sitting, it would be necessary, seeing the manifest impossibility of deferring the question, that the necessary resolution should, at the latest, be agreed upon at a sitting to be convened for the day after to-morrow, Friday.

[18657] No. 501.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 23.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April* 23, 1913.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegrams, dated the 22nd and 23rd instant, relative to Montenegrin affairs.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 501.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April* 22, 1913.

TEN transports have arrived to date, and work of embarkation is going on. Servian troops from south have come up to Durazzo, and are waiting to be embarked.

The Servian rearguard previously mentioned has been withdrawn, and is retiring upon Alessio.

I transmitted to Servian general this morning Turkish Government's safe conduct for transports conveying troops to Salonica.

Enclosure 2 in No. 501.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April* 22, 1913.

SERVIAN general sent me written communication to-day, in which he most strongly represents that Albanians, both Christians and Mussulmans, feel great uneasiness at the withdrawal of Servian troops. They state openly that they are dissatisfied with the fate which Europe has destined for them, and predict that, with the withdrawal of a competent authority to maintain law and order, the control of affairs will be vested in Mussulman Bey, who has for years been subsidised by foreigners, who are seeking thus to promote their interests in the country.

The general alleges that the sufferings of Christians have already commenced, two having been murdered at Pecune, a Christian chemist robbed at Kavola, and two other Christians assassinated at Tirana.

He has requested that I should communicate with the Government in this sense, so that disorder and massacre may not become prevalent on the withdrawal of the Servian army from Durazzo.

I am sending a letter by first post.

Enclosure 3 in No. 501.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty

(Telegraphic.) *April* 23, 1913.

AUSTRIAN Government informed their rear-admiral that a ship with 6,000 tons of Indian corn for Montenegrin army was about to leave Messina for Durazzo. I have therefore extended blockade to Durazzo from 6 A.M. 23rd April, having the consent of all my colleagues to do so. Servians will be accorded the same facilities under the blockade as at San Giovanni di Medua.

[18565] No. 502.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 64.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, April* 23, 1913.

SCUTARI has fallen.

[18742] No. 503.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 156.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, April* 23, 1913.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs to-day expressed apprehension that the fall of Scutari, of which news had just reached him, might lead to some military action on the part of Austria. He was afraid that even collective coercive measures would arouse Russian public opinion, and, although Government would probably be able to control it, he was anxious, if possible, to avoid them. King Nicholas would, he believed, give up Scutari in return for some territorial compensation, and he would be very grateful if you could see your way to suggesting that Montenegro should be given a further strip of territory between the lake and the right bank of the Boyana. He was telegraphing to Paris in the above sense. It might, he said, be difficult to induce

Austria to consent to this, but it would be deplorable if, now that peace was almost in sight, situation were again to take a turn for the worse.

His Excellency also spoke with some anxiety of Serbo-Bulgarian relations. He was doing all he could to reconcile their differences; but, while Bulgaria was ready to submit them to Russia's mediation, Servia had not so far expressed her willingness to do so.

[18750] No. 504.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 63 A.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, April* 23, 1913.

FOLLOWING from military attaché for Director of Military Operations:—

"According to latest information 15th and 16th Army Corps are fully mobilised and ready to start at once if required. Batteries have six guns, and auxiliary troops are fully provided. From excess establishments supplementary cadres have been formed to undertake garrison duties so that units can march at full strength. Fourth, seventh, and thirteenth corps remain partially mobilised. Batteries have six guns; establishment of companies, 175, Honved units included. For these corps to complete to war strength about seven days necessary. Unconfirmed information states that reserve force may be assembled at Budapest Further information confirms news of preparations at Bozen and Laibach. In the first ten and [? or] eleven corps artillery regiments have six batteries; elsewhere, five."

[18732] No. 505.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 107.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, April* 23, 1913.

OTTOMAN Debt.

Your despatch No. 26 of 27th March.

The German Minister presented memorandum some time ago. French and Austrian colleagues are about to do similarly to-morrow, but the Italian Chargé d'Affaires has as yet no instructions.

Should I proceed with the French and Austrian Ministers?

[18573] No. 506.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, April* 23, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 66 of 18th April: Protest against preferential treatment of Greek goods in Crete.

All my colleagues have not yet received instructions.

I have received, and have sent by post, reply to collective note of 28th March (see my despatch No. 62), in which Greek Government justify preferential treatment in the occupied territories by precedent of Italian action in occupied Ægean islands, where Italian goods enter duty free. If true this seems unanswerable. No doubt the same answer would be given in the case of Crete, although Crete is not technically occupied. Is it desirable to expose ourselves to this?

[19717] No. 507.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 195.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April* 23, 1912.

THE meeting of the Ambassadors came to-day to the following resolution, and you should act upon it when your colleagues have received the necessary instructions:—

"La réunion pense qu'il convient de prescrire aux Ambassadeurs des Puissances à Constantinople de faire connaître à la Sublime Porte par une démarche collective

l'acceptation par les alliés des bases de la paix, et l'invitation adressée à ces derniers de cesser les hostilités, de désigner leurs plénipotentiaires et de choisir un lieu de réunion pour les négociations de paix. La Sublime Porte sera invitée, en meme temps, à cesser les hostilités, à choisir les représentants et à se prononcer sur le choix d'un lieu de réunion pour la conférence de la paix."

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 179; St. Petersburgh, No. 354; Vienna, No. 151; Rome, No. 152; and Paris, No. 180, for information only.)

[19717] No. 508.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 50.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, April 23, 1913.*

YOU should, as soon as your colleagues have received the necessary instructions, make collectively with them a communication to the Montenegrin Government in the following terms:—

"La réunion des Ambassadeurs est d'avis qu'il convient de déclarer collectivement au Gouvernement monténégrin que la prise de Scutari ne modifie en rien les décisions des Puissances relatives à la délimitation nord et nord-est de l'Albanie, que, par conséquent, la ville de Scutari doit être évacuée dans le plus bref délai et qu'elle devra être remise aux Puissances représentées par les commandants des forces navales internationales. Le Gouvernement monténégrin sera invité à donner une prompte réponse à cette communication."

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 355; Paris, No. 181; Rome, No. 153; Vienna, No. 152; Constantinople, No. 196; and Berlin, No. 180.)

[19717] No. 509.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.**

(No. 67.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 23, 1913.*

AS soon as your colleagues are similarly instructed, you should make collectively with them the following communication to the Government to which you are accredited:—

"Les Puissances prennent acte avec satisfaction de la réponse des alliés à leur dernière note et de leur acceptation des bases de paix formulées dans cette note. Les bases de paix ayant été déjà agréées par la Sublime Porte, les Puissances invitent les belligérants à cesser immédiatement les hostilités, à désigner leurs plénipotentiaires et le lieu de la réunion pour la négociation de la paix.

"Quant aux réserves de la réponse des alliés relatives aux îles et à la délimitation de l'Albanie, les Puissances font de nouveau observer que ces questions sont exclusivement de leur ressort. En conséquence, elles font remarquer que la cession des îles par la Turquie ne peut être mentionnée comme le font les alliés dans le paragraphe 2 de leur réponse."

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 178; Constantinople, No. 194; Paris, No. 179; Rome, No. 152; St. Petersburgh, No. 353; and Vienna, No. 150, for information only.)

[18643] No. 510.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 89.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 23, 1913.*

THE Austro-Hungarian Ambassador called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 19th April to read a telegram from Count Berchtold. The Austrian Minister at Cettinjé reported the day before yesterday that Prince Danilo of Montenegro had stated that the besieging force had been bombarding the forts round Scutari and would now proceed to bombard the town; that seventy were dying daily of hunger in Scutari; that there were 8,000

* Also to Sir H. Rax-Ironside (No. 102), Sir R. Paget (No. 85), and Count de Salis (No. 49).

sick in hospital; and that the garrison was exhausted. The speedy fall of Scutari was therefore anticipated.

Count Berchtold considered that in these circumstances it was necessary for the international fleet to accentuate its pressure, and that he had telegraphed to the Austrian admiral to propose to his colleagues that one or two points on the coast should be occupied. Count Berchtold was of opinion that Europe must not be defied in this manner by Montenegro, and that it would be absurd to allow Scutari to fall under the eyes of the international fleet. He was anxious to avoid being placed in the disagreeable necessity of taking isolated action against Montenegro.

Sir A. Nicolson told Count Mensdorff that he would communicate what his Excellency had said to the Prime Minister and me, but that he had some doubts as to whether we should be disposed to land men.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[18805] No. 511.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 7.)
Sir, *Canea, April 12, 1913.*

THERE have been very few subjects for report in Crete since the arrival of Mr. Dragoumis as Governor-General, appointed by the King of Greece, and it may be as well to submit some general remarks on the present situation in the island.

It is safe to say that the past half-year is the calmest which Crete has known in autonomous times. Not even a public meeting has disturbed the general tranquillity, and the population, no longer incited to create trouble by interested persons, has entirely belied its well-earned reputation for turbulence. No doubt this satisfactory state of things is largely due to Mr. Dragoumis himself, who from the day of his arrival took the reins of government entirely into his own hands, refused to be influenced by, or even to consult, the old gang of disreputable politicians, and let it be known that he would stand no nonsense.

The public in general appears quite content to find itself under a benevolent despotism, but naturally the cliques which were accustomed to misadminister the island to their personal profit, and who now find their occupation gone, are far from satisfied. They can, however, do nothing, and have to confine themselves to veiled criticisms of the Governor-General in the press, which the latter gentleman can safely ignore.

The turn which affairs have taken causes great disappointment amongst the politicians, who when they clamoured for union with Greece meant union on their own terms and never believed that it would imply the annexation pure and simple by which they are now faced and which they see will leave them out in the cold. There is some anxiety, too, amongst the upper classes in general at the prospect of Crete being included immediately in the Greek fiscal system, which will naturally render living much more expensive. The Cretans have hitherto been very lightly taxed, and they always hoped that they would be granted a privileged position in this respect compared with the rest of Greece, at least for some years after union was accomplished.

The Mussulmans have, perhaps, profited more than any other class by the general tranquillity. The *mot d'ordre* was issued from the beginning that the duration of the war was to be considered a close time for them, and this has, generally speaking, been scrupulously observed. At no time since I came to Crete have there been fewer outrages on Mussulmans to deplore, nor is there any appreciable relapse in this respect even since the return of the numerous bad characters who joined volunteer bands at the beginning of the war. This is the more admirable considering that practically the whole of the Cretan gendarmerie is now in Thessaly and Epirus (a further contingent of 100 odd left last week), and the reserve gendarmes who form the only police force in the island do not show themselves particularly efficient.

The Mussulmans on their part have responded by taking a public share in the mourning for the late King of Greece. This, if not a very sincere, was certainly a wise proceeding.

Crete is now to all practical purposes a part of the kingdom of Greece. Greek laws are applied wholesale, and nothing remains of the old régime but the naval clubs at Suda and the Capitulations. I should not like to guarantee, however, that the

enterprising Mr. Dragoumis will refrain for ever from encroaching even on the latter institution.

The foreign flagstaffs on Suda Island have been cut down, and Mr. Dragoumis has announced in the Official Gazette that, as a memorial to the late King, one of the ruined churches on that island "freed during His Majesty's reign" will be restored.

Further, the custom-house authorities have been notified that the produce of Crete will henceforward be admitted into Greece free of duty.

The position of the foreign consuls in Crete is at times very difficult. For more than a year past they have been debarred from correspondence with the local authorities owing to the insistence of the latter to head their letters "Kingdom of Greece." The only Government in the island since last October has been Mr. Dragoumis himself, and with Mr. Dragoumis they are forbidden to have any official relations. All matters of business have to be treated verbally with subordinate officials like the chief of the gendarmerie, and when this resource fails they can do nothing.

Should the present situation drag on much longer I should be inclined to recommend that we should be authorised to treat Mr. Dragoumis as a *de facto* Government.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

[18835] No. 512.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 20.)
Sir, *Cettinjé, April* 17, 1913.

THOUGH the recent official communiqué respecting the policy of the Russian Government towards Montenegro in relation to the present crisis was published on the 10th April in St. Petersburgh, no mention whatever of it appeared in the telegrams of the "Correspondence Bureau" distributed by the Montenegrin post office during the three following days. On the evening of Saturday the 12th April, a very much abridged version of the message of the St. Petersburgh telegraphic agency was published in the official "Glas." No attempt was made to deal with the main points of the Russian statement, but a short paragraph immediately after it declared that, evidently Russian diplomacy did not dispose of accurate sources of information. It did not know for example that in Montenegro, the will of the King and the will of the people were identical. So far from wishing to involve Russia in a European war, the King had begged the Russian Government not to embark on one for the sake of Montenegro; the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs were challenged to produce the correspondence on the subject. Russia was of course right not to spill Russian blood except in the interests of Russia. Montenegro would act in the same way, not risking the blood of its sons except when honour, the safety of the country, national traditions, and the glorious Montenegrin past required it.

A subsequent statement issued by the Press Bureau on the 14th April, but not so far printed, makes no direct reference to Russia, but announces in general terms that Montenegro, even after the withdrawal of the Servians, will not abandon the seige of Scutari. An inspired article of the 3rd (16th) April deals with the suggestions for remedying the economic troubles of the country by a loan; it is declared that the King will never accept such a shameful bargain, which is due to the desire of Vienna to inflict humiliation on Montenegro. A previous article in the "Vjesnik," published on the 2nd April, equally attributes in violent language, to Austria the action of the Powers in calling on Montenegro to discontinue the seige of Scutari and retire from Albanian territory.

I enclose herewith translations of the articles to which reference is made.*

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

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* Not printed.

[18757] No. 513.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 79.)
Sir, *Athens, April* 17, 1913.

M. COROMILAS spoke to me again to-day about the occupation of Vallona by Turkish troops, who had taken down the Albanian flag and rehoisted the Turkish. The presence of these troops so near the Greek outposts was a danger, especially considering their disorganised and undisciplined condition. He thought it might be necessary to re-establish the blockade which had just been raised.

I argued that if they were famished they would be still more dangerous, and that it was much better to allow supplies to reach them. The passage of arms and munitions could, of course, still be intercepted. He said that, at any rate, it was a matter for consideration whether it would not be best for the Greek and Servian forces to carry out a combined operation against Ali Riza and Djavid Pasha's troops, who amounted to about 15,000 men, capture them, afterwards returning to their own positions. I did not gather that he had any intention of proposing this operation to the Servians without being assured that no objection would be raised to it, but he clearly regards the presence of the Turks as constituting a certain military danger at present and a source of embarrassment in future.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[18758] No. 514.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 80.)
Sir, *Athens, April* 17, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 74 of the 14th instant and to your telegram No. 62 of the same date, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the communication which the representatives of the six Powers have this day sent to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, acquainting him with the northern and north-eastern frontiers of Albania as established by their Governments.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 514.

Joint Note communicated to M. Coromilas.

LES représentants de l'Allemagne, de l'Autriche-Hongrie, de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne, de l'Italie et de la Russie, se référant au troisième point de leur communication du 1er (14) avril, ont l'honneur de faire connaître à son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères la délimitation nord et nord-est de l'Albanie, telle qu'elle a été établie par leurs Gouvernements.

"La frontière de l'Albanie partira de la côte adriatique à l'embouchure de la Boyana; elle suivra le thalweg de ce fleuve jusqu'au village de Coritza situé sur la rive droite. De là elle atteint le sommet des montagnes séparant la Boyana du lac de Scutari, en laissant le Tarabosch à l'Albanie. Elle traverse le lac près du village Zogay, qui reste à l'Albanie, jusqu'à la baie de Licheny-Hotit, d'où elle suit la frontière entre les tribus de Groudaet Hoti cédées au Monténégro d'une part, et les tribus de Kastrati et Klémenti d'autre part, laissant ces deux tribus à l'Albanie. Elle se confond ensuite avec les limites actuelles entre la tribu monténégrine de Koutchi d'un côté et la tribu de Klémenti de l'autre côté jusqu'au territoire de Gussigné et Plava; elle laisse ces villes avec leurs dépendances au Monténégro en suivant la chaine principale et la ligne du partage des eaux entre le Lim d'un côté et le Drin de l'autre. Elle quitte cette chaîne pour gagner la crête des collines au sud de la ville de Djakova, qui est laissée hors de l'Albanie, et continue sur cette crête jusqu'au Drin Blanc. Elle suit le cours de ce fleuve jusqu'à l'ouest de Prisren (et ensuite la ligne-frontière entre le district de Prisren) et le district de Liouma, laissant ce dernier à l'Albanie. De là elle suit la crête de la montagne Korab, en laissant à l'Albanie le district de la Basse Dibra et hors de l'Albanie le district de Reka. Quittant cette crête un peu au nord de la

ville de Dibra, qui reste hors de l'Albanie, la frontière gagne le Drin Noire, qu'elle remonte jusqu'au village de Loukovo, d'où, en se dirigeant par les crêtes principales séparant le bassin du Drin de celui du Tchoumbi, et en laissant Strouga hors de l'Albanie, elle gagne la rive du lac d'Okhrida dans les environs du village Lin."

Athens, le 4 (17) *avril*, 1913.

[18759] No. 515.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 81.)

Sir, *Athens, April* 17, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 68 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of an Act of the Greek Ministerial Council (1) excepting certain articles from freedom from duty on importation into Greece from the occupied territories; and (2) permitting the importation duty free into the occupied territories of certain articles which are not liable to duty in Greece.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 515.

Act of the Ministerial Council concerning Exception from Freedom of Duty of Vegetable and Industrial Products transported into Greece from the Occupied Territories.

Act 599.

THE Ministerial Council, taking into consideration the report of the Finance Minister of this year, divided into two chapters, (1) concerning exception from freedom of duty of products transported from the occupied territories into Greece; and (2) concerning the free import of raw material into the occupied territories:

Approves of the following articles being excepted from freedom of duty:—

1. Beer and malt.
2. Spirits of wine of every kind and spirituous liquors.
3. Explosives and gunpowder.
4. Tobacco, cut or not. Cigars and cigarettes.
5. Ready-made clothes.
6. Forest produce.
7. Flour in general, and products of pastry (macaroni, pastes, &c.).

Permits the free importation into the territories under military occupation of the following raw materials, which are also liable to no duty with us:—

1. Class 150 of the customs tariff.—Cotton, ginned or not, for use exclusively in cotton spinning mills. (Free in the tariff.)
2. Class 6 A of the customs tariff.—Raw wool. (Free in the tariff.)
3. Class 175 A of the customs tariff.—Woollen yarn, unbleached, untwisted or twisted. (Free, owing to the German convention.)
4. Class 6 A of the customs tariff.—Bark of trees, and all other vegetable material employed in tanning. (Free in the customs tariff.)

[18944] No. 516.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 24.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April* 23, 1913.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a letter, dated 13th instant, which has been received through the Commander-in-chief,

Mediterranean, from the commanding officer, His Majesty's ship "Medea," respecting the state of affairs at Corfu.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 516.

Commander Woodward to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

Sir, *H.M.S. "Medea," Corfu, April* 13, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that on arrival here on the 11th instant I found eight empty Greek transports at anchor, awaiting orders to embark troops for Salonica. There are a few Greek troops in the town, mostly men who have been brought over from Santa Quaranta for a few days' furlough, invalids, and convalescents. There are also about one dozen Servian officers staying in the hotels who are here for the benefit of their health.

2. About 3,000 Turks (Greek prisoners) are accommodated at the barracks close to the citadel. They are slovenly in appearance, and the sanitary arrangements for them appear to be very primitive. A certain number of these prisoners are being utilised for loading coal from the stores into lighters for the transports. It is presumed that these prisoners are being paid for their work.

3. On the 12th the "Esmere," a small Greek transport, embarked about 100 Greek troops from the shore and proceeded south. Another Greek transport arrived from Santa Quaranta with 220 Greek troops and transferred them to the Greek transport "Khristos Markettos," which proceeded south. Italian steamer "Bosnia" arrived from the north with about 100 Greek troops, embarked about 100 more, then proceeded south. The Greek steamer "Zatoynia" arrived from north and disembarked about 200 Greek troops. It is understood that these are on furlough, and will be embarked later and sent south.

4. The Greek steamship "Chrisomallith Sifneo" arrived at 2 P.M. on the 12th, and reported having been fired on by the Turkish cruiser "Hamidieh" twenty-eight days previously, when lying at San Giovanni di Medua. Was struck several times by shells, and her crew deserted her on being fired at. The fore-bridge and steering gear was evidently struck by a 6-inch shell, which completely wrecked it. Another 6-inch shell struck the water-line abreast of the fore-bridge, port side, but does not appear to have exploded. The hole has been stopped with cement and wood. The cargo of cotton and hay in the fore-hold caught fire and burnt out the fore part of the ship. Ship's side, from stem to fore-bridge, is buckled owing to the heat on both sides. Decks, beams, and coamings of hatchways are also buckled. The ship came into harbour steering from wheel on poop. She left for Piræus at 5·25 A.M. on the 13th instant.

5. The British consul reports that 2,000 Greek troops, with horses and carts, will embark for Santa Quaranta, for Salonica, within the next two or three days if possible. To-day the Greek transport "Thraki" arrived from Santa Quaranta with about 400 troops and one motor-car. She communicated with the shore and then departed with troops southwards. Seven Greek transports, with troops, horses, and deck cargo covered with canvas, which appears to be guns, have passed the harbour, about 6 miles off, steering south along the Albanian coast. This appears to confirm the consul's report of the Greek troops being transported south, probably to Piræus or Salonica.

I have, &c.
W. E. WOODWARD.

[18947] No. 517.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 24.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April* 24, 1913.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 24th instant, relative to Montenegrin affairs.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 517.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April 24, 1913.*

YOUR No. 333.

Conference arranged this morning to send detachment of 1,000 men from international squadron to Scutari to maintain order when Montenegrins hand over the town.

[18816] No. 518.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 205.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, April 23, 1913.*

SUSPENSION of hostilities between Turkey and Bulgaria has been prolonged to 4th May.

[18956] No. 519.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 61.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, April 24, 1913.*

TELEGRAMS have been received by representatives of Great Powers from Committee of Panepirote Congress at Janina, and from inhabitants of Delvino Leskoviki, Khimara, Tepelen, Premeti, Bambovo, Margariti, Paramythia, Filiates, Kriaza, protesting strongly against separation from Greece.

(Copies go by post.)

[18954] No. 520.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 65.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Cettinjé, April 24, 1913.*

FOLLOWING telegram from British vice-admiral:—

"Beg you will inform President of the Council of Ministers of the Royal Government that the blockade of the coast notified on the 10th instant is being forthwith extended to Durazzo harbour. Vessels navigating in the extended portion of the blockaded area will be allowed forty-eight hours to leave if they so wish. Please communicate to all representatives of the foreign Powers at Cettinjé."

[18955] No. 521.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 66.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, April 24, 1913.*

MY immediate preceding telegram of to-day.

I have addressed note to Montenegrin Government in accordance with vice-admiral's request.

[18942] No. 522.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey. (Received April 24.)

(No. 61. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, April 24, 1913.*

I LEARN from a most confidential source that the Austro-Hungarian Government are awaiting anxiously the reply of the Powers to their circular telegram

communicated to the various Governments with regard to Scutari. Should the answers prove unfavourable, my informant told me yesterday, Minister for Foreign Affairs' opinion was that he would have to instruct his Ambassador to cease attending the Ambassadors' meetings in London, as it seemed to him useless for the Ambassadors to form decisions which they seem incapable of finding means of putting into execution. Should Minister for Foreign Affairs take this step, it would mean that he had decided to let Austria carry out the decision of the Powers in the manner she should think most expedient. My informant said to me that opinion in Government circles was that Austria could not yield a step more to Slav ambitions without running the risk of such a loss of prestige as would create a very serious state of things within Dual Monarchy.

A very strong article which appeared in this morning's "Fremdenblatt" on the situation created by the fall of Scutari was drafted at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and submitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who approved of it, but it was finally somewhat toned down by the editor of that newspaper.

[18935] No. 523.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 152.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Sophia, April 24, 1913.*

PROLONGATION of cessation of hostilities already arranged.

(Repeated to Belgrade and Constantinople.)

[18732] No. 524.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 86.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, April 24, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 107 of 23rd April: Ottoman Public Debt.

You may act with your French and Austro-Hungarian colleagues.

[18573] No. 525.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 155.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 24, 1913.*

SIR F. ELLIOT'S telegram No. 60 of 23rd April.

Is statement that Italian goods enter occupied Ægean islands duty-free correct?

[18742] No. 526.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 356.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 24, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 156 of 23rd April.

You will have received text of the communication which it is proposed to make to the Montenegrin Government, which was drawn up at meeting of Ambassadors yesterday, and to which I trust that M. Sazonof will be able to consent. It is clear that the Powers cannot permit their decisions to be overridden by Montenegro; and, moreover, unless a decisive communication of the character of the one above mentioned is delivered without delay, there is every probability that Austria-Hungary will take immediate action against Montenegro, and a most serious situation will arise. A warning to Montenegro offers possibly the only way of averting isolated action by Austria-Hungary, and if this warning is given at once, it may be possible to induce Austria-Hungary to postpone action until it is seen what results the warning will produce. You should lay these considerations before M. Sazonof, and ask him to agree to the communication proposed to be made to Montenegro.

[18856] No. 527.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.**

(No. 168.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 24, 1913.*

M. CAMBON and Count Benckendorff both spoke to Sir A. Nicolson on the 22nd April, in regard to the reply from the allies. They were both strongly of opinion that no time should be lost in calling a meeting of the Ambassadors, on the 23rd April, if possible, for the purpose (1) of informing the allies that the Powers took note of their acceptance of the mediation of the Powers on the bases proposed by the latter; (2) in order to put the allies and Turkey into touch with each other with the object of their appointing delegates and selecting a place to discuss terms of peace; (3) and this was the most urgent and important in order to obtain from the allies and Turkey a formal engagement that hostilities must at once cease over the whole field of operations.

In regard to the reservations made by the allies they could very well be treated later—the main point was to obtain the cessation of hostilities. The Powers from the outset had declared that the questions of the limits of Albania and of the islands were matters which would be settled by the Powers, and there was no question of modifying or departing from this attitude. But M. Cambon and Count Benckendorff considered that it was urgently necessary to take action that the allies had accepted mediation on the bases proposed by the Powers, and that no serious or immediate attention need be paid to the reservations.

Sir A. Nicolson said he would communicate through me with the Prime Minister to see if it were possible to have a meeting here on the afternoon of the 23rd April.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[17803] No. 528.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 12.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 24, 1913.*

M. POPOVITCH, the Montenegrin delegate, called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 16th April and stated that he had been instructed to convey to His Majesty's Government that Montenegro had irrevocably decided to continue her efforts to capture Scutari; that she would not be turned aside by any compensations, territorial or financial; and that, if the Powers landed troops, they would be treated as enemies. M. Popovitch said that he had been recently in Paris, and was discussing with his colleague there as to territorial compensation, when on Monday last, the 14th, they received a peremptory order from Cettinjé to break off all discussions with M. Pichon and to make the announcement which he had just delivered to me.

Sir A. Nicolson asked M. Popovitch if Montenegro really intended to defy the whole of Europe, and to endeavour to take Scutari even when they were abandoned by their ally and when their coast was blockaded by the Powers. He replied that by the action of the Powers, by the offer of ridiculous and inadequate territorial compensations, Montenegro had been rendered desperate, and she would sooner perish than bow to what she considered the unjust fiat of the Powers. If Austria invaded her and conquered her she would be absorbed in the Dual Monarchy, and would find Dalmatian, Bosnian, and other brothers in the same fold. At any rate, she would have perished with honour. Sir A. Nicolson pointed out the folly of the course Montenegro was pursuing. M. Popovitch explained eloquently, and indeed pathetically, the treatment which had been meted out to Montenegro. His orders were formal and precise.

Sir A. Nicolson said that he would convey his message to the Prime Minister and to me.

M. Popovitch scouted as quite unacceptable in any case the question of financial aid from the Powers.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Also to Sir F. Bertie, No. 269.

[18857] No. 529.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 90.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 24, 1913.*

COUNT MENSDORFF called on the 22nd April and read to Sir A. Nicolson further telegrams from Count Berchtold, again urging that the pressure on Montenegro should be accentuated, and proposing that detachments should occupy Dulcigno and Antivari. His Excellency said that M. Pichon had informed the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Paris that the French Government would not object if all the other Powers agreed. (There must have been a misunderstanding on this point, as M. Cambon had informed Sir A. Nicolson that M. Pichon was opposed to any landing of detachments). Count Mensdorff recapitulated all his former arguments as to the necessity of the Powers making their decisions respected, and not allow themselves to be defied by Montenegro. He again added, that if Scutari were to fall before the eyes of the international fleet, Europe would have rendered herself ridiculous. Sir A. Nicolson told Count Mensdorff that he had placed all these arguments before the Prime Minister and me in recording his Excellency's last conversation here, and that at the meeting on the 21st instant, his Excellency had himself heard that we were not prepared to land detachments. Personally, Sir A. Nicolson doubted if public opinion here would admit that the lives of British bluejackets should be endangered for the purpose of bringing Montenegro to reason; and in considerable sections of the public there was a feeling that His Majesty's Government had gone quite far enough, some thought too far, in participating in the blockade.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[18513] No. 530.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 24, 1913.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a communication from the French Ambassador at this Court, embodying the proposed programme of the deliberations of the forthcoming international commission for the settlement of the financial questions arising out of the present war.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey would be glad to receive any observations which the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury may have to offer on the points comprised in this programme.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[18996] No. 531.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 8.)

Sir, *Canea, Crete, April 16, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that twenty Greek officers and forty non-commissioned officers arrived here yesterday from Greece. It is understood that they will act as instructors to the 1912 contingent of recruits (not yet called out) of the former Cretan militia, which will henceforth presumably be treated as an integral part of the Greek army.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

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* No. 156.

[18980] No. 532.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 60. Secret.)

Sophia, April 18, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 32, Secret, of the 10th ultimo, and to previous correspondence respecting the secret negotiations proceeding between the Bulgarian and Servian Governments as to the boundaries of their future possessions in the territories to be acquired from Turkey as the result of the present war, I have the honour to report that the Bulgarian Government have replied through their representative at Belgrade to the Servian proposals, the details of which are in your hands.

The Bulgarian note categorically refuses all the Servian demands, and insists that the future boundaries must be laid down in accordance with the Treaty. As no reference whatever is made in the note to the special services rendered by Servia to Bulgaria during the latter portion of the war, the answer cannot fail to be of a quite unsatisfactory nature to the Servian Government.

I understand that the entire matter will be put into the hands of the Russian Government, which, according to the stipulations of the Military Convention, have to arbitrate on all questions arising between Bulgaria and Servia out of the war.

I have, &c.

H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[18981] No. 533.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 61.)

Sophia, April 19, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to Mr. Consul-General Lamb's despatch No. 32 of the 12th April to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, which contains an account of the forcible conversion to Christianity of the Mussulman inhabitants of Tchervnik!(or Tchervnikli), near Pehtchevo, it would appear that the Bulgarian priest, Pop Gheorghi, went so far as to disregard the instructions of the Natchalnik of Pehtchevo in establishing himself at Tchervnik in order to compel its inhabitants to embrace Christianity.

It has occurred to me that, if this case were brought specially to the notice of the Bulgarian Government as one which particularly merited their attention, an opportunity would be afforded to the latter of signifying the disapproval which they profess of such forcible conversions, and at the same time the suitable punishment of the ecclesiastic in question might serve as a deterrent to other persons who have distinguished themselves in the religious persecution of Moslems.

Should the Bulgarian Government, on the other hand, decline to take action against an individual who has persistently ignored the orders of a local official who was himself acting in accordance with the professed intentions of his Government, it will be impossible for the latter to pretend any longer that they are sincere in expressing their disapproval of the religious persecution, the existence of which they are unable to deny.

Under these circumstances I would venture to submit that I should perhaps be authorised to point out to the Bulgarian Government the desirability of making an example of the Pop Gheorghi above mentioned, in the hope that some slight impression may be produced upon other parties engaged in similar acts of religious persecution.

I have, &c.

H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[18974] No. 534.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 132.)

St. Petersburgh, April 22, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 128 of the 17th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the protocol of the sixth sitting of the Conference of Ambassadors respecting the Mediation between Roumania and Bulgaria.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 534.

Protocol of Sixth Meeting, held April 17, 1913.

APRÈS un échange d'observations, est adopté le texte suivant :—

"La Conférence des Ambassadeurs, réunie à Saint-Pétersbourg et à laquelle ont pris part, sous la présidence du Ministre Impérial des Affaires Etrangères de Russie, les Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne, d'Angleterre, d'Autriche-Hongrie, d'Italie et de France pour se prononcer sur le différend qui s'est élevé entre les Gouvernements bulgare et roumain au sujet de la frontière méridionale de la Dobroudja ;

"Après avoir examiné les revendications formulées par la Roumanie et les concessions offertes par la Bulgarie,

"Décide :

"1. La ville de Silistrie doit être attribuée à la Roumanie.

"La nouvelle frontière roumano-bulgare partira d'un point sur le Danube à 3 kilom. environ à l'ouest de la périphérie de Silistrie, coupera la route de Choumla, puis la route de Varna, également à 3 kilom. environ de la périphérie de la ville, et gagnera directement la frontière actuelle.

"Une commission mixte bulgaro-roumaine fixera sur les lieux, dans un délai de trois mois à dater de la présente décision, le tracé de la frontière.

"Au besoin, elle pourra s'adjoindre des experts à nommer par les Puissances médiatrices.

"2. Le Gouvernement roumain donnera une indemnité à ceux des sujets bulgares habitant Silistrie, ou le territoire englobé dans la nouvelle frontière, qui auront fait connaître, dans un délai de six mois à dater de la présente décision, leur désir de quitter la ville ou le territoire ci-dessus délimité.

"Une commission mixte bulgaro-roumaine, après avoir constaté le dommage, fixera le montant de l'indemnité.

"Au besoin, elle pourra s'adjoindre des experts à nommer par les Puissances médiatrices.

"3. Conformément à l'engagement qu'elle s'est déclarée prête à prendre, la Bulgarie n'élèvera aucune fortification le long de la frontière actuelle, du Danube à la mer Noire.

"Une commission mixte déterminera, dans un délai de six mois à dater de la présente décision, la zone à l'intérieur de laquelle la Bulgarie s'interdit de construire des ouvrages fortifiés et s'oblige à démanteler ceux de ces ouvrages qui pourraient s'y trouver.

"Au besoin, elle pourra s'adjoindre des experts à nommer par les Puissances médiatrices.

"4. La conférence enregistre la déclaration faite à Londres par le délégué de la Bulgarie et consignée dans le protocole du 16 (29) janvier, 1913, aux termes de laquelle 'la Bulgarie consent à donner l'autonomie aux écoles et aux églises des Koutzo-Valaques se trouvant dans les futures possessions bulgares, en tant que ces écoles seront fréquentées par les enfants koutzo-valaques, et à permettre la création d'un épiscopat pour ces mêmes Koutzo-Valaques, avec la faculté pour le Gouvernement roumain de subventionner, sous la surveillance du Gouvernement bulgare, lesdites institutions culturelles.'

"Avant de se séparer, la conférence a à cœur de constater que les dispositions connues de la Bulgarie à consentir des sacrifices au maintien et au resserrement de ses liens d'amitié avec la Roumanie ont singulièrement facilité sa tâche.

"Elle exprime la conviction que la cession de Silistrie à la Roumanie ne saurait manquer de produire le résultat unanimement recherché.

"Sa Majesté le Roi Ferdinand et son Gouvernement méritent que les Puissances leur en sachent gré.

"Fait en huit exemplaires à Saint-Pétersbourg, le avril, 1913."

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, les Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne, d'Angleterre, d'Italie et de France se déclarent autorisés à signer. L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche dit avoir besoin d'en référer à son Gouvernement.

Dès que l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche aura reçu l'autorisation qu'il demande, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères informera les Ministres de Bulgarie et de Roumanie de la décision de la conférence.

[18964] No. 535.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 210.)
Sir, *Paris, April 24, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I enquired yesterday of the Political Director at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs whether a communication had been received from the German Government similar to that enclosed to me in your despatch No. 262 of the 19th instant, relative to the protection of the commercial interests of foreign Powers in the territory to be annexed by the allied Balkan States as the result of the present war.

M. Paléologue said that nothing of the kind had been received from the German Government. Should one be received later, he promised to inform me what reply would be returned to it by the French Government.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[19107] No. 536.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 25.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, April 25, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegrams, dated 25th instant, relative to affairs in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 536.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April 25, 1913.*

SUBMIT I could proceed to Scutari in my barge by the Boyana if His Majesty's Government are of opinion that interview between myself, unaccompanied by any foreign officers, and Montenegrin general and Minister of War might facilitate a settlement of the present question.

San Giovanni di Medua being in direct telephonic communication with Scutari, I could make arrangements locally for interview and safe conduct.

There is very little food in the country for inhabitants or army, and it is stated the situation in Scutari is serious.

Enclosure 2 in No. 536.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April 25, 1913.*

TELEGRAM as follows received from H.M.S. "Hibernia":—

"German 'Geoben' sailed for Kovely Bay to-day. She is to remain there for two days and to proceed to the Piræus.

"Later she is expected to visit Alexandretta and other Levantine ports as circumstances may determine."

[19036] No. 537.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 207.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, April 24, 1913.*

SIR R. CRAWFORD is leaving alone for Paris on 28th April, remainder of commission following later.

(Sent to Paris.)

[19011] No. 538.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 67.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, April 24, 1913.*

SCUTARI.

So far Montenegrins have not been able to enter town, but it is reported that they will do so to-morrow. There are rumours amongst Albanians here that population may continue to resist after evacuation of the town by the Turkish troops.

[19089] No. 539.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 65.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, April 25, 1913.*

THE Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs dined with me last night, and I found him rather depressed and anxiously awaiting the reply to his circular note to the Powers. On that answer much will depend. He said that the proposal to demand from Montenegro the cession of Scutari to the Powers was excellent if practicable, but he seemed to be very sceptical as to Montenegro accepting it. It remained then to be seen what effective coercive measures the Powers were prepared to apply in common against Montenegro. If they had nothing else to offer but a stricter blockade, he then intimated that he would have to consider what means Austria-Hungary would have to resort to to see the will of the Powers obeyed. He laid great stress on this, that the Powers should come to some practical resolution without delay, for Austria-Hungary could not afford to wait and allow the world to become accustomed to see the Montenegrins established in Scutari.

In official circles here the feeling is that the moment has come when Austria-Hungary will have to decide whether it is still possible to work in concert with the other Powers or whether she must take action alone.

[19113] No. 540.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 158.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, April 25, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 356 of 24th April.

Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees to proposed communication, but is most anxious that the Powers should at the same time let the King of Montenegro know privately that if he gives up Scutari he will receive some territorial compensation. He said Austria might object to compromise any further territory on the right bank of Boyana on account of its proximity to Tarabosh, but that, from what Austrian Ambassador had told him, he thought she might agree to some territorial compensation on the left bank, though she might prefer not to tell the King so till Scutari had been given up. Before recourse was had to force we ought to exhaust all pacific means to bring pressure to bear on the King. He might be threatened with financial boycott in the event of his refusing to yield, while promises of financial support should be held out to him should he bow to the wishes of the Powers. Austria must be induced to abstain from any military

action till all other methods had been tried and failed. Should coercive measures have to be adopted in the end his Excellency expressed hope that other Powers besides Austria would take part in them. Display of force and the firing of a few shots would, he believed, furnish the King with an excuse for surrendering.

[19112] No. 541.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 108.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, April 25, 1913.*

FOLLOWING is repetition of telegram from Monastir to-day, No. 12 :—

"Fourteenth regiment has left Monastir for Kuprulu. Its destination is believed to be Pirot."

[19041] No. 542.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 54. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, April 25, 1913.*

FRENCH Minister for Foreign Affairs told me last night that M. Isvolsky had suggested to him that, in the changed circumstances caused by the fall of Scutari, it would be advisable that the French and British Governments should propose territorial compensation to Montenegro. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that such a proposal did not seem to him to be one for France or England to put forward. If the Russian Government favoured such a suggestion, they should make it themselves.

[19093] No. 543.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, April 25, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 176 of 18th April, respecting the treatment of Greek goods in Crete.

The French Minister at Athens has been instructed to join his colleagues in protest suggested by you.

[19094] No. 544.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey. (Received April 25.)

(No. 153.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, April 25, 1913.*

MONTENEGRO.

The Prime Minister informs me that he has received news from Cettinjé and other sources that the King and the Government will resign all claim to Scutari in return for pecuniary indemnity and territorial extension in the plain of Boyana and in territory of Clementi tribe.

[19683] No. 545.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 182.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 25, 1913.*

AT the meeting of Ambassadors to-day it was agreed that the collective step at Cettinjé proposed at the last meeting should be taken without delay, and that a short term should be fixed within which the Montenegrin Government should give their

* Also to Sir G. Buchanan (No. 350), Sir R. Rodd (No. 156), Sir F. Cartwright (No. 153), and Sir E. Goschen (No. 182).

reply. As soon as the collective communication has been made, the meeting considered that the blockade should be rendered stricter so as to prevent Montenegro from obtaining foodstuffs and also that measures should be taken to prevent King Nicholas and his Government from obtaining financial aid. The naval commandants should receive instructions to that effect.

If these measures do not suffice to induce the Montenegrin Government to submit, the meeting considered that the occasion would arise for proceeding to other measures.

By order of his Government, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared that it was of importance to come at once to some resolutions as to coercive measures and to consider the possibility of a disembarkation in Montenegin ports. The Italian and German Ambassadors supported this declaration. The Prime Minister and the French and Russian Ambassadors considered that for the present it would be sufficient to keep to a stricter blockade.

The Russian Ambassador said that, in order to facilitate the acceptance by King Nicholas of the note of the Powers, M. Sazonof was of opinion that he might be given to understand officiously that when he had submitted to the wishes of the Powers the latter would not refuse to take into consideration, so far as was possible, certain concessions to be made to him. M. Sazonof had spoken with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh with respect to his views on that point.

[19683] No. 546.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 25, 1913.*

YOU should report to me and also let the vice-admiral know as soon as you and your colleagues have made the collective communication to the Montenegrin Government.

[19683] No. 547.

Procès-verbal of Meeting of Ambassadors of April 25, 1913.

LA réunion est d'avis qu'il y a lieu de procéder d'urgence à la démarche collective proposée le 23 avril et de fixer au Gouvernement monténégrin pour sa réponse un court délai à déterminer par les Puissances. Aussitôt après la remise de la note des Puissances, la réunion considère que le blocus devrait être resserré de façon à mettre obstacle au ravitaillement de Monténégro en vivres et que des mesures pourraient être prises pour empêcher le Roi Nicolas et son Gouvernement de se procurer des ressources financières. Des instructions dans ce sens devraient être adressées aux commandants des forces navales.

Si ces moyens ne suffisent pas à déterminer le Gouvernement monténégrin à se soumettre, la réunion pense qu'il y aura lieu de recourir à d'autres mesures.

D'ordre de son Gouvernement, l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie déclare qu'il importerait de prendre dès maintenant des résolutions au sujet des mesures coercitives et d'envisager la possibilité d'un débarquement dans les ports monténégrins.

Les Ambassadeurs d'Italie et d'Allemagne appuient la déclaration du Comte Mensdorff.

Le Premier Ministre, les Ambassadeurs de France et de Russie pensent qu'il suffit d'en tenir quant à présent au resserrement du blocus.

L'Ambassadeur de Russie dit que pour faciliter l'acceptation de la note des Puissances par le Roi Nicolas, M. Sazonof serait d'avis de lui faire entendre officieusement que lorsqu'il aura déféré aux désirs des Puissances, elles ne se refuseront pas à prendre en considération dans la mesure du possible certaines concessions à lui faire, et que d'ailleurs il a entretenu de ses vues sur ce point l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie à Saint-Pétersbourg.

[19152] No. 548.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 330.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April 19, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, in recent meetings of the Council of the Debt, a point of some interest has been under discussion as to the disposal of the revenues obtained from the 3 per cent. customs surtax.

The bondholders of the 1904 loan and the Bagdad Railway Company claim that, as the condition that the product of the surtax was to be devoted to the three Roumelian vilayets is now a dead letter, it follows that the receipts obtained from this source should be included in the ordinary surplus available as security for their annuities.

In a meeting of the Council held on the 10th March, the Austro-Hungarian delegate upheld the claim of the Bagdad Railway Company, pointing out that article 9 of the Bagdad Railway Convention of 1908, in excluding the 3 per cent. from the security affected to the loan, only did so in consideration of a special state of things. The renunciation was not absolute, and with the disappearance of the state of things contemplated the renunciation itself automatically lapsed.

This opinion was upheld by the German delegate, but the Turkish commissioner maintained, in the name of the Ministry of Finance, that the Council of the Debt had no competence to give a decision on the subject. This point was contested by the German delegate, but it was finally decided to refer the question to the Government for a reasoned opinion.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[19153] No. 549.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 331.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April 19, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 246 of the 28th ultimo, transmitting copy of a despatch No. 16, from His Majesty's vice-consul at Rhodes to His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna, regarding the action of a band of insurgents in the island of Castellorizo, I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's vice-consul at Rhodes has now further reported to me on this matter.

From a report received it would appear that on the 3rd instant the Greek Government caused the repatriation of these insurgents who had hoisted the Greek flag on the island in place of the Ottoman.

On the 8th a delegate from Castellorizo arrived in Rhodes with a general mandate to seek assistance from the Italian authorities, the cadi, and the foreign consuls, and to beg the Turkish Government for a general amnesty, as in view of their natural apprehensions of possible Turkish reprisals they would otherwise be compelled to evacuate the island and to settle elsewhere.

The delegate informed Mr. Biliotti that it had been impossible either to prevent the insurgents from carrying out their plans or to resist complying with their instructions without incurring the risk of serious loss of life, but that they had done their best to ensure the safety of the Turkish officials and the Mussulman population of the island. He particularly requested Mr. Biliotti to communicate this explanation to me.

The Greek consul at Rhodes, according to the report, authorised the Dimogherondia to lower the Greek flag and to hoist the Ottoman flag in its place, and the cadi, together with the Dimogherondia's delegate, left in an Italian torpedo-boat for Castellorizo.

On the 10th the torpedo-boat returned and reported that the cadi and the delegate had landed at Macri, presumably to get into telegraphic communication with Constantinople, as no such facilities exist either at Castellorizo or on the mainland opposite it.

The reply of General Ameglio to the request for immediate protection was to the effect that he could not interfere in the matter without instructions, as the Italian flag had not been hoisted on the island of Castellorizo.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[19170] No. 550.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 83.)

Sir, *Athens, April 21, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a despatch from the British delegate on the International Financial Commission respecting a request by the National Bank of Greece to be released from the obligation imposed at the time of the settlement of Greek finances in 1898 of holding in reserve bonds of the 2½ per cent. guaranteed loan given the bank in payment of advances to the Government prior to that date.

I have, &c.

F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure 1 in No. 550.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.

(No. 4.)

Sir, *International Financial Commission, Athens, April 21, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter which has been addressed to me by the governor of the National Bank of Greece enquiring whether the Commission are disposed to assent to the liberation of the bonds of the 2½ per cent. guaranteed Greek loan given to the bank in payment of advances to the Greek Government prior to the settlement of 1898, under conditions described in the report on the work of the International Financial Commission for the settlement of the Greek finances (see Parliamentary Paper "Greece No. 2 (1898)," p. 67).

The Commission, after carefully considering the arguments put forward by M. Valaoritis, are of opinion that there is no good reason for refusing his request, and we propose to reply to him in this sense.

It is true that when in 1908 a similar request was made by the Ionian Bank the Commission declined to give their consent, basing their decision on arguments which will be found in Sir F. Elliot's despatch No. 171 of the 25th December of that year (Confidential Print "South-Eastern Europe," part 237, pp. 31-40), covering a despatch from Mr. Young, who was then British delegate on the Commission.

I confess that I find some difficulty in following the reasoning of Mr. Young in this matter, and I observe that it is contrary to the legal opinion taken by the bank, and also to the opinion of the expert consulted by the Russian financial attaché in Paris (see Confidential Print, part 236, pp. 116–125).

The result of the refusal has been a loss to the Ionian Bank by the depreciation of the bonds from approximately 84 to 74, which may be roughly estimated at 8,000*l.*, in addition to the loss of profits from the employment of these funds had they been released.

Whether, however, the refusal of the Commission was then justified need not now be considered. Circumstances have since changed, and the stability of exchange, then uncertain, appears to have been completely established by the law of the 19th March, 1910, authorising the issue of notes by the National Bank against gold and exchange. Even six months of war have not effected this stability. The notes so issued now almost equal the amount of notes of forced currency, with the result that that about two-fifths of the whole paper circulation is covered by the special reserves of the bank, so that the forced currency has practically, though not theoretically, already been abolished.

That the Commission even at first foresaw that it might be possible to consent to the release of the fund constituted by the deposit of these bonds before the abolition of the forced currency is shown by the last sentence of the letter from the then president of the 4th (16th) July, 1898, liberating the banks from the obligation as regards bonds to the value of 8,082,793 fr. 50 c., such consent being then reserved for the future decision of the Commission.

Should the application of the National Bank be followed by a renewal of the request of the Ionian Bank for a similar release, I see no reason why it should again meet with a refusal, since, even assuming the possibility of the depreciation of its notes, limited to 7,000,000 drachmas, this would hardly affect the notes of the National Bank or the general rate of foreign exchange which alone is of interest to the bondholders.

It would give the two banks a grievance if we were to persist in immobilising a considerable portion of their capital, especially at a time like the present when the needs of the Government offer opportunities for its more remunerative employment, thus making up to some extent for the loss already incurred by the depreciation in the value of the bonds.

As the matter is somewhat urgent, I have the honour to request that I may be informed by telegram whether His Majesty's Government see any objection to the course proposed by the Commission.

I have, &c.
H. D. BEAUMONT.

Enclosure 2 in No. 550.

Governor of National Bank of Greece to Mr. Beaumont.

Athènes, le 4 (17) *avril*, 1913.

M. le Président,

PERMETTEZ-moi de vous entretenir, à titre officieux, d'une question qui intéresse la Banque nationale de Grèce surtout au point de vue moral, mais qu'elle ne considère pas de sa dignité de soumettre officiellement à votre Commission sans avoir la certitude préalable que sa demande sera accueillie favorablement par elle.

Si vous jetez un regard sur de bilan de la Banque nationale du 31 décembre, 1899, vous constaterez que le maximum de sa circulation fiduciaire s'élevait à—

	Drachmes.
1. Pour compte du Gouvernement	71,000,000
2. Pour compte de la Banque nationale	66,000,000
3. En billets de 1 et de 2 drachmes	15,000,000
Total	152,000,000

et que, par contre, les disponibilités en or destinées à favoriser l'action modératrice de la banque sur l'agio et à faire face aux besoins de devises sur l'étranger, dans les moments de disette du marché, comprenaient—

	Fr.
(*a.*) L'encaisse métallique (dont 563,045 fr. seulement en or) de ..	1,924,865
(*b.*) Les disponibilités à l'étranger qui sont inscrites au bilan pour 13,031,971 drachmes, mais qui en réalité au cours du change ne représentaient en or qu'environ	8,700,000
Soit un total de	9,924,865

Ainsi la proportion entre la circulation fiduciaire à cours forcé et les disponibilités métalliques en Grèce et à l'étranger n'était même pas de 6½ pour cent de cette circulation. Quant au change, son maximum s'était élevé en cette année à 168½, son minimum à 149 et la moyenne annuelle à 156½.

Rien d'étonnant par conséquent si au moment de la publication du Décret Royal du 23 avril, 1898, sur l'Émission de l'Emprunt 2½ pour cent garanti par les Puissances, c'est-à-dire à une époque où la Banque nationale était encore plus faible qu'en 1899 au point de vue de ses disponibilités en or, on nit cru prudent d'introduire dans le décret le paragraphe second de l'article 3 du chapitre I, "Conditions générales de l'Emprunt," d'après lequel "les obligations destinées à couvrir les banques d'émission des sommes en or qui leur ont été empruntées en vertu des lois sur le cours forcé, ainsi que de leurs autres avances en or, resteront déposées à la Banque de France, qui ne pourra s'en dessaisir que sur l'avis conforme de la Commission internationale." On avait la juste crainte qu'avec la situation si faible de la banque en or et avec le cours si élevé du change, les obligations de cet emprunt qui représentaient l'encaisse de la Banque nationale lors de l'introduction de cours forcé et qui à cause de la garantie des Puissances pouvaient être considérées comme de l'or, se soient vendues et leur produit en or ne soit utilisé pour d'autres besoins de la banque.

Je crois inutile d'insister sur le progrès accomplis depuis cette date et sur la politique monétaire que la Banque nationale a suivi avec prudence, méthode et persévérance, malgré les critiques qui lui ont été souvent adressées et les sacrifices qu'elle s'est imposés, surtout pour augmenter son stock or et pour combattre la hausse

du change. Aujourd'hui encore elle n'hésite pas de prendre à sa charge des frais considérables pour augmenter son encaisse or dans le pays.

Toutes ces circonstances sont connues de la Commission financière internationale, et je saisis avec plaisir cette occasion pour vous dire combien la Banque nationale lui est reconnaissante pour l'estime dont elle l'a toujours honorée, et pour le concours qu'elle lui a prêté en maintes circonstances dans l'intérêt du pays.

Mais rien ne peut mettre en lumière avec plus d'évidence les résultats de progrès accomplis, que le bilan de la Banque nationale de Grèce du 31 décembre, 1912. Ainsi dans ce bilan le total maximum de la circulation fiduciaire de la Banque nationale s'élevait à cette date à 227,778,575 drachmes, tandis que d'autre part les disponibilités en or étaient constituées à cette même date—

	Fr.
1. D'une encaisse exclusivement en or de	14,036,703
2. Des disponibilités à l'étranger d'ensemble	156,949,219
Soit un total de	170,985,922

Ainsi la couverture d'or qui peut être utilisée pour le maintien du pair du billet de banque, pair qui a été atteint depuis la fin décembre 1909, est passée d'environ 6½ pour cent du maximum des billets en circulation en 1899 à environ 75 pour cent de cette circulation à la fin de 1912.

La Banque nationale de Grèce croit donc avoir accompli son devoir et s'être montrée digne de la confiance de la Commission ainsi que de la reconnaissance des créanciers que celle-ci représente, mais elle estime en outre qu'il n'y a plus aucune raison pour que les 14,222,500 fr. capital nominal des obligations de l'emprunt 1898 2½ pour cent hellénique garanti par les Puissances, ne soient pas mises à sa libre disposition, puisque cet actif ne représente qu'une partie relativement peu importante de son actif en or, dont le total s'élève à 241,413,250·22 fr., conformément à l'analyse de notre actif et passif en or et en billets de banque annexée au compte rendu des opérations de l'année 1912, et que l'or disponible pour le maintien du change au pair s'élevait à plus de 170,000,000 de francs. D'ailleurs, la politique financière et monétaire suivie par la Banque nationale de Grèce donne à la Commission la plus sûre garantie que la banque n'aliénera pas cette partie de son actif or.

C'est sur cette question que je voudrais connaître, M. le Président, votre opinion personnelle et à titre tout à fait privé avant d'adresser une demande officielle à la Commission financière internationale.

La situation de la banque à tous les points de vue prouve que c'est pour elle une question morale, mais j'ajoute en plus que cette immobilisation pourrait lui être quelquefois préjudiciable, par exemple dans le cas où la situation du marché rendrait plus avantageux d'utiliser pour ses opérations de change des crédits au lieu de ses disponibilités liquides à l'étranger. Comme vous savez, la perte qui résulte pour la banque à la suite de la baisse de ce titre, qui lui a été imposé au cours de 104, s'élève à près de 4,000,000 de francs, et elle sera bien reconnaissante à la Commission financière si celle-ci lui permettait, en lui autorisant l'utilisation de cet actif, d'amortir en partie au moins la perte en question.

Recevez, &c,
Le Gouverneur,
J. VALAORITIS.

[19320] No. 551.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 333. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April* 21, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that on Wednesday, the 16th instant, the Princess Khadijeh, fourth wife of the ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid, together with her son, Prince Ahmed Noureddin, aged 12, took refuge at this embassy, sought my protection, and begged me to have forwarded to His Majesty the King a document, of which translation is enclosed herewith, saying that they would not quit the embassy until a reply had been received and protection assured.

The document, meant to be telegraphic, explains their case in brief. According

to their statement, their goods, jewellery, &c., were taken from them by the Salonica army which came to Constantinople in April 1909 and dethroned the ex-Sultan. They have since been in poverty, and, driven to despair, took refuge in the unoccupied house at Matchka which belonged to Sultan Abdul Hamid's mother, and had been assigned by the ex-Sultan to Ahmed Riza Bey, President of the Chamber. They were ordered to leave on the ground that, if they continued to reside in the house of the President of the Chamber, people might say that the constitution had been abolished, and, as the mother and child refused to quit the house, it was surrounded by police agents, apparently with a view to starving them out.

I sent Mr. Fitzmaurice to see the Grand Vizier on the subject, and it was arranged that the Prince and his mother should reside at a kiosk at Maslak, near Therapia, in which Abdul Hamid had lived for some time in his youth. The Grand Vizier, in the name of the Ottoman Government, gave assurances that they would not be molested in the Maslak kiosk, and authorised me to give these assurances to the mother, and I did so, and after some further difficulty they were prevailed on to leave the embassy, accompanied by a cavass.

On Saturday, the 19th April, Prince Abdul Medjid, son of Sultan Abdul Aziz and fourth in the line of succession, called on me, and, after some general conversation, broke out into bitter criticisms of the methods of the Committee of Union and Progress, the tyranny of which he described as being far worse than anything experienced under Abdul Hamid's reign. Any Prince, he said, who was even suspected of not being in sympathy with the Committee was spied on and subjected to innumerable petty persecutions. This had specially been the case with Prince Vahdeddin (second in line of succession), who was practically a prisoner in his house, and whose life had been made unbearable. As a last resort he was thinking of taking refuge in the British Embassy and claiming the protection of our flag.

I endeavoured to allay his anxiety, and remarked that, if Prince Vahdeddin was careful to give no pretext for his being suspected of having any special political views, the methods of which he complained would perhaps cease.

Prince Abdul Medjid added that he had heard a rumour that the Committee was contemplating exiling from the capital members of the Imperial family who were suspected of being opposed to the Committee. Rumours to this effect have of late been bruited among the Moslems of Constantinople.

In justice to Prince Vahdeddin I should say that, since the change of régime, he has been most careful to keep aloof from politics for or against the Committee, and this, indeed, seems to be one of the principal reasons for his being suspected and persecuted.

The Committee regard those in position who do not overtly manifest sympathies in its favour as its greatest enemies, and, being republican in spirit, seem especially hostile to such members of the Imperial family as are not servile to it.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 551.

Petition addressed to His Majesty the King.

(Translation.) *April*, 1329 (1913).

WE, the undersigned, are the wife and son of the deposed Sultan Abdul Hamid. Five years ago all our wealth and money, our goods and jewellery, were seized, and we were turned out of our house into the street. Since then we have been living in any corner we could rent, deep in debt. Now the police have been put into our house in order to evict us from the konak at Matchka, belonging to my husband. We are even prevented from obtaining such necessaries as bread and water, and our lives are in serious danger by reason of threats. We are therefore compelled to appeal to your Majesty's world-famed justice, humanity, and protection.

The requests we would make of your Majesty are—

(1.) That my child, who is still young, and my own life be taken under your Majesty's protection.

(2.) That the police be removed immediately from our house at Matchka, and that our rights as human beings be protected.

His (my son's) father was an old friend of your late respected father.

We have the honour to conclude by saying that we shall be grateful and thankful to the end of our lives for this your favour and humanity, which will ensure security of life and protection to an oppressed Prince, poor and friendless, and to his unhappy mother.

PRINCE AHMED NOUREDDIN
(Son of Sultan Abdul Hamid).
KHADIJEH
(Mother of Prince Ahmed Noureddin).

[19155] No. 552.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 26.)

(No. 335.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April* 22, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herein copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Adrianople, reporting on the situation in that town from the 31st March to the 7th April.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 552.

Consul Samson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Adrianople, April* 8, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of your Excellency, the following report on the situation in this town during the past week:—

The looting which took place during the days immediately succeeding the taking of the town appears to have been more extensive than was at first supposed. Practically all the houses of the better class in the Turkish quarters have been completely emptied, in addition to many other smaller houses, whilst the Jewish quarter has also suffered, though not to the same extent. The pillage was the work mainly of the lower classes of the Greek population, aided by Bulgarian soldiers. The former, however, took the more active part in the work, the Bulgarians often being merely stationed at the door of the house whilst the Greeks entered it. For forty-eight hours after the taking of the town there was practically no central authority. Order, however, was gradually restored and to-day may be said to be complete, save for the inevitable confusion which must necessarily exist in the transfer of a town from one administration to another. General Vasof, who directed the attack on the eastern defences which resulted in the fall of this fortress, has been appointed Military Governor of the district, General Grancharof Governor of the town, and M. Kojuharof, formerly my Bulgarian colleague here, prefect.

The King of Bulgaria arrived in the town on the 2nd April to attend a requiem for the late King of Greece. His Majesty, who was accompanied by the Queen, was in undress uniform, and, beyond the fact that the streets were guarded by troops, everything was done to give to the service as unofficial a character as possible. The Greek Metropolitan, in whose church the requiem mass was celebrated, had caused it to be decorated with the flags of the allied nations. These, however, were removed shortly before the King's arrival, leaving only the Greek flag. The unofficial character of the service was further accentuated by the fact that His Majesty did not mount the throne which had been reserved for him, but remained seated at the foot of it. He made no stay in the town itself, but, after visiting the eastern line of defences, proceeded by train to Dedeagach.

By the 2nd April practically all the Turkish garrison were in the hands of the Bulgarians, the prisoners including 1,000 officers and 50,000 men, though probably some officers are still hidden in houses in the town. The officers were despatched to Bulgaria, chiefly, I understand, to Philippopolis and Eski Zagara, whilst such of the

men as had not already been sent out of the town were concentrated in two camps, one on an island in the Tunja, to the north of the town, and another, Arda fort, to the south of it and near the Marash railway bridge. The numbers in these two camps on the 31st March were about 20,000, the latter being the larger. Conditions were very bad, the men being without shelter and receiving very little food. I learn from the men themselves that on the first two days they received one loaf amongst eight men daily, the ration being gradually increased to the present allowance of half a loaf (about 1 lb.) per man per day. The issue, however, appears to be irregular, many men being without food of any kind. As the issue takes place every two days, the recipients usually have none left after the day of issue. The camps are under the supervision of the Turkish medical officers, who have been retained here for this work. They are, however, doing practically nothing. There has been much sickness in the camps and a number of deaths, chiefly from dysentery and inanition. There is also a certain amount of cholera in the town, but for the present this is not widely spread.

With a view to improving the horrible condition of the prisoners' camps, I asked General Vasof to allow Mr. Haig, the head of a British medical mission sent by the Red Crescent Society, to work in the camps, and to give him full authority to make any arrangements which he might consider necessary. I described to General Vasof the horrible state of the prisoners, and begged him to endeavour to improve it, stating that this consulate was prepared to co-operate by every means in its power. He agreed to my suggestion, and Mr. Haig and his party, together with Lieutenant-General Broadwood, are now at work in the camps, the consulate affording them assistance.

In addition to that amongst the prisoners, great distress prevails amongst the Moslem population, who are able to obtain very little bread. The Bulgarian authorities are distributing a certain amount daily, but not sufficient to meet the needs of the people. The present price of flour, 35 fr. per sack, makes it difficult for the poorer classes to purchase bread. This consulate is therefore organising a distribution of it in the Turkish quarters, which will commence to-morrow, the cost being borne by the funds at the disposal of General Broadwood for the present. It is proposed, also, to devote to this purpose a portion of the fund placed at the disposal of the consulate by the Indian newspaper "Comrade" as soon as this is available. A committee composed of some of the chief Turkish notables together with a member of the municipal council, and myself as president, is being formed to administer this fund. The number of the Turkish population requiring immediate assistance is 10,094, according to municipal statistics, and it is believed that their immediate necessities will best be met by the distribution referred to. The distress amongst non-Moslem communities is less acute than that from which the Moslem population are suffering, in addition to which the latter are better organised. British aid is being distributed to these by the Friends' War Victims' Fund through their representatives, Messrs. Wallis and Crossfield, who are also contributing to the assistance of Moslem non-combatants.

The problem of feeding the prisoners and the civil population has been immensely increased by the destruction of the Marash railway bridge, the central span of which has been destroyed. I understand that a month must elapse before it can be repaired. In the meantime the railway runs only to Marash. Large quantities of provisions had been accumulated by the Bulgarian authorities and by merchants at Mustapha Pasha, with a view to the reprovisioning of the town, but, under present circumstances, this is proceeding but slowly.

Both postal and telegraphic communications have been re-established for some days, but all the letters are censored.

General Savof and army headquarters are expected to arrive in the town to-day from Demokita. General Ivanof, with the majority of the second army, has left for Chorlu, there remaining only sufficient troops to maintain order in the town. The vali is still here; his movements, as those of the other officials of the late Government, are restricted, but I understand that neither he nor they are considered prisoners.

I am preparing a report descriptive of the fall of this fortress, detailed information as to which has been forthcoming but slowly, in view of the confusion which everywhere prevailed until three days ago. The relief of the prisoners and of the civil population is, however, so urgently necessary that I propose to confine my efforts to work in that direction for the present. I trust that your Excellency will approve my delaying the completion of the report until the present distress has been dealt with.

At the moment of closing this despatch information reaches me that cases of pillage and ill-treatment have occurred in the outlying Turkish quarters during the

past two nights. Should this be the case, the opinion expressed earlier in this report that order had been completely restored would need modification. I will not fail to enquire into the matter with a view to reporting further on it.

I have, &c.
L. L. R. SAMSON, *Major*.

[19178] No. 553.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 96.)
Sir, *Rome, April 23, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 75 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to report that, in the course of conversation yesterday with the Secretary-General of the Italian Foreign Office, I took advantage of an opportunity which he gave me to elicit something more from him as to the Italian attitude with regard to the southern frontier of Albania. Signor de Martino said the difficulty the Italian Government found in admitting the claims of the Greeks on the coast was exclusively a technical military question, but both the Austrian and the Italian staff were in complete agreement in insisting on this difficulty. They held that it was inadmissible that the whole of the mainland coast of the Corfu channel should be transferred to Greece, as that channel could be converted into a naval base, which would dominate the narrow entrance to the Adriatic. Italy regarded the Corfu channel much as she had regarded Vallona. Austria would never consent to see Italy at Vallona, as Italy could never consent to see Austria established there, and she would certainly accept the issue of war rather than give way on that point. The Corfu channel was only a very little further south, and therefore it was against the interests of Italy that it should be exclusively controlled by a naval Power, or a Power which might readily develop naval strength. I asked him if Albania was to be neutralised, and, if Greece were ready to neutralise the Corfu channel also, what difference it made whether Albania or Greece occupied the coast, as in neither case would it be possible to erect fortresses there. Signor de Martino said it was not so much a question of fortifications as of ability to collect and supply a fleet there and maintain communications overland, and for that reason it was preferable that one side of the narrow part of the channel should not be in the hands of Greece. Italy was quite ready to agree to the line of the kalamas as the frontier. Greece desired to have it further north, and he hoped that there was room for a compromise between the two points of view.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[19267] No. 554.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 134.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, April 23, 1913.*

WITH reference to previous telegraphic correspondence, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of an *aide-mémoire* which I have received from the Russian Government on the subject of the protest to be made at Athens against the action of the Greek Government regarding Cretan customs.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 554.

Aide-mémoire communicated to Sir G. Buchanan.

EN réponse à l'aide-mémoire en date du 6 (19) avril, année courante, le Ministère Impérial a l'honneur d'informer l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique que, de son côté, il partage l'avis exprimé dans cet aide-mémoire, à savoir, que le régime douanier en Crète doit être maintenu jusqu'à la conclusion définitive de la paix.

Les recettes douanières de l'île étant affectées au payement des intérêts et de

l'amortissement de l'emprunt de 1906, le régime douanier en Crète ne peut subir de modification que par l'accord préalable des Puissances intéressées.

Le Gouvernement Impérial a donné en conséquence à son Ministre à Athènes l'instruction de se joindre aux représentations à ce sujet des Puissances.

Saint-Pétersbourg, le 9 (22) *avril*, 1913.

[19210] No. 555.

Sir P. Harvey to Sir L. Mallet.—(Received April 26.)

National Health Insurance Audit Department,
Tothill Street, London, April 24, 1913.

Dear Mallet,

HEREWITH memorandum as requested.

Yours sincerely,
H. P. HARVEY.

Enclosure in No. 555.

Memorandum by Sir P. Harvey.

IT seems desirable that the British delegates should receive further indication of the views of the Government in the matter of the suggested indemnity to be paid by Turkey to the allies.

While in Paris I saw the Russian, German, and French delegates. The Russian spoke with the greatest cynicism on the subject. He said that it was not a matter which could be settled by any rule of justice, but must be dealt with in an arbitrary manner according to what suited the interests of Europe. Turkey could afford to pay an indemnity, and should be made to pay as much as she can afford. I pointed out that Turkey would oppose to any such demand the objection that the Balkan States had not fulfilled the pecuniary obligations imposed on them by the Treaty of Berlin. M. Sevastopoulo replied that any such objection was now barred by prescription. The fact that Turkey had not been in a position to enforce her claim against the Balkan States in the past could not prevent the latter enforcing their claims against Turkey now.

The German delegate stated that his Government wished Turkey to continue to be a State "capable of buying things," and did not want her crippled financially; his Government was consequently opposed to the idea of an indemnity.

The French delegate indicated a general disapproval of the idea of the indemnity, but admitted that his Government was in fact consenting to examine the question.

It would seem that if the question of an indemnity is relegated by the Powers to the commission, this will be tantamount to admitting the principle of it. The real question for the commission would be as to its amount.

Two points may be recalled in this connection:

1. The 3 per cent. customs surtax granted to Turkey on condition that 75 per cent. of the proceeds thereof should be affected to Macedonia was only granted for seven years. Even though its renewal may be considered highly probable, yet the Powers can, as things stand, impose conditions on this renewal. Consequently, to consent to the proceeds of this revenue being pledged for an indefinite period for the purpose of a war indemnity means foregoing possible advantages to the Powers for the benefit of the allies.

2. It is alleged that Turkey will be financially in a stronger position after the loss of its European provinces. No doubt the expenditure in Macedonia was larger than the revenue from that territory. This would be mainly due to the concentration of a probably disproportionate part of the Turkish army on its European frontiers. If the Turkish army be hereafter reduced, it is quite possible that Turkey's financial position will be stronger than in the past, and that she could consequently afford to pay something in the way of an indemnity in addition to defraying the cost of the war. Whether this is really so, and if so, how much she could afford to pay, are questions which could be best discussed with Sir R. Crawford.

H. P. HARVEY.

April 24, 1913.

[19244] No. 556.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received April 26.)

Sir,

Treasury Chambers, April 25, 1913.

I AM directed by the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th instant, transmitting a copy of a telegram from Sir G. Lowther relative to the apparent discrepancy between the figures given by Sir A. Block of the revenues at the service of the Ottoman Public Debt arising from the ceded territories and the calculations put forward by the French Government.

My Lords have already expressed their preference for the French scheme, provided that the annuity calculated thereunder does not fall short of the total sum contributed by the ceded territories in a normal year to the service of the Debt. As the calculations now before them will no doubt be discussed in detail at the meeting of the International Commission in Paris, they presume that Sir E. Grey will not desire their further observations at the present time.

I am, &c.
ROBERT CHALMERS.

[19257] No. 557.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received April 26.)

Sir,

Treasury Chambers, April 25, 1913.

HAVING laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury Sir L. Mallet's letter of the 14th instant, enclosing copy of a letter from Sir P. Harvey, British delegate to the International Commission about to assemble in Paris to settle the financial questions arising out of the present war, asking authority to propose an amendment to the formula accepted by the Ambassadors' conference here, I am directed to make the following reply:

While my Lords see no serious objection to a reopening of the question whether the annuity to be borne by the allies should be capitalised on a basis of 4 per cent., it would not in their opinion be right, in seeking a fresh basis, to have regard to the present depressed price of Turkish securities. The amortisation of a portion of the Turkish debt would, they presume, be carried out on the basis of the market price of the various loans, and this price will no doubt rise after the cessation of hostilities. This objection would be in part removed if the basis of capitalisation were sought in the average price of the Turkish loans over a period of years preceding the war, but, in addition, allowance would require to made for the effect of the prospect of immediate redemption on a large scale in raising prices.

Sir Paul Harvey suggests that account should be taken not only of the price of Turkish securities but of the terms on which the allies might be expected to borrow. My Lords recognise that the Commission or the Powers desiring to facilitate the operation of capitalisation may determine on grounds of policy to take this factor into consideration, but they are not clear that the proposal would not injure the interest of the bondholders. From a purely financial point of view the object should be to secure that any capital sum to be paid by the allies shall be sufficient to reduce the outstanding capital of that portion of the Turkish debt in respect of which their contribution is paid. If the allies are to be conceded an option to capitalise on favourable terms, it will doubtless be considered whether they should not be called on to exercise the option within a definite very limited period.

Subject to these observations, my Lords see no objection to the British delegate raising the question for discussion at the meeting of the Commission.

I am, &c.
ROBERT CHALMERS.

[19206] No. 558.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 26.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April 26, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 25th instant, relative to Montenegrin affairs.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 558.

Admiralty to Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII."

(Telegraphic.) *Admiralty, April 25, 1913.*

WITH reference to your telegram of to-day, His Majesty's Government are of opinion that it would be most undesirable for you to undertake any such mission as you propose in present circumstances.

It is desired to prevent Montenegro from obtaining supplies and the King and Government from receiving external financial assistance.

Your colleagues should therefore be consulted as to any possible measures which would make the blockade stricter, but do not carry out these measures until His Majesty's Minister in Cettinjé intimates to you that the Montenegrin Government has actually received the collective communication.

[19302] No. 559.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 69.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, April 26, 1913.*

SECRETARY of State for Foreign Affairs says that the longer things are left unsettled as regards Scutari the greater the danger of complications, as public opinion in Austria and Russia would become every day more excited. He thinks that the only thing to do is at once to give Austria and Italy a mandate, and, if the latter refuses, ot Austria alone. If something is not decided soon, Austria will have to take the matter into her own hands.

[19288] No. 560.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 79.)

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, April 26, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 155 of 24th April: Italian custom-house regulations in the Ægean islands.

Information desired was not available at the War or Finance Departments, and it has been necessary to telegraph to Rhodes for a report.

[19296] No. 561.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 109.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, April 26, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 108 of 25th April.

Military attaché gives me the following information which he has received from Servian War Office:—

Two regiments of Servian artillery are still with Bulgarian forces. At least fifteen days must elapse before the whole of their troops can reach Servia. It is therefore unlikely that hostilities could under any circumstances commence before 10th May.

Military attaché asks for permission to proceed home on fifteen days' leave from 29th instant. I see no objection. Please inform War Office.

[19138] No. 562.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 68.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, April 26, 1913.*

SCUTARI.

My telegram No. 67 of 24th April.

It is difficult to ascertain here on what terms Essad Pasha has agreed to evacuate town. It would appear that he is marching out with all his arms and ammunition and field artillery.

According to confidential source, which I think worthy of attention, Essad Pasha is to march on Tirana, and proclaim himself Ruler of Albania.

[19043] No. 563.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 123. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 26, 1913.*

A RETIRED naval officer, now connected with a company who often received orders for the construction of engines from Messrs. Armstrong, Whitworth, called at this Office on the 22nd instant and informed a member of it, who happens to be a private friend of his, that the latter firm have just despatched Captain Honner to Constantinople as their special agent charged to conduct negotiations with the Turkish Government.

The nature of these negotiations was unknown, but it was natural that, if, as was likely, they concerned future naval construction, no mention of it should have been made by Messrs. Armstrong here, nor any request for support addressed to your Excellency by Captain Honner, since any arrangement reached during the continuance of the war might be considered as a breach of neutrality.

I have to request your Excellency to regard this information as confidential, as the person who brought it here fears that, if Messrs. Armstrong should discover that His Majesty's Government are in possession of it, they may be able to ascertain the manner in which it was revealed.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[19298] No. 564.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 70.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, April 26, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 68 of 26th April.

Montenegrins have occupied town without resistance, and good order is being maintained.

Nothing is published here with regard to terms on which evacuation took place It may be suspected that a bargain was made with Essad, who has withdrawn with his forces and remaining supplies.

[19299] No. 565.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 71.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, April 26, 1913.*

MY despatch No. 19 of 17th April: Scutari

English doctor [group undecypherable] tells me vice-consul was injured by a shell at the consulate on 18th March. Wound not severe. He has recovered.

[19300] No. 566.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 72.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, April 27, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 49 of 28th March to Athens.

Mediation representation not yet made, as Russian Minister awaiting instructions.

[19301] No. 567.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 73.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, April 27, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 50 of 23rd April: Evacuation of Scutari.

A collective representation was made at midday to-day in the sense of resolution. I am informing [group omitted: ? vice-admiral] in accordance with instructions.

[19307] No. 568.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 66.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, April 27, 1913.*

COUNT BERCHTOLD, whom I saw to-day, expressed great disappointment at the outcome of the Ambassadors' réunion of the 25th instant. He informed me that the Austrian admiral had assured him that no ship had been permitted to break the blockade, and that therefore the suggestion that the blockade should be rendered more effective was of no value whatever. His Excellency said that the King of Montenegro would always be able to obtain money through underhand channels, as has been his practice hitherto, and that therefore the proposal to curtail financial assistance was also useless. Montenegro must be forced to give way to the will of the Powers by some really efficacious measure. The patience of Austria-Hungary, said Count Berchtold, was almost exhausted, and if the Powers produced no practical scheme she would be obliged to decide her own plan of action before many days were past. Count Berchtold informed me that King Nicholas intended to make a State entry into Scutari on the 29th, and, in defiance of the wishes of the Powers, to make an official proclamation of annexation. If he established himself in Scutari the state of affairs would be much more serious, as the peace of Europe would be endangered by any further delay in putting an end to an impossible situation. The Pan-Slavist party in Russia would be encouraged by such a delay to initiate a violent agitation against M. Sazonof which might be crowned with success.

Count Berchtold told me that the Russian Ambassador had mentioned to him the question of possible compensation to Montenegro for the abandonment of Scutari. His Excellency said that if such compensation had to be given at the expense of Albania there could be no question of it. It would be equivalent to giving a reward for successfully defying the wishes of the Great Powers, and Greece would thereby be encouraged to insist on her claims in South Albania. The point of view of the Austro-Hungarian Government was that the abandonment of the siege of Scutari was the condition on which the Dual Monarchy made the concessions on the northern frontier of Albania That engagement was broken by the entry into Scutari of the King of Montenegro, and Austria's hands were freed.

Count Berchtold complained that Russia was delaying the common action with

regard to Montenegro, and that the resolution passed at the Ambassadors' *réunion* of the 23rd had not yet been put into effect at Scutari because the Russian Minister had not received the necessary instructions from his Government. Count Berchtold declared that if those instructions were not sent at once he should instruct the Austro-Hungarian representative to act without his Russian colleague.

The Emperor received Count Berchtold and the chief of the general staff last night in an audience which lasted a long time. Count Berchtold told me that public opinion in Vienna was very anxious for him to take prompt action, and he appeared to me to-day to be more inclined to give way to the great pressure which is being brought to bear on him.

His Excellency expressed the hope that the blockade against the coast of Montenegro would not be raised if Austria-Hungary was obliged to take military action against that country, for if the international squadron were withdrawn Montenegro would be encouraged to make every effort to resist the forces of the Dual Monarchy.

I endeavoured to ascertain from Count Berchtold whether Italy would join Austria-Hungary in military action against Montenegro, but his Excellency would not give me a clear statement on this point, and confined himself to intimating that Austria would, in any case, have the moral support of her ally in any isolated action which she might be obliged to take.

[19304] No. 569.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 81.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, April 27, 1913*

YOUR telegram No. 155 of 24th April.

All Italian goods imported into the islands in military occupation pay customs duties, with the exception only of supplies and material destined for use of military forces.

[19297] No. 570.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 110.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, April 27, 1913.*

THERE is a persistent rumour that Essad Pasha has proclaimed himself Ruler of Albania under the suzerainty of Turkey whilst renouncing Scutari in favour of Montenegro. No confirmation as yet.

[19344] No. 571.

Mr. Vaughan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 44.)
Sir, *Bucharest, April 21, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that M. Filipesco, the Minister of Domains and the most warlike member of M. Maioresco's Cabinet, has resigned and that his portfolio has been entrusted to M. Arion who, until the reconstruction in October last, had been Minister of the Interior.

In his letter to the President of the Council tendering his resignation, M. Filipesco based his action on the divergence of his views from those of his colleagues in the matter of the differences with Bulgaria. He had been anxious to resign from the very first, when it became apparent that the policy of peace-at-any-price could only result for Roumania in a rectification of frontier dependent on such good-will as might be shown her. Now that the solution of the question no longer depended on the Roumanian Government he begged that the acceptance of his resignation might not be deferred.

Immediately after the Minister's resignation a leading newspaper published an interview with M. Filipesco in which he violently attacked M. Take Jonesco. The principal accusations which he levied at the Minister of the Interior were that he had consistently maintained, even to foreigners, that Roumania would in no case go to war; and that he had not respected the secrecy incumbent on a member of the cabinet, whose decisions became known in Sophia almost as soon as they were taken.

The publication of this interview led to an interpellation in the Chamber, where M. Maioresco, in an able speech, traversed all M. Filipesco's statements, while M. Take Jonesco stoutly repudiated all the accusations against himself.

An effect of the interview has been to cause M. Marghiloman, the Minister of Finance and the next most militant member of the cabinet to M. Filipesco, to identify himself more closely with the more peaceable policy of M. Maioresco, as he was obliged to support M. Take Jonesco in the debate against M. Filipesco, whose views he had previously been believed to share to a large extent.

It is possible that the campaign of recrimination is not yet at an end, as to-day M. Filipesco publishes a long letter in the press, adhering to all his previous statements, although he grants that the Prime Minister is right on a single point, viz., that it is not just to accuse M. Take Jonesco of having served foreign interests intentionally. He had only imputed indiscretions to him.

In the final paragraphs of his letter he disclaims any intention of wishing to wreck M. Maioresco's Government and concludes as follows :—

"Let him rest in peace and power. Let him organise a triumphal entry into Silistria. As for myself, I was only anxious to decline a place in his procession.

"All that I wish is that there should not fall on my name the maledictions of generations to come, who will suffer cruelly by the loss of our pre-eminence in this part of Europe and who will be struck with amazement by the fact that, by the pusillanimity we have shown when there was a question of creating an international position for ourselves, we let the eastern question be solved without us, in return for a strip of ground just sufficient wherein to bury the dignity of the nation."

I have, &c.
J. C. T. VAUGHAN.

[19345] No. 572.

Mr. Vaughan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 45.)
Sir, *Bucharest, April 21, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Roumanian Parliament adjourned the day before yesterday for the Easter recess, and will reassemble on the 7th of next month.

Shortly before its adjournment an annual grant of 100,000 fr. (4,000*l.*) was voted for Prince Carol, only three or four members offering any opposition.

Some consternation was caused in the Chamber of Deputies on the 18th instant by an individual in the strangers' gallery, who fired a blank cartridge from a revolver whilst M. Take Jonesco was addressing the House. The author of the disturbance proved to be a feeble-minded Roumanian from Macedonia who wished to call attention to the condition of his fellow-countrymen in the conquered territories.

M. G. G. Cantacuzino, the President of the Senate, and a former Prime Minister, died early in the month, and M. Rosetti, also a former Prime Minister, has been appointed his successor. Owing to M. Rosetti's advanced age, the appointment is only considered temporary, and M. Lahovary, who until a few weeks ago was Minister of Domains, is spoken of as likely to take his place before long. M. Lahovary has already succeeded M. Cantacuzino as president of the Conservative Club, but at the present moment there is no official leader of the Conservative party, as it has proved impossible to induce M. Carp to reassume the position.

M. Maioresco is somewhat anomalously placed, as although president of the Council, he has never been elected the official head of the Conservative party. He was, however, the only member of the party who could muster the support of the Conservative Democrats, and thus enable the Government to be carried on.

M. Marghiloman, the present Minister of Finance, is spoken of as ultimately likely to become the leader of the Conservatives, especially as M. Maioresco is credited with a strong desire to be relieved of the cares of office as soon as the international situation renders such a course possible.

I have, &c.
J. C. T. VAUGHAN.

[19411] No. 573.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 21.)
Sir, *Cettinjé, April 21, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 63 of to-day's date, relative to the offer of mediation by the Powers, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the collective representation made to the Montenegrin Government on the 16th April and the text of the reply returned to-day.

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 573.

Joint Note communicated to the Montenegrin Government, April 16, 1913.

LES Puissances, prenant acte avec satisfaction des dispositions des alliés pour la cessation des hostilités, répondent de la façon suivante sur les quatre points formulés dans la note des alliés :—

1. Le premier point ne soulève pas d'objection.

2. Sur le second point, les Puissances font observer que le sort de îles de la mer Egée ayant été réservé à l'appréciation des Puissances, ce point ne peut être admis que sous réserve des décisions à prendre au sujet de certaines de ces îles.

3. Sur le troisième point, les Puissances déclarent qu'elles sont prêtes à faire connaître dès maintenant aux alliés la délimitation nord et nord-est de l'Albanie et que celle du sud et du sud-est leur sera communiquée aussitôt qu'elle aura été établie.

4. Sur le quatrième point la solution de toutes les questions d'ordre financier ayant été réservée à la Commission de Paris, à laquelle prendront part les délégués des belligérants, les Puissances estiment qu'il n'y a pas lieu de s'expliquer quant à présent sur le principe d'une indemnité.

La frontière nord et nord-est d'Albanie est fixée de la manière suivante :—

La frontière de l'Albanie partira de la côte de la mer Adriatique à l'embouchure de la Boïana et suivra le thalweg de ce fleuve jusqu'au village de Goritza, situé sur la rive droite; de là elle atteint le sommet des montagnes séparant la Boïana du lac de Scutari en laissant le Tarabochie à l'Albanie; elle traverse le lac puis du village Zogaj, qui reste à l'Albanie, jusqu'à la baie de Lichény Hoti, d'où elle suit la frontière entre les tribus de Grouda et Hoti, cédées au Monténégro, d'une part, et les tribus de Kastrati et de Klémenti d'autre part, laissant ces deux tribus à l'Albanie; elle se confond ensuite avec les limites actuelles entre la tribu monténégrine de Kouchi d'un côté et la tribu de Klémenti de l'autre côté jusqu'au territoire de Goussigné et Plava; elle laisse ces ville avec leurs dépendances au Monténégro en suivant la chaîne principale de ligne de partage des eaux entre le Lim d'un côté et le Drin de l'autre; elle quitte cette chaîne pour gagner la crête des collines au sud de la ville de Dibra, qu'elle laisse hors de l'Albanie, et continue sur cette crête jusqu'au Drin Blanc; elle suit le cours de ce fleuve jusqu'à l'ouest de Prizrend et ensuite la ligne frontière entre le district de Prizrend et le district de Lioumа, laissant ce dernier à l'Albanie; de là elle suit la crête de la montagne Korab en laissant à l'Albanie le district de la Haute-Dibra et hors de l'Albanie le district de Reka. Quittant cette crête un peu au nord de la ville de Dibra, qui reste hors de l'Albanie, la frontière gagne le Drin Noir, qu'elle remonte jusqu'au village de Loukovo, d'où elle se dirigeant par les crêtes précédentes séparant le bassin du Drin de celui du Cikounbi et en laissant Struga, à tous de l'Albanie, elle gagne la rive du lac d'Ochrida dans les environs du village de Lin.

Enclosure 2 in No. 573.

Note communicated by the Montenegrin Government, April 21, 1913.

LES États alliés se font un devoir d'adresser aux Grandes Puissances leurs vifs remerciements pour la communication qu'elles leur ont faite, d'après laquelle :

1. La ligne Énos–Midia sera prise comme base des négociations et non comme ligne définitive.

2. La cession des îles de la mer Égée par la Turquie est admise sous la réserve de la décision à prendre au sujet de certaines d'entre elles.

3. Les Grandes Puissances sont prêtes à faire connaître dès à présent la délimitation projetée du nord et nord-est de l'Albanie et feront connaître celle du sud et sud-est dès qu'elle aura été établie.

4. La solution de toutes les questions financières ayant été réservée à la commission technique de Paris, à laquelle prendront part les délégués des belligérants, les Puissances estiment qu'il n'y a pas lieu de s'expliquer quant à présent sur le principe de l'indemnité.

Les États alliés constatent que les conditions ci-dessus, auxquelles les Grandes Puissances consentent d'intervenir comme médiatrices en vue de la conclusion de la paix avec la Turquie, diffèrent un peu de celles qu'ils ont formulées dans leur réponse du 6 avril.

Cependant, dans leur sincère désir de faciliter et de faire aboutir la médiation offerte, les États alliés, en remerciant de nouveau les Grandes Puissances de vouloir bien admettre le principe de l'indemnité de guerre, déclarent qu'ils acceptent cette médiation, en se réservant dans le cours des négociations de débattre avec les Grandes Puissances les questions se rapportant aux îles et à la fixation définitive des frontières de la Thrace et de toute l'Albanie.

[19357] No. 574.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 82 A.)

Sir, *Belgrade, April 22, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, on the 18th instant, the Skupshtina passed a Bill authorising a credit of 90,000,000 dinars (3,600,000*l.*) for the upkeep of the army until demobilisation, and for meeting expenditure resulting from the war up to the end of the year.

This credit includes a sum of 30,000,000 dinars (1,200,000*l.*), already authorised by the Council of Ministers on the 30th January, 1913, for army requirements, and the sum of 30,000,000 dinars (1,200,000*l.*), which, as reported in my telegram No. 99 of the 8th instant, was stated by the Minister of Finance to be required for the maintenance of the army until the delimitation of the new territories rendered demobilisation possible. This statement caused the Bulgarian Government to request an explanation. I was subsequently informed by my Bulgarian colleague that M. Pashitch disclaimed any previous knowledge of the statement of the Minister of Finance, to whom the Prime Minister had indicated that it was regrettable that he should have alluded in his speech to foreign politics.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[19412] No. 575.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 22.)

Sir, *Cettinjé, April 23, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 65 and 66 of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram received in the course of the past night from Vice-Admiral Burney, as well as copy of the note which I have in consequence addressed to the Montenegrin Government relative to the extension to Durazzo of the blockade notified to them on the 10th April.

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 575.

Vice-Admiral Burney to Count de Salis.

(Telegraphic.) *Zelenika, April 22, 1913.*

BEG you will inform the president of the Council of Ministers of the Royal Government that the blockade of the coast, notified on the 10th instant, is being forthwith extended to Durazzo harbour. Vessels now in the extended portion of the blockaded area will be allowed forty-eight hours to leave if they so wish.

Please communicate to all representatives of foreign Powers at Cettinjé.

Enclosure 2 in No. 575.

Count de Salis to M. Vukotitch.

M. le Ministre, *Cettigné, le 23 avril, 1913.*

ME référant à ma note en date du 10 avril, j'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à votre Excellence que les limites du blocus établi par l'escadre internationale seront étendues incessamment jusqu'au port de Durazzo. Aux bateaux se trouvant déjà dans les eaux visées par cette nouvelle disposition et désireux de s'en éloigner sera accordé un délai de quarante-huit heures.

Je saisis, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

[19327] No. 576.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 342.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April 24, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a letter from the Representative of the British Bondholders on the Administrative Council of the Ottoman Public Debt, on the question of the protection of the Debt's interests in Macedonia.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 576.

Sir A. Block to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Constantinople, April 22, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to thank you for the communication of the letters exchanged between Dedeagatch, Sophia, and London, with regard to the action of the Bulgarian Government officials in the matter of our revenues in Macedonia.

I beg you will be good enough to express to His Majesty's Government the thanks of the Debt Council for the interest taken by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and by His Majesty's Minister at Sophia. After consultation with my colleagues, we are of opinion that as long as the state of war exists in Macedonia the Council of the Debt must continue, with the assistance that the British diplomatic and consular officials, as well as the officials of other Great Powers, are able to afford, to meet the difficulties that arise in Macedonia to the best of our ability.

We quite understand that the state of transition must naturally, for the moment, be an obstacle to the proper collection of our revenues, and we doubt whether under present conditions the appointment of an agent at Sophia would very much facilitate the action of our officials.

As soon, however, as peace is assured, the Council of the Debt will take a decision with regard to the appointment of agents in the capitals of the Balkan States on the lines of Mr. Vice-Consul Heard's memorandum.

For the present, therefore, we think that Mr. Vice-Consul Heard's proposal must remain in abeyance.

I return the documents, and with reiterated thanks,

I have, &c.
ADAM BLOCK.

[19329] No. 577.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 344.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April 24, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Turkish Financial Commission at the Paris Conference will be composed as follows:—

Nail Bey, ex-Minister of Finance, ex-Minister of Public Instruction in Hilmi Pasha's Cabinet, formerly deputy for Djanik in Anatolia, and now a senator, was one of the original Turkish directors of the National Bank of Turkey.

Djavid Bey, whose career is too well known to call for any comment here.

Haladjian Effendi, an Armenian, ex-Minister of Public Works, deputy for Constantinople constituency, and legal adviser to the Ottoman Public Debt.

Sir R. Crawford, adviser to the Turkish Customs administration, who proceeds in his quality of financial adviser to the Ottoman Government.

Besides the four principal delegates, the three following officials are attached to the Commission in a consultative capacity:—

Hrant Bey Abro, an Armenian, legal adviser to the Sublime Porte.
Mukhtar Bey, inspector of railways.
Moncfek Bey, inspector of finance.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[19368] No. 578.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 83.)

Sir, *Belgrade, April 24, 1913.*

IN compliance with the instructions in your despatch No. 28 of the 9th instant, I recently spoke to the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs concerning the outrages alleged to have been committed upon Moslems in territory in Servian occupation.

M. Stefanovitch said he much regretted any unfavourable impression that might be caused in England by such reports, but the Servian Government had a clear conscience, and could not admit any accusations that were not substantially proved. They were of course unable to prevent the circulation of falsehoods.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[19370] No. 579.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 85.)

Sir, *Belgrade, April 24, 1913.*

I HAD the honour to report in my telegram No. 106 of the 22nd instant that the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had informed me that the movements of troops now taking place in Macedonia were purely precautionary, and were necessitated by the military dispositions taken by the Bulgarians, which appeared somewhat menacing.

In making this statement, M. Stefanovitch expressed the hope that it would be possible to arrange the differences between Bulgaria and Servia without recourse to extreme measures; the Servian Government were anxious to do all in their power to maintain the alliance, and realised how deplorable any breach would be, but at the

same time they must ask for a revision of the territorial dispositions of the treaty which circumstances had rendered unfair towards Servia.

I observed that it was surely a somewhat peculiar theory that a bargain once solemnly concluded and subscribed could be subsequently repudiated because circumstances had rendered it disadvantageous to one of the parties; if such a theory were accepted it would be futile ever to enter into any prior arrangements. M. Stefanovitch replied that Servia had fulfilled a good deal more than her obligations under the treaty during the war; she had supplied large numbers of troops and some artillery for Adrianople, whereas, according to arrangement it was Bulgaria who should have sent 100,000 men to Servia's assistance. Bulgaria should therefore now be less uncompromising and be prepared to listen to Servian claims regarding the districts now in the occupation of the Servian army.

I said that I understood that by the *ante bellum* arrangements certain districts had been set down as undisputably Servian, others as undisputably Bulgarian, while yet others, amongst which were Kumanovo, Uskub, Struga, Dibra, were considered doubtful, and were therefore, in case of dispute, reserved for the arbitration of the Czar of Russia. A map showing these several spheres had appeared in the "Times" of the 18th instant. The Bulgarians, I had heard, were ready to cede the doubtful districts to Servia without any further discussion, and considered this fact should be quite sufficient compensation for any extra services rendered by Servia during the war. They were, however, not at all prepared to make any concessions with regard to such districts as Ochrida, Monastir, Perlepé, Kuprulu, which lay within the Bulgarian sphere.

M. Stefanovitch had not seen the map in the "Times," but said it was probably incorrect, as very inaccurate ideas existed concerning the stipulations of the treaty. I said in that case it would seem advisable to publish the treaty so that the truth might be known, and it might become more possible to form a correct judgment as to the rights of the case. M. Stefanovitch evaded any direct reply to this suggestion. He deplored the fact that the Bulgarians had thought fit to raise the question of territories before the end of the war, but I pointed out to him that as far as I could judge, the discussion had at first arisen through the utterances of the Servian press and the defiant declarations of the Servian army to the effect that they would never give up Monastir. M. Stefanovitch then made a somewhat remarkable statement, namely, that the opinion of the Servian army counted for nothing; one had only to look at the fuss the army had at first made about retiring from Albania and subsequently about abandoning Scutari, and the little result it had produced to know that the opinions of the army were not worth considering, and could be turned by the Government in any direction it chose. The Bulgarians might therefore well let any expressions of opinion by the army pass unnoticed.

After the protestations made to me by M. Pasitch on various occasions recently, adducing opposition in the army as the reason which made it impossible for him to conform to the advice of the Powers, these remarks of M. Stefanovitch are interesting and well worth remembering for the future.

From the above and other conversations I gather that the general attitude in Servia is briefly as follows:—

That compensation is due to Servia from Bulgaria for extra services rendered in the course of the war; that it is quite immaterial what may have been the stipulations previously concluded with Bulgaria, as these are not applicable to the altered conditions, namely, Bulgaria having occupied Thrace and Servia having been deprived of her conquests in Albania; that the alliance was never concluded to be only for the advantage of Bulgaria, and that a huge Bulgaria and a small Servia would upset the equilibrium of the Balkan alliance.

So far as I know, the Bulgarian Government merely reply to these points by stating that they must insist on the stipulations of the treaty which clearly lay down the respective spheres, which foresaw all eventualities, and were so precise as to take account not only of villages but even houses. I understand that the Bulgarian Government have unofficially suggested the publication of the treaty, but the Servian Government certainly show no signs of agreeing to this course—a fact which can but create the impression that the Servians are conscious of a decided weakness in their case.

For the moment both Servians and Bulgarians appear wholly uncompromising, and it is difficult to see how their views are to be reconciled. Both sides are making military preparations in Macedonia, and it is not impossible that a collision may soon occur unless steps are taken to mediate.

The probability of mediation by Russia is being much discussed, and there is little doubt that so far as Servia is concerned, Russian influence is sufficient to cause all abandonment of her present claims; the settlement of the present differences therefore appear to depend solely upon the views which obtain at St. Petersburgh.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[19371] No. 580.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 86.)
Sir, *Belgrade, April 25, 1913.*

THE news of the fall of Scutari has been received with much enthusiasm in Servia. More public excitement has indeed been manifest in Belgrade than on any previous occasion during the war. This can in great part be accounted for, in the first place, by a desire to parade a feeling of kinship for the Montenegrins as being Serbs, and, secondly, as a protest against the intention of the Powers to give Scutari to Albania.

For M. Pashitch and the Government, however, the surrender of Scutari has not come altogether *à propos*. The belief had been spread abroad that the Montenegrins were powerless to take Scutari without the assistance of the Servian army, a belief which was intended to deprecate King Nicholas, to foster discontent among his subjects, and prepare them for the idea of union with Servia. This intention has now been thwarted by Scutari surrendering immediately after the withdrawal of the Servian troops, and, not only this, but the Servian Government have laid themselves open to the reproach of abandoning their ally, which they might have escaped by keeping their troops round Scutari for only a few days longer.

The whole Servian press hail the fall of Scutari as a great Serb victory, and express the hope that the Powers will reconsider their decision, and allow the Montenegrins to retain what they have captured.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[19316] No. 581.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 28.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, April 26, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram dated to-day from the Vice-Admiral, 3rd Squadron.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 581.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April 26, 1913.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 334, the blockade of Albanian coast to Durazzo and of the Montenegrin ports is now quite strict, and only the following vessels are allowed to enter or depart, viz., hospital ships for Servian sick and wounded, and transports for embarkation of Servian troops are allowed at Durazzo and San Giovanni di Medua.

On arrival all these ships are closely examined, and embarkation is superintended by an officer of the international fleet.

[19554] No. 582.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 28.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April 28, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a letter which has been received from Vice-Admiral Burney, dated the 22nd instant, forwarding translation of a letter from the general officer commanding the Servian army in Albania.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 582.

Vice-Admiral Burney to Admiralty.

"King Edward VII," San Giovanni di Medua,
Sir, *April 22, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 50 of to-day's date, I have the honour to forward herewith a translation of the letter I received from General Peter Boïovitch, commanding the Servian army in Albania.

I have, &c.
CECIL BURNEY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 582.

General Boïovitch to Vice-Admiral Burney.

(Translation.)
Admiral, *San Giovanni di Medua, April 22, 1913*

I THINK it my duty to bring to your notice the following facts:

I have received from those in command of our troops in Albania who have retired to Durazzo reports saying that the evacuation has been effected in perfect order, and that the Albanian population has expressed its gratitude and its thanks to our troops for the justice and order which they have re-established in those places where they have been camped. The greater part of the population, without regard to religious or race differences, is deeply affected by the departure of our troops, because they believe that, when they have gone, justice and order will no longer exist. Already they complain of violence and murder occurring in certain places immediately after the departure of our troops. At present it is the Christians that are suffering. For instance, at Pécune, two Christians have been killed; at Kavala, a Christian chemist has been pillaged; at Tirana, two other Christians have been assassinated.

Most of the population, Christians and Mussulmen alike, though mostly Christians, openly express their agony at the thought of the massacres that will be caused by the Mussulman Beys as soon as our troops have left Durazzo, and they are not content at the fate which Europe has reserved for them, because they assert that this state of affairs will not benefit the people, only the Mussulman Beys, which latter have been for long past the paid servants of interested foreigners, and they further state that the people will be happier under Servian authorities.

In bringing to your knowledge these facts, I would beg of you to bring them to the notice of those that can deal with them, so that violence and massacres may be avoided in those territories that the Servian army has left or is about to leave.

Will you accept, Admiral, the assurance of my high consideration.

P. BOÏOVITCH.

[19548] No. 583.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 28.)

(Confidential.) *Admiralty, April 28, 1913.*

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegrams, dated the 27th instant, relative to affairs in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 583.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

April 27, 1913.

(Telegraphic.)

A FORCE of 22,000 men from Scutari, under Essad Pasha, went through Alessio this morning on their way to Tirana. They had no wagons, and with the exception of horses and mules and eighteen field pieces, they had little transport.

They received three days' provisions from Servian general, as they had no supplies.

Enclosure 2 in No. 583.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

April 27, 1913.

(Telegraphic.)

H.M.S. "YARMOUTH" sends following report from Salonica :—

"38,000 men of the 8th division of Bulgarian army are stated to be concentrated in Doiran Kukush district. The Bulgarians are ready to leave Salonica. Complications expected by Greeks."

From H.M.S. "Black Prince," the 28th April :—

"Have reached Port Saïd. Greek 'Hydra' and two destroyers are at anchor 5 miles east-north-east of Port Saïd. Nothing known of 'Hamidyeh.'"

[19482] No. 584.

M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, April 28, 1913.)

(Télégraphique.) *Saint-Pétersbourg, le 24 avril, 1913.*

M. SAZONOF n'a pas d'objection en principe à la formule de la démarche collective à Cettigné. Se maintenant entièrement sur le terrain de la décision prise par les Puissances, il tient compte de la nécessité de pression ultérieure sur le Monténégro pour lui imposer soumission. Il trouve que ces moyens de pression, sans recourir à la force, sont loin d'être épuisés. Il lui revient de sources sûres que le Monténégro commence à souffrir du manque de vivres. Il pense que le resserrement du blocus poserait cette question et qu'on pourrait en même temps couper toute ressource financière revenant de l'étranger.

Mais M. Sazonof pense en soumant le Roi de se soumettre à la volonté des Puissances il convient, pour arriver à la solution prompte de cette question, qu'indique toute l'Europe, de faire comprendre au Roi Nicolas, non seulement la nécessité d'une prompte et décisive soumission, mais aussi de lui en faire saisir l'avantage. M. Sazonof pense que cette voie est la plus naturelle et de beaucoup la plus sage. Il s'agissait de faire savoir très confidentiellement au Roi que pour le cas de sa soumission les Puissances se réserve de prendre en considération certains de ces termes de concession et d'y faire droit dans la mesure du possible. La forme de ces concessions serait à

rétablir. M. Sazonof s'est entretenu de ce sujet avec l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie à Saint-Pétersbourg. Le Comte Thurn a répondu qu'il pensait que la dignité de l'Autriche exigeât d'abord la soumission du Roi Nicolas après quoi on pourrait envisager la question de compensation.

La réponse du Comte Berchtold à ces ouvertures est par conséquent attendue à Saint-Pétersbourg.

[19385] No. 585.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 74.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, April 27, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 27th April: Scutari.

The representation was made by means of a collective note addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as no responsible person could be found to receive the representatives of the Powers.

The Minister has replied this evening that, as Easter is both a national and religious festival, his Government cannot deliberate upon or even receive communications which have not a character of extreme urgency. The Minister must therefore confine himself to acknowledging the receipt of the note, reserving to himself to give a reply when the festival is over.

[19562] No. 586.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 160.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, April 28, 1913.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs, whom I saw to-day immediately after Austrian and German Ambassadors, told me that latter had said that, failing collective action by Europe or a European mandate to Austria, Austria must be left to take such action as she deemed necessary. From language held to him by Austrian Ambassador, it seemed almost certain that, unless some decision had been taken at meeting of Ambassadors to-day, Austria would act by herself. His Excellency had said all he could to urge Austria to desist from such a step, but with very little hope of success.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that French Government had declined to take part in any coercive measures unless they were given a special mandate by Russia. Such a mandate Russia could not give. He gathered that His Majesty's Government would also abstain, and was doubtful about Italy.

His Excellency shares the view to which several of my colleagues have given expression that, while King Nicholas would probably yield to collective action by Europe, he will resist such action if taken by Austria alone. Should this prove to be the case and should there be bloodshed, I fear that Russian public opinion will get beyond control. Minister for Foreign Affairs is, I think, inclined to under-estimate the present feeling of the country, but, even if the Emperor is strong enough to resist it, His Majesty might have to sacrifice Ministers who are responsible for his present policy.

I reminded Minister for Foreign Affairs that he had told me a fortnight ago that the Emperor was very angry with King Nicholas and that his Excellency would not protest against separate action by Austria. His Excellency replied that the Emperor was still very angry, and that when the President of the Duma in a recent audience had begun speaking about Scutari His Majesty had at once cut him short. On my enquiring what Russian Government would do, his Excellency said that until he had consulted the Emperor he could not say whether they would take any precautionary military measures or not. They would, however, have to publish some statement to the effect that they regarded Austria's action as a political error for which they assumed no moral responsibility.

[19565] No. 587.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 82.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, April 28, 1913.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has frankly admitted that public opinion in this country will not allow Italy to join Austria alone in intervention in Montenegro. Any co-operation, however small, on the part of Great Britain and France or of one of them which would be sufficient to maintain international character of action would suffice; such co-operation, for instance, might be a naval disembarkation at Antivari or Dulcigno. Italy would then co-operate efficaciously. Failing such limited action by Great Britain or France, Austria will *primâ facie* act alone, and he regards that eventuality with the utmost anxiety.

[19564] No. 588.

Mr. Vaughan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 66.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, April 28, 1913.*

VICE-CONSUL at Kustendjo reports that Turkish steamer sailed 27th April: cargo of guns, ammunition, mines, and other war material.

[19753] No. 589.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 365.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 28, 1913.*

I FOUND this morning that the Austrian Ambassador had instructions to press for an agreement for further coercive action against Montenegro in the too probable event of a refusal by the King of Montenegro to evacuate Scutari.

There are great difficulties in coming to any agreement for further international action; there are as great difficulties in agreeing to a mandate making all the Powers responsible for forcible action taken by one or two Powers alone.

After discussing the situation with the Russian and French Ambassadors, I came to the conclusion that I had better take at the reunion this afternoon the line which I sketched out to them beforehand.

No better alternative being forthcoming, I made the following observation after the Austrian Ambassador had made his proposals:—

I said that I would submit to the Cabinet any suggestions that were made for military action, but it was hardly a matter in which Great Britain could be expected to take part in military action. On the other hand, I thought Great Britain could not object to military measures taken by any other Power or Powers that might in the last resort be reasonably necessary to uphold the agreement about Scutari to which she is a party.

What, therefore, I would like to say to the King of Montenegro would be that, if he submitted to the will of the Powers, they would discuss with him after the evacuation of Scutari reasonable compensation; if, on the other hand, he refused the demand of the Powers, Great Britain would give him no support and would disinterest herself in his fate. I must, however, submit the whole question to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet in this sense on Wednesday before finally committing His Majesty's Government.

I hope this will meet with approval of Minister for Foreign Affairs. I see no chance of obtaining a solution by any more favourable method; and the only chance of inducing the King of Montenegro to withdraw from Scutari seems to be that the attitude I propose should be adopted by other Powers and made known to him.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 183; Paris, No. 184; Rome, No. 158; and Vienna, No. 154.)

[19304] No. 590.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 69.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, April 28, 1913.*

SIR R. RODD'S telegram No. 81 of 27th April: Preferential treatment of Greek goods in Crete.

You may now act as soon as your colleagues have received instructions.

[19975] No. 591.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 202.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 28, 1913.*

I SAW the French and Russian Ambassadors this morning, and discussed the situation with them. I suggested to them the line that I thought of adopting at the *réunion* this afternoon.

The French Ambassador agreed that it was desirable that I should take this line, and the Russian Ambassador, without committing himself so definitely, took no objection to its being put forward by me.

I accordingly carried out my intention, as recorded in the proceedings of the *réunion*, this afternoon.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[19974] No. 592.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 59.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 28, 1913.*

THE Bulgarian Minister informed me to-day that his Government had not received the representation inviting them to choose a place and delegates for drawing up the terms of peace. They regretted that the Financial Commission in Paris had been adjourned till as late as the 15th May next. They were anxious that the meeting of Ambassadors in London should prepare the terms of peace. The allies would never be able to draw them up for themselves, or at any rate they would take a very long time in doing so. The hundreds of thousands of men at Chatalja could not be kept there indefinitely without fighting. Bulgaria must therefore fight or make peace quickly.

I said that the only thing I saw that the Powers could do in the way of a draft of the terms of peace would be to turn their last representation, stating the terms of peace, into the form of a treaty. I would consult the Ambassadors about this.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[19973] No. 593.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 119.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 28, 1913.*

THE Italian Ambassador informed me to-day, before the *réunion*, that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in reply to a communication, had informed the Austrian Government that, in the event of isolated action by Austria, Italy must reserve liberty of action to protect her own interests. The Ambassador also informed me that he would have to oppose a mandate to Austria alone; that his Government advocated further international action; and that, if an expeditionary force was necessary, it should not be one organised by Austria and Italy alone, but that it would be necessary for us to join in it, however formally.

I said that, though I must consult the Cabinet, I did not believe that it was

* Also to Sir G. Buchanan (No. 176).

practicable for us to take part in any military action with Austria and Italy only, nor was it reasonable to suppose that we, as one of the Powers least directly interested, should take part in separate military action arranged by the Powers most directly interested.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[19823] No. 594.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No 145.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 28, 1913.*

THE German Ambassador urged upon me this morning that we should join with Austria and Italy in coercive measures against Montenegro. He said that this was the only way in which a mandate could be agreed to. If we would join, Russia would probably agree to a mandate; but it would be impossible to obtain a mandate for Austria and Italy alone. For us to join in the action suggested would be consistent with the speeches that had been made by the Prime Minister and myself.

I said that those speeches did not bind us to take part in anything but general international action. They might be construed as binding us, in the event of general international action failing, not to object to any reasonable measures taken in the last resort by another Power or Powers to uphold the agreement come to by the Powers; but this was the limit of honourable obligation that I considered to be imposed upon us.

Prince Lichnowsky admitted that we were not bound to do more than this, but he urged how dangerous it would be if Austria was forced to act alone. Count Berchtold's position had become very difficult, and, if he was overthrown, it would only be to be succeeded by someone who would act alone. British participation seemed the only way of obtaining a mandate that would avoid this danger.

I said that my personal impression was that we should not take part in any but general international action. For us to act with Austria and Italy only would be for one of the least interested Powers to act with two of the most interested, and I could not commit myself to any separate British action without consulting the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. There were only two ways of dealing with the King of Montenegro —one was compensation and the other coercion. I understood that, during my recent absence from London, everyone had agreed that a loan should be made to the King of Montenegro if he submitted to the will of the Powers.

The German Ambassador said that this was so. His Government considered that any further territorial compensation was impossible; but, in his own personal view, the question of a few villages more or less ought not to matter, if peace could be preserved by conceding them.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[19822] No. 595.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 92.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 28, 1913.*

THE Austrian Ambassador informed me to-day verbally of his instructions, of which he gave me the following note for convenience of record.

I remarked that a part of these instructions was now superseded by the fact that the collective *démarche* had been made in Cettinjé.

Count Mensdorff expressed satisfaction at hearing this, but he urged that the King of Montenegro was practically certain to refuse to evacuate Scutari, and that it was therefore necessary to come to an agreement as to what steps should be taken in this event. Count Mensdorff added that he would not act upon his instructions to make a definite proposal at the reunion this afternoon if any other proposal likely to be effective was forthcoming.

I observed that I must first explore the ground, for which purpose I was seeing all the Ambassadors separately before the *réunion*, to ascertain what instructions they had. I knew that something had been passing direct between M. Sazonof and Count

Berchtold, and I hoped to hear from Count Benckendorff what that was. In any case, we could hardly come to an agreement this afternoon as to further measures of coercion. All that could possibly be expected was that, if any proposal was made, the Ambassadors should refer it to their Governments.

Count Mensdorff said that, even if he had to make his proposal, it would in that case not be a rupture.

I said that I assumed that, in any case, coercive measures were contemplated only in the event of the collective *démarche* now made in Cettinjé meeting with an unfavourable reply, or no reply within a reasonable time, or otherwise failing to be effective.

To this Count Mensdorff agreed.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 595.

Note communicated by Count Mensdorff.

THE decision of the *réunion* of the 23rd to carry out without delay the *démarche* at Cettinjé having not been acted upon for the reason that all the Powers had not supplied their representatives with the necessary instructions, it seems very doubtful that the view expressed by the Ambassadors on the 25th, "qu'il y a lieu de procéder d'urgence et de fixer au Gouvernement monténégrin pour sa réponse un court délai à déterminer par les Puissances," will be approved by all the Powers and carried out "à la lettre."

We have no guarantee that the decision of the *réunion* of the 25th will be carried out any faster than that of the 23rd. But besides that, the measures contemplated by the Ambassadors' meeting to put pressure on Montenegro do not seem to be of a nature to induce Montenegro to yield rapidly to the will of Europe.

At an earlier period, before the material of war coming from Servia and Russia and the provisions for Montenegro had been landed, the blockade and its extension might have had a certain importance. At the present moment the Albanians would suffer much more severely by the blockade than the Montenegrins. The latter are provided with provisions for two or three months, left to them by the Servians; besides they are sure to get all the necessary supplies, thanks to the building of a road for motors and owing to the fact that arrangements have been made by which 4,000 animals for transport are available in Montenegro and as many in Servia.

To cut off Montenegro from supplies seems therefore out of the question, and they could only feel the unpleasant effects of the blockade after a long time.

The plan "de resserrer le blocus" seems quite useless, as our naval commanders guarantee that the blockade is already effective now. They would certainly not have consented to an ineffective action. Measures "pour l'empêcher de se procurer des ressources financières" might be a way to render Montenegro in future more amenable to the will of Europe, but they cannot be looked upon as means of pressure to force King Nicholas and his Government to a rapid evacuation of the Albanian territory. It certainly would not be difficult for Montenegro to procure financial aid by other ways —to control this would be obviously impossible.

Concerning Count Benckendorff's proposal to give Montenegro to understand that by giving way it might obtain certain advantages, it is of course open to any Power to influence King Nicholas in any way she thinks proper; but the Imperial and Royal Government could not, in the present state of affairs, contemplate the plan of giving financial help to Montenegro. Nor could we furnish Montenegro with any hope of territorial *agrandissement*, as it would have to be at the expense of Albania.

We must insist on the collective *démarche* being made at Cettinjé. Our Minister has been instructed to wait till the 29th—on which day the official entry of King Nicholas in Scutari is supposed to take place—in view of ascertaining whether all his colleagues had received instructions to make the collective *démarche* in question. Should this not have happened, he would have to express himself on behalf of the Imperial and Royal Government in the sense of the decision of the *réunion*, as we do not wish on any account to let an attempt of a solemn *prise de possession* of a town occupied against the will of the Powers to pass without a formal protest.

I am instructed to urge upon the *réunion* that an agreement ought to be reached concerning the coercive measures which the Powers must take in case of a delay in the

answer of Montenegro, or of a refusal, or of an acceptance which would not be kept by Montenegro.

We cannot look upon the absolutely ineffective proposals of the *réunion* of the 25th as coercive measures, and I am instructed to propose again the occupation or bombardment of Montenegrin ports or an expedition to Scutari.

If, contrary to our expectation, the *réunion* does again not come to any decision regarding such measures, we would have to refrain from making any further proposals, and reserve to ourselves to apply *au moment donné* the measures which seem suitable for the execution of the European decision.

Austro-Hungarian Embassy, London,
April 26, 1913.

[19976] No. 596.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.**

(No. 93.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 28, 1913.

THE following is the record of what took place at the meeting with the Ambassadors this afternoon:—

"Le Comte Mensdorff, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, revient sur la question des mesures de coercition à employer contre le Roi de Monténégro et son Gouvernement pour le cas où il userait à l'égard des Puissances de procédés dilatoires, ou s'il leur répondait négativement, ou encore si, après leur avoir donné une réponse satisfaisante, il ne faisait pas évacuer Scutari. L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie considère que les moyens de coercition pourraient consister soit dans un bombardement d'une ou de plusieurs villes de la côte, soit dans l'occupation de ces villes, soit même dans une expédition sur Scutari. Il insiste pour que la réunion envisage ces éventualités et il ajoute que, dans le cas où elle ne parviendrait pas à préciser les mesures à prendre, le Gouvernement austro-hongrois se réserve de prendre au moment donné les mesures qui lui paraîtraient nécessaires pour mettre à exécution les résolutions de l'Europe.

"Le Prince Lichnowsky appuie les vues du Comte Mensdorff.

"Le Marquis Imperiali les appuie également, et insiste sur la nécessité d'une action énergique et internationale. Dans cet ordre d'idées, il ajoute que l'occupation d'un ou de plusieurs ports aurait un certain effet moral, que ce serait le signe de l'union des Puissances, et que la mesure suffirait sans doute à déterminer le Roi Nicolas à se soumettre.

"Le Prince Lichnowsky s'exprime dans le même sens.

"L'Ambassadeur de France, interrogé par Sir E. Grey, répond qu'il ne croit pas que son Gouvernement se prête à un débarquement, et que d'ailleurs, à son avis personnel, un débarquement pas plus qu'un bombardement n'aurait d'effet. Il estime qu'avant de s'occuper de mesures de coercition, il conviendrait de rechercher le moyen de faciliter au Roi Nicolas une réponse satisfaisante en lui faisant comprendre qu'aussitôt après l'évacuation de Scutari les Puissances prendront en considération certaines compensations à accorder au Monténégro.

"Sir E. Grey dit qu'il soumettra au Cabinet la suggestion d'une action militaire, mais il doute que ce soit un cas où l'on puisse attendre de la Grande-Bretagne une action de ce genre. D'autre part, il pense que la Grande-Bretagne ne pourrait faire d'objections à ce que d'autres Puissances recourent en dernier ressort aux mesures raisonnables et nécessaires qui pourraient être prises pour faire exécuter l'accord auquel elle a pris part au sujet de Scutari.

"Ce que Sir E. Grey préfererait serait une déclaration au Roi de Monténégro disant que s'il se soumet à la volonté des Puissances elles discuteront avec lui après l'évacuation de Scutari des compensations raisonnables. Si, au contraire, il se refuse à la demande des Puissances, le Gouvernement britannique ne lui donnera aucun appui et se désintéressera de son sort. Sir E. Grey doit cependant soumettre la question au Premier Ministre et au Cabinet et s'exprimera dans ce sens au Conseil du mercredi prochain, 30 courant. Il fera connaître à la réunion la décision définitive de son Gouvernement.

* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 293), Sir E. Goschen (No. 146), Sir R. Rodd (No. 120), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 117).

[16748] No. 597*.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 28, 1913.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Athens,* transmitting copy of a despatch from the British delegate on the International Financial Commission, who requests instructions as to the disposal by the commission of the sum relinquished by His Majesty's Government in favour of the Civil List of the late King of Greece under the Treaty of the 29th March, 1864.

Sir E. Grey would propose to enquire as to the views of the French and Russian Governments on this subject, but before doing so he would be glad to learn whether their Lordships have any observations to offer upon the matter.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

* No. 291*.

"Les Ambassadeurs porteront l'opinion de Sir E. Grey à la connaissance de leurs Gouvernements respectifs, en les priant de leur faire connaitre leurs vues à ce sujet avant la prochaine réunion."

At the end of the meeting I stated what the Bulgarian Minister had said to me just before we met.

All the Ambassadors, except the French Ambassador, were in favour of the terms of peace that we had already stated being put into the form of a draft treaty.

I suggested that no opinion could be expressed upon the matter this afternoon, but I would endeavour to have a draft prepared.

I had suggested Wednesday afternoon for the next meeting, but the Italian Ambassador thought this would not give time to receive the views of all the Governments on what had been discussed to-day, and this opinion seemed to be shared by some others. The next meeting was therefore fixed for Thursday.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[18238] No. 597.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 124.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 28, 1913.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 53 of the 22nd January, forwarding a complaint addressed to you by the British Commissioner on the Administration of the Ottoman Debt as to interference with the functions of that institution in the territories occupied by the forces of the allied Balkan States, I transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Athens containing the reply of the Greek Government to the note which,* by my instructions, he addressed to them on the subject.

I have to request your Excellency to communicate this paper to Sir A. Block, with the request that he will furnish his observations on the contentions advanced by the Greek Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[19613] No. 598.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 85.)
Sir, *Athens, April 21, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 74 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith the further reply of the Balkan allies to the proposals of mediation,† which M. Coromilas read and handed to the representatives of the Great Powers this evening.

I have transmitted it in full in my telegram No. 59, since the recapitulation which it contains of the conditions stated by the Powers does not cite them textually; indeed, one of my colleagues thought that M. Coromilas had interpreted the point relating to the islands as a greater concession to the demands of the allies than the Powers had intended it to be.

It will be noticed that the allies claim to discuss with the Powers the definitive fixation of the frontiers of all Albania, notwithstanding the communication made to them on the 17th April.

One of the representatives asked M. Coromilas whether it was true, as had been stated in the press, that a Greek and Servian officer had, with a Bulgarian, signed an armistice with the Turks at Chatalja. He replied that no armistice had been signed at all; there had been a verbal agreement between the Bulgarians and the Turks, to which neither the Servians nor the Greeks were parties. There was, however, no question of hostilities anywhere, unless Djavid Pasha threatened to take the offensive from Vallona.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

* No. 447. † No. 161.

[19614] No. 599.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 86.)

Sir, *Athens, April 22, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the reply which the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs has returned to the collective note which was addressed to him on the 28th March, and of which a copy was enclosed in my despatch No. 63 of that date, on the subject of the customs régime applicable in the Turkish territories occupied by the Balkan allies.

The note observes that the first four points of the collective protest have no applicability to the Greek administration. As regards the fifth point—preferential treatment of Greek goods on importation into the occupied territories—it asserts that the practice is based on right and on precedent, citing in particular what has been done by Italy in the Ægean islands occupied by her, where Italian goods are admitted free of duty.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 599.

M. Coromilas to Sir F. Elliot.

M. le Ministre, *Athènes, le 4 (17) avril, 1913.*

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser en date du 15 (28) mars dernier conjointement avec ses collègues d'Italie, de Russie, d'Allemagne, d'Autriche-Hongrie et de France, pour me transmettre une communication de leurs Gouvernements concernant le régime douanier sur les territoires turcs occupés par les alliés balkaniques.

En ce qui concerne les quatre premiers points visés dans le texte de la communication collective, je me permets de faire observer à votre Excellence que les considérations qui s'y rapportent ne sauraient avoir trait à la ligne de conduite adoptée par le Gouvernement Royal dans l'administration des provinces occupées par les forces grecques. Les autorités grecques n'y ont jamais procédé à une double perception de droits de douane, ni imposé de surtaxes sous le nom de contributions de guerre, taxes de consommation ou d'équivalent de taxes de monopoles, ni, enfin, prohibé l'importation de certains articles comme étant des articles de monopoles en Grèce. Le Gouvernement Royal n'a fait au contraire que maintenir, autant que faire se pouvait, dans les provinces en question le *statu quo* en matière d'impôts, afin de ne pas troubler, avant le plein fonctionnement du régime définitif, les conditions économiques existantes, et s'est gardé de grever les populations de ces pays de toute nouvelle imposition, sous quelque forme que ce fût.

Quant au traitement appliqué aux provenances de Grèce importées dans les territoires occupés, le Gouvernement grec, en les admettant en franchise de droit, ne fait qu'user de son droit, étant donné que les impôts perçus par le Fisc grec concourent aux frais d'administration des territoires occupés déboursés par ce même Fisc. D'ailleurs, le Gouvernement Royal en cette occasion se conforme aux précédents, par exemple, à ce qui advint lors de l'occupation de Thessalie en 1897 par les forces turques. Le même système est suivi aussi par le Gouvernement d'Italie sur les îles grecques de la mer Égée occupées encore par elle ; les marchandises italiennes y entrent, en effet, en franchise de tout droit.

Veuillez, &c.
L. S. COROMILAS.

[19577] No. 600.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 63.)

Sir, *Sophia, April 22, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Prime Minister called on me on the 20th instant and read me the reply which, he informed me, the allies had agreed on the 19th instant to send to the Great Powers, respecting the mediation proposals.

On the morning of the 20th, however, prior to the reply being drawn up, he

received a telegraphic communication from Athens and a telephonic communication from Belgrade, in which both the Greek and Servian Governments made further reservations respecting the north and south frontiers of Albania. The Servian Government in addition wished that the indemnity question should be more strongly insisted upon. After strenuous negotiations he had arranged that Servia should accept the Greek reservations, but Greece refused to accept the Servian ones. M. Gueshof, in expressing his disappointment at the further delay caused by these reservations, declared that Bulgaria was now merely acting as an intermediary, and that the reply, as far as Bulgaria and Turkey were concerned, was a favourable one.

His Excellency then drew my attention to a Reuter's telegram from London, dated the 19th instant, to the effect that it was believed that the Powers themselves would eventually draw up conditions of peace, on lines already indicated, and that they would then in their capacity of mediators present them to the belligerents. The Prime Minister, in view of the constant disappointments he had met with, believed that this would now be the best course to pursue, and he was anxious that I should bring the exact situation to your notice. He said that he was still continuing his efforts to bring the two Governments into line, but that, if he did not shortly succeed, he felt that some authoritative statement emanating from the Powers would be the most efficacious way of dealing with the situation.

Meanwhile instructions have been sent to the headquarter staff to endeavour to arrange, in the most friendly manner possible, a prolongation of the suspension of hostilities until the signature of a preliminary treaty.

On the evening of the 21st instant I received and telegraphed to you the reply of the allies.

M. Gueshof then went on to discuss the situation as between the allies. He stated that, with respect to the territorial questions which had arisen between Servia and Bulgaria, and with the details of which you are already acquainted, the frontier in dispute to the south of Uskub would doubtless be arranged by the Russian Government, in accordance with the military convention existing between the two countries, but that the claim of Servia to Kuprulu, Perlepe, and Monastir could not for one moment be entertained, as it was distinctly laid down in the convention that it belonged to the Bulgarian sphere. Whilst listening sympathetically to his Excellency's statement of the case, I refrained from making any suggestion, beyond remarking that as it was a family quarrel I felt sure it would be settled *en famille*.

The Prime Minister then reverted to the thorny questions likely to arise between Greece and Bulgaria, especially as regards the future possession of Salonica. He informed me that the Greek Government were not only desirous of retaining Salonica, but that many Greek chauvinists considered that the towns of Serres, Drama, and Cavalla, and the districts adjoining these towns, should also fall under Greek sway. He told me that if no amicable arrangement could be come to between the two Governments, the Bulgarian Government would suggest at Athens that the entire question be submitted to the Great Powers, and that Bulgaria would loyally abide by their decision. From certain information which he had received, however, he was led to suppose that, in so far as Salonica was concerned, the Greek Government would not accept any arbitration.

The Prime Minister, after alluding to the above questions, told me that he had just received a statement from the War Office to the effect that in the course of the war the Bulgarians had lost 31,000 men killed or died of disease and 52,000 wounded. These losses he stated were much higher than those of the Greeks and Servians combined, and from this I could well realise how very desirous Bulgaria was not to embark on a fresh war.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[19578] No. 601.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 64.)

Sir, *Sophia, April 24, 1913.*

WITH reference to Salonica telegram No. 26, repeated to me in your No. 93 of the 14th instant, relative to the reports of violence used to compel the Moslem villagers of

Osmanieh to embrace Christianity, I have the honour to state that I spoke to the Prime Minister on the subject on the 16th instant, and left with his Excellency a note (copy enclosed) of what I had said.

In reply, I have now received the note, of which copy is also enclosed, stating that, according to a report received from the Military Governor of Macedonia, no violence had been proved to have been exercised against the inhabitants of the above-named districts, although some attempts had been made to intimidate them.

In my despatch No. 61 of the 19th instant I ventured to suggest, in the light of the further details contained in Mr. Lamb's despatch No. 32 to Sir G. Lowther of the 12th instant, that the Bulgarian Government might be urged to make an example of the minister of religion who seems to have been the instigator of violence in this case, and I await your instructions before taking further action.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 601.

Note communicated to Bulgarian Prime Minister by Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

REPORTS have been received by His Majesty's Government showing that extreme violence is still being exercised in order to compel the Mussulman villagers of Osmanieh to adopt Christianity. Fugitives who have reached Salonica are seen to bear obvious signs of ill-treatment, and state that in one village alone ten or twelve men have died from the beatings inflicted on them.

April 3 (16), 1913.

Enclosure 2 in No. 601.

Note communicated to Sir H. Bax-Ironside by Bulgarian Government.

LE Ministre des Affaires Étrangères et des Cultes a l'honneur de faire savoir à la Légation de Sa Majesté britannique qu'il a transmis au Gouverneur militaire de Macédoine le contenu de sa notice en date du 3 (16) courant.

Le Gouverneur militaire répond que pendant la conversion dans le christianisme de certains Pomaks (Bulgares-Mahométans) dans le district de Petchévo (Osmanié), il n'y avait ni de violences, ni de meurtres.

Au mois de février, des gens armés ont essayé d'intimider quelques Pomaks des villages Istevnik et Tsrnik, mais l'enquête ordonnée sur leurs plaintes n'a prouvé nulle part une véritable agression.

Sophia, le 10 (23) *avril*, 1913.

[19579] No. 602.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 65. Confidential.)

Sir, *Sophia, April* 24, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 60, I have the honour to report that my Russian colleague, in the course of conversation with me yesterday, referred to the difficulties which had arisen between the allies respecting the partition of the newly conquered territories.

M. Nekludof prefaced his remarks by stating that, as far as he was aware, there was no truth whatever in the report that M. Tcharykof, the late Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, had been appointed to discuss the outstanding questions with the three Governments interested.

He had, however, received information from St. Petersburgh to the effect that his Government would view with satisfaction a meeting between the Prime Ministers of Greece, Bulgaria, and Servia, for the purpose of amicably arranging their differences.

M. Nekludof then stated that had informed his Government that, in his

opinion, a preferable method of procedure would be for M. Venezelos and M. Gueshof to meet in the first instance, and for M. Gueshof to discuss matters later with M. Pasitch. He did not think there was any necessity for the Greek and Servian Prime Ministers to meet, as those countries could arrange the minor outstanding questions between them by direct correspondence. The Russian Minister's reasons for preferring this method of procedure were that he considered the allies would be less chauvinistically inclined in a conference *à deux* than in a conference *à trois*, and that it would be easier to bring pressure to bear on Servia when once the Greek claims had been eliminated. My colleague is further of opinion that Bulgaria will have to give in about Salonica and allow Greece to remain in possession; whereas, on the contrary, he believed that the Russian would be able to persuade the Servian Government to evacuate Ochrida and Monastir, and hand these towns over to the Bulgarian Government. He seemed more sceptical about the future of Kuprulu and Perlepe.

This view of the situation is, there appears reason to believe, in direct opposition to that of the Russian Minister at Belgrade, who is said to have made it known that his Government will strongly maintain the claims of the Servian Government to the rhomboid lying to the north of Monastir.

On my Russian colleague asking my views on this matter, I informed him that, whilst listening most sympathetically to the arguments advanced, I could only express the wish that the allies would come to a satisfactory arrangement without any resort to force, and that I felt sure that the advice of the Russian Government would carry great weight.

M. Nekludof seemed somewhat upset at the news of the surrender of Scutari, and stated that he feared the position of the Russian Government would now be a most difficult one, as the Montenegrins had political support in high quarters in the Russian capital.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[19580] No. 603.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 66.)

Sir, *Sophia, April* 24, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a report which I have received from Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon, D.S.O., military attaché to His Majesty's legation, respecting the present condition and distribution of the Bulgarian forces, and the feeling prevalent among the officers of the army with regard to Russia.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 603.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

Sir, *Sophia, April* 23, 1913.

I RETURNED yesterday from Adrianople, where I spent four days as the guest of the Headquarter Staff. There is a strong feeling at the present time amongst Bulgarian officers against Russia. I venture to report this on account of the political power at present possessed by the army, and also because, generally speaking, all Bulgarians think alike on national questions. There are, no doubt, exceptions, and General Radko Dmetrief, who is well known as a Russophil, is now serving under General Koutinchef at Chatalja, in the army which he formerly commanded with General Koutinchef under him. The reason for this reversal of commands is believed to be General Dmetrief's desire to respect Russian wishes with regard to forcing the Chatalja lines, whereas General Savof wished to disregard them.

It is considered by officers with whom I talked that Russia has not only assisted Roumania in the matter of Silistria, but that she is also prepared to side with Servia in any questions that may arise with regard to the division of the conquered territory.

An attempt is being made to exaggerate the losses of the Bulgarian army during

the campaign, and the Chief of the Staff told me that the number of men who had been killed or died of disease amounted now to 80,000. I suggested that this number also included the wounded, but he insisted that it only represented those that had died. The object of this exaggeration may be ascribed to the agreement made between the allies before the war. It is therein stated that the final settlement of territorial claims amongst them shall be based on the sacrifices that each has made, as well as on the nationality of the inhabitants of the districts under dispute.

The number of men now under arms is also being exaggerated, no doubt with the object of impressing Servia and Greece. We were informed that this number was now 650,000, without including transport drivers and other non-combatants, who amount to another 200,000.

From what I saw and heard I feel, moreover, sure that the army is reduced in numbers to considerably below its establishment, and there is every wish to come to an agreement with Servia and Greece regarding Monastir and Salonica rather than to engage in a fresh war at the present time.

The secret of the distribution of the army at the present time has been well kept, and no reliable information is available regarding the number of men who were sent westwards from Adrianople. Possibly only the 8th division is at present opposite the territory occupied by the Servians and Greeks. The fact that the Dedeagatch line has been recently closed to commerce indicates, however, the probability that other troops are being moved westwards from Chatalja or Bulair.

Authority has been given for the formation of a brigade of infantry in Macedonia. This brigade is to be on a regular basis, and is the first of the new units (which will probably amount to four divisions) that are to be added to the Bulgarian army on the conclusion of peace. The brigade is to be known as the "Brigade of Serres," and is to have its headquarters and one regiment at that place. The other regiment will be at Cavalla.

When referring to the relations between Bulgaria and Russia I omitted to state that there are at present about sixty Russian officers of junior rank serving with the Bulgarian army. Of this number fifteen are on the active list. This information was given to me by the Russian military agent here.

I have, &c.
F. LYON, *Military Attaché.*

[19581] No. 601.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 67.)
Sir, *Sophia, April 24, 1913.*

THE proceedings of the Bulgarian Sobranjé from the date of my despatch No. 58 of the 10th instant up to the 19th instant, when the assembly adjourned for the Easter holidays until the 4th May, have been of little interest or importance.

The only occasion on which foreign affairs were discussed was on that of an interpellation to the Prime Minister with regard to the progress of the peace negotiations, and to the complaints received of the illiberal treatment of Bulgarian persons and interests in the territories occupied by Servia. M. Gueshof replied on the first point that Bulgaria and her allies were accepting the proposals of the Powers with certain reservations, which he hoped were not of a nature to delay the conclusion of peace; on the second point he stated that the Servian Administration had prohibited the sale of Bulgarian newspapers, and prevented Bulgarians from travelling in certain districts in its occupation. The Bulgarian Government were, however, convinced that notice of these occurrences would be taken by the Servian Government, to whose knowledge they had been brought, and who had promised an enquiry into them.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[19583] No. 605.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 69.)
Sir, *Sophia, April 25, 1913.*

AT the time of writing my despatch No. 59 of the 10th instant, resuming the principal events of the previous fortnight, there seemed to be still a serious danger

that the Bulgarian military authorities might yet carry out the projected endeavour to force the Chatalja lines and enter Constantinople, in spite of the opposition of the Cabinet at Sophia. It is probable that the King became convinced, if he had not always been so, of the unwisdom of such an attempt, and possible that some news may have reached Sophia of the strong measures which the Powers had in contemplation. On the 14th instant, Dr. Danef, as the strongest member of the Ministry, was despatched to Chatalja to impress the views of himself and his colleagues on the generals in command, and on the 15th instant a cessation of hostilities was arranged for ten days, which has since been further extended. To forestall the objections of the other allies to this arrangement, everything was done to give it an appearance of informality, and it was at first described as merely a truce for the purpose of burying the dead. It seems, however, that it is an armistice in all but name, and includes a provision that the Turkish fleet shall not oppose the revictualling of the Bulgarian forces by sea. It is likely to be prolonged until hostilities are definitely abandoned, so that the danger to Constantinople would seem to have now passed away.

What may have inspired the Bulgarian staff with moderation is also the fact that, according to reports since received, confirmed by the large numbers of wounded who have arrived at Sophia, the fighting at Chatalja about the 9th and 10th instant resulted a good deal less favourably to the Bulgarian arms than was represented here.

On the 13th instant I carried out, together with my colleagues, the *démarche* pursuant to the instructions contained in your telegram No. 90. Copy of the communication left with the Prime Minister on that occasion is enclosed herewith.*

The communication to the Bulgarian Government of the north and north-east frontiers of Albania was made collectively on the 18th, after my Austrian and Russian colleagues had found themselves to be in agreement on the details of the text. Copy of this text is also enclosed herewith.*

On the occasion of the *démarche* of the 13th, the Prime Minister had told me that Bulgaria was now perfectly satisfied with the conditions of peace in so far as they affected her, and the Bulgarian Government have since been anxious that the other allies should announce their conformity with them at an early a date as possible, and have done their utmost to that end. Objections and emendations put forward by Servia and Greece nevertheless delayed the delivery of the allies' reply.

It was finally communicated on the 21st instant, in the wording of which copy is enclosed.*

The tension between the several allies has meanwhile been increasing and is giving great anxiety both to their Governments and to that of Russia, a subject on which I had the honour to report to you in my despatches Nos. 63 and 65 of the 22nd and 24th respectively.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[19584] No. 606.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 70.)
Sir, *Sophia, April 25, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a report from Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon, D.S.O., military attaché to His Majesty's legation, reporting on the present disposition of Bulgarian troops along the front towards the territories occupied by Servia and Greece, and on that of the opposing Servian and Greek forces.

I have, &c.
(for His Majesty's Minister),
W. O'REILLY.

Enclosure in No. 606.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 2 B. Confidential.)
Sir, *Sophia, April 25, 1913.*

WITH reference to my No. 1 B of the 23rd instant I have the honour to report that further information that I have obtained indicates that movements of Bulgarian

* Not printed.

troops which have recently taken place are possibly due to the intention to take the offensive against their allies after the conclusion of peace with Turkey.

At the present time the military situation in Macedonia is approximately as follows. The Bulgarian forces are occupying a line—Istid, Petric, Serres, Drama Cavalla. In the northern portion of this line, and facing the Servians, they have one division and a brigade of 7,000 Macedonians. In the southern portion, facing the Greeks, there are two divisions. Two of these three divisions are the 7th and 8th, and the third is probably the 4th division.

The Servians are occupying the right bank of the Vardar and also Strumitza. Along this line they have 100,000 men. There are also two regiments of cavalry and three battalions of infantry at Egri Palanka. In Servia itself, and close to the eastern frontier, there are three divisions distributed round Nish and Pirot.

The Greeks claim to have concentrated practically the whole of their army round Salonica.

The Servians believe that the Bulgarian army is too exhausted to take the offensive against either Servia and Greece combined or Servia alone. They, therefore, consider the moment to be favourable for enforcing their claims to compensation for assistance rendered to the Bulgarians at Adrianople.

I have, &c.
F. LYON.
Military Attaché.

[19623] No. 607.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 136.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, April 26, 1913.*

THE news of the fall of Scutari was received in St. Petersburgh on the morning of the 23rd instant. There is no doubt that all classes here hailed the success of the Montenegrin arms with the deepest satisfaction, even if its outward expression was limited to press articles and an abortive attempt to recommence the Panslavist demonstrations of the past month. The latter took the form of a *Te Deum* on Wednesday at the Spassa Peobrajenia Church and a procession in the streets, after which the demonstrators sent a congratulatory telegram, signed by M. Khomiakof to King Nicholas. On the following day another thanksgiving service was celebrated at the Kazan Cathedral, the intention being to process afterwards to the Fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul and lay a wreath on the tomb of Alexander III. A crowd of several thousands assembled outside the cathedral, but was successfully dispersed by the police.

As regards the press, the almost universal opinion is that, firstly, the fall of Scutari will necessitate the revision of the decision as to its fate come to by the conference of Ambassadors at London, and, secondly, that Austria will not take any independent action. Such at least is the expressed opinion of the "Novoe Vremya," "Rech," "Russkaya Molva," and other leading St. Petersburgh journals, but it is clear at the same time that fear as to the consequences of isolated action on the part of Austria alone keeps the tone of jubilation in the press within bounds.

The "Rech" is perhaps the only newspaper here which adopts the view that the taking of Scutari cannot serve as a reason for altering the attitude taken up by the Great Powers, and discusses the question as to what steps the latter can take to enforce their will. In a leading article on the subject it expresses the opinion that a compromise will be found in the grant of territorial compensation to Montenegro. This is probably the view taken by all moderate sections of Russian public opinion, who undoubtedly feel that the vast sacrifices of the Montenegrins entitle them to compensation in some form or other.

It must be admitted that the tone of the press as a whole is not as openly anti-Austrian as might have been expected, in spite of the obvious and comprehensible irritation felt that the wishes of Austria alone prevents an immediate solution of the difficulty in favour of the Montenegrins. "Is it possible," asks the "Molva," that "a sheet of paper signed by the Great Powers should outweigh in the balance of history and justice the whole sum of the tears and of the blood of a nation." The "Novoe Vremya" asks the same question, but uses another less edifying word for the sheet of paper. The latter journal is, as usual, the most violent, and is at times melodramatic and at others merely Panslavist. According to its columns, telegrams have been exchanged

with King Nicholas, in which the latter thanks the editors of "the brave newspaper which has never abandoned its defence of the Montenegrin national cause." It points to the lukewarmness of England and to the growing sympathy felt for the Montenegrins in France and Italy, and curiously enough takes to task the angry tone of the Austrian and German press.

The "Bourse Gazette" publishes an interview granted to its Cettinjé correspondent by King Nicholas, in which the latter is said to have declared that Scutari was the chief object of the war; that one-third of his troops had perished before its walls; and that the nation insists on its retention. If it had not been for Austria, Scutari would long ago have been Montenegrin, but he (King Nicholas) believed, and was almost (*sic*) sure, that the Lord would help Montenegro, and that her "little mother" Russia would not abandon her, as she had never done for two centuries.

The Russian press is, however, so unreliable that it is impossible to give too much credence to its authentic interviews. As an example of this, the "Rossia" has to-day published a denial of an alleged interview with Prince Troubetzkoi, of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which was reported yesterday in the "St. Petersburgh Gazette."

I might add, in conclusion of this short summary of the press, that the semi-official "Rossia" itself has so far maintained a complete reserve as to its opinion on the consequences of the fall of Scutari.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[19676] No. 608.

Mr. Ramsay to Mr. Maxwell.—(Received April 29.)

Treasury, April 26, 1913.

My dear Maxwell,

WE are really not in a position, as we say officially, to offer you informed criticism hereon.

But I may send you, unofficially, copy of a memorandum by one of my colleagues, in case it may prove of some slight use, although, as I say, we cannot give it our official imprimatur on our incomplete knowledge of the facts.

Yours sincerely,
M. J. RAMSAY.

Enclosure in No. 608.

Unofficial Note, for which Treasury cannot accept any reponsibility.

THE following observations may perhaps be made with regard to the proposals set out in the note from the Bulgarian Government, though, for reasons which will appear below, the Treasury are not in a position to furnish any reasoned or informed criticism on the details of the scheme.

It appears from the annual report of the council of administration of the Ottoman Public Debt, 1911–12, that the—

	£ T.
Total revenues received by the council in that year were	5,090,836
From which there fell, to be deducted, certain revenues handed over in full to the Turkish Treasury and also the expenses of collection, in all	964,238
leaving	4,126,598
The fixed charge for the service of the debt under the control of the council is	2,157,375
The surplus or "excédent," viz.	1,969,223
is devoted, as to 25 per cent., to the extraordinary sinking fund of the debt	492,305
And the balance of 75 per cent. goes to the Ottoman Treasury ..	1,476,918

There are two important points to be noted. Firstly, 1911–12, though the latter months were disturbed by the outbreak of the Italo-Turkish war, was, according to the

report of the council, a prosperous year. Secondly, the above figures relate only to the debt under the control of the council of administration (viz., the unified debt and the lottery bonds) and to the revenues at the disposal of that council. The figures take no account therefore of more than half the outstanding debt of Turkey, comprising various loans secured on various revenues at the disposal of the Turkish Government.

In particular it appears from Sir H. Babington-Smith's memorandum, forwarded to the Treasury on the 1st February, that three of these loans (viz., the 4 per cent. loan of 1904 and the Bagdad Railway loans, second and third series) are secured on the 75 per cent. of the "excédent" that goes to Turkey, and from the particulars given on page 24 of the special report on the Ottoman Public Debt, 1912, by Sir A. Block it can be calculated that the service of these three loans requires an annuity of £T. 532,014.

The view expressed in the Treasury letter of the 19th March last was that, in calculating the annuity to be paid by the allies, due allowance should be made for any cases in which particular revenues or groups of revenues derived from the ceded territories go partly to the service of the debt and partly to the Turkish Treasury. Under neither alternative suggested in that letter would, for instance, such part of the "excédent" of the council's revenues as is entirely free from debt charges continue as a burden on the allies.

The Bulgarian Government may, however, have approached the matter from a different point of view. The note runs: ". . . les alliés se sont déclarés prêts à prendre à leur charge une partie de la dette publique ottomane consolidée, partie calculée en proportion des revenus concédés en garantie à percevoir dans les territoires conquis." The interpretation is not clear (the expression "dette publique ottomane consolidée" seems especially vague), but it may be that a payment equal to the whole of the revenues given as security for the debt (and not merely the sums appropriated out of those revenues to the actual service of the debt) is contemplated. If so, subject to the doubt attaching to the word "consolidée," the Bulgarian proposals may assume that the allies would shoulder a somewhat larger portion of the debt than has, in fact, been suggested.

If the substantive part of the Bulgarian note is understood correctly, the suggestion is that the share of the Turkish Government in the yield of the customs surtax of 3 per cent. furnishes a source of revenue amply sufficient to guarantee the payment of a war indemnity without loss (and, in fact, with some gain) to the extraordinary sinking fund of the debt.

According to the report of the council this customs surtax produced in 1911–12 a revenue of £T. 1,151,185, but the report of the council does not make it clear what sum should be deducted for the cost of collection, though a figure as small as £T. 7,925 is mentioned on page 29. This revenue, being one of those at the disposal of the council of administration, figures in the total of £T. 5,090,836 on page 1 of this memorandum. If we may assume that the other revenues at the service of the council will always be sufficient to meet the fixed charge of £T. 2,157,375 per annum this surtax may be regarded as going, to the extent of 25 per cent. or £T. 287,796, to the extraordinary sinking fund and, to the extent of 75 per cent. or £T. 863,389, to Turkey.

The Treasury are not in a position to go further into the complicated questions raised in the Bulgarian note, and the Foreign Office will no doubt be guided by the advice of those at Constantinople, *e.g.*, Sir A. Block. The following would appear to be among the important points requiring elucidation:—

(1.) Is the Bulgarian note correct in contending that the Turkish Government is under obligation to devote its share of the yield of the customs surtax to the administration of the European provinces?

(2.) Is the Turkish share of the surtax in any way pledged to the service of any part of the Turkish debt? (As intimated above, certain loans are secured on the Turkish share of the "excédent," of which the Turkish share of the customs surtax forms part.)

(3.) How will the yield of the surtax be affected by the loss of the conquered provinces?

(4.) How will the heads of expenditure, to the service of which the Turkish share of the surtax is earmarked, be affected by the same cause?

[19676] No. 609.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received April 29.)

Sir, *Treasury, April 26, 1913.*

I HAVE laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury Sir L. Mallet's letter of the 14th instant, enclosing for the observations of their Lordships copies of communications from the Bulgarian Minister at this Court, setting forth the arguments advanced by the Bulgarian Government in favour of the payment of a war indemnity by Turkey to the allied Balkan States.

The general object of these papers is to show that the Ottoman Government will have at its disposal, after the conclusion of the war, free moneys sufficient to secure the payment of a war indemnity without prejudice to the claims of Turkish creditors. The argument is founded on, and can only be tested by, a detailed examination of recent accounts, but my Lords have no first-hand or complete information as to the facts of the case, and in these circumstances they can only express regret that they do not feel themselves in a position to offer Secretary Sir E. Grey any useful criticisms of the arguments adduced.

I am, &c.
ROBERT CHALMERS.

[19609] No. 610.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 215.)

Sir, *Paris, April 28, 1913.*

THE "Temps," in the leading article of yesterday evening's issue, expresses the hope that the Powers may not be "bluffed" by Austria into collectively coercing Montenegro into evacuating Scutari, and so repeat the mistake which they made in arranging for a naval demonstration.

The writer describes the fear of isolated military action by Austria as pure fantasy. Austria is not going to enter upon a needless war with the four Balkan States, under the eyes of the Dalmatians, Croats, and Czechs, whom she can barely keep in hand, nor is she likely to do so at a time when she is raising a railway loan. Austria has the right to "bluff," and it is her game to do so, but she will not act. Furthermore, the Albanian question may be about to develop in an unlooked-for manner in view of the alleged agreement between King Nicholas and Essad Pasha, the defender of Scutari, which is supposed to foreshadow the latter's proclaiming himself Prince of Albania.

The question thus resolves itself, the writer concludes, into one of deciding by what means Montenegro may be induced to evacuate Scutari. Two methods are available—pressure and promises. A mean between them must be found, and it is for the Ambassadors' meeting to make up the right "prescription."

I transmit to you herewith an article which appears in the "Figaro" of to-day's date over the signature of the editor, M. Calmette.* He protests against the incomprehensible and unjust criticisms which are daily being levelled at the conference of Ambassadors in London.

M. Calmette declares that the conference has already preserved Europe from a general war by keeping the Powers diplomatically united in the face of many and great difficulties.

The protest thus made is presumably addressed first and foremost to the "Temps," which is constantly deriding the Ambassadorial conference, and is, to all appearance, more anxious to make difficulties for Austria than to see a reasonable settlement of the questions at issue brought about by patient negotiation in London.

Some of the Nationalist papers follow the lead of the "Temps," possibly because it is believed that the chance of the Three Years' Service Bill being passed by the Chamber will be increased if the French public be impressed by the feeling that the relations between Austria and Russia are so strained that at any moment peace may be broken and Europe involved in a general war.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

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* Not printed.

[19570] No. 611.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 29.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty April 28, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram dated the 28th instant, relative to Montenegrin affairs.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 611.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April 28, 1913.*

SERVIAN general left San Giovanni di Medua with most of troops. Four thousand men, 400 sick and wounded, and battery of artillery left. Wounded are to leave when hospital ships arrive which are expected to-morrow.

With reference to my telegram No. 59, Essad's troops proceeding to Tirana are composed of Albanians. Should I allow Turkish transports to be sent to San Giovanni di Medua witbin the blockade to embark Turkish troops for Durazzo, which are at present encamped with their guns south of Alessio waiting to embark?

[19571] No. 612.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 29.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April 29, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram dated the 28th instant, relative to affairs in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 612.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April 28, 1913.*

TELEGRAM as follows sent by Essad to War Minister, Constantinople:—

"Reached Alessio safely and were saluted by Servian general and his troops. I have left the battery of quick-firing guns south of Alessio until ships are available for their transport from San Giovanni di Medua to Durazzo. I request that the necessary money and supplies should be sent at once, as we are practically without resources.

"Desire definite instructions as to action to be taken on arriving near Tirana, bearing in mind what is condition of my redifs. Anxiously await reply."

My telegram No. 60 should have stated that the battery of eighteen guns only was left south of Alessio while remainder of Essad's force has gone to Tirana.

He intends to embark the guns at San Giovanni di Medua and have them conveyed to Durazzo.

[19777] No. 613.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 67.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, April 29, 1913.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to me in a tone this morning which showed that he would not wait much longer before taking coercive measures against Montenegro. He hoped that meeting of Ambassadors on Thursday would result in

some practical solution of the Scutari question. He hopes that England will be able to show her flag on Montenegrin territory, as he told me that in that case Italy would take part with Austria in carrying out military expedition. He evidently foresees great trouble with Russia should Austria be driven to act entirely alone, and in the interests of the general peace and in order to maintain the concert he evidently hopes that England will face joint action with Italy and Austria in this business. If England and Italy stand aside, Austria must proceed alone and face all the consequences.

I enquired whether, in the event of Austria acting alone and succeeding in occupying Scutari, she would float the Austrian flag on that city in the interval during which an Albanian Government was being created, or whether she would invite the Powers to send detachments to hold the town temporarily and fly their flags. He said that he had not considered this question, but realised that it was one which would have to be thought over.

With regard to communication made by the Russian Ambassador here on the subject of compensations to Montenegro, he said that he held firmly to his view that concessions were out of the question, as the last concession that Austria could make (and which he made at your urgent request) was that of Djakova on the clear understanding that the siege of Scutari should cease.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that from information just received from Cettinjé the King had no intention of yielding, and that he now says that without the authority of his Parliament he cannot withdraw from Scutari nor can he do so before peace is signed.

Essad Pasha's attitude is causing the Minister for Foreign Affairs considerable anxiety. The Turkish Ambassador here has asked for Austrian support to a proposal put forward by his Government that Essad's troops should be recalled and transported to Asia Minor. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has promised to support this proposal.

[19776] No. 614.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 70.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, April 29, 1913.*

SCUTARI.

Judging from language of both Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Austrian Ambassador this afternoon, possibility of Austria taking immediate action cannot be excluded. They both said that every moment lost would render action more difficult, and that public opinion in Austria would brook no further delay. I said to Austrian Ambassador that I presumed that anyhow they would wait result of Thursday's meeting of Ambassadors. He replied that he had no precise information, but that they felt in Austria that any decision which might be come to on Thursday would mean further negotiations and delay, and that time was precious. Secretary of State said the same, and added that it was out of the question for him to preach patience any more. He seems to be convinced that Russia would not move, even if Austria acted alone, and considers that Russian Government are quite strong enough to resist any Pan-Slav agitation.

But he spoke rather bitterly of Russia's dilatoriness at Constantinople, and it was evidently in his mind that she did not wish peace to be signed before Scutari question was settled.

He regretted your inability to accept his proposal as to action by England, Austria, and Italy, but said that he quite understood your point of view.

[19772] No. 615.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 209.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, April 29, 1913.*

ON instructions from vice-admiral commanding the blockading squadron, the captain of His Majesty's ship "Zealandia" communicated direct to Grand Vizier, in his capacity of Minister of War, message from Essad Pasha at Alessio, requesting

instructions as to disposal of troops under his command and as to his action at Tirana, and asking for immediate despatch of provisions and money.

The Grand Vizier asked the captain to send the following reply :—

"A Essad Pacha, Alessio.

"Il serait convenable de licencier les troupes locales après avoir pris armes et embarquer le reste des troupes avec armes [group undecypherable] destination Berouth.

"Dans le cas où flotte internationale s'oppose auxdites troupes destination Berouth, il serait opportun de les débarquer à Valona pour opérer jonction avec le reste de l'armée ouest se trouvant entre Valona et Bérat.

"En ce cas, enverrons vivres et argent à Valona.—MAHMOUD SHEVKET."

As the message could be taken in by all foreign ships, I suggested to captain that he should inform vice-admiral that, unless he was in communication with Essad Pasha with full knowledge of His Majesty's Government, I considered it injudicious to forward message.

Vice-admiral replied that he was not in communication with pasha, and captain has so informed Grand Vizier.

[19774] No. 616.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 212.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, April 29, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 209 of 20th April.

Grand Vizier informs me that he has sent message to Essad Pasha through Ottoman Ambassador at Rome in the hope that he will be able to forward it.

[19769] No. 617.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 154.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, April 29, 1913.*

MEDIATION proposals.

Your telegram No. 102 of 23rd April.

My Russian colleague has no instructions, and so we are unable to act.

Reuter's Agency has published garbled version of the instructions sent to the other representatives.

[19768] No. 618.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 163.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, April 29, 1913.*

MY despatch No. 128.

On the Ambassadors meeting yesterday to sign the decision, the Minister for Foreign Affairs informed us that he had communicated its terms confidentially to the Roumanian and Bulgarian Governments, and that the latter had begged that the concluding paragraphs might be omitted or modified, as otherwise they might be accused of having let it be known that they were willing to cede Silistria.

We agreed to omit the last paragraph and to introduce slight modification into the two preceding ones. As, however, the Austrian Ambassador said that he must submit the proposed changes to His Government, the signature was deferred until 2nd May.

[19775] No. 619.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 164.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, April 29, 1913.*

I COMMUNICATED to Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning contents of your telegram No. 365 of 28th April.

He quite approves language which you propose to hold to King of Montenegro, and said he would not mind how strongly you put matter before him. He would, however, much regret were you to declare publicly, so that Austria should know, that Great Britain would not object to military measures taken by any other Power or Powers, and would leave Montenegro to her fate. This was going too far, and would be an indirect encouragement to Austria to take military action. Russia could never associate herself in such a declaration. He believed that King Nicholas might in time be forced to yield to collective pressure of the Powers, and Russia could never approve of isolated action by Austria.

As regards measures that might in last resort be reasonably necessary, his Excellency said that, if in the end Austria did take action, such action must be confined to Albanian territory with the sole object of making King Nicholas retire from Scutari. There must be no occupation of Cettinjé or of any strategical points on Montenegrin frontier, though she might perhaps disembark her troops at Antivari. His Excellency gathers from conversation with Italian Ambassador yesterday that Italy will not take part in any military action. He regrets this, as, though he believes that outside St. Petersburgh Russian public opinion desires peace, he is nevertheless nervous as to the effect that isolated action by Austria may have on the country. Though he did not actually say so, he evidently regrets that the Powers do not see their way to give appearance of collective action by disembarking detachments at certain points on coast.

His Excellency is to see Emperor this afternoon.

[19772] No. 620.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 201.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, April 29, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 209 of 20th April.

You should consult with your colleagues as to asking the Turkish Government whether they would be prepared to supply transports to convey Essad's troops or any other Turkish troops in Albania to Asia Minor on understanding they are to take no further part in any hostilities. If Turkish Government agree instructions would be sent to vice-admiral and other naval commanders to permit transports to carry out duty, provided, of course, all the Powers consent.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 159 ; Vienna, No. 155 ; Berlin, No. 184 ; Paris, No. 185 ; and St. Petersburgh, No. 367.)

[18981] No. 621.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 103.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 29, 1913.*

YOUR despatch No. 61 of 19th April : Forcible conversion of Moslems.

You are authorised to use your discretion in taking such action as you suggest.

[19772] No. 622.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.**

(No. 160.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, April 29, 1913.*

MY telegram to Sir G. Lowther No. 201 of 29th April.

Ascertain from Minister for Foreign Affairs if he would consent to above step and would send the necessary instructions.

[20153] No. 623.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 94.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 29, 1913.*

THE Austrian Ambassador showed me to-day a statement, taken from the newspapers, that an announcement had been made in Vienna that, as the Ambassadors' meeting had come to no decision yesterday, Austria would take matters into her own hands and carry out the decision of the Powers respecting Scutari.

I observed that this pointed to immediate action on the part of Austria. The Austrian proposal at the Ambassadors' meeting had been that an agreement should be come to respecting action to be taken if certain contingencies arose. It was not logical for Austria, if no such contingent decision was arrived at, immediately to say that she must act without waiting for the contingencies to arise. I could understand her saying that, if no agreement was come to for international action when the contingencies arose, she must take action herself: that would be a respectable and intelligible proposition; but the announcement in the press appeared to go further than that.

The Ambassador contended that even the announcement in the press was covered by his statement that, if the *réunion* did not come to any decision, Austria would reserve to herself to apply, "au moment donné," measures that seemed suitable for the execution of the European decision.

I said that "au moment donné" in this context must clearly mean when the contingencies arose, and not at once. The essential thing was that Scutari should be evacuated; but whether the evacuation was secured in a week or a month, so long as it was definitely secured, was surely of small importance compared with the preservation of the concert of Europe.

The Ambassador asked me whether, if Austria did take action alone, it would break up the concert of Europe.

I said that it was very important that Austria should not *brusquer* the situation unnecessarily.

The Ambassador emphasised the provocative way in which one complication arose after another, the last being the arrangement between the King of Montenegro and Essad Pasha.

I admitted that the situation had been difficult and provocative, but I repeated that, so long as the evacuation of Scutari was secured, the question of whether it was obtained in a week or a month was of little importance compared to the preservation of the concert of Europe.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[19485] No. 624.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 57.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 29, 1913.*

THE Bulgarian Minister spoke to Sir A. Nicolson on the 26th April in regard to the military concentration of Greek forces in the Salonica Vilayet, where he said seven divisions were assembled. Moreover, the tension between the Serbs and the

* Also to Sir F. Cartwright (No. 156), Sir E. Goschen (No. 185), Sir F. Bertie (No. 186), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 368).

Bulgarians was increasing. He trusted that the Powers of the Triple *Entente* would be able to exercise a moderating influence at Athens and Belgrade as it would be a scandal were hostilities to arise between the allies. The Bulgarians were not afraid either of the Serbs or of the Greeks—and he hinted obscurely that the Serbs might find opposed to them not only Bulgaria but also a great Power—meaning Austria-Hungary.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[19484] No. 625.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 112.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 29, 1913.*

THE German Ambassador called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 26th April. He said that for the first time he viewed the situation with very serious misgivings, as if the evacuation of Scutari were in any way delayed, Austria-Hungary would, he believed, take action by herself. He quite understood that it was impossible to think of the Powers agreeing on united coercive action of a serious character—such as a collective military expedition—and he had told his Government, even before he had spoken to the Prime Minister, that public opinion here would not sanction the Government taking serious military operations on land. If Montenegro did not yield promptly there was then the question of conferring a mandate, and here again there would be difficulties.

He threw out the suggestion as to whether I could indicate to M. Popovitch that, if his Government yielded at once, we would do our best with the Powers to obtain some compensation, and that possibly we should not find the Powers hard-hearted. Sir A. Nicolson said that there was something in this idea, and that he would speak to me. Sir A. Nicolson understood from Prince Lichnowsky that, of course, the sanction of the Powers to such a move on my part was necessary.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[19682] No. 626.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 173.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 29, 1913.*

COUNT BENCKENDORFF left with Sir A. Nicolson on the 24th April the telegram of which I transmit copy herewith to your Excellency. Sir A. Nicolson said that M. Cambon had already spoken to him in regard to it. The telegram, of course, was despatched before M. Sazonof had received the text of the communication which it was proposed to make to Montenegro. This warning to Montenegro was to the effect that the fall of Scutari introduced no change in the decisions of the Powers, who had all, severally and jointly, decided that Scutari was not to be held by Montenegro, that the delimitation of northern and north-eastern Albania had been finally settled, and that, consequently, Montenegro must evacuate Scutari. Sir A. Nicolson would speak quite frankly to his Excellency; but his personal opinion was that perhaps the only way of averting Austrian forcible action against Montenegro being immediately taken was that all the Powers should without any delay agree to giving instructions to their representatives at Cettinjé to make the communication. Such a step might give us all a little breathing time, as Count Berchtold might be disposed to wait till we could see the results of this warning. But, if any delay were to occur in delivering the message, Austria might, and probably would, take action herself, and a most serious and dangerous situation would arise. The present moment, when too much excitement existed among the Balkan States and at St. Petersburgh and so much anger at Vienna, was a critical one, and, to Sir A. Nicolson's mind, it was of the highest importance to give some little time for all this agitation to calm down and allow moderation and reason to prevail. Sir A. Nicolson was, he confessed, haunted by the fear, on the one hand, of precipitation in Vienna, and, on the other hand, of delay at St. Petersburgh. Either would produce a very serious situation. The only means of postponing hasty measures

was the immediate communication of the warning. It was not the moment to discuss compensations to Montenegro: the mere mention of any territorial compensation might precipitate Austrian action, and, indeed, would mean the reopening of the whole Albanian question, which had, we thought, been in part at any rate settled after many weary weeks of hard work and anxiety. Sir A. Nicolson begged Count Benckendorff to urge M. Sazonof to consent without delay to the resolution arrived at yesterday. Time was very precious. Count Benckendorff agreed with Sir A. Nicolson, and said he would telegraph.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 626.

M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff.

(Très Confidentiel.)
(Télégraphique.) *Saint-Pétersbourg, le 23 avril, 1913.*

LA reddition de Scutari confronte le Gouvernement Impérial avec de nouvelles difficultés considérables. Il est impossible de ne pas prévoir le retour d'une effervescence extrême de l'opinion publique russe pour le cas où des mesures coercitives seraient prises contre le Monténégro. Au dire de l'Ambassadeur d'Italie, l'opinion publique italienne se comporterait de même. Le Gouvernement Impérial estime que dans les autres pays des sympathies pourraient également se manifester.

Il est difficile de se dissimuler que la prise de Scutari apporte quelque altération aux conditions qui ont présidé à la stipulation des décisions des Puissances. Le point de vue établi par le communiqué officiel ne nous permet guère de prendre d'initiative. Les Gouvernements anglais et français ne jugeraient-ils pas possible de s'entendre pour poser la question de certaines compensations possibles au Monténégro? Un télégramme subséquent vous en indiquera. L'occupation de Scutari, en créant des conditions nouvelles, permettrait peut-être de traiter cette question en dehors des autres, sans créer de précédent fâcheux pour celles-ci.

[18642] No. 627.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon.

HIS Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the French Ambassador, and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of his Excellency's communication of the 22nd instant, relative to the International Commission about to meet in Paris to settle the financial questions arising out of the present war.

Sir Edward Grey has the honour to inform M. Cambon in reply that the date, the 15th May, proposed by the French Government as that of the meeting of the Commission is satisfactory to His Majesty's Government.

With reference to the proposals for the representation on the Commission and sub-commissions of the different Powers taking part, Sir E. Grey has the honour to state that His Majesty's Government do not propose to be represented by more than two delegates in all, and that Sir Paul Harvey will represent them both on the Commission and on the sub-commissions. If there should be two sub-commissions sitting simultaneously, so that it is impossible for him to attend both, an endeavour will be made to arrange that His Majesty's Government should be represented, on the sub-commission on which Sir P. Harvey is not sitting, by Sir Richard Crawford, one of the representatives of the Ottoman Government.

His Majesty's Government do not propose to appoint any technical assistants, at any rate for the present.

Foreign Office, April 29, 1913.

[19915] No. 628.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 30.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, April 30, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegrams, dated the 29th and 30th instant, relative to affairs in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 628.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April 29, 1913.*

OFFICER came to me this morning from Turkish colonel in command of 2,500 men and battery south of Alessio to request that I should telegraph to Minister of War, Constantinople, informing him that they have no provisions, and asking that a transport may be sent to convey them from San Giovanni di Medua to Constantinople. They have now received eight days' provisions from Servians. They wish instructions as to future action if not to be conveyed to Constantinople. Have sent telegram, but taken no further action.

Enclosure 2 in No. 628.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April 29, 1913.*

"MICHAEL POSEIDON" (Greek) has taken about 1,000 Servian troops southward from Corfu.

Enclosure 3 in No. 628.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April 30, 1913.*

FOUR transports have reached Salonica with Servian troops on board.

[19901] No. 629.

Papers communicated by Russian Ambassador, April 30, 1913.

(1.)

(Confidentiel.)

M. SAZONOF télégraphie à notre Ambassadeur à Vienne:—

"Veuillez exprimer au Comte Berchtold qu'en donnant notre consentement à la démarche collective à faire à Cettigné nous gardons en vue ce que j'ai dit à l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie et ce qui lui avait paru acceptable, notamment, qu'après la soumission du Roi Nicolas à la volonté des Puissances la question de compensation pourra être soulevée. Nous sommes prêts à ne pas lier aujourd'hui cette question à la déclaration à faire au Roi Nicolas, mais il nous semble qu'il appartient aux Puissances de trancher d'accord cette question. Veuillez représenter au Comte Berchtold notre ferme espoir qu'il saura apprécier quels efforts sont les nôtres pour le maintien de la solidarité des Puissances."

(2.)

M. Sazonof télégraphie en même date à l'Ambassadeur à Berlin :—

"Veuillez vous expliquer dans le sens du télégramme ci-contre avec M. de Jagow. Veuillez lui représenter l'extrême difficulté de la situation dans laquelle se trouverait la Russie pour le cas d'une action prématurée de la part de l'Autriche, ou de son refus de toute concession."

(3.)

Télégramme de M. Sazonof en date du 13 (26) *avril*, 1913.

Mr. Asquith et M. Pichon ne désirant pas prendre maintenant une initiative dans la question des compensations, nous autorisons notre Ministre à Cettigné à se joindre à la démarche collective prévue par la conférence. Nous serions contraires à la fixation d'un délai pour la réponse du Roi Nicolas pour les raisons indiqués dans un télégramme précédent. Après l'expiration du délai, au cas du refus du Roi, des mesures coercitives s'imposeraient aux Puissances, qui sont d'ailleurs loin d'être unanimes dans cette question. Nous ne pouvons laisser les Cabinets de Londres et de Paris ignorer que si l'Autriche en venait aux mesures coercitives nous nous verrions obligés de refuser d'assumer la responsabilité de ces mesures. L'acte de soumission du Roi Nicolas sera, nous en avons le ferme espoir, considéré suffisant pour entamer la question des compensations territoriales. Si les Puissances jugent que le moment n'est pas encore venu pour une promesse même confidentielle à faire au Roi Nicolas, rien n'empêche que les Puissances s'entendent dès à présent sur cette question. Il serait surtout important de s'entendre à ce sujet avant tout en principe. On pourra n'en rien dire au Roi.

[19902] No. 630.

M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, April 30.)

(Confidentiel.)
(Télégraphique.) *Saint-Pétersbourg, le* 12 (25) *avril*, 1913.

LA proposition de laisser aux belligérants le soin de traiter entre eux les conditions de la paix nous inspire quelques appréhensions: le précédent des pourparlers entre eux à Londres suffit pour les expliquer. Nous aurions préféré que les Puissances communiquent aux parties intéressées les conditions définitives. Ce mode de procéder éviterait une perte de temps et répondrait mieux au but d'une prompte conclusion de la paix ainsi qu'aux intérêts des belligérants. La fixation des frontières sur la base Enos–Midia pourrait être confiée à une commission technique européenne à laquelle seraient adjoints des représentants turcs et bulgares. Veuillez faire part de ces observations au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

(Identique à Paris.)

[19807] No. 631.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 75.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, April* 29, 1913.

IT seems clearly established that there was no fighting before the surrender of Scutari. Official accounts issued here and reproduced by the press elsewhere describing general attack and capture of positions are entirely untrue. The evacuation took place peacefully, and based on agreement arrived at between Essad Pasha and the King, the terms of which are now understood to be that Essad should withdraw his forces of over 20,000 men with his field guns, colours, ammunition, and remaining supplies. On proclaiming himself Prince of Albania under the suzerainty of the Sultan, he is to be recognised in that capacity by the King, and in return he recognises the King's claim to the town of Scutari and territory north of the River Drin.

[20322] No. 632.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 76.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Cettinjé, April* 30, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 74 of 27th April, following is reply received to-day from Montenegrin Government :—

"Gouvernement Royal a eu honneur recevoir communication Puissances du 27 avril.

"Il croit remplir un devoir envers elles et rendre en même temps hommage à cause nationale dont il a la charge, en justifiant son attitude par un exposé des raisons qui l'ont déterminé à ne pas prendre purement et simplement acte de la décision des Puissances concernant frontières nord et nord-est Albanie.

"Gouvernement Royal regrette de n'avoir pas été consulté avec ses alliés au sujet délimitation Albanie. Celle-ci a été cependant délivrée du joug turc par les armes victorieux des alliés, et c'est à eux qu'elle doit son émancipation politique.

"D'autre part, ses limites déterminent aussi de territoriale des Etats alliés en même temps qu'une foule d'intérêts politiques et économiques qui ne sauraient les laisser indifférents.

"Gouvernement Royal ne peut s'empêcher croire qu'une consultation des alliés s'imposait aux délibérations Puissances, évolution politique des Etats balkaniques étant affectée par formation nouvel Etat albanais.

"Gouvernement Royal croit que fixation limites Albanie ne pouvant par sa nature être exécutoire qu'après conclusion de paix entre alliés et Empire ottoman, toute mesure prise par Puissances pour évacuation des places ci-devant assiégées et des territoires occupés, ainsi que pour cessation hostilités, implique nécessairement une violation neutralité, c'est-à-dire du droit qu'ont les alliés d'opérer comme belligérants sur toute étendue du théâtre de guerre turco-balkanique et, par conséquent, limitation arbitraire de la base des négociations pour paix avec Empire ottoman.

"Gouvernement Royal regrette que raisons précitées ne lui aient pas permis prendre acte de la délimitation des frontières en question, surtout pour ce qui concerne règlement question Scutari et son territoire, dont la délimitation—toute à l'avantage de l'Etat inexistant—est dirigée, assurément bien, contre les intentions des Puissances comme contre sécurité de l'Etat monténégrin et contre ses intérêts plus vitaux, ce qui, dans opinion Gouvernement Royal, constitue manifeste injustice.

"Puissances ayant délibéré blocus de côte monténégrine pour exercer pression sur Monténégro en vue d'abandon siège de Scutari, comme ce n'est pas avec intention défier la volonté Europe, mais plutôt dans plénitude de la conscience de ses devoirs nationaux, que Gouvernement Royal refusa se soumettre à une décision qui le privait d'une ville et d'un territoire considérés par lui comme essentiellement importante pour Monténégro.

"Et c'est animé par même esprit et déterminé par les besoins impérieux de sa conservation qu'il a eu honneur déclarer 21 avril aux Puissances, d'accord avec alliés, qu'il se réservait dans le cours de négociations avec la Porte le droit de débattre avec Puissances les questions se rapportant à fixation frontières Albanie.

"Sur ces entrefaites ville Scutari capitula.

"Gouvernement Royal, soucieux de témoigner sa déférence aux Puissances, déclare que ce fait nouveau ne constitue aucunement dans sa pensée un défi à la décision concernant sort de ville Scutari."

After stating, among other things, that: "La prise de possession de Scutari a été accueillie chaleureusement par toutes les classes de la population de cette ville," note continues :—

"Ces preuves non équivoques d'adhésion pourraient être de nature à modifier les résultats de l'enquête faite par Puissances sur des données insuffisantes.

"En présence de cet état de choses et pour les raisons que Gouvernement Royal vient analyser et de soumettre au jugement éclairé des Puissances, Gouvernement Royal a honneur de déclarer qu'il reste fidèle à communication faite aux Puissances en date du 21 avril, et qu'il se réserve aborder question Scutari le jour où dans le cours des négociations pour la paix avec Empire ottoman les alliés débattront avec Puissances la fixation définitive des frontières Albanie."

[19938] No. 633.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 68.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, April 30, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 201 of 29th April to Constantinople.

The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees (as reported in my telegram No. 67 of 29th April) to proposal to transport troops from Albania. He has been already in communication with the Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject, who will no doubt concert with his colleagues as to approaching the Turkish Government.

[19939] No. 634.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 69.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, April 30, 1913.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché for Director of Military Operations:—

"According to information here, report that 10,000 troops moved from Trieste last Saturday is incorrect. Within the last few days, however, groups of reinforcements for garrisons in Dalmatia have been moved from Pola. I hear also to-day, on good authority, that further troops will be sent from Trieste to Cattaro to-day; one report says 17,000 men. Reports from Herzegovina say that troops have been close up to the border. General impression amongst my colleagues is that main effort will be made by sea against Antivari and Scutari, and Northern Albania occupied. Whether Montenegro will be invaded from the north at the same time is not known."

[19930] No. 635.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 165.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, April 30, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 164 of 29th April.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has just sent me *aidé-memoire* of which the following is substance:—

"So far the Powers have maintained their solidarity both as regards resolutions which they have deemed it right to take in common as well as regards choice of means for giving effect to them.

"Isolated action of one Power would make a break in the whole work elaborated by the constant efforts of the Powers in this direction.

"In the opinion of the Russian Government the Powers have not nearly exhausted all pacific measures for imposing their will on Montenegro. Sir E. Grey, it appears, is ready to inform King Nicholas that in the event of his refusing to conform to the wishes of the Powers England would disinterest herself completely in his fate. (End of R.)

"Now, in the opinion of Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, the fate and personal interests of King Nicholas might doubtless leave the Powers indifferent were it not that at present moment the question is closely bound up with another of far more serious character, namely, whether the proposed declaration of His Majesty's Government would not be regarded by Austria as an encouragement to her dangerous projects.

"It would therefore be preferable that the declaration of His Majesty's Government should be made confidentially to King Nicholas."

[19931] No. 636.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 166.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, April 30, 1913.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs, whom I have seen since despatching my telegram No. 165 of 30th April, said that Austria would probably commence operations day after to-morrow, and that it was impossible to foresee consequences of her action. Apart, moreover, from complications to which it might give rise, it would not be so easy to get her out of Albania when she once got there, and circumstances might arise which might lead her to demand some territorial compensation. He was [group omitted: ? expecting] visit of Italian Ambassador, and was going to impress on him necessity of Italy not allowing Austria to act alone. He would, however, much prefer that England and France should put in appearance. It was not necessary for them to take action in operations, and it would suffice were they to make a semblance of participation by landing detachments at port where Austrian troops would disembark, and hoisting their flags. He could not understand objections raised by His Majesty's Government. They could explain their action as necessary consequence of their being parties to an agreement which, as they had throughout declared, must be enforced, and landing of detachments might be described as demonstration.

I said that I feared that public opinion in England would condemn any such action on our part, and that it was impossible for us to act without France, and France had declared she would take no part in coercive measures without a mandate from Russia.

His Excellency replied that, as he had already told me, Russia could not give her such a mandate. He would beg me to telegraph to you what he had said.

Minister for Foreign Affairs would not say what Russian Government propose to do when Austria marches. I gather, however, that they will publish a communiqué of some kind marking their disapprobation of her action.

French Minister tells me that Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom he had just left, had not again pressed him to urge his Government to participate in coercive action.

[19932] No. 637.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 167.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, April 30, 1913.*

YOUR circular telegram of yesterday.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said he could not join in step you proposed to take at Constantinople. He had impression that idea of removing Essad's troops had already been mooted by Austrian and German Ambassadors at Constantinople, and Turkish Ambassador here had already spoken to him on the subject. He considered that it would be a dangerous step to take; 10,000 of these troops were, he believed, Albanians, and under a capable commander like Essad, might be useful to maintain order. Austria would no doubt like to see them removed, in order that they might be replaced by Austrian troops, but he could not be a party to such an arrangement. Presence of these troops in Albania would, moreover, serve as an emphasis to Turkish sovereignty, which it was most important to maintain.

[19936] No. 638.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 71.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, April 30, 1913.*

YOUR circular telegram of 29th April: Turkish troops in Albania.

Ottoman Government have already made this proposal to German Government, and German Ambassador has been instructed to lay it before Ambassadors' meeting.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs approves suggestion.

[19937] No. 639.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 72.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, April 30, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 189 of 30th April to Paris came out "from San Giovanni di Medua to Durazzo."

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says he thinks transport of Turkish battery from both towns should certainly be permitted, but not from one town to the other.

[19933] No. 640.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 57.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, April 30, 1913.*

YOUR circular telegram (No. 186 to Paris) of yesterday.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs concurs in instructions sent to His Majesty's representative at Constantinople (telegram No. 201 of yesterday to him) concerning removal of Turkish troops from Albania. French Government will issue like instructions to French Ambassador..

[19934] No. 641.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 58.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, April 30, 1913.*

YOUR circular telegram of to-day.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs does not see any objection to removal by transports of Turkish battery from San Giovanni di Medua to Durazzo. French naval commander will be instructed to conform his action to that of the British admiral.

[19935] No. 642.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 59. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, April 30, 1913.*

FRENCH Minister for Foreign Affairs told me this evening that the Italian Ambassador had informed him to-day that the Austro-Hungarian Government have given notice to the Italian Government, as by the Austro-Italian agreement they are bound to do, that unless the Powers shortly succeed in obtaining the withdrawal of the Montenegrins from Scutari Austro-Hungarian Government will act for themselves, either by the occupation of ports or by an advance of troops on Scutari.

Italian Ambassador here says that Italian Government will in either event take a pledge by the occupation of a port, which the French Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks will be Durazzo.

[19830] No. 643.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 28.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Salonica, April 30, 1913.*

TWO transports with Servian troops returning from Albania arrived last night; 22,000 men are expected.

Relations between the Greeks and the Servians are, however, somewhat less cordial.

[19917] No. 644.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 83.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, April 30, 1913.*

AUSTRIA and Montenegro.

Following is the position as viewed by the Italian Government this morning:—

They abide by their determination not to act with Austria alone in coercive measures, though quite ready to act if His Majesty's Government would co-operate, however small such co-operation might be. Nor will they agree to give Austria a mandate to act alone. Secretary-General informed me confidentially that Austria, if acting alone, would not confine operations to Scutari, but contemplated the occupation of Cettinjé. It is to obviate this eventuality, with all its ultimate consequences, that the Italian Government urge so strongly the co-operation of ourselves and France. The situation of Italy is very serious. She must hold to her agreement with Austria regarding Albania, but cannot contemplate without the greatest misgiving conditions which might be imposed after the occupation of Cettinjé. He added that their information was that Servia would not move if Austrian operations were confined to Scutari, but would support Montenegro if her territory was occupied by Austria.

[19775] No. 645.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 374.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, April 30, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 164 of 29th April.

Declaration was made by me at *réunion* on Monday, as stated in my telegram No. 365 of 28th April to you, but Russian Ambassador here has no doubt explained this already to Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[20040] No. 646.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 375.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 30, 1913.*

IT is clear that we are confronted by probability, if not certainty, that Austria will take separate action soon, and may do so at any moment. It is most important that Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs should decide what course he means to take. In view of impossibility of carrying international action further, and of provocative attitude of Montenegro, I do not see how this contingency can be averted, and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs will have to decide what his attitude will be after declaration to be made by Austrian Ambassador at *réunion* to-morrow.

I propose then to ask what measures it is proposed by Austria to take, and not to discuss matter further till we have this information. Meanwhile I have sent to Berlin, Vienna, and Rome the telegram repeated to you (No. 190 of 30th April to Berlin), of which you can inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 192.)

[19570] No. 647.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 189.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, April 30, 1913.*

ADMIRAL has asked whether transports should be allowed to take Turkish battery from San Giovanni di Medua to Durazzo. Please ascertain as soon as possible views of Government to which you are accredited whether this should be permitted.

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* Also to Sir E. Goschen (No. 188), Sir R. Rodd (No. 162), Sir G. Buchanan (No. 371), and Sir F. Cartwright (No. 158).

[20039] No. 648.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.**

(No. 190.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April* 30, 1913.

I UNDERSTAND that at *réunion* to-morrow Austrian Ambassador will announce that as no agreement about coercive measures to be taken, if the collective *démarche* at Cettinjé has no result, was reached at the last *réunion* the contingency mentioned by Austrian Ambassador on that occasion has arisen and Austria is obliged to reserve to herself the taking of measures to carry out the decision of the Powers.

I regard the situation as critical. It cannot be denied that the attitude of Montenegro has introduced provocative complications. As, however, there is complete agreement on the essential point that Scutari must go to Albania and that this result must be secured, the time (provided it be not too long a time) within which the result is secured is of less importance than the paramount necessity of preserving the concert of Europe.

I cannot say how far immediate separate action by Austria will imperil the concert; I am apprehensive of effect it may have upon public opinion in other countries, which will be a matter not of argument but of fact.

But if we are inevitably confronted by this contingency I would urge most careful consideration of the possibility that the measures adopted and the steps actually taken by any Power or Powers separately may make the whole difference to its effect upon public opinion in other countries and upon their Governments. If this point has not yet been considered by German Government, it ought to be taken into most careful consideration before actual steps are taken. I cannot speak with any certainty, but nothing should be neglected that contains even a chance of preserving the peace of Europe.

I have spoken in this sense to Italian, German, and Austrian Ambassadors, and when pressed to explain more precisely I observed that if a weak man trespassed upon the ground of someone else a much stronger man might be regarded as justified in turning him by force off the ground on which he was trespassing, but not in giving him a severe thrashing in his own house and even burning his house down.

I thought that the feeling of public opinion in this country was sure to be affected to some extent by such considerations.

(Addressed to Berlin, Vienna, and Rome; repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 373, and Paris, No. 191.)

[21005] No. 649.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 87.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April* 30, 1913.

RUSSIAN Ambassador informs me that, in view of possibility of separate action by Austria against Montenegro, Servia is to be advised by Russian Minister to make it clear that she has disinterested herself in the question of Scutari, and to advise King Nicholas to submit to the will of the Powers.

The object of this is to give Austria no pretext for fixing any responsibility upon Servia, and to prevent Servia from being involved in Austrian action.

Russian Ambassador asked that you should give similar advice at Belgrade, and you should do so.

Separate action by Austria seems only too probable, and it would be deplorable if Servia were involved.

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* Also to Sir F. Cartwright (No. 160), and Sir R. Rodd (No 164), *mutatis mutandis*.

[19483] No. 650.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 290.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 30, 1913.

COUNT MENSDORFF, at the meeting of the Ambassadors on the 25th April, wished Sir A. Nicolson to take down the following as the expression of the wishes of Count Berchtold:—

"Il importerait donc de prendre une résolution dans notre réunion d'aujourd'hui au sujet des mesures coercitives envers le Roi de Monténégro dans le cas qu'il ne donne pas de prompte réponse ou une réponse négative, ou bien, tout en faisant une déclaration satisfaisante, il retarde l'évacuation et la remise de Scutari.

"C'est seulement dans le cas qu'une décision dans ce sens soit prise par les Puissances dans le plus bref délai possible que nous pourrions encore attendre et nous abstenir de prendre en main nous-mêmes la tâche de mettre en exécution la volonté de l'Europe."

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[18576] No. 651.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 291.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 30, 1913.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 203 of the 22nd instant relative to the action to be taken for the protection of the interests of British and French holders of the Treasury bills issued by that bank and the Bank of Salonica on the 14th February, 1912.

Your Excellency should inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Ministers at Athens and Sophia have received instructions to consult their French colleagues on this subject and afterwards to discuss the matter with the Greek and Bulgarian Ministers for Foreign Affairs respectively.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[20242] No. 652.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 296.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 30, 1913.

I DISCUSSED with M. Cambon to-day the situation created by the communication that Count Mensdorff had made to me this morning of what he was to say at the *reunion* to-morrow.

We agreed that the only thing to be done at the moment would be to ask Count Mensdorff what measures Austria proposed to take.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[20243] No. 653.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 297.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 30, 1913.

THE French Ambassador informed me to-day that M. Pichon had telegraphed to support at St. Petersburgh the attitude that I had described at the last *réunion* as being that of the British Government and the line that I advocated.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Also to Sir E. Goschen (No. 144), Sir F. Cartwright (No. 91), Sir G. Buchanan (No. 174), and Sir R. Rodd (No. 118).

[18576] No. 654.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.**

(No. 37.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 30, 1913.*

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copies of correspondence with the National Bank of Turkey and with His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris,† relative to the action to be taken for the protection of the interests of British and French holders of the Treasury bills issued by that bank and the Bank of Salonica on the 14th February, 1912.

I have to request you to discuss the matter with the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs after consultation with your French colleague, who, as you will observe from Sir F. Bertie's despatch, has received instructions to take that course.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[20238] No. 655.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 122.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 30, 1913.*

THE Italian Ambassador gave me to-day the substance of several telegrams that he had received from his Government. They were to the effect that isolated action on the part of Austria was, the Italian Government thought, not yet justified. Montenegro might yet give in without isolated action. Compensation, however, could not be agreed to. It would be a bad precedent, encouraging other States to confront the Powers with a *fait accompli*. But, without mentioning compensation, it might be said to Montenegro that the Powers, after she had submitted about Scutari, would take the measures necessary for securing her welfare. The Ambassador drew a great distinction between an invasion of Montenegrin territory by Austria and operations by her directed against Scutari alone.

I said that I thought public opinion here, though not so closely affected either by race sentiment or geographical position as public opinion in Austria, Russia, and Italy, would disapprove of punitive measures taken by Austria against Montenegro. Public opinion here would not resent measures taken in the last resort, which could be considered reasonably necessary to uphold an agreement to which we had announced in Parliament that we were a party. The House of Commons had received this announcement at the time with general assent. Public opinion here would probably admit that the Montenegrins had been foolish and provocative, but it would urge that they were a small and elementary people, who had not had much training in good manners, and that, while it might be reasonable to go to Scutari and turn the Montenegrins out of the town, it would be unduly harsh to take punitive measures against them in their own territory.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[20239] No. 656.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 148.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 30, 1913.*

I SPOKE to the German Ambassador this afternoon as I had just spoken to the Italian Ambassador, and also in the sense of my telegram No. 190 of to-day to your Excellency.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Also to Sir H. Bax-Ironside (No. 58), *mutatis mutandis*.

† National Bank of Turkey, February 18; to ditto, February 26; National Bank of Turkey, March 3; ditto, March 5; ditto, March 19; ditto, March 19; ditto, March 27; to Sir F. Bertie, No. 229, April 4; Sir F. Bertie, No. 269, April 22; to ditto, No. 291, April 30, 1913.

[20240] No. 657.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F Cartwright.

(No. 96.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 30, 1913.*

I SPOKE to the Austrian Ambassador this afternoon in the same way as I had spoken to the Italian and German Ambassadors.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[20759] No. 658.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 100.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 30, 1913.*

COUNT MENSDORFF gave me verbally this morning some information, of which for convenience he left me the following record that he had prepared in great haste. He wished me to have it before the Cabinet meeting this morning.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 658.

Note communicated by Count Mensdorff, April 30, 1913.

CONSIDERING that an agreement about the coercive measures to be applied if the collective *démarche* at Cettinjé had no result, has not been reached at the last *réunion*, the contingency mentioned by me on that occasion has arisen, that we are obliged to reserve to ourselves to take measures to carry out the decisions of the Powers.

Concerning the objections of M. Cambon to disembarkation of troops, we think that such a manifestation—even without any fighting—might make it possible to King Nicholas to impress upon his people that he is obliged to yield. It would, however, of course, remain ineffective, if, as M. Sazonof suggested, it was declared beforehand that on no account one could go any further.

Though no decision about coercitive measures was taken at the last *réunion*, we still think we have some reason to hope that some Powers might decide to co-operate in the necessary action with us by land or by sea.

Concerning Sir E. Grey's idea to hold out the hope of "compensations raisonnables" to King Nicholas in case he gives way, we would make the following observations:—

Montenegro must first of all respect the decisions of the Powers and evacuate Scutari, without this constituting a claim for any compensation.

We have already repeatedly declared that we could not take into consideration any territorial compensations at the expense of the north and north-eastern frontier of Albania as definitely settled by the Powers.

Should the Powers, after the evacuation of Scutari, consider the moment come to offer to the exhausted kingdom some possibilities of economic existence we will reserve to ourselves to take part in these conversations.

I am instructed to tell Sir E. Grey that we would be very glad if other Powers would take part with us in the necessary action against Montenegro. We would welcome it most particularly if Sir E. Grey was in a position to inform the *réunion*, that we might count upon—at least—the naval co-operation of England.

We would attach all the more importance to this British assistance as it would facilitate it to Italy to co-operate in the action which would thus be given a more international character, a fact most highly desirable in the European interest.

[20241] No. 659.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 179.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 30, 1913.

I TOLD Count Benckendorff this afternoon that we should be confronted at the reunion to-morrow by the declaration that Count Mensdorff had told me he was instructed to make to us. I observed that the whole difference in the situation might depend upon what measures Austria intended to take, and that, if this was so, it would be very desirable that M. Sazonof should make it clear that this point was of importance. He had touched upon the point in conversation with your Excellency, as described in your telegram No. 164 of yesterday.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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